White v. White ( 2014 )

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA14-274
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 16 December 2014
KAREN H. WHITE,
Plaintiff
v. Pasquotank County
No. 09-CVD-770
RICHARD McMULLEN WHITE,
Defendant.
Appeal by Plaintiff from judgments entered 22 February 2011
by Judge Robert P. Trivette and 17 September 2013 by Judge C.
Christopher Bean in Pasquotank County District Court. Heard in
the Court of Appeals 10 September 2014.
The Twiford Law Firm, P.C., by Edward A. O’Neal, for
Plaintiff-Appellant.
Pritchett & Burch, PLLC, by Lloyd C. Smith, Jr., Lloyd C.
Smith, III, and Jonathan E. Huddleston, for Defendant-
Appellee.
DILLON, Judge.
Karen H. White (“Wife”) appeals from the trial court’s
declaratory judgment barring her claim for equitable
distribution of real property acquired by Richard McMullen White
(“Husband”) in his own name during the marriage based on the
-2-
terms of an antenuptial agreement. She also appeals from the
final consent judgment awarding alimony, attorney’s fees, and
equitable distribution. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Background
Husband and Wife were married in 1983 and three children
were born of the marriage. Shortly before their marriage, the
parties signed an antenuptial agreement (the “Antenuptial”)
which addressed their rights to certain property owned by either
party.
At the time of their nuptials, Husband owned real estate
associated with his used car business; Plaintiff owned personal
property but not any real estate. During the marriage, Husband
acquired several rental properties titled in his name. Also
during the marriage, Husband and Wife purchased their marital
home, which was titled in both of their names.
In 2009, the parties separated. Wife filed this action
raising claims for child custody and support, post separation
support and alimony, equitable distribution, and attorney’s
fees. Husband filed his answer admitting that the marital home
was “marital property” but pleaded that the Antenuptial was a
bar to equitable distribution with respect to property he owned
in his individual name.
-3-
In 2010, Wife filed a motion for declaratory judgment to
determine the rights and obligations of the parties under the
Antenuptial. Husband filed a motion for partial summary
judgment requesting the trial court to decree that the terms of
the Antenuptial operated as a bar to Wife’s claim for equitable
distribution of the real estate titled to him.
In 2011, following a hearing on the matter, the trial court
entered a declaratory judgment (the “Declaratory Judgment”)
stating that the Antenuptial was unambiguous and that it barred
Wife’s claim for equitable distribution of Husband’s real
estate.
In 2013, the trial court entered a consent order (the
“Consent Order”) which resolved the remaining claims of the
Wife. The Consent Order stated that Wife’s claims for equitable
distribution of Husband’s real estate had been adjudicated by
the Declaratory Judgment and that Wife had not waived her right
to appeal the Declaratory Judgment.
On 2 October 2013, Wife filed appeal from the Declaratory
Judgment and the Consent Judgment.
II. Analysis
On appeal, Wife contends that the trial court erred in
finding that the Antenuptial was unambiguous in creating a
-4-
waiver of her marital interest in real property acquired by
Husband during the marriage. She concludes that this property
should be classified as marital property and subject to
equitable distribution. Husband counters that Wife waived any
challenge to the Consent Judgment; that her entire appeal should
be dismissed because she has attempted to manipulate the rules
of procedure to appeal from an interlocutory order; and that the
Declaratory Judgment and Consent Judgment should be, otherwise,
affirmed.
A. Waiver/Dismissal
Husband contends that Wife waived her right to appeal from
the Consent Judgment which set the final terms of equitable
distribution by failing to raise any argument in her brief
challenging this judgment. Wife concedes in her reply brief
that she has abandoned her appeal of the claims adjudicated by
the Consent Judgment. Accordingly, any appeal from the
adjudication of those claims has been waived. However, Wife’s
failure to present an argument regarding the Consent Judgment
does not waive her right to appeal from the Declaratory Judgment
adjudicating her equitable distribution claim regarding the real
estate acquired by Husband in his name during the marriage.
-5-
Husband also argues that Wife’s appeal from the Declaratory
Judgment should be dismissed, contending that she has attempted
to manipulate the rules of procedure by signing the Consent
Judgment so that her appeal from the Declaratory Judgment would
not be interlocutory. Specifically, Husband argues that the
Consent Judgment “specifically acknowledged the right to
reinstate a claim if the appeal was successful” in contradiction
to our holding in Hill ex Rel Hill v. West, 177 N.C. App. 132,
627 S.E.2d 662 (2006).
We believe that our holding in Hill is distinguishable from
the present case and, therefore, overrule Husband’s argument
that Wife’s appeal should be dismissed. We recently noted that
“[t]his Court has . . . repeatedly limited Hill to the specific,
unusual facts present in that case.” Tong v. Dunn, ___ N.C.
App. ___, ___, 752 S.E.2d 669, 674 (2013) (citing Curl v. Am.
Multimedia, Inc., 187 N.C. App. 649, 654, 654 S.E.2d 76, 80
(2007); Goodman v. Holmes & McLaurin Attorneys at Law, 192 N.C.
App. 467, 472, 665 S.E.2d 526, 530 (2008); and Duval v. OM
Hospitality, LLC, 186 N.C. App. 390, 651 S.E.2d 261 (2007)). In
Hill, the plaintiffs raised a number of claims against a number
of parties. 177 N.C. App. at 133, 627 S.E.2d at 663. The trial
court granted summary judgment against the plaintiffs with
-6-
respect to some of the claims. Id. This Court dismissed the
plaintiff’s appeal from a partial summary judgment order as
interlocutory, and noted that additionally the plaintiffs had
failed to include a statement of the grounds for appellate
review in violation of the appellate rules of procedure. Id. at
133, 627 S.E.2d at 663. On remand to the trial court, the
plaintiffs attempted to effect an immediate appeal from the
partial summary judgment order by voluntarily dismissing their
remaining claims in a rather unique manner. Id. at 135, 627
S.E.2d at 664. Specifically, the plaintiffs dismissed their
remaining claims in the form of a consent judgment entered by
the trial court whereby the plaintiffs’ remaining claims were
dismissed. Id. at 134-35, 627 S.E.2d at 663-64. However, the
consent judgment allowed the plaintiffs to resurrect these
dismissed claims in the event the plaintiffs won their appeal
regarding the other claims, even if the appeal was not resolved
in one year, thereby circumventing the requirements of N.C. R.
Civ. P. 41. Id. We dismissed the appeal as having been taken
from an interlocutory order, stating that the “manipulat[ion of]
the Rules of Civil Procedure in an attempt to appeal the []
summary judgment that otherwise would not be appealable” did not
-7-
convert the partial summary judgment order into an appealable
final judgment. Id. at 135, 627 S.E.2d at 664.
In the present case, however, the Consent Judgment does not
contain any language that attempts to manipulate N.C. R. Civ. P.
41 through the inclusion of a statement that claims could be
reinstated at any time without regard to the one-year
limitation. This judgment simply states that it is a final
judgment on the equitable distribution claim “pending” a
successful appeal by Wife challenging the trial court’s
Declaratory Judgment regarding the Antenuptial, which could
operate to reinstate the claim for equitable distribution with
respect to Husband’s real estate. Therefore, Hill is not
controlling and Defendant’s argument is overruled.
B. Antenuptial Agreement
Wife argues that the trial court erred in finding that
there were no ambiguities in the Antenuptial and concluding that
it barred equitable distribution of the property acquired by one
of the parties during their marriage. We disagree.
“Declaratory judgment affords the appropriate procedure to
alleviat[e] uncertainty in the interpretation of written
instruments and to clarify litigation associated with an actual
controversy.” McCabe v. Dawkins, 97 N.C. App. 447, 449, 388
-8-
S.E.2d 571, 572 (citation omitted), disc. review denied, 326
N.C. 597, 393 S.E.2d 880 (1990). Under the Uniform Declaratory
Judgment Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-253 et seq., “the court’s
findings of fact are conclusive if supported by any competent
evidence; and a judgment supported by such findings will be
affirmed, even though there is evidence which might sustain
findings to the contrary[.]” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Allison, 51 N.C. App. 654, 657, 277 S.E.2d 473, 475, disc.
review denied, 303 N.C. 315, 281 S.E.2d 652 (1981). Thus,
“[t]he function of our review is, then, to determine whether the
record contains competent evidence to support the findings[] and
whether the findings support the conclusions.” Id. The trial
court’s conclusions of law are reviewable de novo. Cross v.
Capital Transaction Grp., Inc., 191 N.C. App. 115, 117, 661
S.E.2d 778, 780 (2008) (citation omitted), disc. review denied,
363 N.C. 124, 672 S.E.2d 687 (2009).
Two people who are contemplating marriage may enter into a
valid contract before marriage with respect to the property and
property rights of either or both after marriage. Stewart v.
Stewart, 222 N.C. 387, 391, 23 S.E.2d 306, 308 (1942). We have
further explained that “[t]he term ‘antenuptial agreement’ or
‘marriage settlement’ is often applied to such agreements” and
-9-
that “a valid antenuptial agreement may serve as a plea in bar
to the equitable distribution of property acquired during the
marriage[,]” pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(d). Prevatte
v. Prevatte, 104 N.C. App. 777, 780-81, 411 S.E.2d 386, 388
(1991). In other words, even though the right to equitable
distribution is a statutory property right, that “right may be
waived by a complete property settlement which contains a
general release of spousal property rights.” Id. at 781, 411
S.E.2d at 388. Husband pleaded as a bar to equitable
distribution of his real estate the terms of the Antenuptial.
Therefore, the issue before us is whether the Antenuptial
operated as a bar to Wife’s claim for equitable distribution of
the real estate owned solely in Husband’s name.
Principles of construction applicable to contracts,
generally, are applicable to premarital agreements. Stewart v.
Stewart, 141 N.C. App. 236, 240, 541 S.E.2d 209, 212 (2000).
“The heart of a contract is the intention of the parties[,]” and
“[t]his intention is to be gathered from the entire instrument,
viewing it from its four corners.” Jones v. Palace Realty Co.,
226 N.C. 303, 305, 37 S.E.2d 906, 907 (1946). “The contract
must be construed as a whole, and a paragraph or excerpt must be
interpreted in context with the rest of the agreement.”
-10-
Security Nat'l Bank v. Educators Mut. Life Ins. Co., 265 N.C.
86, 93, 143 S.E.2d 270, 275 (1965) (citations omitted). “When
the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous,
construction of the agreement is a matter of law for the court
and the court cannot look beyond the terms of the contract to
determine the intentions of the parties.” Stovall v. Stovall,
205 N.C. App. 405, 410, 698 S.E.2d 680, 684 (2010). “If the
words employed are capable of more than one meaning, the meaning
to be given is that which it is apparent the parties intended
them to have.” Jones, 226 N.C. at 305, 37 S.E.2d at 907(citation and quotation marks omitted).
Section I of the Antenuptial is at the heart of the
parties’ arguments, which states
[a]ny property, either real or personal,
acquired by either prospective spouse,
before or after their marriage, shall be the
separate property of the party owning or
obtaining the property, and the other party
shall make no claim or demand on the
separate property or on the heirs,
executors, or administrators of the owner’s
estate, for that separate property.
(Emphasis added.) Wife argues that the phrase “after their
marriage” in this paragraph is ambiguous, as it could mean (1)
after the marriage ended by divorce (excluding property acquired
during marriage and giving Plaintiff a right to equitable
-11-
distribution in Defendant’s real property) or (2) after date of
marriage (including property acquired during marriage and
excluding Plaintiff’s right to equitable distribution of
Defendant’s real property). Plaintiff reasons that because of
this ambiguity, we should look to her trial and deposition
testimony along with other parts of the agreement to determine
the intent of the parties and that their intent was not to waive
equitable distribution of their property acquired by either
party during the marriage. Plaintiff concedes, however, that
“before . . . marriage” means before the parties were married.
Therefore, we must determine the parties intention in regards to
the phrase “after marriage[.]”
We believe that the trial court correctly interpreted the
Antenuptial to apply to property acquired by either party during
the marriage. Looking to the “four corners” of the document, we
note that in a preamble to the rest of the terms of the
agreement, the Antenuptial states:
The parties stipulate and recite that:
1. Prospective Husband and Prospective Wife
intend to be married.
2. Prospective Husband and Prospective Wife
are legal owners of real and personal
property located in the State of North
Carolina.
-12-
3. Prospective Husband and Prospective Wife
desire to retain all property that they
presently own, whether real or personal, as
separate property, after solemnization of
their marriage.
4. That parties wish to set forth other
provisions relative to the manner in which
they will conduct themselves after marriage
and relate the business context in which
they will operate as man and wife.
(Emphasis added). The parties’ intent, as stated in the
preamble is that the agreement govern their conduct, including
the ownership of property, “after solemnization of the
marriage[,]” “after the marriage[,]” and “as man and wife.”
Paragraph 3 of the Preamble makes it clear that Section I’s
“before . . . marriage” refers to property owned before
“solemnization of their marriage[.]” We believe that it is
equally clear from paragraph 4 of the Preamble that “after
marriage” means while operating “as man and wife” or “after
solemnization of their marriage[.]”1
Wife contends that an antenuptial agreement must expressly
mention “equitable distribution” in order to operate as a waiver
1
An antenuptial agreement can be invalidated if it is the
product of undue influence, duress, coercion, or fraud, and if
there is a lack of full disclosure between the parties as to
their respective financial status. Howell v. Landry, 96 N.C.
App. 516, 525, 386 S.E.2d 610, 615 (1989). Plaintiff raised
none of these contractual defenses on appeal.
-13-
of this right. In Hagler v. Hagler, 319 N.C. 287, 354 S.E.2d
228 (1987), our Supreme Court held two identical releases for
the husband and wife in a separation agreement operated as a bar
to equitable distribution: “any and all other rights arising out
of the marriage relation in and to any and all property now
owned by the [“Wife,” or “Husband”] or which may be hereafter
acquired by [her or him] and further does hereby release the
right to administer upon [her or his] estate.” Id. at 288, 295,
254 S.E.2d at 231, 234-35. The agreement did not contain the
phrase “equitable distribution.” Id. However, the Court
analyzed the intent of the parties based on the specific terms
of the agreement and determined that they intended a waiver of
equitable distribution. Id. In the present case, by entering
into the Antenuptial, the parties agreed that any property
acquired and owned by either of them would be the separate
property of the owner. Accordingly, Wife’s argument is
overruled.
III. Conclusion
The unambiguous language of the Antenuptial stated that
real or personal property acquired by either party before or
after marriage was separate property, and this language
supported the trial court’s findings and conclusion that the
-14-
Antenuptial operated as a waiver of equitable distribution of
such property in the Declaratory Judgment. As we affirm the
Declaratory Judgment, we also affirm the conclusions based on
that Declaratory Judgment in the Consent Judgment.
Accordingly, the trial court’s judgments are
AFFIRMED.
Judge HUNTER, Robert C. and Judge ERVIN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).