Breedlove v. Warren ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA15-1381
Filed: 20 September 2016
Wake County, No. 15 CVS 4434
GILBERT BREEDLOVE and THOMAS HOLLAND, Plaintiffs
v.
MARION R. WARREN, in his official capacity as Interim Director of the N.C.
Administrative Office of the Courts, and the NORTH CAROLINA
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, Defendants
Appeal by plaintiffs from order entered 19 September 2015 by Judge George
B. Collins, Jr., in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11
May 2016.
Center for Law and Freedom, by Elliot Engstrom, and Ellis Boyle Law, PLLC,
by W. Ellis Boyle, for plaintiff-appellants.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Grady L.
Balentine, Jr., for defendant-appellees.
CALABRIA, Judge.
Gilbert Breedlove (“Breedlove”) and Thomas Holland (“Holland”) (collectively,
“plaintiffs”) brought this action against the North Carolina Administrative Office of
the Courts (“AOC”) and its Interim Director, Marion R. Warren (“Warren”)
(collectively, “defendants”). Plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s grant of defendants’
motion to dismiss. We affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
BREEDLOVE V. WARREN
Opinion of the Court
Plaintiffs served as magistrates, Breedlove from Swain County and Holland
from Graham County. Both identify as devout Christians.
In the autumn of 2014, the Supreme Court of the United States, and the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, established that states within the Fourth Circuit,
including North Carolina, cannot decline to marry a same-sex couple, nor can they
decline to recognize an otherwise lawful marriage of a same-sex couple from a
different state. See Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.
308, 190 L. Ed. 2d 140 (2014). This holding was subsequently and explicitly affirmed
under North Carolina law. See Gen. Synod of the United Church of Christ v. Resinger,
12 F. Supp. 3d 790, 791 (W.D.N.C. 2014) (holding that “any . . . source of state law
that operates to deny same-sex couples the right to marry in the State of North
Carolina . . . [is,] in accordance with Bostic, supra, unconstitutional”).
On 13 October 2014, the Director of AOC, at the time John Smith (“Smith”),
issued a guidance memorandum (the “Interim Guidance Memo”) to various North
Carolina judicial employees, including, inter alia, plaintiffs. This document stated
that the AOC had “received a sufficient number of requests for guidance given the
recent federal ruling on same-sex marriages to justify this interim memorandum of
guidance to magistrates.” This document stated that magistrates should
immediately begin conducting marriage ceremonies for same-sex couples, and that
such marriages “should not be delayed or postponed while awaiting further
-2-
BREEDLOVE V. WARREN
Opinion of the Court
clarification of other questions or issues.” The document further advised recipients
that a more detailed memorandum was forthcoming.
On 14 October 2014, AOC issued a second memorandum (the “Same-Sex
Marriages Memo”) to various North Carolina judicial employees, including, inter alia,
plaintiffs. In this document, AOC presented various questions, and answers thereto,
on the issue of magistrates performing same-sex marriages. In response to the
question as to whether a magistrate who performs other marriages may refuse to
marry a same-sex couple for whom a marriage license had been issued, the document
stated that a magistrate’s refusal to lawfully marry a same-sex couple would
“[violate] the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution” and further “would
constitute a violation of the oath and a failure to perform a duty of the office.” In
response to the question as to the consequences of refusal of a magistrate to marry a
same-sex couple, the document stated that “refusal is grounds for suspension or
removal from office, as well as potential criminal charges[,]” and that North Carolina
law “makes clear that this criminal provision remains enforceable in addition to the
procedures for suspension and removal under G.S. 7A-173.” In response to the
question of whether a magistrate’s reason for refusal made a difference to the
outcome, the document stated that it did not.
On 5 November 2014, AOC composed a letter to Senator Phil Berger (“Berger”),
President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate. Berger had requested that AOC
-3-
BREEDLOVE V. WARREN
Opinion of the Court
revise the Same-Sex Marriages Memo, and suggested that the document violated the
religious workplace protections of federal Title VII. In its letter in response to Berger,
AOC stated that “our magistrates are affirmatively bound by [federal] rulings in
exercising their official powers,” and that the document was issued to judicial
employees in order to ensure that they are “aware of the potential consequences for
failure to comply with the injunction and follow the law.”
Plaintiffs sought accommodations so that they would not be forced to violate
their religious beliefs by performing same-sex marriages. Plaintiffs’ requests for
accommodation were denied, and plaintiffs ultimately resigned.
On 6 April 2015, plaintiffs brought the underlying action against AOC and
Smith. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged violations of plaintiffs’ rights under the North
Carolina Constitution, and sought a declaratory judgment that AOC’s policy of
forcing plaintiffs to perform same-sex marriages was unconstitutional, and a
preliminary and permanent injunction against being forced to perform same-sex
marriages. Plaintiffs also sought to be reappointed as magistrates, and to receive
back pay and benefits for the time spent resigned from their posts.
On 11 May 2015, Smith and AOC filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint,
pursuant to, inter alia, Rules 12(b)(1) and (6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure. Specifically, the motion alleged that plaintiffs “have failed to allege an
actual case or controversy, in that neither the AOC Director nor AOC has any
-4-
BREEDLOVE V. WARREN
Opinion of the Court
authority over magistrates, and Plaintiffs, therefore, lack standing;” and that
plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, in that the
memoranda at issue “did not constitute a mandate to magistrates” and “[did] not
violate either plaintiff’s rights[,]” and that Smith was “entitled to qualified
immunity.”
Between the filing of this motion and the filing of the trial court’s order, Smith
stepped down from his role, and Warren was appointed Interim Director of AOC.
Warren replaced Smith, in his official capacity, as a defendant in this case.
On 19 September 2015, the trial court entered an order on defendants’ motion
to dismiss. In its order, the trial court found and held that it “lacks subject matter
jurisdiction in that there is no actual case or controversy, because the defendants
have no power to nominate, appoint, remove, or otherwise control magistrates, nor
do the defendants have the power to institute criminal prosecutions against
magistrates for failure to perform their duties.” The trial court granted defendants’
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and (6) of the North Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Plaintiffs appeal.
II. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing
In their first argument, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in granting
defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of standing. We disagree.
-5-
BREEDLOVE V. WARREN
Opinion of the Court
A. Standard of Review
“In our de novo review of a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, we view the
allegations as true and the supporting record in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party.” Mangum v. Raleigh Bd. of Adjust., 362 N.C. 640, 644, 669 S.E.2d 279,
283 (2008).
B. Analysis
“As the party invoking jurisdiction, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the
elements of standing.” Neuse River Found., Inc. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 155 N.C.
App. 110, 113, 574 S.E.2d 48, 51 (2002) (citation omitted). In order for a plaintiff to
demonstrate standing, he must show three things:
(1) injury in fact-an invasion of a legally protected interest
that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant;
and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that
the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
Strates Shows, Inc. v. Amusements of Am., Inc., 184 N.C. App. 455, 460, 646 S.E.2d
418, 423 (2007) (citations and quotations omitted).
Plaintiffs contend that they had standing to bring their claims against
defendants because (1) defendants were in a position of practical and actual authority
over plaintiffs, (2) defendants exerted authority over North Carolina magistrates,
including plaintiffs, and (3) plaintiffs resigned from their positions as magistrates
-6-
BREEDLOVE V. WARREN
Opinion of the Court
due to defendants' exertions of authority. For the purpose of defendants’ motion to
dismiss, these allegations are taken as true.
The North Carolina Constitution provides for the appointment of magistrates
as follows:
For each county, the senior regular resident Judge of the
Superior Court serving the county shall appoint from
nominations submitted by the Clerk of the Superior Court
of the county, one or more Magistrates who shall be officers
of the District Court.
N.C. Const., art. IV, § 10. This provision is further codified in the North Carolina
General Statutes. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-171 (2015).
The General Statutes also provide procedures for the removal of magistrates:
A magistrate may be suspended from performing the
duties of his office by the chief district judge of the district
court district in which his county is located, or removed
from office by the senior regular resident superior court
judge of, or any regular superior court judge holding court
in the district or set of districts as defined in G.S. 7A-
41.1(a) in which the county is located. Grounds for
suspension or removal are the same as for a judge of the
General Court of Justice.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-173(a) (2015).
Lastly, the General Statutes provide for the administrative and supervisory
authority over magistrates:
The chief district judge, subject to the general supervision
of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, has
administrative supervision and authority over the
operation of the district courts and magistrates in his
-7-
BREEDLOVE V. WARREN
Opinion of the Court
district. These powers and duties include, but are not
limited to, the following:
...
(4) Assigning matters to magistrates, and consistent with
the salaries set by the Administrative Officer of the Courts,
prescribing times and places at which magistrates shall be
available for the performance of their duties; however, the
chief district judge may in writing delegate his authority to
prescribe times and places at which magistrates in a
particular county shall be available for the performance of
their duties to another district court judge or the clerk of
the superior court, or the judge may appoint a chief
magistrate to fulfill some or all of the duties under
subdivision (12) of this section, and the person to whom
such authority is delegated shall make monthly reports to
the chief district judge of the times and places actually
served by each magistrate.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-146(4) (2015).
These statutes, taken together, make it explicit that the appointment of
magistrates is within the authority of the Senior Resident Superior Court Judge; that
the suspension of magistrates is within the authority of the Chief District Court
Judge; that the removal of magistrates is within the authority the Senior Resident
Superior Court Judge, or any superior court judge holding court in the relevant
county; and that administrative and supervisory authority over magistrates is vested
in the Chief District Court Judge, pursuant to the general supervision of the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court. Nowhere in any of these statutes is AOC listed as a
-8-
BREEDLOVE V. WARREN
Opinion of the Court
party with any authority to appoint, sanction, suspend, remove, or generally
supervise magistrates.
Plaintiffs contend that defendants nonetheless possess this authority, due to
various statutory provisions that grant AOC various ministerial powers with respect
to judicial employees and officials, including magistrates. However, plaintiffs’
complaint was not premised upon defendants setting their salary, or evaluating their
work experience; it was premised upon the concern that their adherence to their
religious beliefs would result in their removal as magistrates. Although AOC is
entrusted with statutory authority to establish and evaluate judicial compliance with
regulations, rules, and procedures,1 the statutes cited above clearly show that AOC
lacked the power, its memoranda notwithstanding, to sanction, suspend, or remove
plaintiffs. As such, we hold that defendants lacked any authority to sanction,
suspend, or remove plaintiffs.
Because defendants lacked the actual authority to sanction, suspend, or
remove plaintiffs, the allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint, when viewed as true and
considered in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, fail to demonstrate an injury that
defendants were capable of inflicting upon plaintiffs, and by extension fails to show
that such an injury could be redressed. If defendants could not remove plaintiffs,
then defendants could not have harmed plaintiffs by such a removal, and therefore
1 See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7A-171.1, 7A-171.2, 7A-174, 7A-177, 7A-343.
-9-
BREEDLOVE V. WARREN
Opinion of the Court
plaintiffs lacked standing to bring an action for this purported harm. We therefore
hold that the trial court did not err in granting defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack
of standing.
This argument is without merit.
III. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
In their second argument, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in
granting defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Because we have
already held that the trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint for lack
of standing, we need not address this issue.
AFFIRMED.
Judges McCULLOUGH and TYSON concur.
- 10 -