In re S.J.B. ( 2020 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 409A19
Filed 25 September 2020
IN THE MATTER OF: S.J.B.
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from order entered on 24 July
2019 by Judge Andrea F. Dray in District Court, Buncombe County. This matter was
calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 29 July 2020 but was determined
on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of the North
Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Hanna Frost Honeycutt for petitioner-appellee Buncombe County Department
of Health and Human Services.
Jackson M. Pitts for Guardian ad Litem.
David A. Perez for respondent-appellant mother.
BEASLEY, Chief Justice.
Respondent, the mother of S.J.B. (Susan)1, appeals from the trial court’s
24 July 2019 order terminating her parental rights. The issue before the Court is
whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding and concluding that it was in
Susan’s best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights. We hold the trial
court did not abuse its discretion and affirm the trial court’s order.
1 Pseudonyms are used throughout the opinion for ease of reading and to protect the
juvenile’s identity.
IN RE S.J.B.
Opinion of the Court
On 24 October 2017, the Buncombe County Department of Social Services
(DSS) received a child protective services report alleging neglect. After a two-month
investigation, DSS filed a petition alleging Susan was a neglected and dependent
juvenile. DSS alleged respondent: (1) was suffering from untreated mental health
conditions that kept her from being able to get out of bed; (2) was resistant to
receiving treatment for her mental health issues; (3) refused a higher level of mental
health treatment for Susan’s half-brother, Eric, because she did not want people
coming into her home; (4) took Eric off of his prescribed mental health medication,
which led to behavioral issues at school; (5) neglected Eric’s dental needs; (6) had a
history of substance abuse; (7) was on probation for driving while impaired;
(8) refused to work with DSS to create a full case plan; (9) refused to submit to hair
follicle tests for illicit substances; (10) refused to allow Eric and Susan to submit to a
hair follicle test to determine if they had been exposed to illegal substances; (11) failed
to submit to a Comprehensive Clinical Assessment (CCA); (12) was impaired during
an unannounced home visit; (13) had illicit drugs and drug paraphernalia in her
home; and (14) had been arrested and charged with felony possession of heroin,
possession of a Schedule IV controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia,
and child abuse.
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IN RE S.J.B.
Opinion of the Court
DSS obtained non-secure custody of Susan and Eric and placed them in foster
care, but Eric was ultimately returned to his father’s custody.2 Respondent’s mother
was approved as a placement for Susan on 20 February 2018. In early March 2018,
DSS received reports alleging drug use by Susan’s grandmother while Susan was
residing in the home. On 13 March 2018 Susan’s grandmother admitted that, if tested
at that time, she would test positive for multiple illicit substances, and multiple
people had smoked crack cocaine in the home while Susan was asleep in her bedroom.
Based on these statements, DSS removed Susan from her grandmother’s home and
placed her with her original foster parents.
After a hearing on 4 April 2018, the trial court entered an order on 10 May
2018 adjudicating Susan to be a neglected and dependent juvenile. The court
continued custody of Susan with DSS and granted respondent supervised visitation
with Susan for one hour each week. The court also ordered respondent to, in part: (1)
complete a CCA and follow all recommendations; (2) engage in medication
management; (3) complete random drug screens within twenty-four hours of request;
(4) engage in a parenting program and exhibit appropriate discipline and parenting
during visits with Susan; (5) obtain stable housing; (6) address pending criminal
charges and accumulate no additional charges; and (7) complete “SOAR Court” intake
and engage in treatment if deemed appropriate.
2 Susan and Eric have different biological fathers. The identity of Susan’s father is
unknown.
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IN RE S.J.B.
Opinion of the Court
After a 5 June 2018 hearing, the trial court entered an initial permanency
planning and review order on 23 July 2018. The court found respondent had not made
any efforts to complete a CCA or to address her mental health needs. She had
submitted to an initial hair follicle drug screen but did not complete her last
requested drug screen and had not engaged in any programs to assist her in her
sobriety. Respondent still had pending criminal charges, had not been cooperative
with DSS, and was homeless and unwilling to utilize shelters. The court continued
custody of Susan with DSS and set Susan’s primary permanent plan as reunification,
with a secondary permanent plan of adoption.
The trial court conducted a subsequent permanency planning and review
hearing on 28 September 2018 and entered its order from that hearing on 24 October
2018. The court found respondent completed a CCA on 17 July 2018 but had not
followed through with most of the recommendations from the assessment. She
continued to refuse to complete requested drug screens and did not report substance
abuse as an issue when she completed her CCA. Respondent was consistent with
attending visitations but struggled with exhibiting appropriate behavior during
them. She had been living with Susan’s grandmother and had obtained a job. The
court continued Susan’s primary and secondary permanent plans as reunification and
adoption and ordered DSS to complete any steps necessary to finalize the plans.
A third permanency planning and review hearing was set for 9 January 2019,
but in early January 2019, respondent overdosed on Fentanyl and entered an
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IN RE S.J.B.
Opinion of the Court
inpatient treatment detox and rehabilitation program after she was released from
the hospital. The trial court continued the hearing until February by order entered
10 January 2019 because respondent was in inpatient treatment. Respondent,
however, failed to complete the program and was discharged. In its order from the
continued hearing, the trial court set the primary permanent plan for Susan as
adoption and the secondary permanent plan as reunification.
Subsequently, DSS filed a petition to terminate parental rights on 28 January
2019, alleging grounds as to respondent of neglect, willful failure to correct the
conditions that led to Susan’s removal from her home, and failure to pay a reasonable
portion of the cost of Susan’s care while Susan was in DSS custody. See N.C.G.S. §
7B-1111(a)(1)–(3) (2019). After a hearing on 12 July 2019, the trial court entered an
order terminating respondent’s parental rights on 24 July 2019.3 The court concluded
all three grounds alleged by DSS existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights
and that termination of her parental rights was in Susan’s best interests. Respondent
appealed the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights, arguing that the trial
court abused its discretion in concluding that terminating respondent’s rights was in
Susan’s best interest. We disagree.
Termination of parental rights proceedings consist of two stages: adjudication
and disposition. N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109, -1110 (2019); In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101,
3 The order also terminated the parental rights of Susan’s unknown father.
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IN RE S.J.B.
Opinion of the Court
110, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984). At the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner must prove
by “clear, cogent, and convincing evidence” that one or more grounds for termination
exist under section 7B-1111(a) of our General Statutes. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(e), (f)
(2019). If the petitioner proves at least one ground for termination during the
adjudicatory stage, “the court proceeds to the dispositional stage, at which the court
must consider whether it is in the best interests of the juvenile to terminate parental
rights.” In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 842, 788 S.E.2d 162, 167 (2016) (citing In re
Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247, 485 S.E.2d 612, 614–15 (1997); N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110)). In
making the best interest determination,
the court shall consider the following criteria and make
written findings regarding the following that are relevant:
(1) The age of the juvenile.
(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile.
(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in
the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile.
(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent.
(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and
the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other
permanent placement.
(6) Any relevant consideration.
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110. “We review this decision on an abuse of discretion standard[.]”
In re L.M.T., 367 N.C. 165, 171, 752 S.E.2d 453, 457 (2013). “An ‘[a]buse of discretion
results where the court’s ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary
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IN RE S.J.B.
Opinion of the Court
that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.’ ” In re T.L.H., 368 N.C.
101, 107, 772 S.E.2d 451, 455 (2015) (quoting State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372
S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988)).
The trial court made the following findings of fact addressing each of the
factors in section 7B-1110(a):
2. The minor child is five years old.
3. The minor child has been placed in her current foster
home since June 1, 2018.
4. The minor child is strongly bonded with [her] foster
parents and identifies them as her parents. The
relationship is stable, predictable and loving.
5. The minor child is strongly bonded with the other
children in the home.
6. The minor child has a half sibling in Florida. The foster
parents have made two trips with the minor child to visit
her half sibling and facilitate weekly face time
communication.
7. The foster parents have a strong relationship with the
maternal grandmother. They have invited her to
extracurricular events for the minor child.
8. The foster parents have expressed their desire to adopt
the minor child.
9. The minor child has an inconsistent and diminishing
bond with the respondent mother. The minor child has
expressed worries about returning to the care of
respondent mother.
...
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IN RE S.J.B.
Opinion of the Court
11. The maternal grandmother previously had placement
of the minor child, but the minor child was removed from
the maternal grandmother’s home after another member of
the maternal grandmother’s household was abusing drugs.
The [c]ourt in the underlying juvenile case has not
reconsidered placement in the maternal grandmother’s
household. The maternal grandmother has not attended
court previous to this hearing to request placement.
12. The likelihood of adoption is high.
13. The minor child’s permanent plan is adoption and,
therefore, the parental rights of the respondent mother . . .
must be terminated in order to accomplish that plan.
14. The only barrier to adoption is termination of parental
rights.
Respondent does not challenge these findings, and they are thus binding on appeal.
In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 395, 831 S.E.2d 49, 54 (2019) (citing Koufman v. Koufman,
330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991) (holding that unchallenged findings of
fact made at the adjudicatory stage are binding on appeal)).
Instead, respondent argues that the trial court did not make several findings
of fact regarding evidence at the hearing she believes the court should have
considered in determining Susan’s best interests. She contends the court should have
made findings regarding: (1) her future plan to enter a residential twelve-month drug
rehabilitation program; (2) the potential for Susan to reside with her after she
completed three to six months of the rehabilitation program; (3) Susan’s relationship
with her half-brother, Eric, and whether that relationship would continue if she were
adopted; and (4) Susan’s bond with her maternal grandmother and her potential
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IN RE S.J.B.
Opinion of the Court
placement with her grandmother. She further argues the trial court’s lack of
dispositional findings regarding these circumstances show that it failed to properly
weigh the competing goals of preserving Susan’s ties to her biological family and
achieving permanence for Susan through severing those ties in favor of adoption. See
In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3, 11–12, 832 S.E.2d 698, 703–04 (2019). These arguments are
misplaced.
Respondent does not identify any conflict in the evidence that would require
the trial court to make specific findings addressing the factual basis for her
arguments. We have held,
[a]lthough the trial court must consider all of the factors in
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a), it “is only required to make written
findings regarding those factors that are relevant.” “A
factor is relevant if there is conflicting evidence concerning
the factor, such that it is placed in issue by virtue of the
evidence presented before the district court.”
In re C.J.C., 374 N.C. 42, 48, 839 S.E.2d 742, 747 (2020) (quoting In re A.R.A., 373
N.C. 190, 199, 835 S.E.2d 417, 424 (2019)); see also In re S.D.C., 373 N.C. 285, 290,
837 S.E.2d 854, 858 (2020) (holding the same when considering any “relevant
consideration” pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(6)).
Respondent testified she had “looked into” attending a year-long drug
rehabilitation program that may have allowed Susan to live with her after three to
six months of participation in the program. Respondent’s mere intention to
participate in a drug rehabilitation program, however, had very limited relevance to
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IN RE S.J.B.
Opinion of the Court
Susan’s best interests, particularly given that respondent’s rights were terminated,
in part, because of respondent’s history of relapse and failure to complete drug
rehabilitation programs.
Respondent’s argument that the trial court did not make findings regarding
Susan’s bond with her maternal grandmother and her potential placement with her
grandmother is likewise without merit. It was uncontested that Susan had a bond
with her grandmother, and her grandmother believed that bond to be strong. The
grandmother also testified she was in a different emotional position than when Susan
was removed from her care, was able to set boundaries, had cut ties with the sister
whose cocaine use led to Susan’s removal from her care, and was financially able to
take care of Susan. Nevertheless, the trial court found that while the foster parents
have a strong relationship with the grandmother, the grandmother had not
previously appeared in court to request that Susan be placed with her.
Likewise, the trial court considered Susan’s relationship with Eric. It was also
uncontested that Susan had a bond with her half-brother. The court found that
Susan’s foster parents had taken two trips to Florida to allow Susan to spend time
with Eric and continued weekly face time communication.
The trial court’s unchallenged findings show it considered Susan’s bond with
Eric and her maternal grandmother and her maternal grandmother’s potential as a
possible placement option for Susan in making its best interest determination. Thus,
while Susan’s foster parents could potentially cease contact with Susan’s
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IN RE S.J.B.
Opinion of the Court
grandmother and half-brother after the adoption is complete, it is the province of the
trial court to weigh the evidence before it and “this Court lacks the authority to
reweigh the evidence that was before the trial court.” In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. at 12,
832 S.E.2d at 704. Thus, we hold the trial court made sufficient dispositional findings
regarding Susan’s bond with her maternal grandmother and half-brother in light of
the evidence before it.
The trial court’s dispositional findings show it considered the relevant
statutory criteria of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) and that the court weighed the competing
goals of preserving Susan’s ties to her biological family and achieving permanence for
Susan through adoption. This Court is satisfied with the trial court’s conclusion that
termination of respondent’s rights was in Susan’s best interest. Therefore, we affirm
the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights.
AFFIRMED.
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