State v. Davis ( 2014 )

NO. COA14-258
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 21 October 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Cumberland County
No. 11 CRS 009135
ANTOINETTE NICOLE DAVIS
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 18 October 2013
by Judge James Floyd Ammons, Jr. in Cumberland County Superior
Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 August 2014.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Kathleen N. Bolton, for the State.
Amanda S. Zimmer for defendant-appellant.
HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.
Antoinette Nicole Davis (“defendant”) appeals from judgment
entered pursuant to her Alford plea to two counts of felonious
child abuse and one count each of second degree murder, human
trafficking, conspiracy to commit sexual offense of a child by
an adult offender, first degree kidnapping, first degree sexual
offense, sexual servitude, and taking indecent liberties with a
minor. On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court’s denial
of her motion to suppress incriminating statements made to law
-2-
enforcement personnel during interviews conducted in November
2009. Specifically, defendant argues that the trial court erred
by concluding that: (1) defendant was not subject to custodial
interrogation during these interviews, and (2) her confession
was voluntarily and understandingly made.
After careful review, we affirm the trial court’s denial of
defendant’s motion to suppress.
Background
From 10 November 2009 through 14 November 2009, defendant
was interviewed four times by law enforcement personnel at the
Fayetteville City Police Department. She went to the police
department voluntarily for each of the four interviews, with the
stated purpose of helping the officers find her missing five-
year-old daughter, S.D.1
A. The First Interview
On 10 November 2009, defendant called 911 to report that
S.D. was missing. She went to the police station and spoke with
Detective Tracey Bowman (“Detective Bowman”). The first
interview began at 8:54 a.m. and lasted approximately six hours
and nine minutes. Defendant was left alone in the interview
room for long periods of time, with the door closed but
1
To protect the privacy of the minor victim, we will refer to
her using her initials.
-3-
unlocked. Detective Bowman told defendant that she was keeping
the door closed as a safety precaution because criminal suspects
were inside the building. Defendant was allowed to take
bathroom and cigarette breaks, but was accompanied by Detective
Bowman during each. Detective Bowman explained that a Police
Department safety code required that she escort defendant.
Defendant was offered beverages several times throughout the
interview and was given food to eat.
In the first interview, defendant told Detective Bowman
that she did not know what happened to S.D. or who could have
taken her. At the time, defendant and S.D. were living in a
trailer with defendant’s sister, Brenda. Defendant claimed to
have put S.D. to sleep in S.D.’s brother’s bedroom at around
5:00 a.m. that morning, and that at around 6:00 a.m., S.D.’s
brother told defendant that S.D. was no longer in the bed with
him. When defendant discovered that no one in the trailer had
seen S.D., she searched the front part of her neighborhood then
called the police.
Towards the end of the interview, defendant expressed
frustration at being at the police station for so long, because
she wanted to be out looking for S.D. Detective Bowman told her
she could leave if she really wanted to, but defendant declined.
-4-
Defendant left the station approximately six hours after
arriving.
B. The Second Interview
The second interview began at 5:25 p.m. on 11 November 2009
and lasted approximately thirty minutes. During this interview,
defendant told Detective Bowman that her boyfriend, Clarance Coe
(“Coe”), had taken S.D. She claimed that he hit S.D. twice in
the face in the early morning hours of 10 November 2009 after
having an intense argument with defendant. Although defendant
claimed that she tried to stop him, Coe “took off” in a car with
S.D. Defendant told Detective Bowman that she believed S.D. to
be somewhere around the Murchison Road area. After taking
defendant’s statement, Detective Bowman checked to see if there
were any new developments in the case. Soon thereafter,
defendant left the station.
C. The Third Interview
The third interview began at 8:38 p.m. on 12 November 2009
and lasted approximately forty-six minutes. Detective Bowman
initiated the interview by telling defendant that she knew
defendant had been lying about what happened to S.D. Detective
Bowman yelled and cursed at defendant, repeatedly accusing her
of lying. Defendant began to cry. Detective Bowman showed
-5-
defendant a photograph of S.D. with Mario McNeil, also known as
“Mono,” and asked defendant what she thought Mono would say when
he was caught. Defendant then admitted that she had lied the
previous day and that Coe had nothing to do with S.D.’s
disappearance. Detective Bowman told defendant that her false
statements lead to Coe’s arrest and incarceration and that lying
to a federal agent is a federal offense punishable by up to five
years in prison.
During the interview, Detective Bowman left the room and
closed the door as a safety precaution due to other prisoners
being in the building. Defendant asked for and received a glass
of water, at which time Detective Bowman told defendant that
they needed to work together to get S.D. back safely. Defendant
told Detective Bowman that Mono had a relationship with
defendant’s sister, Brenda. Defendant was then allowed to take
a bathroom break and was left alone in the interview room.
Before defendant left the police station, Detective Bowman told
her that she did not know what would happen as a result of
defendant’s lies, and that “[a]ll we care about right now is
finding your daughter.” Defendant thanked Detective Bowman and
left the police station.
D. The Fourth Interview
-6-
The fourth and final interview began at 11:53 a.m. on 14
November 2009 and lasted approximately five hours and thirty
minutes. Rather than speaking with Detective Bowman, defendant
was interviewed by Detective Carolyn Pollard (“Detective
Pollard”) and Sergeant Chris Corcione (“Sgt. Corcione”).
Defendant was seated in the back corner of the interview room,
with Detective Pollard and Sgt. Corcione between her chair and
the door. After approximately two hours of discussing
defendant’s personal background, defendant indicated that her
stomach hurt. She told the officers that she was pregnant.
Detective Pollard suggested that defendant go to the Health
Department for an examination, but defendant refused and said
“[m]y next step is to finish trying to find my daughter.”
Defendant then began recounting the events surrounding
S.D.’s disappearance. She awoke on the morning of 10 November
2009 to find S.D. gone. Defendant asked her sister’s boyfriend
if anyone had been in the house, and he replied “Mono.”
However, defendant claimed that she did not see or hear anyone
in the house and reiterated that she had nothing to do with
S.D.’s disappearance. Defendant admitted to Detective Pollard
and Sgt. Corcione that she lied in previous interviews and “put
it all on [Coe].” However, defendant said that she lied because
-7-
Detective Bowman scared her and “tried to make her know
something she didn’t know.” Detective Pollard asked defendant
if she was scaring her, and defendant said that she was not.
Defendant then said that she wanted to tell the truth after she
learned that Coe had been arrested because of her previous lies.
Sgt. Corcione told defendant that he wanted her to tell the
truth, because Mono was in jail and had already informed the
police that defendant knew what happened to S.D. The officers
told defendant that they already knew what happened but that
they needed to hear it from her; they repeatedly asked defendant
to stay on the “right track” by telling the truth. Defendant
told the officers that Mono came to the trailer because he
wanted to have sex with her. Sgt. Corcione advised defendant to
stay on the right track, and said that no matter what she said
she would “walk out of here.”
Eventually, defendant said that she owed Mono $200.00, and
that he wanted either the money that was owed or sex to repay
the debt. Sgt. Corcione told defendant that Mono was going to
tell the truth to save himself, so she needed to be entirely
truthful about what happened next. He told defendant “I got to
hear it from you so we can put that monster away.” Defendant
emotionally confessed to the officers that Mono took S.D. to a
-8-
motel room with defendant’s consent with the understanding that
“[a]ll he was supposed to do was have sex with her.” She said
that this arrangement would settle her $200.00 debt. Defendant
then claimed that the plan was for Mono to take S.D. to a motel
for another individual to have sex with her, but she did not
know whom the third party was. After giving these statements to
the officers, defendant requested and was allowed to take a
cigarette break.
When she returned, defendant was asked for details
regarding the arrangement she had with Mono. Defendant denied
knowing the specifics of Mono’s plan for S.D. Defendant was
then left in the interview room alone. She asked Sgt. Corcione
how much longer she was going to be there, to which he responded
“[n]ot too much longer.” Defendant took another bathroom and
cigarette break and asked Detective Pollard to join her outside.
After returning, defendant took one more bathroom break, then
was left alone in the interview room for approximately thirty
minutes. Detective Bowman then entered the room and advised
defendant that she was under arrest and was no longer free to
leave.
On 16 November 2009, S.D.’s body was found on the side of
Walker Road outside of Fayetteville. Medical examiners
-9-
concluded that S.D.’s cause of death was asphyxiation. Blood
was found on anal and vaginal swabs, indicating sexual trauma.
Defendant was charged with human trafficking, felonious
child abuse, felony conspiracy, first degree kidnapping, first
degree murder, rape of a child by an adult offender, sexual
servitude, and taking indecent liberties with a child. She
filed a motion to suppress the incriminating statements made to
Detective Pollard and Sgt. Corcione during the fourth interview,
but did not move to suppress any statements made in the other
three interviews. After hearing the parties on defendant’s
motion to suppress, the trial court entered an order denying the
motion.
In exchange for dismissal of the rape charge and a
reduction from first to second degree murder, defendant entered
an Alford plea on 18 October 2013. Pursuant to the plea
agreement, she was sentenced to 210 to 261 months imprisonment.
Defendant timely appealed from judgment, but failed to give
notice during plea negotiations as to her intent to appeal the
denial of her motion to suppress. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-979
(2013). Furthermore, defendant’s notice of appeal failed to
identify the specific court to which the appeal was taken, in
violation of Rule 4 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate
-10-
Procedure. In our discretion, we grant defendant’s petition for
writ of certiorari to reach the merits of her appeal. See N.C.
R. App. P. 21(a)(1) (2013); State v. Franklin, __ N.C. App. __,
__, 736 S.E.2d 218, 220 (2012).
Discussion
I. Custodial Interrogation
Defendant first argues that the trial court failed to
address whether a reasonable person in defendant’s position
would have believed she was under arrest or restrained to a
significant degree, and therefore erred by concluding that
defendant was not subject to custodial interrogation during the
fourth interview. We disagree.
We review the trial court’s legal conclusions in an order
denying a motion to suppress de novo. State v. Parker, 137 N.C.
App. 590, 594, 530 S.E.2d 297, 300 (2000). We also review the
legal conclusions for whether they are supported by the trial
court’s findings of fact. State v. Waring, 364 N.C. 443, 467,
701 S.E.2d 615, 631 (2010). “[A] trial court’s findings of fact
are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence,
even if the evidence is conflicting.” Id. at 469, 701 S.E.2d at
632 (citation omitted). Unchallenged findings of fact are
deemed supported by competent evidence and are binding on
-11-
appeal. State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 168, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878
(2011).
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees that “no person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const.
amemd. V. The United States Supreme Court has held that the
Fifth Amendment bars statements resulting from custodial
interrogation from being used against a defendant unless the
defendant was administered certain procedural safeguards before
responding, specifically being advised of the “right to remain
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney[.]” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 16 L. Ed.
2d 694, 706-07 (1966).
However, the Court has emphasized that
Police officers are not required to
administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom
they question. Nor is the requirement of
warnings to be imposed simply because the
questioning takes place in the station
house, or because the questioned person is
one whom the police suspect. Miranda
warnings are required only where there has
been such a restriction on a person’s
freedom as to render him “in custody.”
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 50 L. Ed. 2d 714, 719
(1977) (per curiam).
-12-
The “definitive inquiry” in determining whether a person is
“in custody” for Miranda purposes is whether, based on the
totality of the circumstances, there was a “formal arrest or a
restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a
formal arrest.” State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 662, 483 S.E.2d
396, 405 (1997) (citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318,
128 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1994) (per curiam)). This determination
involves “an objective test, based upon a reasonable person
standard, and is to be applied on a case-by-case basis
considering all the facts and circumstances.” State v. Hall, 131
N.C. App. 427, 432, 508 S.E.2d 8, 12 (1998) (quotation marks
omitted). While “no single factor controls the determination of
whether an individual is ‘in custody’ for purposes of
Miranda[,]” State v. Garcia, 358 N.C. 382, 397, 597 S.E.2d 724,
737 (2004), our appellate courts have “considered such factors
as whether a suspect is told he or she is free to leave, whether
the suspect is handcuffed, whether the suspect is in the
presence of uniformed officers, and the nature of any security
around the suspect,” State v. Waring, 364 N.C. 443, 471, 701
S.E.2d 615, 633 (2010) (internal citations omitted).
Defendant argues that the trial court’s conclusion of law
that she was not subject to custodial interrogation during the
-13-
fourth interview is erroneous for two reasons: (1) the trial
court used a subjective rather than objective test, in
contravention of long-standing precedent, and (2) the trial
court’s findings of fact are unsupported by competent evidence,
and those findings in turn do not support the conclusion that a
reasonable person in defendant’s position would not have felt
constrained to the same degree as with a formal arrest. We
disagree with both contentions.
First, there is no indication that the trial court utilized
a subjective rather than objective test in its conclusions of
law regarding whether defendant was subject to custodial
interrogation. The trial court concluded that:
The Defendant was not subjected to custodial
interrogation during the interviews of
November 10, 2009, November 11, 2009,
November 12, 2009 and November 14, 2009
until about 5:25 p.m. on November 14, 2009
when Det. Bowman told her that she was under
arrest. The Defendant was not in custody
until that point in time because the
Defendant had not been formally arrested or
otherwise deprived of her freedom of
movement of the degree associated with a
formal arrest until that moment.
(Emphasis added.) This conclusion of law tracks verbatim
language found in applicable opinions issued by this Court and
our Supreme Court regarding the test for whether an individual
was subject to custodial interrogation. See State v. Buchanan,
-14-
353 N.C. 332, 339, 543 S.E.2d 823, 828 (2001) (“[T]he
appropriate inquiry in determining whether a defendant is ‘in
custody’ for purposes of Miranda is, based on the totality of
the circumstances, whether there was a ‘formal arrest or
restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a
formal arrest.’”) Although the trial court did find as fact
that defendant believed she was free to leave at various points
of the interview, it also entered numerous findings of fact
detailing the objective circumstances of the interview. There
is no indication that the trial court supported its conclusion
that defendant was not subject to custodial interrogation with
the finding of fact that she subjectively felt free to leave;
that finding of fact could have properly been considered in the
trial court’s conclusion regarding the voluntariness of her
confession.
Thus, because the trial court’s conclusion that defendant
was not subject to custodial interrogation makes no reference to
defendant’s subjective state of mind, but does determine the
“appropriate inquiry” as set out in Buchanan, we conclude that
the trial court did not operate under a misapprehension of law.
Defendant’s argument is overruled.
-15-
Additionally, we hold that the trial court’s findings of
fact are supported by competent evidence, and those findings
support its conclusion of law that defendant was not subject to
custodial interrogation.
First, the trial court’s finding of fact that defendant was
not threatened is supported by competent evidence. Although
defendant was told by Detective Bowman in the third interview
that lying to a federal officer was punishable by up to five
years in prison, neither Detective Pollard nor Sgt. Corcione
threatened her with arrest or imprisonment during the fourth
interview. Rather, Detective Pollard and Sgt. Corcione told
defendant that they were unconcerned with the potential
consequences of her previous lies and wanted to get to the truth
of what happened so that they could find S.D. Because the only
interview subject to defendant’s motion to dismiss was the
fourth interview, Detective Bowman’s prior statements to
defendant do not render the trial court’s finding of fact that
defendant was not threatened erroneous.
Second, competent evidence supports the trial court’s
finding of fact that defendant was not restrained during the
fourth interview. Defendant concedes that she was not
handcuffed or physically restrained in any way. However,
-16-
defendant contends that her freedom of movement was restricted
to the degree associated with a formal arrest because she was
seated in the corner of the interview room and was “crowded” by
Detective Pollard and Sgt. Corcione, who were seated on either
side of defendant, between her and the door. Although we do not
dispute defendant’s characterization of the seating arrangement
inside the interview room, we do not find that these
circumstances amounted to a “restraint” on her
mobility. Defendant requested and was allowed to take multiple
bathroom and cigarette breaks throughout each of the four
interviews. Although she was escorted by an officer for each of
these breaks, our Supreme Court has noted that it is “unlikely
that any civilian would be allowed to stray through a police
station,” indicating an unwillingness to consider a police
escort for a bathroom break as weighing in favor of a contention
that a defendant was in custody. Waring, 364 N.C. at 472, 701
S.E.2d at 634. During the fourth interview, Detective Pollard
even suggested that defendant leave and go to a medical center
when defendant indicated that she felt pain and stomach illness
due to her pregnancy. Defendant declined to leave; she elected
to continue speaking to the officers with the hope that they
would help her find S.D. Thus, because the record demonstrates
-17-
that defendant could have left the fourth interview had she
desired to do so and generally had the freedom to take breaks
whenever she requested them, competent evidence supports the
trial court’s finding of fact that defendant’s freedom of
movement was not restrained.
Given that competent evidence supports the trial court’s
factual findings that defendant was neither threatened nor
restrained during the fourth interview, we find no error in its
legal conclusion that defendant was not in custody for the
purposes of Miranda. In addition to the above, we find
competent evidence to support the trial court’s findings of fact
that: (1) defendant voluntarily went to the police station for
each of the four interviews; (2) she was allowed to leave at the
end of the first three interviews; (3) the interview room door
was closed but unlocked; (4) defendant was allowed to take
multiple bathroom and cigarette breaks; (5) defendant was given
food and drink; and (6) defendant was offered the opportunity to
leave the fourth interview but refused. Our Courts have
consistently held that similar circumstances do not amount to
the level of custodial interrogation. See, e.g., State v.
Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 658-63, 483 S.E.2d 396, 402-06 (1997)
(holding that a defendant was not in custody where he
-18-
voluntarily went to the police station, was not told that he was
under arrest, was interviewed in a room at the police station
but was not handcuffed, was offered food, and the officer did
not answer him when he asked if he could leave); State v. Deese,
136 N.C. App. 413, 417-18, 524 S.E.2d 381, 384-85 (2000)
(holding that a defendant was not in custody where he was
permitted to arrange the interview at a time convenient to him,
was told that he was free to leave, was not physically
threatened or restrained, and was left alone in the interview
room for periods of time); State v. Waring, 364 N.C. 443, 471,
701 S.E.2d 615, 633-34 (2010) (holding that the defendant was
not in custody where officers told him he was not under arrest,
he voluntarily went with officers to the police station, was
never restrained, was given bathroom breaks, was left alone in
an unlocked interview room, and was not deceived, misled, or
threatened).
We conclude that under the totality of the circumstances, a
reasonable person in defendant’s position would not have
believed that she was formally arrested or restrained to the
degree associated with a formal arrest at the time defendant
gave incriminating statements during the fourth interview.
-19-
Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that defendant
was not subject to custodial interrogation.
II. Voluntariness of Confession
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by
concluding that her statements made in the fourth interview were
freely and voluntarily given, when in fact they were coerced by
fear and hope. We disagree.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
requires that a defendant’s confession be voluntary for it to be
admissible. State v. Thompson, 149 N.C. App. 276, 281, 560
S.E.2d 568, 572 (2002). “If, looking to the totality of the
circumstances, the confession is the product of an essentially
free and unconstrained choice by its maker, then he has willed
to confess and it may be used against him; where, however, his
will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination
critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due
process.” State v. Hardy, 339 N.C. 207, 222, 451 S.E.2d 600,
608 (1994) (quotations and brackets omitted). Our Supreme Court
has identified a number of relevant factors to consider in this
analysis, such as:
whether defendant was in custody, whether he
was deceived, whether his Miranda rights
were honored, whether he was held
incommunicado, the length of the
-20-
interrogation, whether there were physical
threats or shows of violence, whether
promises were made to obtain the confession,
the familiarity of the declarant with the
criminal justice system, and the mental
condition of the declarant.
Id. However, “[t]he presence or absence of any one or more of
these factors is not determinative.” State v. Kemmerlin, 356
N.C. 446, 458, 573 S.E.2d 870, 881 (2002).
Here, defendant argues that she was coerced into confessing
because: (1) Sgt. Corcione promised her that she would “walk
out” of the fourth interview regardless of what she said,; (2)
the officers lied to her about what information Mono had given
them; and (3) she was mentally unstable and unfit to give a
voluntary confession due to the stress of having a missing
child, being pregnant, and being implicated in S.D.’s
disappearance.
First, we do not believe that Sgt. Corcione’s promise that
defendant would “walk out” regardless of her statements rendered
defendant’s confession involuntary. This argument was
previously addressed in Thompson, where the defendant argued
that his confession was involuntary where the interviewing
officer promised him that he would not be arrested regardless of
what he said. Thompson, 149 N.C. App. at 282, 560 S.E.2d at
572. This Court held that the officer’s promise did not make
-21-
the confession involuntary because it could not have led the
defendant “to believe that the criminal justice system would
treat him more favorably if he confessed to the robbery.” Id.
at 282, 560 S.E.2d at 573. In so holding, the Court contrasted
previous cases where officers’ promises of assistance or
leniency in future prosecutions were held to be unduly coercive.
See, e.g., State v. Fox, 274 N.C. 277, 293, 163 S.E.2d 492, 503
(1968) (holding that a suggestion that the defendant might be
charged with accessory to murder rather than murder if he
confessed rendered the confession involuntary). Sgt. Corcione’s
statements are almost identical to those made in Thompson.
Thus, in accordance with Thompson, we hold that Sgt. Corcione’s
promise that defendant would “walk out” of the interview
regardless of what she said did not render her confession
involuntary. Without more, Sgt. Corcione’s statements could not
have led defendant to believe that she would be treated more
favorably by the criminal justice system if she confessed to her
involvement in S.D.’s disappearance and subsequent death.
Second, there is no indication that the officers lied about
what information Mono provided. No evidence was presented at
the suppression hearing regarding what Mono told law
enforcement, and there is nothing to support defendant’s claim
-22-
that Detective Pollard and Sgt. Corcione lied to defendant about
the information Mono provided. However, even assuming that the
officers were untruthful, the longstanding rule in this state is
that “[t]he use of trickery by police officers in dealing with
defendants is not illegal as a matter of law.” State v.
Jackson, 308 N.C. 549, 574, 304 S.E.2d 134, 148
(1983). Specifically, our Supreme Court has held that “[f]alse
statements by officers concerning evidence, as contrasted with
threats and promises, have been tolerated in confession cases
generally, because such statements do not affect the reliability
of the confession.” Id. Thus, because there is no indication
that Sgt. Corcione or Detective Pollard lied to defendant
regarding the information Mono provided law enforcement, we find
her argument unpersuasive. Even assuming that they did lie,
this interrogation tactic would not “affect the reliability of
the confession,” id., and therefore would still be insufficient
to support a conclusion that the confession was coerced or
involuntary.
Finally, we do not believe that defendant’s mental state
rendered her confession involuntary and coerced. Although
defendant did tell Detective Pollard and Sgt. Corcione that she
had not slept in five days due to the stress of S.D. being
-23-
missing, the trial court found as an uncontested finding of fact
that defendant “appeared to be coherent, did not appear to be
impaired in any way, . . . appeared to understand what was being
said during the interview[,]” and “the majority of her answers
were reasonable and were being taken in relationship to the
question.” Detective Pollard offered defendant the opportunity
to stop the interview and go to the Health Department, but
defendant declined, indicating that her “next step” would be to
help the officers find S.D.
In sum, nearly all of the relevant factors identified by
the Hardy Court weigh in favor of the State. As discussed
above, defendant was not in custody when she made incriminating
statements to Detective Pollard and Sgt. Corcione, and
therefore, her Miranda rights were not implicated. See
Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 337, 543 S.E.2d at 827. Furthermore,
competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact
that defendant was neither threatened with prosecution for lying
nor physically restrained during the fourth interview. She was
not held incommunicado, as demonstrated by the fact that she was
able to access her cell phone multiple times during the fourth
interview. She was offered water and food in addition to being
allowed to take bathroom or cigarette breaks whenever she
-24-
requested them. There were no threats of force or shows of
violence used against her. She was a competent, literate,
twenty-five-year-old woman who clearly understood the English
language and responded clearly and reasonably to the questions
asked. When given the opportunity to leave the fourth
interview, she chose to stay in an effort to help the officers
find her missing daughter.
Given the totality of these circumstances, we hold that
defendant’s confession was “the product of an essentially free
and unconstrained choice by its maker,” Hardy, 339 N.C. at 222,
451 S.E.2d at 608, and we affirm the trial court’s conclusion of
law that defendant’s statements “were not the product of hope or
induced by fear.”
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s
denial of defendant’s motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED.
Judges DILLON and DAVIS concur.