Mastanduno v. Nat'l Freight Indus. , 262 N.C. App. 77 ( 2018 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA17-1058
Filed: 16 October 2018
North Carolina Industrial Commission, I.C. No. Y22434
VINCENT MASTANDUNO, Employee, Plaintiff,
v.
NATIONAL FREIGHT INDUSTRIES, Employer, and AMERICAN ZURICH
INSURANCE CO., Carrier, Defendants.
Appeal by Plaintiff from order entered 22 May 2017 by the Full Commission of
the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 March
2018.
Law Offices of John M Kirby, by John M. Kirby for plaintiff-appellant.
Teague, Campbell, Dennis & Gorham, L.L.P., by S. Scott Farwell and Bruce A.
Hamilton, for defendants-appellees.
MURPHY, Judge.
This case requires that we examine the relationship between a public
document entitled an “Opinion and Award” (“Award”) and a workers’ compensation
claimant’s privacy interest in the personal medical information relevant to the
resolution of his claim. Every year, the North Carolina Industrial Commission enters
hundreds of Awards, which are the written records of decision for adjudicated
workers’ compensation claims. After these Awards are entered, they are uploaded to
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a publicly accessible and searchable online database.1 Due to the fact that workers’
compensation claims arise from physical injuries suffered at work, the evidentiary
findings contained within an Award often directly address a claimant’s medical
conditions and employment history.
In prior proceedings before the Industrial Commission, Plaintiff unsuccessfully
moved to have his entire case file sealed. He complained that due to the Commission’s
policy to make Awards available to the public online, Plaintiff’s personal and medical
information (which becomes part of that Award) will be disseminated and his privacy
interest in avoiding the disclosure of this information will be compromised. On
appeal, Plaintiff argues that he has a privacy interest rooted in statute and the U.S.
Constitution, and contends this interest can only be protected by a judicial order that
preemptively seals his entire workers’ compensation case file, including any future
Award entered for his claim. After careful review, we conclude that there is no
statutory or constitutional basis that obligates the Industrial Commission to seal
Plaintiff’s workers’ compensation file.
BACKGROUND
On 29 May 2012, Vincent Mastanduno (“Plaintiff”), while employed as a truck
driver, slipped and fell on a wet floor while moving a pallet during work, injuring his
1 See Searchable Databases, N.C. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION,
http://www.ic.nc.gov/database.html (last accessed 27 August 2018).
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lower back. On 11 September 2012, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Accident with the
Industrial Commission to obtain workers’ compensation benefits. His employer at
the time, Defendant National Freight Industries, filed a Form 60 Employer’s
Admission of Employee’s Right to Compensation on 19 November 2012 for temporary
total compensation in the amount of $740.56 per week. National Freight Industries
was covered by a workers’ compensation insurance policy through American Zurich
Insurance Company (collectively “Defendants”).
Several years later on 14 March 2016, Defendants filed a Form 33 with the
Industrial Commission requesting that Plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim be
assigned for a hearing. Defendants alleged that Plaintiff was no longer disabled and
refused to cooperate with medical treatment authorized and paid for by Defendants.
Plaintiff filed his response, denying that he had not been compliant with Defendant’s
direction for medical care and further claiming that he remained disabled. On 29
March 2016, the Industrial Commission entered an order permitting Plaintiff’s
counsel at the time to withdraw. Plaintiff then proceeded pro se. Plaintiff’s initial
hearing was set for 12 July 2016, and the matter was assigned to Deputy
Commissioner Tyler Younts.
On 6 June 2016, prior to Plaintiff’s July 2016 evidentiary hearing, Plaintiff
moved to have all information regarding his hearing sealed “so that it is not a matter
of public record.” Deputy Commissioner Younts subsequently entered an order
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denying Plaintiff’s request to seal his file, concluding that “Plaintiff’s Workers’
Compensation claim file is not a public record[,]” and “to the extent that certain
Orders and Awards of the Commission are public records, Plaintiff has provided no
factual or legal basis for the relief sought.” Plaintiff then requested Deputy
Commissioner Younts to reconsider his previous motion and a conference call was
held on 24 June 2016. Plaintiff expressed various privacy concerns associated with
the potential use of his personal medical information. Deputy Commissioner Younts
again denied Plaintiff’s request to seal his file, concluding:
Nevertheless, it remains the case that all injured workers
involved in litigation before the Industrial Commission
operate under the same privacy rules. Thus, the
undersigned finds insufficient basis for the extraordinary
relief Plaintiff seeks.
Plaintiff then appealed Deputy Commissioner Younts’ denial to the Full
Commission. Because the Deputy Commissioner’s order was interlocutory, Plaintiff
was required to submit reasons warranting immediate review by the Full
Commission. Plaintiff’s primary privacy concern is that Awards of the Industrial
Commission are made available to the public and immediately placed online, and,
therefore, third parties could use personal and medical information included therein
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to his detriment.2 Plaintiff also alleged that the denial of his motion to seal infringed
on his Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution.
On 10 April 2017, Plaintiff’s Motion to Seal was heard by the Full Commission,
and on 22 May 2017 the Commission denied Plaintiff’s motion. The Full Commission
concluded that pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 97-92(b), the Opinions and Awards of the
Commission are public records, but the medical records and other evidence upon
which an Award would be premised are not. The Commission also concluded that
“Plaintiff has offered no evidence or legal argument which would justify his claim
being treated differently than that of any other injured worker who is seeking benefits
under the Act.” Finally, the Full Commission’s order correctly recognized that it did
not have jurisdiction to rule on Plaintiff’s Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment
arguments because the Commission does not have jurisdiction to rule on
constitutional issues.3 Plaintiff timely appealed the Full Commission’s 22 May 2017
denial of his Motion to Seal.
Represented by counsel on appeal, Plaintiff argues that the Industrial
Commission was obligated to seal his entire file upon request because “[p]ursuant to
2 For example, Plaintiff claimed that his record should be sealed because otherwise: (1) his
insurance premium rates could increase because he would be considered a greater risk; (2) he could be
denied visas for travel to other countries; (3) there is risk that he could be blackmailed; (4) he could be
prohibited from adopting a child; (5) he could be prevented from renting an apartment; and (6) the
posting of these records could result in cyberbullying, identify theft, and impairment of his ability to
obtain lines of credit.
3 In re Redmond, 369 N.C. 490, 493, 797 S.E.2d 275, 277 (2017) ( “[I]t is a ‘well-settled rule
that a statute’s constitutionality shall be determined by the judiciary, not an administrative board.’”).
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North Carolina statutory law and federal Constitutional law, a person has a right to
privacy with respect to his or her medical information.”
GROUNDS FOR APPELLATE REVIEW
Plaintiff’s appeal is interlocutory as the Full Commission’s order does not
finally dispose of all issues in the matter. However, “immediate appeal may be taken
from an interlocutory order when the challenged order affects a substantial right of
the appellant that would be lost without immediate review.” France v. France, 209
N.C. App. 406, 411, 705 S.E.2d 399, 404-05 (2011) (citation and alteration omitted).
“No hard and fast rules exist for determining which appeals affect a substantial right.
Rather, such decisions usually require consideration of the facts of the particular
case.” Estrada v. Jaques, 70 N.C. App. 627, 640, 321 S.E.2d 240, 249 (1984) (citation
omitted).
Plaintiff argues that a substantial right is affected because any Award in this
matter will necessarily contain some of Plaintiff’s medical information and this
information will be made available online at the time the Award is entered. Thus,
because the Full Commission has denied his motion to seal on the grounds that there
is no legal basis for Plaintiff’s requested relief, Plaintiff’s privacy rights will be lost
absent review by this court. Plaintiff cites several cases in support of his right to
appellate review. See France, 209 N.C. App. at 411, 705 S.E.2d at 405 (“Absent
immediate review, documents that have been ordered sealed will be unsealed, and
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proceedings will be held open to the public. Because the only manner in which
Plaintiff may prevent this from happening is through immediate appellate review,
we hold that a substantial right of Plaintiff is affected . . . .”); Velez v. Dick Keffer
Pontiac GMC Truck, Inc., 144 N.C. App. 589, 592, 551 S.E.2d 873, 875 (2001) (“While
certainly if the Financial Privacy Act was implicated here, it would raise a substantial
right . . . .”).
For the purpose of determining whether the challenged order affects a
substantial right, we need not definitively decide at the outset whether Plaintiff’s
personal or medical information would fall within the scope of any specific statutory
or constitutional privacy protections. Rather, it is sufficient that absent immediate
review, some of Plaintiff’s personal and medical information will be made available
to the public upon entry of a final Award and that some of this information might be
subject to statutory and constitutional privacy protections. See Woods v. Moses Cone
Health Sys., 198 N.C. App. 120, 124, 678 S.E.2d 787, 791 (2009) (finding the
production of documents which might be protected by statute to affect a substantial
right). Plaintiff has therefore demonstrated that the order denying his motion to seal
by the Full Commission affects a substantial right.
Finally, since the Industrial Commission did not have jurisdiction to pass upon
Plaintiff’s constitutional privacy claims, it is appropriate for this Court, as the first
destination for the dispute in the General Court of Justice, to address these
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constitutional arguments even though they were not passed upon below. See
Redmond, 369 N.C at 497, 797 S.E.2d at 280 (“When an appeal lies directly to the
Appellate Division from an administrative tribunal, in the absence of any statutory
provision to the contrary a constitutional challenge may be raised for the first time
in the Appellate Division as it is the first destination for the dispute in the General
Court of Justice.”).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff argues that he has “a Constitutional and statutory right to
confidentiality over his private medical information.” We initially note that Plaintiff
relies heavily on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589, 97 S. Ct. 869 (1977), to support his contention that an Award of the
Industrial Commission implicates a constitutional “privacy right.” However, the U.S.
Supreme Court has not explicitly recognized a constitutional right to keep one’s
personal information private. Rather, Whalen and its progeny stand for the
proposition that there may be a “constitutional privacy ‘interest in avoiding disclosure
of personal matters.’” See Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134,
147, 131 S. Ct. 746, 756 (2011) (citing Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600, 97 S. Ct. at 876;
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 457, 97 S. Ct. 2777, 2797
(1977)). With this constitutional backdrop in mind, we first address Plaintiff’s claim
that he has a statutory right to have his workers’ compensation file sealed.
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A. Statutory Right to Privacy
An individual’s privacy interest in their personal information may be protected
by statute. Our Supreme Court has recognized that although the Public Records Act
“provides for liberal access to public records,” the General Assembly may dictate “that
certain documents will not be available to the public.” Virmani v. Presbyterian Health
Services Corp., 350 N.C. 449, 462, 515 S.E.2d 675, 685 (1999); see also N.C.G.S. §
131E-95(b) (2017) (“The proceedings of a medical review committee, the records and
materials it produces and the materials it considers shall be confidential and not
considered public records within the meaning of G.S. 132-1 . . . .”); N.C.G.S. § 7B-
2901(d) (2017) (“The court’s entire record of a proceeding involving consent for an
abortion of an unemancipated minor . . . is not a matter of public record . . . .”);
N.C.G.S. § 132-1.4(a) (2017) (“Records of criminal investigations conducted by public
law enforcement agencies . . . are not public records . . . .”). With respect to Workers’
Compensation proceedings, the General Assembly has already provided that certain
records of the Industrial Commission that are not Awards are not public records:
The records of the Commission that are not awards under
G.S. 97-84 and that are not reviews of awards under G.S.
97-85, insofar as they refer to accidents, injuries, and
settlements are not public records under G.S. 132-1 and
shall not be open to the public, but only to the parties
satisfying the Commission of their interest in such records
and the right to inspect them, and to State and federal
agencies pursuant to G.S. 97-81.
N.C.G.S. § 97-92(b) (2017) (emphasis added).
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Turning to the instant case, because of N.C.G.S. § 97-92(b), Plaintiff’s medical
records and any other documents that are not Awards which refer to accidents and
injuries are already shielded from public disclosure. Any order to seal these records
would be superfluous as they are already, in effect, sealed by statute. With respect
to the Awards of the Industrial Commission, the General Assembly has not provided
any exemption from the Public Records Act. If we were to adopt Plaintiff’s position
and instruct the Industrial Commission to seal a yet to be entered Award, then we
would contravene the legislative intent expressed in N.C.G.S. § 97-92(b). Specifically,
applying the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to § 97-92(b), we conclude
that by expressly listing the subset of records of the Industrial Commission that are
exempted from the Public Records Act (i.e. records that are not Awards), the
legislature intended that Awards of the Industrial Commission are to be public
records. See Morrison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 319 N.C. 298, 303, 354 S.E.2d 495,
498 (1987) (“[T]he doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius provides that the
mention of such specific exceptions implies the exclusion of others.”).
Plaintiff also points us to N.C.G.S. §§ 8-53 and 122C-52 to support his position
that his private medical information is not a matter of public record. N.C.G.S. § 8-
53, which codifies the physician-patient privilege, is a qualified evidentiary privilege
that is waivable by the patient, Adams v. Lovette, 105 N.C. App. 23, 411 S.E.2d 620
(1992), and must yield in some instances when certain medical information “is
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necessary to a proper administration of justice.” N.C.G.S. § 8-53 (2017). More
importantly, the mere existence of the physician-patient privilege has no bearing on
whether an Award of the Industrial Commission is a public record or whether the
Commission is statutorily obligated to seal any Award that makes reference to a
claimant’s medical information. Turning to N.C.G.S. § 122C-52, this statute does
provide that confidential information acquired in attending or treating a client is not
a public record. However, Plaintiff’s reliance is inapposite because § 122C-52 only
applies to services for the “mentally ill, the developmentally disabled, or substance
abusers.” N.C.G.S. § 122C-3(14) (2017). Plaintiff makes no argument addressing
how any of these mental health services are relevant to his workers’ compensation
claim arising from a lower back injury.
Plaintiff next cites a federal statute relevant to health information privacy, the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). See Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 Pub.L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936,
(1996). Although a primary goal of HIPAA is to assure that an individual’s health
information is properly protected from unauthorized disclosure, Plaintiff has failed
to recognize that the HIPAA Privacy Rule does not apply to the Industrial
Commission because they are not a “covered entity.” 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014).
Furthermore, HIPAA regulations expressly permit covered entities, such as a
patient’s doctor, to disclose protected health information to workers’ compensation
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agencies without first obtaining patient authorization. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (a)
(2016).
In sum, none of the above cited statutory provisions support Plaintiff’s position
that he possesses a statutory privacy right in his personal medical information that
obligates the Industrial Commission to seal his workers’ compensation case file on
request, including any Award. Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 97-92(b), Plaintiff’s medical
records are already exempted from the Public Records Act. Regarding Plaintiff’s
request to seal any Award entered by the Commission, we again emphasize the
General Assembly is the body vested with the authority to determine which kinds of
otherwise public records “shall be shielded from public scrutiny.” France, 209 N.C.
App. at 413, 705 S.E.2d at 406. While the General Assembly could have exempted
the Awards of the Industrial Commission from the Public Records Act, they did not.
“Absent clear statutory exemption or exception, documents falling within the
definition of public records in the Public Records Law must be made available for
public inspection.” Virmani, 350 N.C. at 462, 515 S.E.2d at 685 (citation and
quotation marks omitted).
B. Constitutional Right to Privacy
Plaintiff also contends “even if the Public Records Act applied to this matter,
this act does not trump an individual’s Constitutional right to privacy over his or her
private health information.” As the U.S. Supreme Court did in Whalen and National
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Aeronautics & Space Administration, we will assume for present purposes that the
Industrial Commission’s refusal to seal Plaintiff’s case file implicates a privacy
interest of constitutional significance. See Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 562
U.S. at 147, 131 S. Ct. at 756 (“As was our approach in Whalen, we will assume for
present purposes that the Government’s challenged inquiries implicate a privacy
interest of constitutional significance.”).
Initially, our review of the Industrial Commission’s decision to not
preemptively seal Plaintiff’s Award must consider the “context” of a workers’
compensation proceeding. See id. at 148, 131 S. Ct. at 757 (“[J]udicial review of the
Government’s challenged inquiries must take into account the context in which they
arise.”). The Workers’ Compensation Act was enacted in 1929, and its purpose was
not only to offer a swift and certain remedy for an injured worker, but also to ensure
a limited and determinate liability for employers. See S.L. 1929-120. In 2017, the
Industrial Commission had exclusive original jurisdiction over 64,000 filed workers’
compensation claims, and approximately 1,800 claims were scheduled for hearings
before a Deputy Commissioner. Over 400 of these claims were appealed to the Full
Commission.4 Our assessment of the constitutionality of the challenged publicizing
of medical information in an Award must take into account the crucial role the
4 North Carolina Industrial Commission, Fiscal Year 2017 Annual Report,
http://www.ic.nc.gov/2017AnnualReport.pdf (last accessed 27 August 2018).
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Industrial Commission plays for workers and the State’s economy, as well as the
sheer magnitude of claims that must be adjudicated in a timely manner.
Next, we must weigh Plaintiff’s privacy interests implicated by the public
dissemination of an Award against the public interest. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 458, 97 S.
Ct. at 2798 (“[A]ny intrusion must be weighed against the public interest in
subjecting the Presidential materials of appellant’s administration to archival
screening.”); see also France, 209 N.C. App. at 417, 705 S.E.2d at 408 (holding
plaintiff’s claim to be without merit since he “fail[ed] to show that any such right to
privacy outweighs the qualified right of the public to open proceedings”).
As discussed supra, by not exempting the Awards of the Industrial Commission
from the Public Records Act, our legislature has determined that these records are of
special public interest and are to be made available in their original form. The
Industrial Commission’s policy of providing web access to final Awards is a
reasonable, cost-effective manner of making these records available for public
inspection. Furthermore, N.C.G.S. § 97-84 expresses other important public interests
at stake:
The case shall be decided and findings of fact issued based
upon the preponderance of the evidence in view of the
entire record. The award, together with a statement of the
findings of fact, rulings of law, and other matters pertinent
to the questions at issue shall be filed with the record of the
proceedings . . . .
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N.C.G.S. § 97-84 (2017). We recognize that the findings of fact of an award will often
include potentially sensitive information that might otherwise be considered private,
such as a claimant’s identity, a claimant’s employment history, a description of the
injury suffered at work, and the effects of the injury on the claimant’s physical and
mental capabilities. However, the inclusion of pertinent and relevant information
such as this is necessary because it ensures that workers’ compensation claims are
resolved impartially with well-reasoned decisions. Not only does this serve the
public’s interest in government transparency, but, without this information, our
ability to conduct effective appellate review would be significantly impaired. See
Wilkes v. City of Greenville, 369 N.C. 730, 746, 799 S.E.2d 838, 849 (2017) (“[T]he
Commission must make specific findings that address the ‘crucial questions of fact
upon which plaintiff’s right to compensation depends.’”).
Regarding Plaintiff’s asserted privacy interests, we are not unsympathetic to
his concerns regarding the disclosure and potential use of personal information
contained in an Award. To illustrate his concerns, Plaintiff submitted a publicly
available final Opinion and Award from another workers’ compensation claim.5
Plaintiff directs our attention to certain findings of this Award which went beyond
the details of the worker’s accident, indicating that the worker experienced episodes
of crying, panic attacks, and was diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
5 I.C. NO. 307020.
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(PTSD). Sensitive as these topics may be, Plaintiff wholly overlooks the crucial role
this personal medical information had in the Commission’s resolution of the claim.
Specifically, crying and panic attacks were some of the symptoms the claimant
presented to her treating physicians after the workplace accident. Furthermore,
based on these symptoms, the claimant’s psychiatrist ultimately diagnosed her with
PTSD, and this evidence supported the Commission’s conclusion that the claimant’s
PTSD was a compensable injury.
Plaintiff nevertheless argues, “It is inconceivable that a ‘proper administration
of justice’ would require the Commission (which is not a court, and thus not subject
to open courts provisions) to disseminate the Plaintiff’s protected, private health
information to the entire world via the Internet.” This argument fails to grasp the
role of an Award in our Workers’ Compensation system. The Industrial Commission
does not make its Awards available online merely because it is necessary for the
proper administration of justice, but a claimant’s Award is made publicly available
because this document is, as a matter of law, an official public record.
Plaintiff’s constitutional privacy argument also overlooks critical distinctions
between the facts of his case and those present in Whalen. In Whalen, a New York
statute that required physicians to identify patients obtaining certain prescription
drugs having potential for abuse was challenged as violating the plaintiff’s privacy
rights. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 592, 97 S. Ct. at 873. Doctors were required to disclose
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the name, age, and address of the patients for which they prescribed Schedule II
drugs and this information was stored in a government office building. Id. The
Whalen plaintiffs argued that patient-identification requirements created a risk of
public disclosure and impaired their interests in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters and “making important decisions independently.” Id. at 599, 97 S. Ct. at 877
“After evaluating the security issues regarding the patient-identification
requirements of the statute, the Supreme Court upheld the statute, stating that the
statute ‘does not, on its face, pose a sufficiently grievous threat to either interest to
establish a constitutional violation.’” ACT-UP Triangle v. Comm’n for Health Servs.
of the State of N.C., 345 N.C. 699, 710, 483 S.E.2d 388, 394 (1997) (citing Whalen, 429
U.S. at 600, 97 S. Ct. at 877).
The most obvious distinction between Whalen and the instant case is that the
personal medical information at issue in Whalen was not directly at issue in an active
legal dispute. Unlike the plaintiff-patients in Whalen, the Plaintiff here is a workers’
compensation claimant who alleges that he is entitled to disability compensation as
a result of a workplace accident. Because Plaintiff seeks compensation based on his
injury, his privacy interest in avoiding the disclosure of medical information relevant
to this claim is lessened, if not waived, due to his status as a party in the present
action.
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Plaintiff also avers that the statutory scheme in Whalen was upheld because
of the security measures taken by the government to protect the patient’s
information. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 607, 97 S. Ct. at 880 (Brennan concurring) (“In
this case, as the Court’s opinion makes clear, the State’s carefully designed program
includes numerous safeguards intended to forestall the danger of indiscriminate
disclosure.”); see also ACT-UP Triangle, 345 N.C. at 712, 483 S.E.2d at 396 (“We
conclude that the statutory security provisions are adequate to protect against
potential unlawful disclosure which might otherwise render the confidential HIV
testing program constitutionally infirm.”). We agree with Plaintiff that the presence
of “safeguards” were considered by cases such as Whalen and ACT-UP Triangle.
However, subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have clarified that Whalen does
not stand for the proposition “that an ironclad disclosure bar is needed to satisfy
privacy interests that may be ‘rooted in the Constitution.’” Nat’l Aeronautics & Space
Admin., 562 U.S. at 157, 131 S. Ct. at 762 (alterations omitted) (citing Whalen, 429
U.S. at 605, 97 S. Ct. 869).
To the extent that Whalen is applicable here, we note that there are
“safeguards” in place which mitigate against the risk of unwarranted and
indiscriminate disclosure of Plaintiff’s personal information. N.C.G.S. § 97-92
already exempts Plaintiff’s medical records from the Public Records Act, and the risk
of any unwarranted disclosure of these records is very low. While an Award will
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invariably contain some personal medical information, N.C.G.S § 97-84 provides that
the Awards of the Industrial Commission are only allowed to include information
“pertinent to the questions at issue.” Thus, this statute guides the pen of the
Commissioners and mitigates against the risk that non-pertinent personal
information will be indiscriminately included in an Award.
In light of the critical role that the Opinion and Award plays in our State’s
workers’ compensation system and our General Assembly’s determination that these
documents are public records, we conclude that Plaintiff’s asserted privacy interests
do not outweigh the public interests at stake here. Accordingly, we conclude that the
Industrial Commission is not obligated to seal Plaintiff’s workers’ compensation file,
including any Award, due to any constitutional privacy interest.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has no statutory or constitutional right to have his entire workers’
compensation case file, including any Award, sealed. Accordingly, the order of the
Industrial Commission denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Seal is affirmed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED.
Chief Judge McGEE and Judge CALABRIA concur.
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