Khatib v. N.C. Dep't of Transp. ( 2018 )


Menu:
  •                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
    No. COA17-1430
    Filed: 4 September 2018
    North Carolina Industrial Commission, I.C. No. TA-23392
    BASMA KHATIB, a/k/a BASMA BADRAN NABABTEH, Plaintiff,
    v.
    NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant.
    Appeal by plaintiff from decision and order entered 23 August 2017 by the
    North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 August
    2018.
    Bryant Duke Paris III PLLC, by Bryant Duke Paris III, for plaintiff-appellant.
    Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Alesia
    M. Balshakova, for defendant-appellee.
    ELMORE, Judge.
    Plaintiff Basma Khatib appeals a decision and order of the North Carolina
    Industrial Commission denying her negligence claim against the North Carolina
    Department of Transportation (“NCDOT”).         Khatib sustained injuries after she
    admittedly deviated from a pedestrian crosswalk to cut across a grass median and
    stepped into an uncovered storm drain, falling five feet underground. She sued the
    NCDOT in the Industrial Commission under the Tort Claims Act, see N.C. Gen. Stat.
    § 143-293, alleging that the NCDOT negligently failed to inspect and maintain the
    KHATIB V. N.C. DEP’T OF TRANSP.
    Opinion of the Court
    storm drain because when she fell into it, the grate normally covering the storm drain
    had been removed and was lying a few feet away. The Commission denied Khatib’s
    claim in relevant part because it concluded she was contributorily negligent “when
    she chose to deviate from the marked crosswalk and run across the grassy median
    without keeping a proper lookout.”
    On appeal, Khatib contends the Commission erred by finding and concluding
    (1) the NCDOT owed her no duty to exercise reasonable care in maintaining its storm
    drain; (2) the NCDOT did not negligently breach this duty; and (3) Khatib’s claim was
    barred by contributory negligence. Because we hold the Commission’s challenged
    findings were supported by competent evidence, which in turn supported its
    conclusion that Khatib’s claim was barred by her own contributory negligence, we
    affirm the Commission’s decision and order on this basis.
    I. Background
    On 26 June 2011, Khatib’s husband dropped her off to go for a jog near
    Centennial Parkway in Raleigh. At that time, Entrepreneur Drive formed a T-
    intersection with Centennial Parkway, and all four directions contained a pedestrian
    crosswalk that covered the entire square of the intersection.          To the west,
    Entrepreneur Drive’s four driving lanes dead-ended a few car lengths from the
    intersection, providing just enough space for cars to park, and those four lanes were
    center divided by a curbed grass median. The grass median extended east beyond
    -2-
    KHATIB V. N.C. DEP’T OF TRANSP.
    Opinion of the Court
    the crosswalk, at which point it became a sidewalk that connected the two segments
    of crosswalk. A storm drain lie on the road adjacent to the northward facing curb of
    the grass median, a few feet west of the crosswalk. For reasons unknown, and first
    discovered by the NCDOT when it learned of Khatib’s fall, the grate normally
    covering that storm drain had been removed and was lying a few feet away.
    At approximately 8:00 p.m., Khatib called her husband to pick her up. Khatib
    continued jogging northbound on Centennial Drive’s sidewalk as her husband, who
    had been driving southbound on Centennial Drive, pulled his car nose first into the
    northernmost lane of the westbound dead-end segment of Entrepreneur Drive and
    parked to wait for her. When Khatib saw her husband’s vehicle, she chose not to
    follow the pedestrian crosswalk path behind the car to enter its passenger-side door
    but instead cut across the grass median to pass by the front of the car. Unfortunately,
    when Khatib stepped off the grass median’s curb, she stepped into the uncovered
    storm drain, fell approximately five feet, and sustained injuries.
    Khatib sued the NCDOT under the Tort Claims Act for negligence. After a
    deputy commissioner dismissed her claim with prejudice based, in relevant part, on
    his conclusion that Khatib’s claim was barred by her own contributory negligence,
    Khatib appealed to the Full Commission. After a hearing, the Commission entered a
    decision and order on 23 August 2017 affirming the deputy commissioner’s decision,
    thereby denying Khatib’s negligence claim against the NCDOT. In relevant part, the
    -3-
    KHATIB V. N.C. DEP’T OF TRANSP.
    Opinion of the Court
    Commission found “[t]he hole [caused by the uncovered storm drain in which Khatib
    fell] was visible to anyone approaching, so long as they were keeping a proper
    lookout[,]” and Khatib’s “failure to use the designated crosswalk and failure to pay
    attention to her surroundings, including the conditions of her path, when crossing the
    median were the proximate cause of plaintiff’s fall and were not reasonable
    considering the circumstances.” The Commission thus concluded that Khatib “failed
    to exercise the standard of care that a person of ordinary prudence would
    demonstrate when she chose to deviate from the marked crosswalk and run across
    the grassy median without keeping a proper lookout” and, therefore, that she was
    “barred from recovery under the Tort Claims Act on the basis of contributory
    negligence.” Khatib appeals.
    II. Analysis
    On appeal, Khatib asserts the Commission erred by not (1) concluding the
    NCDOT owed her a duty to exercise reasonable care in maintaining its storm drain;
    (2) finding and concluding that the NCDOT’s negligence caused her injuries; and (3)
    finding and concluding Khatib had not been contributorily negligent. Because we
    conclude the Commission’s findings supported its conclusion that Khatib’s claim was
    barred by contributory negligence, we affirm the Commission’s decision and order on
    this basis and need not address the first two issues presented on appeal. Cf. State v.
    Blackwell, 
    246 N.C. 642
    , 644, 
    99 S.E.2d 867
    , 869 (1957) (“[A] correct decision of a
    -4-
    KHATIB V. N.C. DEP’T OF TRANSP.
    Opinion of the Court
    lower court will not be disturbed because a wrong or insufficient or superfluous
    reason is assigned.” (citation omitted)).
    A. Review Standard
    “The standard of review for an appeal from a decision by the Full Commission
    under the Tort[ ] Claims Act ‘shall be for errors of law under the same terms and
    conditions as govern appeals in ordinary civil actions, and the findings of fact of the
    Commission shall be conclusive if there is any competent evidence to support them.’ ”
    Webb v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 
    180 N.C. App. 466
    , 467, 
    637 S.E.2d 304
    , 305 (2006)
    (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-293 (2005)). “[W]hen considering an appeal from the
    Full Commission, our Court is limited to two questions: (1) whether competent
    evidence exists to support the Commission’s findings of fact, and (2) whether the Full
    Commission’s findings of fact justify its conclusions of law and decision.” 
    Id. at 467–
    68, 637 S.E.2d at 305 
    (brackets omitted) (quoting Simmons v. N.C. Dep’t. of Transp.,
    
    128 N.C. App. 402
    , 405–06, 
    496 S.E.2d 790
    , 793 (1998)).
    B. Contributory Negligence
    Khatib asserts the Commission erred “when it failed to find as fact and
    conclude as a matter of law . . . that [she] was not guilty of contributory negligence.”
    Khatib also contends the Commission’s findings numbered 5, 7, and 8, as well as its
    legal conclusion numbered 11, which Khatib argues is actually a finding, were not
    supported by competent evidence. We disagree.
    -5-
    KHATIB V. N.C. DEP’T OF TRANSP.
    Opinion of the Court
    Contributory negligence is negligence on the part of the
    plaintiff which joins, simultaneously or successively, with
    the negligence of the defendant alleged in the complaint to
    produce the injury of which the plaintiff complains. In
    order to prove contributory negligence on the part of a
    plaintiff, the defendant must demonstrate: (1) a want of
    due care on the part of the plaintiff; and (2) a proximate
    connection between the plaintiff’s negligence and the
    injury. However, a plaintiff may relieve the defendant of
    the burden of showing contributory negligence when it
    appears from the plaintiff’s own evidence that he was
    contributorily negligent.
    Proffitt v. Gosnell, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 
    809 S.E.2d 200
    , 204 (2017) (citations,
    quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
    The Commission made the following challenged findings and conclusion to
    support its determination that Khatib’s claim was barred by contributory negligence:
    5. Plaintiff saw her husband’s vehicle and jogged toward[s]
    it. Plaintiff was running on the sidewalk then cut through
    the grass median away from the crosswalk and toward[s]
    the front of the vehicle. When she reached the curb of the
    median and stepped down, plaintiff fell into the uncovered
    storm drain, approximately five feet to the bottom.
    7. [sic] According to plaintiff, at the time of the incident it
    was not dark, the weather was nice, and she “could see
    perfectly well.” Plaintiff was focused on looking at her
    husband’s vehicle. She was not looking at the sidewalk,
    the conditions of her chosen path of travel, or the terrain in
    front of her. The hole was visible to anyone approaching,
    so long as they were keeping a proper lookout.
    8. [sic] Plaintiff testified that she did not use the designated
    crosswalk to get to the vehicle even though access to the
    crosswalk was available. . . . [P]laintiff’s failure to use the
    designated crosswalk and failure to pay attention to her
    -6-
    KHATIB V. N.C. DEP’T OF TRANSP.
    Opinion of the Court
    surroundings, including the conditions of her path, when
    crossing the median were the proximate cause of plaintiff’s
    fall and were not reasonable considering the
    circumstances.      Based on the preponderance of the
    evidence, plaintiff was contributorily negligent in causing
    the fall into the storm drain.
    ....
    11. . . . [P]laintiff failed to exercise the standard of care that
    a person of ordinary prudence would demonstrate when
    she chose to deviate from the marked crosswalk and run
    across the grassy median without keeping a proper lookout.
    Accordingly, the Commission concludes that plaintiff is
    barred from recovery under the Tort Claims Act on the
    basis of contributory negligence.
    However, as Khatib has failed to specifically argue how these findings were
    unsupported by record evidence, she has abandoned her purported evidentiary
    challenge to these findings. See N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6). Nonetheless, despite Khatib
    not mounting a proper substantial evidence challenge to the Commission’s findings,
    our review reveals these findings were adequately supported by the record.
    According to Khatib’s own testimony, when her husband arrived to pick her
    up, it “wasn’t dark,” “[t]he weather was nice[,] and [she] could see perfectly well.”
    When Khatib saw her husband’s car arrive, she was looking “toward[ ] the car” and
    “could see [her husband] and . . . children,” but could not see “anything else in front
    of [her],” including the “sidewalk.” Khatib confirmed that “at the time [she was]
    approaching [her] husband’s vehicle [she] was looking at him and [her] children” and
    was “not looking down at [her] feet” to see where she was walking. Khatib also
    -7-
    KHATIB V. N.C. DEP’T OF TRANSP.
    Opinion of the Court
    confirmed that, rather than following the pedestrian-crosswalk path behind the car
    in order to get to the passenger-side door, she cut through the grass median outside
    of the crosswalk path to pass in front of the car. Having concluded the evidentiary
    portions of these findings were supported by the record, we turn to whether these
    findings supported the Commission’s conclusion that Khatib’s claim was barred by
    her own contributory negligence.
    In her brief, Khatib concedes that, as she “was in the process of being reunited
    with her family at the conclusion of her exercise, she saw the family vehicle, [her
    husband], and her children and was briefly distracted from watching where she was
    going.” (Emphasis added.) Nonetheless, she relies on Kremer v. Food Lion, Inc., 
    102 N.C. App. 291
    , 295, 
    401 S.E.2d 837
    , 839 (1991) (“Although failure to discover an
    obvious defect will usually be considered contributory negligence as a matter of law,
    this general rule does not apply when circumstances divert the attention of an
    ordinarily prudent person from discovering an existing dangerous condition.”
    (citation omitted)), to support her argument that “competent and substantial
    evidence mandates a finding of fact that [she] was not guilty of contributory
    negligence inasmuch as her attention was understandably diverted while she was
    exercising and it would have been likewise nearly impossible for her to see the
    uncovered inlet until she was directly on top of it.” Kremer is distinguishable because
    the evidence there showed the plaintiff was walking down a grocery-store aisle
    -8-
    KHATIB V. N.C. DEP’T OF TRANSP.
    Opinion of the Court
    intended for customer foot traffic, and Food Lion had placed items above the aisle
    intended to draw customer attention. After taking two steps into the aisle, the
    plaintiff fell over misplaced dog food bags. 
    Id. at 296,
    401 S.E.2d at 839. Here,
    contrarily, the evidence showed Khatib cut across a grass median outside the
    designated pedestrian-crosswalk path, and no circumstances attributable to the
    NCDOT’s conduct distracted Khatib’s attention. Webb controls this case.
    In Webb, the plaintiff stopped his car at a rest area to purchase a 
    newspaper. 180 N.C. App. at 466
    , 637 S.E.2d at 305. Although he saw a sidewalk for pedestrian
    travel that led to the newspaper kiosk, the plaintiff chose a more direct path across
    the grass and through a shrub bed covered in pine straw, where he was injured after
    tripping over a hidden metal protrusion. 
    Id. at 466–67,
    637 S.E.2d at 305. As here,
    the plaintiff sued the NCDOT for alleged negligence in failure to maintain the
    grounds, and the Commission concluded his claim was barred by contributory
    negligence. 
    Id. at 467,
    637 S.E.2d at 305. On appeal, we affirmed, determining the
    findings supported an inference that the plaintiff “should have had constructive, if
    not actual, knowledge that deviating from an intended walking path into pine straw
    brings with it some danger of injury.” 
    Id. at 469,
    637 S.E.2d at 306. We determined
    the “plaintiff clearly had the capacity to understand that his shortcut carried a safety
    risk[,]” and affirmed the Commission’s decision to deny the claim based on the
    plaintiff’s contributory negligence in deviating from the sidewalk. 
    Id. -9- KHATIB
    V. N.C. DEP’T OF TRANSP.
    Opinion of the Court
    Here, as in Webb, the Commission’s findings support a conclusion that Khatib
    should have known that deviating from the intended pedestrian-crosswalk path onto
    the grass median carried some danger of injury, and that her shortcut carried a safety
    risk. Further, the findings establish, and Khatib conceded below and on appeal, that
    she was distracted by her family and not looking where she was walking.
    Accordingly, we hold the Commission’s findings support its conclusion that Khatib’s
    claim was barred by her own contributory negligence, and affirm its decision and
    order.
    III. Conclusion
    The Commission’s relevant challenged findings were supported by the record,
    which in turn supported its challenged conclusion that Khatib’s claim against the
    NCDOT was barred by her contributory negligence in deviating from the crosswalk
    path to cut through the grass median and failing to keep a proper lookout where she
    was walking. Accordingly, we affirm the Commission’s decision and order denying
    Khatib’s claim on the basis of contributory negligence.
    AFFIRMED.
    Judges HUNTER, JR. and ZACHARY concur.
    - 10 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: COA17-1430

Judges: Elmore

Filed Date: 9/4/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/6/2023