Tillett v. Town of Kill Devil Hills , 809 S.E.2d 145 ( 2017 )


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  •               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
    No. COA17-433
    Filed: 19 December 2017
    Dare County, No. 15-CVS-327
    JERRY R. TILLETT, Plaintiff,
    v.
    TOWN OF KILL DEVIL HILLS, a Body Politic and Municipal Corporation,
    Defendant.
    Appeal by plaintiff and defendant from order entered 14 November 2016 by
    Judge Jeffery B. Foster in Dare County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals
    18 October 2017.
    Nexsen Pruet PLLC, by Norman W. Shearin, for plaintiff-appellee and cross-
    appellant.
    Cranfill Sumner & Hartzog LLP, by Dan M. Hartzog, Jr., for defendant-
    appellant and cross-appellee.
    DIETZ, Judge.
    Judge Jerry Tillett brought suit under our State’s Public Records Act to compel
    the Town of Kill Devil Hills to produce documents that he contends are public records
    subject to disclosure under the Act. The trial court reviewed these documents in
    camera—meaning in private, outside the presence of the parties and the public. The
    court determined that two documents were subject to disclosure and ordered them to
    be produced under seal to Judge Tillett. Both parties appealed.
    TILLETT V. TOWN OF KILL DEVIL HILLS
    Opinion of the Court
    On appeal, the Town argues that the trial court lacked subject matter
    jurisdiction to enter the challenged order. We agree. The applicable section of the
    Public Records Act states that a litigant “may apply to the appropriate division of the
    General Court of Justice for an order compelling disclosure or copying, and the court
    shall have jurisdiction to issue such orders if the person has complied with G.S. 7A-
    38.3E.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-9(a) (emphasis added). As explained in more detail
    below, the General Assembly’s use of the word “jurisdiction” demonstrates that it
    intended for Section 132-9(a) to impose a jurisdictional rule, rather than an ordinary
    procedural rule.
    Judge Tillett concedes that he did not satisfy the requirements of N.C. Gen.
    Stat. § 132-9(a) because he failed to initiate mediation within 30 days of the Town’s
    filing of a responsive pleading, as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-38.3E.
    Accordingly, we must vacate the trial court’s order for lack of subject matter
    jurisdiction.
    Facts and Procedural History
    In early 2015, Judge Jerry Tillett requested various public records from the
    Town of Kill Devil Hills through the provisions of our State’s Public Records Act. The
    Town produced some records but withheld others, arguing that they fell within
    various exceptions to the public records laws. Judge Tillett then sued the Town to
    compel disclosure of the remaining, undisclosed records.
    -2-
    TILLETT V. TOWN OF KILL DEVIL HILLS
    Opinion of the Court
    The applicable provisions of the public records laws required Judge Tillett to
    “initiate mediation . . . no later than 30 days from the filing of responsive pleadings
    with the clerk in the county where the action is filed.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-38.3E(b).
    Judge Tillett did not initiate mandatory mediation within 30 days after the Town
    filed its answer.
    Ultimately, after a hearing and an opportunity to review the disputed
    documents in camera, the trial court ordered the Town to produce copies of two of the
    challenged documents, but also ordered that the documents must remain under seal
    and not be shared with the public generally. Both parties timely appealed the trial
    court’s order.
    Analysis
    We begin our analysis with the Town’s argument that the trial court lacked
    subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate this dispute. Subject matter jurisdiction is a
    question of law that this Court reviews de novo. McKoy v. McKoy, 
    202 N.C. App. 509
    ,
    511, 
    689 S.E.2d 590
    , 592 (2010).
    The Public Records Act provides that a litigant seeking to challenge the denial
    of access to public records “may apply to the appropriate division of the General Court
    of Justice for an order compelling disclosure or copying, and the court shall have
    jurisdiction to issue such orders if the person has complied with G.S. 7A-38.3E.” N.C.
    Gen. Stat. § 132-9(a) (emphasis added).
    -3-
    TILLETT V. TOWN OF KILL DEVIL HILLS
    Opinion of the Court
    Section 7A-38.3E of the General Statutes is titled “Mediation of public records
    disputes” and requires a party who files a civil action under the Public Records Act
    to “initiate mediation . . . no later than 30 days from the filing of responsive pleadings
    with the clerk in the county where the action is filed.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-38.3E(b).
    The General Assembly’s use of the phrase “shall have jurisdiction to issue such
    orders” in Section 132-9(a) is crucial to our analysis. Broadly speaking, there are two
    types of rules governing the manner in which legal claims are pursued in court:
    jurisdictional rules, which affect a court’s power to hear the dispute, and procedural
    rules, which ensure that the legal system adjudicates the claim in an orderly way.
    See Dolan v. United States, 
    560 U.S. 605
    , 610 (2010).
    The    distinction    is   important    because,     unlike   ordinary   procedural
    requirements, jurisdictional requirements cannot be waived or excused by the court.
    In re T.R.P., 
    360 N.C. 588
    , 595, 
    636 S.E.2d 787
    , 793 (2006). Instead, if a litigant fails
    to satisfy a jurisdictional requirement, the court lacks the power to adjudicate the
    dispute at all—rendering any action taken in the case a nullity. State ex rel. Hanson
    v. Yandle, 
    235 N.C. 532
    , 535, 
    70 S.E.2d 565
    , 568 (1952). Moreover, unlike most
    procedural violations, a defect in subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time,
    even for the first time on appeal. Wood v. Guilford County, 
    355 N.C. 161
    , 164, 
    558 S.E.2d 490
    , 493 (2002).
    -4-
    TILLETT V. TOWN OF KILL DEVIL HILLS
    Opinion of the Court
    Ordinarily, courts might consider a mediation requirement like the one
    contained in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-38.3E(b) to be procedural, rather than
    jurisdictional. 
    Dolan, 560 U.S. at 610
    . As a result, a court could excuse noncompliance
    in certain circumstances—for example, by invoking equitable doctrines such as
    estoppel or waiver.
    But courts have long recognized that a legislative body is “free to attach the
    conditions that go with the jurisdictional label to a rule that [courts] would prefer to
    call a claim-processing rule.” Henderson v. Shinseki, 
    562 U.S. 428
    , 435 (2011). This is
    so because it is the legislative branch—in our case, the General Assembly—that
    establishes the jurisdiction of trial courts over these types of claims. See Bullington
    v. Angel, 
    220 N.C. 18
    , 20, 
    16 S.E.2d 411
    , 412 (1941); N.C. Const. Art. IV, Section 12.
    Simply put, even if a rule in a proceeding like this one appears to be merely
    procedural, courts must treat it as jurisdictional if the General Assembly has given a
    “clear indication that the provision was meant to carry jurisdictional consequences.”
    
    Henderson, 562 U.S. at 429
    .
    That is the case here. The Public Records Act states that a litigant “may apply
    to the appropriate division of the General Court of Justice for an order compelling
    disclosure or copying, and the court shall have jurisdiction to issue such orders if the
    person has complied with G.S. 7A-38.3E.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-9(a) (emphasis
    added). Thus, the General Assembly has given the courts a “clear indication” that the
    -5-
    TILLETT V. TOWN OF KILL DEVIL HILLS
    Opinion of the Court
    mandatory mediation requirements of Section 7A-38.3E are jurisdictional
    requirements that must be satisfied for the courts to have the power to adjudicate the
    dispute. Among these jurisdictional requirements is Section 7A-38.3E(b), which
    provides that “[s]ubsequent to filing a civil action under Chapter 132 of the General
    Statutes, a person shall initiate mediation pursuant to this section. Such mediation
    shall be initiated no later than 30 days from the filing of responsive pleadings with
    the clerk in the county where the action is filed.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-38.3E(b).
    We therefore hold that, in order to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court in a
    Public Records Act suit, the plaintiff must initiate mediation within 30 days of the
    filing of the responsive pleading as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-38.3E(b). Judge
    Tillett concedes that he did not initiate mediation within 30 days after the Town filed
    its responsive pleading. Thus, we agree with the Town that the trial court lacked
    jurisdiction to adjudicate this Public Records Act dispute, and we vacate the trial
    court’s order. We note, however, that this ruling does not prevent Judge Tillett, or
    other parties who seek access to these records, from pursuing further Public Records
    Act requests and properly invoking the trial court’s jurisdiction should the Town
    again refuse to produce the records.
    Conclusion
    The trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the challenged order.
    That order is vacated.
    -6-
    TILLETT V. TOWN OF KILL DEVIL HILLS
    Opinion of the Court
    VACATED.
    Judges ELMORE and INMAN concur.
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: COA17-433

Citation Numbers: 809 S.E.2d 145

Judges: Dietz

Filed Date: 12/19/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024