Fuhs v. Fuhs , 245 N.C. App. 367 ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA15-945
Filed: 16 February 2016
Guilford County, No. 14 CVS 7320
ROBERT FUHS, SR., Plaintiff,
v.
SUMMER FUHS, CONSTANCE C. MOORE and LEGAL AID OF NORTH
CAROLINA, INC., Defendants.
Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 22 January 2015 by Judge Stanley L.
Allen, and order entered 16 June 2015 by Judge Lindsay R. Davis, Jr. in Guilford
County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 January 2016.
Randolph M. James, P.C., by Randolph M. James, for plaintiff-appellant.
Poyner Spruill LLP, by T. Richard Kane, for defendant-appellees Constance C.
Moore and Legal Aid of North Carolina, Inc.
TYSON, Judge.
Robert Fuhs, Sr. (“Plaintiff”) appeals from: (1) order allowing Constance C.
Moore’s (“Defendant Moore”) and Legal Aid of North Carolina, Inc.’s (collectively,
“Defendants”) motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim; and (2) order
allowing Defendants’ motion for summary judgment challenging Plaintiff’s abuse of
process claim. We affirm.
I. Factual Background
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Opinion of the Court
Plaintiff and Summer Fuhs (“Summer”) were married on or about 1 May 2004,
and lived in Guilford County, North Carolina. Two children were born of the
marriage: a son, R.F., and a daughter, B.F. On or about 1 August 2012, Summer left
the marital residence due to her “illicit sexual affair” with Doug Posey (“Posey”), a
man she had met on a social media site, Facebook, and who lived in Macon County,
North Carolina. A 10 August 2012 consent order confirmed Plaintiff and Summer
agreed Plaintiff would have physical custody of both R.F. and B.F.
Much of Plaintiff’s complaint describes numerous false allegations Summer
and Posey made against Plaintiff prior to Defendants’ involvement in this case.
According to the complaint, the false allegations asserted by Summer and Posey
included: (1) three reports to the Guilford County Department of Social Services
(“DSS”), accusing Plaintiff of child neglect, alcoholism, and violence toward the minor
children; one report also alleged Plaintiff’s 15-year-old son from a previous marriage
had engaged in “inappropriate sexual behaviors” with B.F.; (2) two attempted arrests,
including one allegation of indecent liberties with his own daughter, B.F.; and (3)
three actual arrests: one for aggravated assault on a female, one for communicating
threats, and one for violation of a 50B Domestic Violence Protection Order.
All reports to DSS were investigated, returned as unfounded, and closed. All
criminal charges were dismissed or resulted in verdicts of not guilty. Relevant
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portions of the above referenced allegations are presented in more detail as they
relate to Defendants’ involvement in this case.
A. Domestic Violence Complaint and Defendant’s Involvement
On 26 June 2013, Summer “place[d] a 50B charge” against Plaintiff in Macon
County (the “DVPO Case”). On 30 June 2013, Summer’s grandmother posted a
picture of B.F. on Facebook, and Plaintiff posted a public comment on the picture. As
a result of Plaintiff’s comment, Summer had Plaintiff arrested for violation of the 26
June 2013 domestic violence protection order. These charges were “immediately
dismissed” by the Macon County District Attorney.
On 9 August 2013, Summer called the Macon County Sheriff’s Department and
alleged Plaintiff had engaged in inappropriate sexual conduct. According to
Summer’s allegations, Plaintiff, while intoxicated, made B.F. remove her clothes and
he touched B.F. inappropriately. The Sheriff’s Department investigated and
concluded the allegations were unfounded, but nonetheless referred the case to DSS.
DSS, in turn, conducted interviews and similarly concluded the allegations were
unfounded.
On 15 August 2013, while Plaintiff was in Macon County defending the alleged
violation of the 50B order, Plaintiff was served with a “First Amended Complaint
Motion for Domestic Violence Order” (the “Amended Complaint”) in the DVPO Case.
The Amended Complaint was prepared by Defendant Moore in her capacity as
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Summer’s attorney. At the time, Defendant Moore was serving as a staff attorney for
Legal Aid of North Carolina, Inc. The second paragraph of the Amended Complaint
drafted by Defendant Moore and signed by both Defendant Moore and Summer
stated:
On August 2, 2013, the minor child [B.F.], age 5, revealed
to a Franklin Police Office [sic], Tony Hopkins, that when
[Plaintiff] becomes intoxicated he takes [B.F.’s] pants off
and touches her vaginal area. The minor child, [R.F.], age
8, has observed [Plaintiff] engaging in this behavior. These
allegations are under investigation by [DSS]. Both children
are afraid of retaliation from [Plaintiff] because of their
statements.
Much of this allegation was repeated in a document entitled “Supplemental Pleading
for [Summer’s] Motion for Emergency Custody and Motion to Modify and Motion to
Continue” (“Supplemental Pleading”), which was filed on 19 August 2013 in the
pending child custody case between Plaintiff and Summer (the “Child Custody Case”).
On 11 September 2013, a “Temporary Memorandum of Judgment/Order Without
Prejudice” was filed in the Child Custody Case, and stated “that pending the DSS
investigation [into Summer’s 9 August 2013 allegations], [Summer] will have
temporary custody” of R.F. and B.F.
After receiving the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff called Franklin Police
Department Officer Tony Hopkins (“Officer Hopkins”) to discuss the allegations made
therein. During the course of their conversation, Officer Hopkins revealed to Plaintiff
that B.F. had never made the allegations to him as was stated in the Amended
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Complaint. Defendant Moore later revealed she made no independent investigation
and relied solely on Summer’s statements in drafting the second paragraph of the
Amended Complaint. On 24 October 2014, the DVPO Case against Plaintiff was
dismissed.
Plaintiff filed the present lawsuit against Summer and Defendants in Guilford
County Superior Court. Plaintiff alleged claims against each defendant of: (1)
malicious prosecution; (2) abuse of process; (3) intentional infliction of emotional
distress; (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (5) libel per se; and (6) slander
per se. On 1 October 2014, the Guilford County Clerk of Superior Court entered
default against Summer for failure to answer, plead, or otherwise appear in the
lawsuit within the time permitted. Summer is not a party to this appeal.
Defendants filed an answer on 10 September 2014 and alleged Plaintiff’s
complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. On 20 January 2015, the
trial court allowed Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for malicious
prosecution and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, but denied
the motion to dismiss as to the abuse of process, libel and slander per se claims.
The case proceeded to discovery on Plaintiff’s remaining claims. On 8 June
2015, the trial court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all of
Plaintiff’s remaining claims. Plaintiff gave timely notice of appeal on 22 June 2015.
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II. Issues
Plaintiff argues the trial court erred by: (1) allowing Defendants’ motion to
dismiss his claim of malicious prosecution; and (2) allowing Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on his claim of abuse of process. Plaintiff has not asserted any
argument regarding his other dismissed claims for negligent and intentional
infliction of emotional distress, libel per se or slander per se. The trial court’s orders
are final concerning those claims.
III. Malicious Prosecution
Plaintiff first argues the trial court erred in allowing Defendants’ motion to
dismiss his claim for malicious prosecution. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
When we review the trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure,
the standard of review is whether, as a matter of law, the
allegations of the complaint, treated as true, are sufficient
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under
some legal theory. The complaint must be liberally
construed, and the court should not dismiss the complaint
unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff could
not prove any set of facts to support his claim which would
entitle him to relief.
Holleman v. Aiken, 193 N.C. App. 484, 491, 668 S.E.2d 579, 584-85 (2008) (citation
and quotation marks omitted). The Court considers Plaintiff’s complaint “to
determine whether, when liberally construed, it states enough to give the substantive
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elements of a legally recognized claim.” Governors Club, Inc. v. Governors Club Ltd.
P’Ship, 152 N.C. App. 240, 246, 567 S.E.2d 781, 786 (2002) (internal citations
omitted), aff’d per curiam, 357 N.C. 46, 577 S.E.2d 620 (2003).
Dismissal is warranted “(1) when the face of the complaint reveals that no law
supports plaintiffs’ claim; (2) when the face of the complaint reveals that some fact
essential to plaintiffs’ claim is missing; or (3) when some fact disclosed in the
complaint defeats plaintiffs’ claim.” Walker v. Sloan, 137 N.C. App. 387, 392, 529
S.E.2d 236, 241 (2000) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
The complaint is reviewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Ford v. Peaches Entm’t Corp., 83 N.C. App. 155, 156, 349 S.E.2d 82, 83 (1986). “[T]he
trial court regards all factual allegations of the complaint as true. Legal conclusions,
however, are not entitled to a presumption of truth.” Walker, 137 N.C. App. at 392,
529 S.E.2d at 241. (citations omitted).
This Court “conducts a de novo review of the pleadings to determine their legal
sufficiency and to determine whether the trial court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss
was correct.” Podrebarac v. Horack, Talley, Pharr, & Lowndes, P.A., 231 N.C. App.
70, 74, 752 S.E.2d 661, 663-64 (2013) (citation omitted).
B. Analysis
To assert a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must establish four
elements: “that the defendant ‘(1) instituted, procured or participated in the criminal
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proceeding against [the] plaintiff; (2) without probable cause; (3) with malice; and (4)
the prior proceeding terminated in favor of [the] plaintiff.’” Hill v. Hill, 142 N.C. App.
524, 537, 545 S.E.2d 442, 451 (Tyson, J., dissenting) (citing Moore v. Evans, 124 N.C.
App. 35, 42, 476 S.E.2d 415, 421 (1996)), rev’d for the reasons stated in dissenting
opinion, 354 N.C. 348, 553 S.E.2d 679 (2001); see also Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C.
181, 202, 254 S.E.2d 611, 625 (1979). In cases for malicious prosecution in which the
earlier proceeding is civil, rather than criminal, in nature, our courts require a
plaintiff to additionally plead and prove a fifth element: “special damages.” See Dunn
v. Harris, 81 N.C. App. 137, 139, 344 S.E.2d 128, 129 (1986).
In this case, the parties do not dispute Plaintiff’s complaint alleges the second,
third, and fourth elements of a malicious prosecution claim. The complaint on its face
alleges a proceeding was instituted against Plaintiff without probable cause, with
malice, and that the proceeding terminated in favor of Plaintiff.
Plaintiff argues the trial court erred in dismissing his claim because the
allegations in his complaint were also sufficient to satisfy the first and fifth elements
of a malicious prosecution claim. Presuming, without deciding, the allegations of the
first were sufficient, we review whether Plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently alleged
special damages, the essential fifth element of malicious prosecution.
Special Damages
Our Supreme Court has held:
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[W]hen the plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution is
based on the institution of a prior civil proceeding against
him he must show . . . that there was some arrest of his
person, seizure of his property, or some other element of
special damage resulting from the action such as would not
necessarily result in all similar cases.
Stanback, 297 N.C. at 203, 254 S.E.2d at 625 (citations omitted). “[T]he requirement
that a plaintiff show some special damage resulting from a prior lawsuit filed against
him ‘is an essential, substantive element of the claim.’” Stikeleather v. Willard, 83
N.C. App. 50, 51, 348 S.E.2d 607, 608 (1986) (citing Stanback, 297 N.C. at 204, 254
S.E.2d at 626).
Prior cases where our appellate courts have found special damages are
instructive:
The gist of such special damage is a substantial
interference either with the plaintiff’s person or his
property such as causing execution to be issued against the
plaintiff’s person, causing an injunction to issue
prohibiting plaintiff’s use of his property in a certain way,
causing a receiver to be appointed to take control of
plaintiff's assets, causing plaintiff's property to be
attached, or causing plaintiff to be wrongfully committed
to a mental institution.
Stanback, 297 N.C. at 203, 254 S.E.2d at 625 (citations omitted). A plaintiff’s
allegation that he “suffered injury to his reputation, embarrassment, loss of work and
leisure time and that he has incurred expenses in defending the claim” has been held
to be insufficient to show special damages. Stikeleather, 83 N.C. App. at 52, 348
S.E.2d at 608.
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Plaintiff argues the assertions in his complaint sufficiently alleged special
damages. Plaintiff asserts the second paragraph in the Amended Complaint, drafted
by Defendant Moore, which alleges Plaintiff sexually assaulted B.F., branded him as
an “evil child molester,” injured his reputation and good name, and required him to
remove damaging information posted on the internet accusing him of a crime.
Plaintiff also argues an interference with his person occurred because he was
required to travel to, and attend, two hearings to defend the DVPO Case. We cannot
agree. Plaintiff’s allegations do not constitute or assert “special damages” as that
term has been interpreted by controlling precedents.
This Court has held that injury to a plaintiff’s reputation and good name are
not special damages. Stikeleather, 83 N.C. App. at 52, 348 S.E.2d at 608. Removing
damaging information from the internet is a predictable result of alleged reputational
damage, and will almost always “necessarily result in all similar cases.” Stanback,
297 N.C. at 203, 254 S.E.2d at 625.
Likewise, having to travel to defend oneself will necessarily be the result in
similar cases. Having to travel to court on two occasions is meaningfully different
from causing execution to be issued against a plaintiff’s person, causing a plaintiff to
be wrongfully committed to a mental institution, and the other instructive examples
of the kind of injuries which rise to special damages highlighted in Stanback. Id. at
203, 254 S.E.2d at 625.
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Plaintiff has failed to allege special damages that are different from those
which would “necessarily result in all similar cases,” a substantive element of the
claim of malicious prosecution. Id. Plaintiff’s argument to the contrary is overruled.
The trial court’s ruling on Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim is affirmed.
IV. Abuse of Process
Plaintiff argues the trial court erred by allowing Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment as to his claim for abuse of process. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper where:
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
In a motion for summary judgment, the evidence
presented to the trial court must be . . . viewed in a light
most favorable to the non-moving party.
An issue is “genuine” if it can be proven by
substantial evidence and a fact is “material” if it would
constitute or irrevocably establish any material element of
a claim or a defense.
A party moving for summary judgment may prevail
if it meets the burden (1) of proving an essential element of
the opposing party’s claim is nonexistent, or (2) of showing
through discovery that the opposing party cannot produce
evidence to support an essential element of his or her
claim. Generally this means that on undisputed aspects of
the opposing evidential forecast, where there is no genuine
issue of fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
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matter of law. If the moving party meets this burden, the
non-moving party must in turn either show that a genuine
issue of material fact exists for trial or must provide an
excuse for not doing so.
This Court reviews an order granting summary
judgment de novo.
Hedgepeth v. Parker’s Landing Prop. Owners Ass’n, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___,
2016 N.C. App. LEXIS 47, at *6-7 (COA15-683 decided 5 January 2016) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
B. Analysis
Our Supreme Court has stated “abuse of process is the misuse of legal process
for an ulterior purpose.” Fowle v. Fowle, 263 N.C. 724, 728, 140 S.E.2d 398, 401
(1965). The claim “consists in the malicious misuse or misapplication of that process
after issuance to accomplish some purpose not warranted or commanded by the writ.”
Id. (emphasis original).
[A]buse of process requires both an ulterior motive and an
act in the use of the legal process not proper in the regular
prosecution of the proceeding, and that both requirements
relate to the defendant’s purpose to achieve through the
use of the process some end foreign to those it was designed
to effect. The ulterior motive requirement is satisfied when
the plaintiff alleges that the prior action was initiated by
defendant or used by him to achieve a collateral purpose
not within the normal scope of the process used. The act
requirement is satisfied when the plaintiff alleges that
once the prior proceeding was initiated, the defendant
committed some wilful act whereby he sought to use the
existence of the proceeding to gain advantage of the
plaintiff in respect to some collateral matter.
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Stanback, 297 N.C. at 201, 254 S.E.2d at 625 (emphasis original) (internal quotations
and citations omitted).
Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, his complaint fails to show any
genuine issue of material fact, which would entitle him to relief on his claim of abuse
of process. The pleadings and other documents in the record show Plaintiff cannot
prove the second essential element of this claim.
The second essential element to support an abuse of process claim is the “act
requirement,” which is satisfied when the plaintiff shows “that once the prior
proceeding was initiated, the defendant committed some wilful act whereby he sought
to use the existence of the proceeding to gain advantage of the plaintiff in respect to
some collateral matter.” Stanback, 297 N.C. at 201, 254 S.E.2d at 625 (emphasis
supplied). Here, Plaintiff’s complaint alleges Defendants sought “temporary custody
orders based upon the false allegations” in the DVPO case.
While the Supplemental Pleading in the Child Custody Case makes reference
to and describes the underlying allegation of sexual abuse by Summer against
Plaintiff, the Supplemental Pleading itself does not mention the Amended Complaint
Defendant Moore drafted and signed in the DVPO Case. The record shows Summer
was not represented by Defendants in the Child Custody Case, but rather employed
a different attorney and law firm, Catherine F. Stalker Esq. (“Attorney Stalker”) and
Forrester Law Firm, to represent her in that proceeding.
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Presuming, without deciding, Plaintiff made sufficient allegations to meet the
“ulterior motive” requirement of an abuse of process claim, the pleadings and other
documents clearly show Defendants did not commit “some wilful act” to use the
existence of the Amended Complaint in the DVPO Case to gain an advantage over
Plaintiff in a collateral proceeding, the Child Custody Case.
While the allegations presented in the second paragraph of the Amended
Complaint were recounted in the Supplemental Pleading, the Amended Complaint is
not mentioned. Further, it was Summer and Attorney Stalker, rather than
Defendants, who drafted the Supplemental Pleading containing the same allegations,
which was filed in the Child Custody Case. Plaintiff’s arguments are overruled.
Counsel’s Conduct and Duty
Our holdings regarding Plaintiff’s failure to allege or show facts to support
essential elements of both claims presented in this appeal should not be construed as
condonation of Defendant Moore’s or any other attorney’s actions regarding these and
the related actions which, if true, may violate the North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure and the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct. See N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 1A-1, Rule 11 (2013) (“The signature of an attorney. . . constitutes a certificate by
him that he has read the pleading. . . ; that to the best of his knowledge, information,
and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact[.] . . . If a
pleading. . . is signed in violation of this rule, the court. . . shall impose upon the
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person who signed it. . . an appropriate sanction[.]”) (emphasis supplied); N.C. Rev.
R. Prof. Conduct 3.1 (“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is
not frivolous.”); see also N.C. Rev. R. Prof. Conduct 3.1, cmt. [2] (“The filing of an
action or defense. . . taken for a client is not frivolous merely because the facts have
not first been fully substantiated[.] . . . What is required of lawyers, however, is that
they inform themselves about the facts of their clients’ cases. . . and determine that
they can make good faith arguments in support of their clients' positions.”) (emphasis
supplied).
V. Conclusion
The trial court properly granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim
for malicious prosecution. Presuming, without deciding, Plaintiff alleged sufficient
facts to satisfy the first four elements of a malicious prosecution claim, the damages
Plaintiff alleged in his complaint would “necessarily result in all similar cases.”
Stanback, 297 N.C. at 203, 254 S.E.2d at 625. These allegations do not rise to the
level of “special damages” required to support the essential fifth element of the claim
for malicious prosecution. Id.The trial court properly allowed Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s claim for abuse of process. No genuine issue of material fact exists and the
pleadings clearly show Defendants did not willfully act to use the existence of the
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Amended Complaint to gain an advantage of Plaintiff in the Child Custody Case, a
collateral matter. Stanback, 297 N.C. at 201, 254 S.E.2d at 625. Defendants were
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2013).
The orders and judgments of the trial courts are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Judges CALABRIA and DAVIS concur.
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