State v. Jackson ( 2016 )


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  •              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
    No. COA15-876
    Filed: 4 October 2016
    Alexander County, Nos. 13 CRS 50158-61, 12 CRS 52344-46
    STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,
    v.
    ADAM ROBERT JACKSON, Defendant.
    Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 11 February 2015 by Judge
    Joseph N. Crosswhite in Alexander County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of
    Appeals 14 January 2016.
    Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Joseph A.
    Newsome, for the State.
    Gerding Blass, PLLC, by Danielle Blass, for Defendant-Appellant.
    INMAN, Judge.
    Adam Robert Jackson (“Defendant”) appeals from a Judgment Suspending
    Sentence following his plea of no contest to one count of manufacturing marijuana.
    On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to
    suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant because the warrant
    application was insufficient to support the magistrate’s finding of probable cause.
    STATE V. JACKSON
    Opinion of the Court
    After careful review, we hold that the warrant application provided a substantial
    basis to support the magistrate’s finding of probable cause. Accordingly, we affirm.
    I. Factual & Procedural Background
    On 30 January 2013, Detective Jessica Jurney and another officer with the
    Narcotics Division of the Iredell County Sheriff’s Office conducted a knock-and-talk
    at the home of a person they had never met. The officers indicated to the person that
    she could face criminal charges based on her1 possession of marijuana. The person
    (“confidential informant” or “informant”) agreed to provide information regarding
    where she obtained the marijuana. The informant told Detective Jurney that she had
    purchased marijuana from Defendant, a male in his early 20s, “with long dark hair.”
    The informant provided Defendant’s name, stated that she had purchased
    marijuana at Defendant’s residence on multiple occasions, and noted that she had
    most recently purchased marijuana from Defendant at his residence two days earlier.
    The informant explained that during her most recent purchase, Defendant asked her
    to wait for him in a front room and went into a bedroom located on the right side of
    his house. The informant then heard the sound of a key turning in a lock. Defendant
    returned with a mason jar containing marijuana and sold a portion of it to the
    informant.
    1 Defendant’s brief notes that the suppression hearing seemed to indicate that the confidential
    informant was female. For this reason, and for ease of reading, we will refer to her as such in this
    opinion.
    -2-
    STATE V. JACKSON
    Opinion of the Court
    The informant told Detective Jurney that Defendant’s residence was located
    off Old Mountain Road in a wooded area across from a development called “Old
    Mountain Village.”    The informant described Defendant’s home as a “modular
    home/trailer.” The informant then led Detective Jurney to a driveway with a mailbox
    marker that read 2099 Old Mountain Road. The informant explained to Detective
    Jurney that the driveway forked in two separate directions at the end and stated that
    Defendant’s residence was located on the left side of the fork. Subsequently, Captain
    Clarence Harris of the Iredell County Sheriff’s Office drove to the same location and
    confirmed that a light-colored modular home was located on the left side of a fork in
    the driveway.
    Detective Jurney searched the CJ LEADS database, a database wherein law
    enforcement officers can refer to DMV information or criminal charges, for “Adam
    Jackson.” The search revealed that a person named “Adam Robert Jackson” resided
    at 2099 Old Mountain Road in Hiddenite, North Carolina, and was twenty-two years
    old. In the photograph, Adam Jackson had shoulder length brown hair and brown
    eyes.
    On 31 January 2013, Detective Jurney contacted Deputy Kelly Ward of the
    Narcotics Division of the Alexander County Sheriff’s Office. Because the address was
    located in Alexander County, Detective Jurney notified Deputy Ward of all of the
    information that had been relayed to her by the informant. On that same day,
    -3-
    STATE V. JACKSON
    Opinion of the Court
    Detective Jurney and Deputy Ward applied to the Alexander County Magistrate for
    a search warrant for Defendant’s residence. As part of the warrant application,
    Deputy Ward submitted an affidavit in which he attached a statement by Detective
    Jurney detailing the information that the confidential informant had relayed to her.
    Deputy Ward’s affidavit stated that in addition to receiving information from
    Detective Jurney, he had “received information on several occasions throughout the
    past year from concerned citizens in the area of the premise to be searched, about
    drug traffic mainly [m]arijuana at the premise to be searched.” Deputy Ward also
    noted that he had searched Defendant’s criminal history and discovered that
    Defendant was charged with possession of marijuana in December 20122 in
    Alexander County.
    An Alexander County Magistrate issued a search warrant for Defendant’s
    residence, which law enforcement officers executed the same day.                        The search
    revealed “indoor grow equipment,” marijuana, and “plants,” which officers seized.
    On 24 June 2013, Defendant was indicted for possession with intent to
    manufacture, sell, and deliver marijuana; manufacturing marijuana; felony
    possession     of   a    Schedule     VI    controlled     substance;      and    maintaining       a
    2 Deputy Ward’s affidavit indicates that Defendant was charged with possession of marijuana
    on 22 December 2013 – nearly a year in the future from the date of the warrant application. However,
    at the hearing on Defendant’s motion to suppress, Deputy Ward testified that this was a clerical error
    in the application, and that the information he obtained reflected that Defendant had been charged in
    December 2012. Defendant’s counsel acknowledged the charge and the correct date.
    -4-
    STATE V. JACKSON
    Opinion of the Court
    vehicle/dwelling/place for a controlled substance.3 On 19 November 2013, Defendant
    filed a motion to suppress evidence discovered as a result of the search of his
    residence.
    Defendant’s motion was heard on 9 February 2015 by Judge Joseph N.
    Crosswhite in Alexander County Superior Court. Deputy Ward and Detective Jurney
    testified at the hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Crosswhite denied
    Defendant’s motion to suppress, and, on 13 March 2015, entered a written order to
    the same effect.
    Two days after the suppression hearing, on 11 February 2015, Defendant pled
    no contest to one count of driving while impaired and one count of manufacturing
    marijuana. Defendant was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment for the driving
    while impaired charge, and 6–17 months imprisonment for the manufacturing
    marijuana charge; however, both sentences were suspended for 30 months of
    supervised probation, subject to certain terms and conditions.
    II. Petition for Writ of Certiorari
    We initially address this Court’s jurisdiction over this appeal. On 24 February
    2015, Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal stating that he “appeals the Order of the
    Superior Court denying Defendant’s motion to suppress all physical evidence seized
    3  On 24 June 2013, Defendant was also indicted for driving while impaired; possession with
    intent to manufacture, sell, and deliver marijuana; simple possession of a Schedule VI controlled
    substance; and possession of drug paraphernalia. These charges stem from an incident occurring 22
    December 2012.
    -5-
    STATE V. JACKSON
    Opinion of the Court
    by law enforcement officers during the search of [] Defendant’s residence on the date
    of the alleged offense, entered in this action.” The Notice of Appeal further specified
    that “[t]he right to this appeal was specifically reserved as part of Defendant’s guilty
    plea.”
    This Court has held that:
    [I]n order to properly appeal the denial of a motion to
    suppress after a guilty plea, a defendant must take two
    steps: (1) he must, prior to finalization of the guilty plea,
    provide the trial court and the prosecutor with notice of his
    intent to appeal the motion to suppress order, and (2) he
    must timely and properly appeal from the final judgment.
    State v. Cottrell, 
    234 N.C. App. 736
    , 739–40, 
    760 S.E.2d 274
    , 277 (2014); see also N.C.
    Gen. Stat. § 15A-979(b) (2015) (providing that the denial of a motion to suppress
    evidence “may be reviewed upon an appeal from a judgment of conviction, including
    a judgment entered upon a plea of guilt[]”).
    Here, Defendant gave notice to the State that he intended to appeal the denial
    of his motion to suppress, and the reservation of the right was noted in the transcript
    of his no contest plea, which provided: “Defendant expressly reserves the right to
    appeal the Court’s denial of Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, and his plea herein is
    conditioned upon his right to appeal that decision pursuant to [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 15A-
    979(b).” However, Defendant’s 24 February 2015 Notice of Appeal failed to indicate
    that he was appealing from the Judgment Suspending Sentence entered against him
    as a result of his 11 February 2015 plea of no contest, as is required by N.C. Gen.
    -6-
    STATE V. JACKSON
    Opinion of the Court
    Stat. § 15A-979(b). Instead, Defendant’s Notice of Appeal only indicated that he was
    appealing from the order denying his motion to suppress.
    On 5 September 2015, Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari, asking
    this Court to review the Judgment Suspending Sentence.            “Whether to allow a
    petition and issue the writ of certiorari is not a matter of right and rests within the
    discretion of this Court.” State v. Biddix, __, N.C. App. __, __,
    780 S.E.2d 863
    , 866
    (2015) (citation omitted). North Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure 21(a) provides:
    The writ of certiorari may be issued in appropriate
    circumstances by either appellate court to permit review of
    the judgments and orders of trial tribunals when the right
    to prosecute an appeal has been lost by failure to take
    timely action, or when no right of appeal from an
    interlocutory order exists, or for review pursuant to
    N.C.G.S. § 15A-1422(c)(3) of an order of the trial court
    ruling on a motion for appropriate relief.
    N.C. R. App. P. 21. In State v. Cottrell, this Court exercised its discretion and granted
    the defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari, “because it is apparent that the State
    was aware of defendant’s intent to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress prior
    to the entry of defendant’s guilty pleas and because defendant has lost his appeal
    through no fault of his own. . . .” 234 N.C. App. at 740, 760 S.E.2d at 277. Here,
    applying the same reasoning as this Court imposed in Cottrell, we grant Defendant’s
    petition for writ of certiorari and address Defendant’s appeal on the merits.
    III. Analysis
    -7-
    STATE V. JACKSON
    Opinion of the Court
    Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to
    suppress. We disagree.
    Our standard of review on an appeal from an order denying a motion to
    suppress is “whether the trial judge’s underlying findings of fact are supported by
    competent evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on appeal, and
    whether those factual findings in turn support the judge’s ultimate conclusions of
    law.” State v. Johnson, 
    98 N.C. App. 290
    , 294, 
    390 S.E.2d 707
    , 709 (1990) (quoting
    State v. Cooke, 
    306 N.C. 132
    , 134, 
    291 S.E.2d 618
    , 619 (1982)). The trial court’s
    conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. State v. O'Connor, 
    222 N.C. App. 235
    , 238–
    39, 
    730 S.E.2d 248
    , 251 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Under a de novo
    review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment
    for that of the lower tribunal.” State v. Biber, 
    365 N.C. 162
    , 168, 
    712 S.E.2d 874
    , 878
    (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    Whether probable cause exists to support issuance of search warrant by a
    magistrate is reviewed under the “totality of the circumstances” test established by
    the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 
    462 U.S. 213
    , 230, 
    76 L. Ed. 2d 527
    , 543 (1983), and adopted by the North Carolina Supreme Court in State v.
    Arrington, 
    311 N.C. 633
    , 641–43, 
    319 S.E.2d 254
    , 259–261 (1984). Under the totality
    of the circumstances test:
    [th]e task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a
    practical, common sense decision whether, given all the
    -8-
    STATE V. JACKSON
    Opinion of the Court
    circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him,
    including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of
    persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair
    probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
    found in a particular place.
    Arrington, 
    311 N.C. at 638
    , 
    319 S.E.2d at
    257–58 (quoting Gates, 
    462 U.S. at 238
    , 
    76 L. Ed. 2d at 548
    ). “ ‘[P]robable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance
    of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.’ ” State v. Riggs, 
    328 N.C. 213
    , 219, 
    400 S.E.2d 429
    , 433 (1991) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Gates, 
    462 U.S. at
    243 n. 13, 
    76 L. Ed. 2d at
    552 n. 13).
    Here, Defendant contests the following paragraph of the trial court’s order
    denying Defendant’s motion to suppress,
    In the present matter, this Court concludes that the
    search warrant was based on information from a reliable
    confidential informant who provided information that was
    both accurate and fresh. The information that was
    provided included a detailed description of the Defendant,
    where he lived, directions to his house, where the
    marijuana was kept, and how it was packaged. This
    information was verified by both officers from the Iredell
    County Sheriffs’ [sic] Department and the Alexander
    County Sheriffs’ [sic] Department.        This Court also
    concludes that the statements made by the confidential
    informant were against her penile [sic] interest in that she
    admitted to purchasing and possessing marijuana from the
    Defendant in the past few days.
    Defendant challenges the trial court’s findings regarding the information
    provided by the confidential informant and the verification of that information by law
    enforcement officers, arguing that it is not supported by competent evidence.
    -9-
    STATE V. JACKSON
    Opinion of the Court
    Defendant contends that the balance of the challenged paragraph, comprised of
    conclusions of law, is not supported by the findings of fact.
    For the reasons discussed below, we disagree with Defendant’s contentions.
    And although the order denying Defendant’s motion to suppress omits a conclusion
    that the application for the search warrant supported a finding of probable cause, the
    trial court’s findings of fact, other conclusions of law, and ultimate denial of
    Defendant’s motion to suppress necessitate such a conclusion.         Accordingly, we
    analyze the challenged findings and conclusions within the context of the larger issue
    before this Court—whether the facts and circumstances set forth in the application
    for the search warrant were sufficient to support a finding of probable cause.
    We start by considering the reliability of the information provided in the search
    warrant application. “[A] magistrate is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from
    the material supplied to him by an applicant for a warrant.” State v. Sinapi, 
    359 N.C. 394
    , 399, 
    610 S.E.2d 362
    , 365 (2005) (citation omitted). The North Carolina Supreme
    Court has held that “great deference should be paid a magistrate’s determination of
    probable cause and that after-the-fact scrutiny should not take the form of a de novo
    review.” Arrington, 
    311 N.C. at 638
    , 
    319 S.E.2d at 258
    . However, this deference is
    not unlimited. State v. Benters, 
    367 N.C. 660
    , 665, 
    766 S.E.2d 593
    , 598 (2014).
    “[U]nder the totality of the circumstances test, a reviewing court must determine
    ‘whether the evidence as a whole provides a substantial basis for concluding that
    - 10 -
    STATE V. JACKSON
    Opinion of the Court
    probable cause exists.’ ” Sinapi, 
    359 N.C. at 398
    , 
    610 S.E.2d at 365
     (quoting State v.
    Beam, 
    325 N.C. 217
    , 221, 
    381 S.E.2d 327
    , 329 (1989)). Therefore, “[a] reviewing court
    has the duty to ensure that a magistrate does not abdicate his or her duty by ‘merely
    ratifying the bare conclusions of affiants.’ ” Benters, 367 N.C. at 665, 766 S.E.2d at
    598 (citation omitted).
    This Court has held:
    When probable cause is based on an informant’s tip a
    totality of the circumstances test is used to weigh the
    reliability or unreliability of the informant. Several factors
    are used to assess reliability including: (1) whether the
    informant was known or anonymous, (2) the informant's
    history of reliability, and (3) whether information provided
    by the informant could be and was independently
    corroborated by the police.
    State v. Green, 
    194 N.C. App. 623
    , 627, 
    670 S.E.2d 635
    , 638 (2009) (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted). We therefore assess the reliability of the information
    provided by the confidential informant under the totality of the circumstances test,
    weighing these reliability factors.
    A. Confidential and Reliable Tip Standard
    As an initial matter, because the affidavit of Deputy Ward is based in part on
    information provided to Detective Jurney from an informant unknown to Deputy
    Ward, “we must determine the reliability of the information by assessing whether the
    information came from an informant who was merely anonymous or one who could
    be classified as confidential and reliable.” Benters, 367 N.C. at 665, 766 S.E.2d at 598
    - 11 -
    STATE V. JACKSON
    Opinion of the Court
    (citation omitted). Information from an anonymous source is afforded less weight in
    the totality of circumstances than information that is confidential and reliable. See
    State v. Hughes, 
    353 N.C. 200
    , 205–06, 
    539 S.E.2d 625
    , 629 (2000).
    In order for a reviewing court to weigh an informant’s tip as confidential and
    reliable, “evidence is needed to show indicia of reliability[.]” 
    Id. at 204
    , 
    539 S.E.2d at 628
    . Indicia of reliability may include statements against the informant’s penal
    interests and statements from an informant with a history of providing reliable
    information. Benters, 367 N.C. at 665, 766 S.E.2d at 598. Even if an informant does
    not provide a statement against his/her penal interest and does not have a history of
    providing reliable information to law enforcement officers, the Supreme Court has
    suggested that “other indication[s] of reliability” may suffice. Hughes, 
    353 N.C. at 204
    , 
    539 S.E.2d at 628
    .
    “When sufficient indicia of reliability are wanting,” a reviewing court uses the
    anonymous tip standard to evaluate the reliability of information provided by an
    informant. Benters, 367 N.C. App. at 666, 766 S.E.2d at 598 (citation omitted).
    An anonymous tip, standing alone, is rarely sufficient, but
    the tip combined with corroboration by the police could
    show indicia of reliability that would be sufficient to pass
    constitutional muster. Thus, a tip that is somewhat
    lacking in reliability may still provide a basis for probable
    cause if it is buttressed by sufficient police corroboration.
    Under this flexible inquiry, when a tip is less reliable, law
    enforcement officers carry a greater burden to corroborate
    the information.
    - 12 -
    STATE V. JACKSON
    Opinion of the Court
    Id. at 666, 766 S.E.2d at 598–99 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
    The North Carolina Supreme Court has utilized the anonymous tip standard in State
    v. Hughes, 
    353 N.C. 200
    , 
    539 S.E.2d 625
     (2000), and State v. Benters, 
    367 N.C. 660
    ,
    
    766 S.E.2d 593
     (2014).
    In Hughes, a “confidential, reliable informant” provided a tip to the captain of
    the Onslow County Sheriff’s Department regarding the defendant’s possession of
    marijuana and cocaine. 
    353 N.C. at
    201–02, 
    539 S.E.2d at 627
    . The captain, who
    received the tip by phone, relayed the information to a detective with the Jacksonville
    Police Department. 
    Id. at 201
    , 
    539 S.E.2d at 627
    . The detective then relayed the
    information to another detective within the department. 
    Id.
     The two Jacksonville
    Police Department detectives subsequently conducted an investigatory stop of the
    defendant and discovered drugs on his person. 
    Id. at 202-03
    , 
    539 S.E.2d at 628
    . The
    North Carolina Supreme Court applied the anonymous tip standard and reversed the
    defendant’s criminal conviction because the informant had not been used to give
    accurate information in the past and because the captain—the only officer who spoke
    with the informant—did not convey to the other officers how he knew the informant
    or why the informant was reliable. 
    Id. at 204
    , 
    539 S.E.2d at 629
    . The Supreme Court
    further noted that the statement of the informant was not against his/her penal
    interest, and that “[t]he only evidence showing that the identity of this informant was
    known is [the captain’s] conclusory statement that the informant was confidential
    - 13 -
    STATE V. JACKSON
    Opinion of the Court
    and reliable.” 
    Id. at 204
    , 
    539 S.E.2d at 627
    . Accordingly, the Supreme Court applied
    the anonymous tip standard in assessing the reliability of the informant, holding that
    “[w]ithout more than the evidence presented, we cannot say there was sufficient
    indicia of reliability to warrant use of the confidential and reliable informant
    standard.” 
    Id. at 205
    , 
    539 S.E.2d at 629
    .
    In Benters, after receiving a tip from an informant face-to-face, a detective with
    the Franklin County Sheriff’s Office relayed to a lieutenant with the Vance County
    Sheriff’s Office that a residence owned by the defendant in Vance County was being
    used as “an indoor marijuana growing operation.” 367 N.C at 661–62, 766 S.E.2d at
    596. The lieutenant who received this third-hand information then applied for a
    search warrant, in which he described the informant as a “confidential and reliable
    source of information.”    Id. at 662, 766 S.E.2d at 596.       After noting that the
    information provided by the informant did not contain a statement against his/her
    penal interest and also noting that the informant did not have a track record, the
    Supreme Court assessed whether the face-to-face meeting between the informant and
    the detective who initially received the tip provided additional indicia of reliability.
    Id. at 665–67, 766 S.E.2d at 598–99. Although that detective received the tip through
    a face-to-face meeting with the informant, as opposed to by phone as in Hughes, the
    Supreme Court still applied the anonymous tip standard, holding that the affiant
    officer had nothing more than another officer’s “ ‘conclusory statement that the
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    STATE V. JACKSON
    Opinion of the Court
    informant was confidential and reliable[.]’ ” Id. at 668, 766 S.E.2d at 600 (quoting
    Hughes, 
    353 N.C. at 204
    , 
    539 S.E.2d at 629
    ). The Supreme Court explained further
    why the anonymous tip standard applied:
    [T]he affidavit here fails to establish the basis for [the
    Franklin County detective’s] appraisal of his source’s
    reliability, including the source’s demeanor or degree of
    potential accountability. The affidavit does not disclose
    whether [the Franklin County detective] met his source
    privately, or publicly and in uniform such that the source
    could risk reprisal. Moreover, nothing in the affidavit
    suggests the basis of the source’s knowledge.
    
    Id.
     at 668–69, 766 S.E.2d at 600.
    Turning to the case before us, in determining which standard applies to the
    confidential informant’s tip, we note that the informant did not have a history of
    providing reliable information in the past. The trial court found in pertinent part:
    Detective Ward indicated that he had never met with the
    confidential informant and was relying upon her
    trustworthiness from Detective Sergeant Jurney.
    Detective Sergeant Jurney indicated that she had never
    worked with the confidential informant before, but the
    information she provided was detailed and accurate as to a
    description of the Defendant, where the marijuana was
    located, and where the Defendant lived.
    The confidential informant’s lack of a “track record” however, does not require this
    Court to consider the tip anonymous. “What is popularly termed a ‘track record’ is
    only one method by which a confidential source of information can be shown to be
    reliable for purposes of establishing probable cause.” Riggs, 
    328 N.C. at 219
    , 400
    - 15 -
    STATE V. JACKSON
    Opinion of the Court
    S.E.2d at 433. Instead, in determining whether to apply the anonymous tip standard
    or the confidential and reliable tip standard, we assess whether the information
    provided by the informant includes a statement against her penal interest and other
    indicia of her reliability.
    “Whether a statement is in fact against interest must be determined from the
    circumstances of each case.” Williamson v. United States, 
    512 U.S. 594
    , 601, 
    129 L. Ed. 2d 476
    , 484 (1994). Here, in the order denying Defendant’s motion to suppress,
    the trial court concluded that “the statements made by the confidential informant
    were against her penile [sic] interest in that she admitted to purchasing and
    possessing marijuana from the Defendant in the past few days.” This conclusion is
    supported by the following findings of the trial court that: “two days prior [to her
    discussion with Detective Jurney], the confidential informant had been to the home
    of Adam Robert Jackson and purchased marijuana[;] . . . “the confidential informant
    had purchased marijuana from inside the home[;] and [] the confidential informant
    had bought marijuana on several prior occasions from the Defendant at the same
    residence.” These findings are supported by the search warrant application and the
    officers’ testimony at the suppression hearing.
    “Statements against penal interest carry their own indicia of credibility
    sufficient to support a finding of probable cause to search.” Beam, 
    325 N.C. at 221
    ,
    
    381 S.E.2d at 330
    .       This Court and the Supreme Court have categorized an
    - 16 -
    STATE V. JACKSON
    Opinion of the Court
    informant’s statement implicating that the informant had used and/or purchased
    marijuana in the past as a statement against the informant’s penal interest, for the
    purpose of weighing reliability. See, e.g., State v. Witherspoon, 
    110 N.C. App. 413
    ,
    418, 
    429 S.E.2d 783
    , 786–87 (1993) (categorizing an informant’s statement as one
    against his penal interest where the informant told an officer that he had used
    marijuana, “thus admitting [the informant’s] possession and use of a controlled
    substance in the past”); Arrington, 
    311 N.C. at 641
    , 
    319 S.E.2d at 259
     (holding that
    “[t]he information supplied by the first informant establishes, against the informant’s
    penal interest, that he had purchased marijuana from the defendant[]”).
    Defendant contends that the confidential informant’s statement was not
    against her penal interest because it “was motivated by a desire to curry favor with
    the authorities to help her avoid conviction on her own charges.” In Arrington, the
    North Carolina Supreme Court refuted this argument:
    Common sense in the important daily affairs of life would
    induce a prudent and disinterested observer to credit these
    statements. People do not lightly admit a crime and place
    critical evidence in the hands of the police in the form of
    their own admissions. Admissions of crime, like admissions
    against proprietary interests, carry their own indicia of
    credibility—sufficient at least to support a finding of
    probable cause to search. That the informant may be paid
    or promised a “break” does not eliminate the residual risk
    and opprobrium of having admitted criminal conduct.
    
    311 N.C. at 641
    , 
    319 S.E.2d at 259
     (quoting United States v. Harris, 
    403 U.S. 573
    ,
    583–84, 
    29 L. Ed. 2d 723
    , 734 (1971)).
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    STATE V. JACKSON
    Opinion of the Court
    Here, the record evidence does not indicate that the confidential informant
    claimed that she was unaware that the substance that she possessed was marijuana.
    To the contrary, the statement of Detective Jurney, included in the search warrant
    application, provides that “[t]he confidential informant told Det. Sgt. Jurney that
    he/she, along with other individuals, had purchased marijuana from [Defendant]
    numerous times at that residence.” Even if the confidential informant had been
    motivated to provide this information by a desire to curry favor with Detective Jurney
    and potentially help her avoid conviction, she still would have incurred the “residual
    risk” of having admitted purchasing, and in turn, possessing marijuana. Accordingly,
    we hold that the information provided was against the confidential informant’s penal
    interest.
    Noting that the confidential informant did not have a track record of providing
    reliable information, but did make statements against her penal interest, we consider
    other indicia of the confidential informant’s credibility and reliability, including the
    face-to-face nature of the officer’s encounter with her and the confidential informant’s
    first-hand knowledge of the information.
    The information that Detective Jurney relayed to Deputy Ward regarding the
    Defendant’s criminal conduct was first ascertained during a face-to-face encounter
    between Detective Jurney and the confidential informant. “ ‘The police officer making
    the affidavit may do so in reliance upon information reported to him by other officers
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    STATE V. JACKSON
    Opinion of the Court
    in the performance of their duties.’ ” Witherspoon, 
    110 N.C. App. at 418
    , 
    429 S.E.2d at
    785–86 (quoting State v. Vestal, 
    278 N.C. 561
    , 576, 
    180 S.E.2d 755
    , 765 (1971)).
    Here, Deputy Ward’s affidavit did not merely rely on the information relayed by
    Detective Jurney. Instead, Detective Jurney accompanied Deputy Ward to apply for
    the search warrant and provided a written statement as part of the warrant
    application.   The face-to-face nature of Detective Jurney’s encounter with the
    confidential informant, outlined in her written statement, distinguishes this case
    from Hughes and Benters. Here, Detective Jurney had the opportunity to assess the
    informant’s demeanor during their initial encounter and during their drive to confirm
    Defendant’s address.    Additionally, the nature of this face-to-face conversation
    between Detective Jurney and the informant “significantly increased the likelihood
    that [the informant] would be held accountable if her tip proved to be false.” State v.
    Allison, 
    148 N.C. App. 702
    , 705, 
    559 S.E.2d 828
    , 830 (2002).
    The confidential informant had first-hand knowledge of the facts she provided.
    Detective Jurney’s written statement detailed the manner in which the confidential
    informant came to observe the information that she then relayed, specifically
    acknowledging that the informant had purchased marijuana from Defendant’s
    residence just two days prior. The informant provided detailed information, including
    that during this most recent purchase of marijuana, Defendant went into a bedroom
    located on the right side of his house, turned a key in a lock, and returned with a
    - 19 -
    STATE V. JACKSON
    Opinion of the Court
    mason jar containing marijuana.         By contrast, the applications for the search
    warrants at issue in Hughes and Benters failed to explain how the informants in those
    cases had become aware of the defendants’ criminal activity. In addition to Deputy
    Jurney’s    detailed   statement,    Deputy     Ward’s     affidavit   explained   specific
    circumstances underlying the search warrant application sufficient for an
    assessment of the confidential informant’s reliability.
    For the aforementioned reasons, we evaluate the reliability of the information
    provided by the informant under the confidential and reliable standard.
    B. Police Corroboration
    Another factor in assessing the reliability or unreliability of an informant is
    “whether information provided by the informant could be and was independently
    corroborated by the police.” Green, 194 N.C. App. at 627, 
    670 S.E.2d at 638
    . As
    explained supra, information provided by the informant in this case is more reliable
    than a tip from an anonymous source. “On the fluid balance prescribed by the
    Supreme Court, a less specific or less reliable tip requires greater corroboration to
    establish probable cause.” Benters, 367 N.C. at 669–70, 766 S.E.2d at 601 (citation
    omitted).
    Both Detective Jurney and Deputy Ward corroborated the confidential
    informant’s tip in various respects.      Detective Jurney searched the CJ LEADS
    database for “Adam Jackson” and found a person named Adam Robert Jackson with
    - 20 -
    STATE V. JACKSON
    Opinion of the Court
    the listed address of 2099 Old Mountain Road—the name and location provided by
    the informant. Detective Jurney’s database search also corroborated the informant’s
    description of Defendant’s appearance and age.
    In addition to providing an address and general description of the
    neighborhood of Defendant’s residence, the informant accompanied Detective Jurney
    to a mailbox marker that read 2099 Old Mountain Road, and explained that
    Defendant’s residence was down a private driveway, located on the left side of a fork.
    After Detective Jurney relayed this information to the Alexander County Sheriff’s
    Office, Captain Clarence Harris drove to the address and ventured down the private
    driveway, where he confirmed the exact location of Defendant’s residence consistent
    with the confidential informant’s description.
    Deputy Ward, after receiving the aforementioned information from Detective
    Jurney, conducted a criminal record search and discovered that “Adam Robert
    Jackson” had been charged with possession of marijuana just over a month earlier,
    on 22 December 2012. Deputy Ward also noted that he had “received information on
    several occasions throughout the past year from concerned citizens in the area of the
    premise to be searched, about drug traffic mainly [m]arijuana at the premise to be
    searched.”
    Defendant challenges the trial court’s finding that law enforcement officers
    verified information regarding where the marijuana was kept and how it was
    - 21 -
    STATE V. JACKSON
    Opinion of the Court
    packaged. We agree that this finding does not corroborate the reliability of the
    information because the officers did not locate the marijuana before applying for the
    search warrant. In order to carry weight as corroborating evidence for the purpose
    of determining the reliability of a tip, information must have been presented to the
    magistrate who issued the search warrant. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-245 (2015)
    (providing that “information other than that contained in the affidavit may not be
    considered by the issuing official in determining whether probable cause exists for
    the issuance of the warrant unless the information is either recorded or
    contemporaneously summarized in the record or on the face of the warrant by the
    issuing official[]”); see also Benters, 367 N.C. at 673, 766 S.E.2d at 603; Hughes, 
    353 N.C. at
    208–09, 
    539 S.E.2d at
    631–32; State v. Brown, 
    199 N.C. App. 253
    , 258–59,
    
    681 S.E.2d 460
    , 464–65 (2009); State v. Holmes, 
    142 N.C. App. 614
    , 621, 
    544 S.E.2d 18
    , 23 (2001); State v. Earhart, 
    134 N.C. App. 130
    , 133–34, 
    516 S.E.2d 883
    , 886 (1999).
    However, we hold that the trial court’s other findings regarding the officers’
    verification of Defendant’s physical appearance, address, and specific directions to
    Defendant’s residence are supported by competent evidence and are sufficient to
    support the trial court’s conclusion that probable cause was established.
    C. Freshness of Tip
    We also consider the freshness of the confidential informant’s information. The
    informant provided Deputy Ward with detailed information regarding her purchase
    - 22 -
    STATE V. JACKSON
    Opinion of the Court
    of marijuana from Defendant just two days prior. The informant relayed specific
    details, including witnessing Defendant go into a bedroom located on the right side
    of his residence, hearing the sound of a key turning in a lock, and observing
    Defendant return to the room where she was waiting with a mason jar filled with
    marijuana. In the order denying Defendant’s motion to suppress, the trial court made
    findings of fact encompassing all of this information.
    The passage of two days between an informant’s observation of criminal
    activity and an issuance of a search warrant bolsters the reliability of a tip. See State
    v. Singleton, 
    33 N.C. App. 390
    , 392, 
    235 S.E.2d 77
    , 79 (1977) (holding that because
    the affidavit “narrowed down the informant’s observation to within 48 hours of the
    time the warrant was obtained[,] . . . the magistrate, acting upon this information,
    could reasonably conclude that there was probable cause to believe that the drugs
    were still in defendant’s possession[]”). Accordingly, we hold that the timely nature
    of the informant’s tip provides additional indicia of reliability.
    For these same reasons, we hold that the conclusion of law challenged by
    Defendant that “the search warrant was based on information from a reliable
    confidential informant who provided information that was both accurate and fresh[,]”
    is supported by the trial court’s findings of fact, which, in turn, are supported by
    competent evidence.
    IV. Conclusion
    - 23 -
    STATE V. JACKSON
    Opinion of the Court
    In assessing the reliability of the information provided by the informant under
    the confidential and reliable tip standard, we consider that the information was
    obtained first-hand, that it was against the informant’s penal interest, and that it
    was timely and not stale. Additionally, we hold that Detective Jurney and Deputy
    Ward’s corroboration of this information was adequate to support a finding of
    probable cause. Accordingly, under the totality of the circumstances test, we hold
    that the application for the search warrant was sufficient to support the magistrate’s
    finding of probable cause.
    AFFIRMED.
    Judge STEPHENS concurs.
    Judge HUNTER, JR. concurs in part, dissents in part, by separate opinion.
    No. COA15-876 – State v. Jackson
    HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part.
    As an initial matter, I join the majority in granting Defendant’s petition for
    writ of certiorari.   However, I respectfully dissent from the majority in favor of
    reversing the trial court.
    - 24 -
    STATE V. JACKSON
    HUNTER, JR., J., Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part
    Reviewing the totality of the circumstances, and all of the record evidence, no
    probable cause existed for a warrant to issue in this case. See State v. Sinapi, 
    359 N.C. 394
    , 398, 
    610 S.E.2d 362
    , 365 (2005) (quoting State v. Beam, 
    325 N.C. 217
    , 221,
    
    381 S.E.2d 327
    , 329 (1989)). To uphold my “duty to ensure that a magistrate does
    not abdicate his or her duty by ‘merely ratifying the bare conclusions of affiants,’” I
    detail the following record evidence of the events leading up to Deputy Ward’s search
    warrant application. State v. Benters, 
    367 N.C. 660
    , 665, 
    766 S.E.2d 593
    , 598 (2014)
    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    As the majority states, Detective Jurney spoke with the confidential informant,
    whom she had never met before, during a knock-and-talk on 30 January 2013.
    Detective Jurney performed this knock-and-talk with another Iredell County
    narcotics detective in connection with an unrelated criminal case. No charges were
    ever filed against the confidential informant, though she admitted to previously
    purchasing some quantity of marijuana from Defendant on a prior occasion.
    The next day, on 31 January 2013, the confidential informant directed officers
    to Defendant’s residence. She identified Defendant’s home and discussed the details
    of her previous marijuana purchase. She described Defendant’s physical appearance
    and age. Officers confirmed Defendant’s residency and past appearance using CJ
    LEADS.
    - 25 -
    STATE V. JACKSON
    HUNTER, JR., J., Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part
    Thereafter, Deputy Jurney relayed the information to Deputy Kelly Ward of
    the Alexander County Sheriff’s Office because Defendant’s residence is located in
    Deputy Ward’s jurisdiction. Deputy Ward attached Deputy Jurney’s affidavit to a
    search warrant application to search Defendant’s home.
    At the suppression hearing, Detective Jurney testified she did not remember
    saying “[to the confidential informant] that if [she] did not cooperate . . . that [her]
    daughter would be removed from her custody.” Detective Jurney testified the
    confidential informant stated she bought marijuana from Defendant after officers
    “indicated . . . [that] the confidential informant [ ] was facing criminal charges
    herself.”
    According to Detective Jurney, “high school kids” contacted her “out of the
    blue” “on several occasions throughout [January 2012 through January 2013].” The
    students voiced concern about their friend who “[bought] drugs and us[ed] cocaine”
    from Defendant. The record discloses no information about these individuals, the
    number of times they contacted Detective Jurney, or the circumstances surrounding
    their conversations with Detective Jurney.
    Prior to the search, officers knew Defendant matched the confidential
    informant’s description of him, based upon his past photo in the CJ LEADS system.
    Officers also knew Defendant lived at the home the confidential informant identified
    because of his listed residence on CJ LEADS. They also knew Defendant was charged
    - 26 -
    STATE V. JACKSON
    HUNTER, JR., J., Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part
    with possession of marijuana two months prior in December 2012. Apart from this,
    the officers did not corroborate the confidential informant’s information about
    Defendant’s marijuana business.
    This Court, and our Supreme Court, have upheld searches of suspected drug
    traffickers’ residences because “officers [ ] discovered some specific and material
    connection between drug activity and the place to be searched.” State v. Allman, ___
    N.C. App. ___, ___, 
    781 S.E.2d 311
    , 317 (2016). Examples of this include: pulling a
    suspect’s trash that is placed at the curb and uncovering several marijuana plants,
    Sinapi, 
    359 N.C. at 395
    , 
    610 S.E.2d at 363
    ; performing controlled drug buys at the
    suspect’s residence using confidential sources, State v. Riggs, 
    328 N.C. 213
    , 215–16,
    
    400 S.E.2d 429
    , 431 (1991); and staking out the suspect’s residence and observing a
    high volume traffic pattern “with visitors only staying [inside] for about one minute”
    and observing several    persons being arrested during that time period for drug
    possession “as they exited the suspect residence,” State v. Crawford, 
    104 N.C. App. 591
    , 596, 
    410 S.E.2d 499
    , 501 (1991).
    The verb “corroborate” means, “To strengthen or confirm; to make more
    certain.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). A witness’s testimony is said to be
    corroborated when “it is shown to correspond with the representation of some other
    witnesses, or to comport with some facts otherwise known or established.” Black’s
    Law Dictionary 344 (6th ed. 1990).         Here, the officers did not corroborate the
    - 27 -
    STATE V. JACKSON
    HUNTER, JR., J., Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part
    confidential informant’s information.          The officers corroborated Defendant’s
    appearance, history of marijuana possession, residence, and the confidential
    informant’s ability to navigate to the residence. The officers did not perform any
    controlled drug buys, observe a large number of visitors that is consistent with an
    ongoing marijuana operation, pull Defendant’s trash to find marijuana or marijuana
    plants, or review Defendant’s electricity and water consumption to corroborate any
    suspicion of marijuana manufacturing. Rather, the officers applied for a search
    warrant using a previously unknown informant’s statements regarding her past
    behavior, which were made after the officers told her she was facing criminal charges,
    and were possibly made after officers threatened to take her daughter from her.
    For the Fourth Amendment to have any effect, officers should corroborate the
    information given to them in circumstances like these. The confidential informant’s
    information and the information in Deputy Jurney’s affidavit, taken in light of the
    totality of the circumstances, do not provide a substantial basis for concluding that
    probable cause exists. Sinapi, 
    359 N.C. at 398
    , 
    610 S.E.2d at 365
     (quoting State v.
    Beam, 
    325 N.C. 217
    , 221, 
    381 S.E.2d 327
    , 329 (1989)).                 Accordingly, I must
    respectfully dissent.
    - 28 -