In re A.H.F.S. ( 2020 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 369A19
Filed 20 November 2020
IN THE MATTER OF: A.H.F.S., R.S.F.S., and C.F.S.
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) and on writ of certiorari
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(b) to review an order entered on 28 May 2019 by Judge
Mack Brittain in District Court, Henderson County. This matter was calendared for
argument in the Supreme Court on 7 October 2020 but determined on the record and
briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of the North Carolina Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
Susan F. Davis for petitioner-appellee Henderson County Department of Social
Services.
Katelyn Bailey Heath and Heather Williams Forshey for appellee Guardian ad
Litem.
Anné C. Wright for respondent-appellant father.
Mercedes O. Chut for respondent-appellant mother.
BEASLEY, Chief Justice.
Respondent-parents appeal from the trial court’s order terminating their
parental rights to A.H.F.S., R.S.F.S., and C.F.S.1 After careful review, we affirm.
1 The minor children A.H.F.S., R.S.F.S., and C.F.S. will be referred to throughout this
opinion as “Amy,” “Riley,” and “Charley,” which are pseudonyms used to protect the identity
of the juveniles and for ease of reading.
IN RE A.H.F.S., R.S.F.S., AND C.F.S.
Opinion of the Court
On 5 May 2016, the Henderson County Department of Social Services (DSS)
filed petitions alleging that Riley, a newborn, was a neglected and dependent juvenile,
and Charley, a one-year-old, was a neglected juvenile. DSS stated that Riley and
respondent-mother had tested positive for amphetamines at Riley’s birth, and
respondent-mother had admitted to using an unknown substance twice in the days
leading up to Riley’s birth. DSS further claimed that Charley, along with respondent-
mother, had also tested positive for drugs when he was born in 2014. DSS alleged
that respondent-mother had untreated bipolar and anxiety disorders and claimed
that, while respondent-mother was still at the hospital, a social worker observed her
“acting erratically, acting anxious, speaking very fast and repeating herself.” Because
of respondent-mother’s behavior, the hospital would not allow respondent-mother to
be with Riley unsupervised.
Respondent-mother left the hospital on 2 May 2016 against the advice of
doctors because she stated she wanted a cigarette. Riley remained at the hospital,
and respondent-mother visited only once after leaving. Respondent-father also visited
Riley only once while she was at the hospital. Both respondents refused to take a drug
screen offered by the social worker. DSS asserted that because of respondent-mother’s
history and current substance abuse and due to respondent-father’s long work hours
neither parent could properly supervise or care for Riley or Charley. DSS stated that
a babysitter was watching Charley while respondent-father worked, but the
babysitter could not also watch Riley. DSS further claimed that neither of the
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respondents could identify an appropriate family member or friend who could care
for the two juveniles. Accordingly, DSS obtained nonsecure custody of Riley.
A nonsecure custody hearing was held on 12 May 2016. DSS filed a
supplemental petition claiming that Charley was at risk because respondent-father
was allowing respondent-mother to care for Charley without supervision. DSS
asserted that respondent-mother had unaddressed substance abuse and mental
health issues and had refused to demonstrate sobriety by complying with drug
screens. DSS obtained nonsecure custody of Charley.
On 2 August 2016, the trial court adjudicated Riley a neglected and dependent
juvenile and Charley a neglected juvenile. On the same date, the trial court entered
a separate dispositional order granting legal custody of the juveniles to respondents
subject to “strict and complete compliance” with requirements set forth in the order.
On 21 February 2017, DSS filed new petitions alleging that Riley was a
neglected and dependent juvenile and that Charley and newborn Amy were neglected
juveniles. DSS alleged that Amy had been born approximately ten to twelve weeks
premature but that it was difficult to determine her exact gestational age at birth
because respondent-mother did not receive any prenatal care. At her birth, both Amy
and respondent-mother tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamines.
On 17 March 2017, DSS filed a supplement to Amy’s juvenile petition. DSS
stated that Amy was still in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit, was being fed through
a feeding tube, and had problems with her heart rate dropping. DSS further stated
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that respondents, or any potential caregivers for Amy, would need to receive special
training in order to understand and identify the special needs of a premature baby.
DSS claimed, however, that respondents had not received this training because
respondent-mother had visited with Amy only twice since her birth, and respondent-
father had not visited Amy since 25 February 2017. DSS additionally alleged that
respondent-mother would not allow the social worker into the residence to observe its
condition, and respondent-mother had refused drug screens requested by DSS on 9
February 2017 and 10 March 2017. Accordingly, DSS obtained nonsecure custody of
Amy. Riley and Charley remained in respondents’ home.
An adjudicatory hearing was held on 6 July 2017. On 3 August 2017, the trial
court entered an order adjudicating Riley, Charley, and Amy neglected juveniles. On
the same date, the trial court entered a separate dispositional order in which it
granted legal custody of all three juveniles to DSS and authorized DSS to place the
children in foster care. The trial court granted respondents supervised visitation. To
achieve reunification, both parents were ordered to, inter alia, obtain mental health
and substance abuse services, maintain appropriate housing, ensure that the
children received appropriate evaluations, and comply with recommendations from
those evaluations.
On 15 November 2017, the trial court set the primary permanent plan for the
juveniles as reunification and the secondary plan as termination of parental rights
and adoption. On 23 August 2018, the trial court held a permanency planning review
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hearing. In an order entered 8 October 2018, the trial court found that respondents
had failed to complete the requirements for reunification. The court determined that
the juveniles’ return home within six months was unlikely, reunification efforts would
be unsuccessful or inconsistent with the health or safety of the juveniles, and
adoption should be pursued. Accordingly, the trial court changed the primary
permanent plan for the juveniles to termination of parental rights and subsequent
adoption with a secondary permanent plan of reunification or custody/guardianship
with a third party. The trial court further ordered that DSS should not file a petition
or motion to terminate parental rights until the results of an Interstate Compact on
the Placement of Children (ICPC) home study on a relative were known.
On 19 December 2018, DSS filed a motion to terminate respondents’ parental
rights pursuant to neglect and willful failure to make reasonable progress. See
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (2) (2019). On 28 May 2019, the trial court entered an
order terminating respondents’ parental rights based on the grounds alleged in the
petition.
On 27 June 2019, respondents gave timely notice of appeal pursuant to
N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-27(a)(5) and 7B-1001(a1)(1).
Respondents first argue that the trial court erred by concluding that grounds
existed to terminate their parental rights. A termination of parental rights
proceeding consists of an adjudicatory stage and a dispositional stage. N.C.G.S. §§
7B-1109, -1110 (2019). At the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner bears the burden of
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proving by “clear, cogent, and convincing evidence” the existence of one or more
grounds for termination under section 7B-1111(a) of our General Statutes. N.C.G.S.
§ 7B-1109(f) (2019). We review a trial court’s adjudication “to determine whether the
findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the findings
support the conclusions of law.” In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 111 (1984) (citing
In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 404, (1982)). If the petitioner meets its burden during the
adjudicatory stage, “the court proceeds to the dispositional stage, at which the court
must consider whether it is in the best interests of the juvenile to terminate parental
rights.” In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 842 (2016) (citing In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247
(1997); N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110).
“[A]n adjudication of any single ground in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) is sufficient
to support a termination of parental rights.” In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 395 (2019).
We begin our analysis with consideration of whether grounds existed pursuant to
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) to terminate respondents’ parental rights. This section
provides that the court may terminate parental rights if “[t]he parent has willfully
left the juvenile in foster care . . . for more than [twelve] months without showing to
the satisfaction of the court that reasonable progress under the circumstances has
been made in correcting those conditions which led to the removal of the juvenile.”
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2).
Termination under this ground requires the trial court to
perform a two-step analysis where it must determine by
clear, cogent, and convincing evidence whether (1) a child
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has been willfully left by the parent in foster care or
placement outside the home for over twelve months, and
(2) the parent has not made reasonable progress under the
circumstances to correct the conditions which led to the
removal of the child.
In re Z.A.M., 374 N.C. 88, 95 (2020).
Respondents do not contest that the juveniles have been in placement outside
of their home for more than twelve months. Instead, respondents contend they made
reasonable progress towards correcting the conditions which led to their removal. We
disagree.
We first address the conditions that led to the removal of the juveniles. The
trial court’s finding of fact 21 states that the juveniles were adjudicated neglected
and removed from respondents’ care in 2017 “due to domestic violence between the
parents, the mother’s substance abuse, the conditions and safety of the home, the
mother’s mental health and the juvenile’s medical needs which need to be addressed.”
Respondent-mother contends that this finding is inaccurate because the 2017
adjudicatory order contains no findings regarding domestic violence. We agree. The
adjudicatory order entered on 3 August 2017 does not mention domestic violence as
an issue necessitating the filing of the juvenile petition and removal of the juveniles
from respondents’ home. Thus, we will not consider that portion of finding of fact 21
that states the juveniles were removed from respondents’ care due to domestic
violence.
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Respondent-mother also contends that the only conditions which led to the
juveniles’ removal were: (1) her positive drug test at Amy’s birth; and (2) the unsafe
and cluttered condition of her home shortly before Amy’s birth. She claims the
remaining conditions cited in finding of fact 21 and described in the adjudicatory
order existed throughout the 2016 case in which the juveniles were not removed from
her home, and thus these conditions were not a proximate cause of their removal in
2017. We are not persuaded.
In the 2017 adjudicatory order, the trial court cited respondent-mother’s
substance abuse and untreated mental health issues, the unsafe condition of
respondents’ home, and Riley’s and Charley’s physical, emotional and developmental
issues that were not being addressed by respondents as grounds for removal. The
trial court also noted that respondent-mother was the primary caregiver for the
juveniles, and respondent-father’s long work hours prevented him from contributing
to childcare or the upkeep of the home. Respondent-mother did not appeal from the
trial court’s adjudicatory order and is bound by the doctrine of collateral estoppel from
relitigating this issue. See In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 409 (2019) (stating that because
the challenged facts were necessary to the determination in a prior adjudicatory order
and the mother did not appeal from that adjudicatory order, she was bound by the
doctrine of collateral estoppel from relitigating the findings of fact) (citing King v.
Grindstaff, 284 N.C. 348, 356 (1973)). Respondent-mother cannot now contend that
these issues did not lead to the juveniles’ removal.
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Opinion of the Court
We next address respondent-mother’s failure to correct the conditions which
led to the juveniles’ removal. The trial court found that respondent-mother: (1) failed
to complete individual substance abuse therapy as recommended by her
Comprehensive Clinical Assessment; (2) failed to submit to forty-three of fifty-six
requested drug screens and tested positive for methamphetamines on 1 April 2019
and 15 April 2019; (3) was convicted of two counts of Felony Possession of a Schedule
II controlled substance in March 2019 with the dates of the offenses being 20
November 2018 and 28 February 2019; (4) was diagnosed with severe bipolar disorder
and failed to address these issues in therapy as recommended by her Comprehensive
Clinical Assessment; (5) failed to demonstrate skills learned in parenting classes; (6)
failed to attend seventeen of twenty-eight medical/dental appointments for the
juveniles and failed to ensure that the medical, dental, and developmental need of
the juveniles are being met; and (7) failed to provide a safe and appropriate home for
the juveniles.
Respondent-mother contends that there was insufficient evidence to support
the trial court’s finding that her home was unsafe. She further argues that her
admission that the home was unsafe, cited by the trial court in finding of fact 35,
occurred over a year before the termination hearing and was both stale and an
improper recitation of testimony. We disagree. Respondent-mother refused to let
social workers into the home on numerous occasions, thus preventing social workers
from determining whether the conditions of the home had improved. When
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respondent-mother did allow social workers inside the home, they reported little
improvement. On 7 July 2018, the guardian ad litem reported to the trial court that
“[t]here has been marginal improvement in the cleanliness and safety of the house.”
On 23 August 2018, a social worker reported to the court that while she had observed
some progress during recent visits, “the home consistently has extreme clutter, safety
hazards throughout the home such as cleaning chemicals, motor oil bottles on the
ground, choking hazards as well as trash throughout the home.” Thus, the trial court
could reasonably infer from these continuing conditions that the home was still
unsafe.
Respondent-mother additionally challenges as not being supported by the
evidence the portion of finding of fact 36 which states that while she completed
parenting class, she failed to demonstrate the ability to provide proper care for the
juveniles. We are not persuaded. The social worker testified at the termination
hearing concerning respondent-mother’s inability to meet the juveniles’ needs. The
social worker noted that immediately following a conversation with the pediatrician
that Amy was lactose intolerant, respondent-mother offered the children regular
milk, and social workers were forced to intervene. Moreover, respondent-mother was
invited to attend the juveniles’ medical and dental appointments. Of the twenty-eight
appointments to which she was invited, she did not attend seventeen of those
appointments. Considering the fact that each of the juveniles has special needs, the
trial court could reasonably infer that respondent-mother has not demonstrated the
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ability to provide proper care for the juveniles when she missed over half of the
juveniles’ medical appointments.
Respondent-mother argues that finding of fact 39, that she failed to ensure the
medical, dental, and developmental needs of the juveniles were being met, is
erroneous. Respondent-mother asserts that she did not have legal custody of the
juveniles and thus had no ability to ensure these needs were being met. e disagree.
All three juveniles have special needs. To address the juveniles’ special needs, the
trial court ordered respondent-mother to attend medical, dental, and developmental
appointments. Respondent-mother does not challenge the trial court’s findings that
she failed to attend numerous appointments. Thus, again, we conclude the trial court
could properly infer that respondent-mother failed to ensure the juveniles’ medical,
dental, and developmental needs were being met.
The trial court could reasonably conclude that respondent-mother’s continuing
unaddressed substance abuse issues, the unsafe condition of the home, and
respondent-mother’s failure to attend medical and developmental appointments for
the juveniles, evidenced a failure to correct the conditions that led to the removal of
the juveniles.
Respondent-mother contends that the trial court failed to find that she had the
ability to make progress regarding the conditions of removal by making a finding of
willfulness. However, the trial court made this required finding in its conclusions of
law when it determined that respondent-mother had “willfully” failed to make
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reasonable progress. Although set forth in the conclusions of law, the trial court’s
determination of willfulness was an ultimate finding of fact. Regardless of whether
this finding is classified as an ultimate finding of fact or a conclusion of law, it still
must be sufficiently supported by the evidentiary findings of fact. See In re Z.A.M.,
374 N.C. at 97 (stating that this Court reviews termination orders “to determine
whether the trial court made sufficient factual findings to support its ultimate
findings of fact and conclusions of law, regardless of how they are classified in the
order”). Here, we conclude that the trial court’s conclusion that respondent-mother
willfully failed to make reasonable progress is supported by clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence and sufficient evidentiary findings of fact. Accordingly, we hold
that grounds existed pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) to terminate respondent-
mother’s parental rights.
We next address respondent-father’s willful failure to correct the conditions
which led to the juveniles’ removal. Respondent-father contends that he completed a
majority of the requirements of his case plan and thus made reasonable progress.
While respondent-father did make progress on several requirements of his case plan,
we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that his progress did not
constitute reasonable progress under the circumstances of this case.
Regarding respondent-father, the trial court made the following pertinent
findings of fact:
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34. The conditions of the home led to the removal of the
juveniles. The Social Worker has been to the home 21 times
and has been denied access to the home 9 times. The Social
Worker has observed the home and yard to be extremely
cluttered with safety hazards and trash in the home and
yard. On April 17, 2019 the Social Worker went to the home
and was denied access to the inside of the home by the
mother who said the house was trashed.
35. Both the mother and father have discussed numerous
times that items and money have been stolen from the
home. The mother has acknowledged to the Social Worker
that the home is not safe for the juveniles.
....
47. The father continues to reside with the mother. The
condition of the home is not appropriate for the juveniles.
48. The father completed parenting classes but has failed
to demonstrate benefit from those classes.
49. The father has failed to ensure that the juveniles’
medical, dental and developmental needs are being met. Of
the 28 times the father was invited to the juveniles’
appointment, he was a no show 18 times, even though
[DSS] would notify the father months in advance to the
date and time of the appointments.
Respondent-father contends that finding of fact 34 is not specific enough
regarding when the clutter and safety hazards were observed. However, as noted
previously herein, a social worker and the guardian ad litem raised concerns about
the state of the home. Accordingly, we conclude this finding of fact was supported by
clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.
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Respondent-father challenges finding of fact 48, claiming that the trial court’s
determination that he “failed to demonstrate benefit” from parenting classes was not
supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. Respondent-father cites reports
from DSS and the guardian ad litem which he claims demonstrated his progress.
However, a social worker testified the respondents have had multiple meetings with
the children’s therapists, during which the therapists discussed recommendations for
respondents to follow during visits to address each child’s needs. Neither respondent
has followed through with those recommendations. Additionally, respondent-father
would engage in arguments with respondent-mother and would repeatedly tell her to
“shut up” in the presence of the juveniles. Accordingly, we conclude there was clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence to support this finding of fact.
Respondent-father also challenges finding of fact 49 and argues that he
attended over a third of the juveniles’ appointments and “took no actions to impede
[DSS] in getting the children’s needs met.” Respondent-father claims that this
constitutes reasonable progress. We disagree. Respondent-father, along with
respondent-mother, were ordered to attend the juveniles’ medical, dental, and
developmental appointments. As discussed previously, the juveniles all have special
needs, and it was important that respondents attend these appointments to be
educated regarding these special needs and to comply with treatment
recommendations for the juveniles. As found by the trial court, respondent-father
failed to attend a majority of the appointments even though he was given notification
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months in advance of the date and time of the appointments. Even when respondent-
father attended appointments, a social worker testified that he was unable to follow
through with treatment recommendations. Thus, we conclude that clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence supports the trial court’s finding that respondent-father missed
numerous appointments, and the trial court could reasonably infer that respondent-
father failed to ensure that the juveniles’ medical, dental, and developmental needs
were being met.
The trial court also made several findings demonstrating respondent-father’s
compliance with his case plan and efforts to correct the conditions that led to the
juveniles’ removal. The trial court found as fact that respondent-father completed
individual therapy, “did what he could to complete couple’s therapy,” and had
attended scheduled visitation with the juveniles. Despite these findings
demonstrating that respondent-father made some progress, we conclude that
respondent-father had not remedied the primary conditions which led to the removal
of the juveniles. As noted by the trial court, respondents continue to reside together,
and their primary residence is still unsafe.
Respondent-father argues that the trial court erroneously based its
determination that grounds existed to terminate his parental rights largely based on
his continuing relationship with respondent-mother. As discussed above, it is
apparent that the trial court considered ample evidence independent of his
relationship with respondent-mother.
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Because the trial court’s conclusion that a ground for termination existed
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) is sufficient in and of itself to support
termination of respondents’ parental rights, we need not address respondents’
arguments regarding N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 413.
We next consider respondents’ arguments concerning disposition. If the trial
court finds grounds to terminate parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a), it
proceeds to the dispositional stage where it must “determine whether terminating
the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best interest” based on the following factors:
(1) The age of the juvenile.
(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile.
(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in
the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the
juvenile.
(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent.
(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and
the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or
other permanent placement.
(6) Any relevant consideration.
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019). The trial court’s assessment of a juvenile’s best
interests at the dispositional stage is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. In re
D.L.W., 368 N.C. at 842. “Abuse of discretion results where the court’s ruling is
manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the
result of a reasoned decision.” State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285 (1988).
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We initially note that the trial court properly considered the statutory factors
set forth in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) when determining the juveniles’ best interests. The
trial court made uncontested findings: (1) regarding the age of the juveniles; (2) that
adoption of each juvenile was likely; (3) that termination of respondents’ parental
rights would aid in the permanent plan of adoption; (4) that Charley had a strong
bond with respondents, but Riley and Amy did not; (5) that the juveniles were bonded
to their prospective foster parents; (6) that the foster parents were providing for the
juveniles’ special needs; and (7) that the proposed adoptive parents had agreed to
allow the juveniles to visit with each other on a regular basis. Because respondents
do not challenge these dispositional findings, they are binding on appeal. In re Z.L.W.,
372 N.C. 432, 437 (2019).
Respondent-father argues that it was not in Riley’s and Amy’s best interests
that his parental rights be terminated without first considering the results of an
ICPC home study previously ordered by the court at the 23 August 2018 permanency
planning review hearing. Respondent-father further claims that it was not in
Charley’s best interests to terminate his parental rights given the strong bond
between himself and Charley. Lastly, respondent-father contends that while Riley
and Amy did not have a strong bond with respondents because all three juveniles
were living in different prospective adoptive homes, it was not in Riley’s and Amy’s
best interests that respondent-father’s parental rights be terminated because it
eliminated the potential for them to live together as a family. We are not persuaded.
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First, although the trial court found that Charley was strongly bonded to
respondents, this Court has recognized that “the bond between parent and child is
just one of the factors to be considered under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a), and the trial
court is permitted to give greater weight to other factors.” In re Z.L.W., 372 N.C. at
437. Based on the trial court’s consideration of the other factors and given the
respondent’s lack of progress in his case plan, this Court concluded in In re Z.L.W.
that “the trial court’s determination that other factors outweighed [the] respondent’s
strong bond with [the juveniles] was not manifestly unsupported by reason.” Id. at
438. Similarly, here, we conclude that the trial court’s determination that other
factors outweighed respondents’ strong bond with Charley was not an abuse of
discretion.
Second, while the trial court had previously ordered that DSS wait to file a
petition to terminate respondents’ parental rights pending an ICPC home study in
Virginia, and termination of respondents’ parental rights precluded the three
juveniles living together as a family unit, we have explained in Z.L.W.:
[w]hile the stated policy of the Juvenile Code is to prevent
“the unnecessary or inappropriate separation of juveniles
from their parents,” N.C.G.S. § 7B-100(4) (2017), we note
that “the best interests of the juvenile are of paramount
consideration by the court and . . . when it is not in the
juvenile’s best interest to be returned home, the juvenile
will be placed in a safe, permanent home within a
reasonable amount of time,” id. § 7B-100(5) (2017)
(emphasis added); see also In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. at
109, (emphasizing that “the fundamental principle
underlying North Carolina’s approach to controversies
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involving child neglect and custody [is] that the best
interest of the child is the polar star”).
Id. at 438. Consequently, in In re Z.L.W., we held the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in determining termination, rather than guardianship, was in the best
interests of the juveniles. Id.
In the instant case, as in In re Z.L.W., the trial court’s findings of fact
demonstrate that it considered the dispositional factors set forth in N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1110(a) and “performed a reasoned analysis weighing those factors.” In re Z.A.M., 374
N.C. at 101. Thus, while consideration of placement alternatives and preserving
family integrity is an appropriate consideration in the dispositional portion of the
termination hearing, the best interests of the juveniles remain paramount.
Accordingly, “[b]ecause the trial court made sufficient dispositional findings and
performed the proper analysis of the dispositional factors,” id., we conclude the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that termination of respondent-
father’s parental rights was in the juveniles’ best interests.
Respondent-mother’s argument concerning disposition is contingent on
respondent-father’s retention of his parental rights. Respondent-mother claims that
respondent-father substantially complied with his case plan and was a fit parent, and
thus the trial court abused its discretion by determining that termination of their
parental rights was in the juveniles’ best interests. However, because we have
already determined that the trial court properly terminated respondent-father’s
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parental rights, these arguments are now moot. We therefore hold that the trial
court’s conclusion that termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights was in the
juveniles’ best interests did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
In summary, we conclude that the trial court did not err in its determination
that grounds existed pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) to terminate respondents’
parental rights. We further conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by determining that termination of respondents’ parental rights was in the juveniles’
best interests. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating respondents’
parental rights.
AFFIRMED.
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