In re C.J. ( 2020 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 159A19
Filed 24 January 2020
IN THE MATTER OF: C.J.
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 14
January 2019 by Judge Sarah C. Seaton in District Court, Onslow County. This
matter was calendared in the Supreme Court on 17 January 2020 but determined on
the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of the North
Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Richard Penley for petitioner-appellee Onslow County Department of Social
Services.
Michelle FormyDuval Lynch, GAL Appellate Counsel, for appellee Guardian ad
Litem.
Parent Defender Wendy C. Sotolongo, by Assistant Parent Defender J. Lee
Gilliam, for respondent-appellant mother.
BEASLEY, Chief Justice
Respondent-mother appeals from an order entered by the trial court
terminating her parental rights to her daughter, Chloe.1 After careful consideration
of respondent-mother’s challenges to the trial court’s conclusion that grounds exist to
terminate her parental rights to Chloe, we affirm the trial court’s order.
1 We refer to the minor child throughout this opinion as “Chloe,” which is a pseudonym
used to protect the identity of the child and for ease of reading.
IN RE C.J.
Opinion of the Court
On 21 October 2014, the Onslow County Department of Social Services (DSS)
obtained nonsecure custody of Chloe and filed a petition alleging she was a neglected
and dependent juvenile. DSS alleged respondent-mother had been arrested in
Georgia and extradited to Mississippi to face charges involving drug trafficking and
stolen weapons. Respondent-mother’s boyfriend had taken Chloe from her school in
Georgia and moved with her to Jacksonville, North Carolina. The boyfriend was
subsequently arrested on charges from Georgia, and Chloe was placed with his
relatives. DSS deemed the placement inappropriate and learned that a Georgia
department of social services had an open case involving respondent-mother and her
alleged use of Chloe to obtain prescription medication. Chloe’s father was
incarcerated in Mississippi on a drug-related conviction and had a projected release
date of 25 January 2016.2
After a hearing on 14 January 2015, the trial court entered an adjudication
and disposition order on 24 April 2015, which it amended by order entered 16
September 2015. The court concluded Chloe was a dependent juvenile and continued
custody of Chloe with DSS. The court ordered respondent-mother to participate in
therapeutic intervention, including diagnostic assessment and testing, and follow all
recommendations; to complete a substance abuse assessment and follow all
recommendations; to complete drug screens as requested by DSS; to obtain and
2 Chloe’s father subsequently died on 19 August 2017 and was not a party to the
termination of parental rights proceeding.
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IN RE C.J.
Opinion of the Court
maintain verifiable employment; to obtain and maintain stable housing suitable for
Chloe; and to maintain communication with DSS. The court also granted respondent-
mother supervised visitation with Chloe for one hour every other week.
By order entered 15 June 2015, the trial court set the primary permanent plan
for Chloe as reunification and the secondary plan as custody with a court-approved
caretaker. On 5 December 2016 the court changed the permanent plan to
guardianship, with a secondary concurrent plan of reunification, after finding that
respondent-mother remained in Mississippi and had not provided DSS or the court
with any evidence that she had participated in her case plan. Over the next several
months, respondent-mother continued to fail to show progress toward meeting the
goals of her case plan. The court ordered DSS to cease reunification efforts on 3
January 2017, and, by order entered 1 June 2018, the trial court set the primary
permanent plan for Chloe as adoption and the secondary plan as guardianship.
DSS filed a petition to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights on 29
August 2018, alleging grounds of neglect, willfully leaving Chloe in foster care for
more than twelve months without making reasonable progress to correct the
conditions that led to her removal, willfully failing to pay a reasonable portion of the
cost of care for Chloe during her placement in DHHS custody, dependency, and
abandonment. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–(3), (6), (7) (2017). After a hearing on 13
December 2018, the trial court entered an order terminating respondent-mother’s
parental rights to Chloe on 14 January 2019. The trial court found and concluded
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IN RE C.J.
Opinion of the Court
respondent-mother’s parental rights were subject to termination based on the
grounds of neglect, willfully leaving Chloe in foster care for more than twelve months
without making reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to her removal,
and abandonment. The trial court further concluded termination of respondent-
mother’s parental rights was in Chloe’s best interests. Respondent-mother filed
timely notice of appeal to this Court from the trial court’s order.
Respondent-mother first challenges four of the trial court’s findings of fact as
unsupported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. However, the challenged
findings are not necessary to support the trial court’s conclusion that respondent-
mother willfully left Chloe in foster care for more than twelve months without making
reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to her removal, and they need
not be reviewed on appeal. See In re T.N.H., 831 S.E.2d 54, 58–59 (2019) (“[W]e review
only those findings necessary to support the trial court’s determination that grounds
existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights.” (citing In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394,
404, 293 S.E.2d 127, 133 (1982))).
Respondent-mother also argues the trial court erred in concluding she willfully
left Chloe in foster care for more than twelve months without making reasonable
progress to correct the conditions that led to her removal, because the conditions
relied upon by the court to support this conclusion did not directly “lead” to Chloe’s
removal. Respondent-mother contends the only condition that directly led to Chloe’s
removal was her potential lengthy incarceration in Mississippi, which she claims to
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IN RE C.J.
Opinion of the Court
have remedied. This Court has recently rejected a similar argument, holding a trial
court’s conclusion on this ground is supported where there exists a “nexus between
the components of the court-approved case plan with which respondent-mother failed
to comply and the ‘conditions which led to [the juvenile’s] removal’ from the parental
home.” In re B.O.A., 831 S.E.2d 305, 314 (2019).
In its initial adjudication and dispositional order, the trial court found Chloe
was removed because respondent had left her in the care of her boyfriend after she
was arrested and extradited to Mississippi to face criminal charges involving drug-
trafficking and stolen weapons. At the time of Chloe’s removal, a Georgia department
of social services had an open case involving allegations that respondent-mother had
used Chloe to obtain prescription medication. The court further found respondent-
mother had a history with Child Protective Services in Mississippi involving
allegations of inappropriate care, sexual abuse of a child by a caretaker or family
friend, exposure of a child to illegal substances, and inappropriate discipline.
Respondent-mother’s demeanor at a hearing in this case led the court to be concerned
that she may have been under the influence when she testified and may have been
suffering from a mental health condition. These findings establish the required nexus
between the components of respondent-mother’s court-approved case plan and the
overall conditions that led to Chloe’s removal.
In its order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights, the trial court
found respondent-mother failed to address any component of her court-ordered case
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IN RE C.J.
Opinion of the Court
plan and had not visited with Chloe since January 2015. These findings are supported
by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that respondent-mother failed to maintain
contact with DSS while Chloe was in the department’s custody or to participate in
court-ordered visitation, to verifiably participate in substance abuse assessment or
drug screenings, or to maintain housing and employment stability. The trial court’s
findings fully support its conclusion that grounds exist to terminate respondent-
mother’s parental rights to Chloe under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) because she
willfully left Chloe in foster care for more than twelve months without making
reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to Chloe’s removal from her
care. See In re B.O.A., 831 S.E.2d at 314–16.
The trial court’s conclusion on this ground “is sufficient in and of itself to
support termination of [respondent-mother’s] parental rights[,]” In re T.N.H., 831
S.E.2d at 62, and we need not address her arguments challenging the remaining
grounds. Respondent-mother does not challenge the trial court’s conclusion that
termination of her parental rights is in Chloe’s best interests. Accordingly, we affirm
the trial court’s order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights to Chloe.
AFFIRMED.
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