In re L.T. ( 2020 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 274A19
Filed 5 June 2020
IN THE MATTER OF: L.T.
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on
22 March 2019 by Judge Aretha V. Blake in District Court, Mecklenburg County.
This matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 18 May 2020 but
determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of
the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Keith T. Roberson for petitioner-appellee Mecklenburg County Department of
Social Services.
Matthew D. Wunsche, GAL Appellate Counsel, for appellee Guardian ad Litem.
J. Thomas Diepenbrock for respondent-appellant father.
BEASLEY, Chief Justice.
Respondent-father appeals from the trial court’s order terminating his
parental rights to his daughter, Laurie.1 After careful consideration of respondent-
father’s challenge to the trial court’s jurisdiction, we affirm the termination order.
On 17 March 2017, the Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services
(DSS) filed a petition alleging that Laurie was a neglected and dependent juvenile.
The petition also alleged that Laurie’s mother lived in Ohio and that Laurie lived
1 Pseudonyms are used to protect the identity of the juvenile and for ease of reading.
IN RE L.T.
Opinion of the Court
with respondent-father in Charlotte, North Carolina. DSS believed Laurie was at a
substantial risk of injury if she remained in respondent-father’s care.
On 12 June 2017, the trial court entered a continuance order. It found that
prior to the scheduled adjudication hearing on 23 May 2017, respondent-father’s
attorney and the guardian ad litem (GAL) attorney advocate informed the court that
Laurie had not lived in North Carolina for six months before the juvenile petition was
filed and that there appeared to be a valid custody order from Delaware in effect that
granted sole custody to respondent-father. The trial court also found that neither
Laurie’s mother nor respondent-father was still living in Delaware. The court
continued the case in order to investigate whether it had jurisdiction under the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA or the Act).
The matter came on for adjudication and disposition on 26 July and 3 August
2017. On 21 September 2017, the trial court entered an order concluding that Laurie
was a neglected and dependent juvenile. In the order, the court also found that Laurie
and respondent-father had resided in Charlotte since September 2016 and concluded
that it had jurisdiction over the case.
On 19 September 2018, DSS filed a motion in the cause to terminate
respondent-father’s parental rights on the grounds of neglect and willfully leaving
Laurie in foster care for more than twelve months without making adequate progress
to correct the removal conditions. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–(2) (2019). On
22 March 2019, the trial court entered an order terminating respondent-father’s
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IN RE L.T.
Opinion of the Court
rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). The court also concluded that
termination was in Laurie’s best interest. Respondent-father appealed.
Respondent-father argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter its
termination order. He contends that the trial court failed to comply with the
requirements of the UCCJEA when it learned of the Delaware custody order at the
beginning of this case and that all the proceedings involving Laurie in North Carolina
are therefore void. We disagree.
Because a court must have subject matter jurisdiction in order to adjudicate
the case before it, “a court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not waivable and can
be raised at any time.” In re K.J.L., 363 N.C. 343, 346, 677 S.E.2d 835, 837 (2009)
(citations omitted). This Court presumes the trial court has properly exercised
jurisdiction unless the party challenging jurisdiction meets its burden of showing
otherwise. In re S.E., 838 S.E.2d 328, 331 (N.C. 2020).
The trial court must comply with the UCCJEA in order to have subject matter
jurisdiction over juvenile abuse, neglect, and dependency cases and termination of
parental rights cases. Id.; see also N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101 (2019). The trial court is not
required to make specific findings of fact demonstrating its jurisdiction under the
UCCJEA, but the record must reflect that the jurisdictional prerequisites in the Act
were satisfied when the court exercised jurisdiction. See In re T.J.D.W., 182 N.C. App.
394, 397, 642 S.E.2d 471, 473, aff’d per curiam, 362 N.C. 84, 653 S.E.2d 143 (2007).
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IN RE L.T.
Opinion of the Court
The parties agree that Laurie was the subject of a valid Delaware child custody
order when DSS filed the initial neglect and dependency petition on 17 March 2017.
Their dispute is whether the trial court had jurisdiction to modify the Delaware order.
Respondent-father contends that the record shows the trial court lacked modification
authority under the Act.
Section 50A-203 of the North Carolina General Statutes governs when the trial
court has jurisdiction to modify an out-of-state custody order under the UCCJEA. It
sets out a two-part test for establishing modification jurisdiction: first, the trial court
must have jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination under N.C.G.S.
§ 50A-201(a)(1) or (2), and second, one of the following must have occurred:
(1) The court of the other state determines it no longer has
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under G.S. 50A-202 or
that a court of this State would be a more convenient forum
under G.S. 50A-207; or
(2) A court of this State or a court of the other state
determines that the child, the child’s parents, and any
person acting as a parent do not presently reside in the
other state.
N.C.G.S. § 50A-203 (2019). Here, it is undisputed that the second part of this test was
met when the trial court made unchallenged findings that Laurie’s mother,
respondent-father, and Laurie no longer resided in Delaware when DSS filed the
juvenile petition. However, respondent-father argues that the trial court did not
satisfy the first part of the test because it did not have jurisdiction to make an initial
child-custody determination under N.C.G.S. § 50A-201(a).
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IN RE L.T.
Opinion of the Court
Section 50A-201(a)(1) states that North Carolina courts have jurisdiction to
make an initial custody determination if North Carolina is the “home state” of the
child when the proceedings commence. The UCCJEA defines “home state” as “the
state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least
six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child-custody
proceeding.” N.C.G.S. § 50A-102(7) (2019).
Respondent-father argues that North Carolina was not Laurie’s home state at
the time DSS filed the neglect and dependency petition. His argument relies
primarily on the following finding from the trial court’s 12 June 2017 order continuing
adjudication of the juvenile petition:
2. Prior to the hearing, the GAL Attorney Advocate and the
attorney for the Father voiced concerns regarding
jurisdiction of the Court in this matter. At the time the
petition was filed the juvenile was not residing in North
Carolina for the previous six months.
While this finding suggests that North Carolina was not Laurie’s home state at the
time these proceedings began, it was based on preliminary information provided to
the trial court by the GAL attorney advocate and respondent-father’s attorney. That
initial information was superseded by more accurate information as the case
progressed. In its adjudication and disposition order entered on 21 September 2017,
the trial court found, “by clear and convincing evidence,” that Laurie and respondent-
father had been residing in Charlotte “since September 2016[,]” which was more than
six months before DSS filed the juvenile petition. This finding was further supported
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Opinion of the Court
by respondent-father’s testimony at the termination hearing. He stated that he
moved to Charlotte on 31 August 2016, and that prior to that time, Laurie was living
with her aunt in North Carolina for another one to three months. He further testified
that Laurie began living with him as soon as he moved to Charlotte. Thus, the record
reflects that Laurie had lived in North Carolina for more than six months by the time
DSS filed the juvenile petition on 17 March 2017. Accordingly, North Carolina was
Laurie’s home state under the UCCJEA, and the trial court had jurisdiction under
N.C.G.S. § 50A-203 to modify the Delaware custody order and preside over this case.
See In re S.E., 838 S.E.2d at 332 (concluding the trial court had jurisdiction under
the UCCJEA based on “stipulations and other record facts” demonstrating that North
Carolina was the child’s home state).
Respondent-father has not met his burden of showing the trial court lacked
jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. We affirm the trial court’s order terminating his
parental rights.
AFFIRMED.
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