State v. Smith ( 2014 )

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA14-384
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 4 November 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Craven County
Nos. 11 CRS 54777, 13 CRS 132
HAROLD DEAN SMITH, JR.
Appeal by the State by writ of certiorari from order
entered 20 March 2013 by Judge Benjamin G. Alford in Craven
County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10
September 2014.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Teresa M. Postell, for the State-appellant.
Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate
Defenders Charlesena Elliott Walker and Katherine Jane
Allen, for defendant-appellee.
CALABRIA, Judge.
The State appeals by writ of certiorari an order granting
Harold Dean Smith Jr.’s (“defendant”) motion to obtain the
prosecuting witness’s psychiatric and psychological medical
records, requiring the State to interview and obtain a sworn
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statement from the prosecuting witness regarding her mental
health history. We reverse.
On 13 November 2011, defendant and his girlfriend Angela
Quinn (“Ms. Quinn”) argued at a home where they resided together
in New Bern, North Carolina. During the argument, defendant
allegedly set some bedding on fire. Both defendant and Ms.
Quinn were able to exit the residence before the fire spread to
other parts of the house. Defendant was subsequently arrested,
charged, and indicted for first degree arson and malicious
burning of personal property.
In May 2012 and again in February 2013, defendant filed
pretrial motions for voluntary discovery, to which the State
timely responded. On 11 March 2013, defendant filed a pretrial
“motion for disclosure of pyschiatric[sic]/psychological medical
records of prosecution witness.” In this motion, defendant
alleged that Ms. Quinn, a witness for the prosecution and the
only witness to the alleged crimes, had previously told
defendant that she had participated in inpatient psychiatric
treatment at Cherry Hospital. In addition, defendant believed
“[Ms. Quinn] was admitted . . . for psychiatric treatment after
the events that [gave] rise” to defendant’s charged offenses.
Defendant also alleged, inter alia, that “[b]ecause the mental
health and/or illness/defects of a witness is grounds for cross-
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examination, the Defendant would be prejudiced in his
opportunity for effective confrontation and cross-examination if
he were not allowed access to the mental health records of the
complaining witness[.]” The trial court granted defendant’s
motion. On 20 March 2013, the trial court ordered the district
attorney to, inter alia, “interview the Prosecuting Witness [Ms.
Quinn] to determine the names dates, [sic] and locations of all
voluntary and involuntary commitments over the past ten (10)
years[,]” and to provide Ms. Quinn’s sworn statement to the
defense to enable defendant’s counsel to “draw Order(s)
directing all records be mailed to” the court for in camera
inspection and disclose to defendant’s counsel any favorable and
material evidence.
On 25 March 2013, the State filed a motion for a temporary
stay, a petition for writ of supersedeas and a writ of
certiorari with this Court. This Court denied the State’s
petition for certiorari and dismissed the petitions for writ of
supersedeas and temporary stay on 30 April 2013. On 3 May 2013,
the State filed an application for a temporary stay, a petition
for writ of supersedeas, and a petition for writ of certiorari
with the Supreme Court of North Carolina. On 20 December 2013,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina allowed the State’s
application for temporary stay and writ of supersedeas. The
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Supreme Court also allowed the State’s petition for writ of
certiorari for the limited purpose of remanding to this Court
for review of the trial court’s order following full briefing by
the parties.
On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred in
ordering the State to interview Ms. Quinn and have her provide a
sworn statement regarding her mental health treatment.
Specifically, the State contends that it does not have any
information regarding Ms. Quinn’s mental health in its
possession, and ordering such an interview amounts to an
investigation to locate evidence favorable to the defendant. We
agree.
Generally, “a criminal defendant is entitled to potentially
exculpatory evidence[.]” State v. Lynn, 157 N.C. App. 217, 220,
578 S.E.2d 628, 631 (2003). “[S]uppression by the prosecution
of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution.” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 10 L. Ed. 2d
215, 218 (1963). The State’s duty to disclose “encompasses
impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence.” State v.
Holadia, 149 N.C. App. 248, 256, 561 S.E.2d 514, 520 (2002)
(citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 87 L.Ed.2d
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481, 490 (1985)).
[I]mpeachment evidence may include evidence
that a witness suffers from a serious
psychiatric or mental illness. The
rationale behind allowing impeachment by
evidence of prior treatment for psychiatric
problems is that although “instances of . .
. mental instability are not directly
probative of truthfulness, they may bear
upon credibility in other ways, such as to
cast doubt upon the capacity of a witness to
observe, recollect, and recount[.]”
Lynn, 157 N.C. App. at 220-21, 578 S.E.2d at 631 (quoting State
v. Williams, 330 N.C. 711, 719, 412 S.E.2d 359, 364 (1992)).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-903 provides, in pertinent part, that
upon a defendant’s motion, the court must order:
(1) The State to make available to the
defendant the complete files of all law
enforcement agencies, investigatory
agencies, and prosecutors’ offices involved
in the investigation of the crimes committed
or the prosecution of the defendant.
a. The term “file” includes the defendant’s
statements, the codefendants’ statements,
witness statements, investigating officers’
notes, results of tests and examinations, or
any other matter or evidence obtained during
the investigation of the offenses alleged to
have been committed by the defendant. When
any matter or evidence is submitted for
testing or examination, in addition to any
test or examination results, all other data,
calculations, or writings of any kind shall
be made available to the defendant,
including, but not limited to, preliminary
test or screening results and bench notes.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-903(a) (2013). “The State, however, is
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under a duty to disclose only those matters in its possession
and is not required to conduct an independent investigation to
locate evidence favorable to a defendant.” State v. Foushee,
___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 758 S.E.2d 47, 52 (2014) (citation and
internal quotations omitted). “[W]e note that this Court has
interpreted the provisions of Section 15A-903 to require
production by the State of already existing documents. The
statute imposes no duty on the State to create or continue to
develop additional documentation regarding an investigation.”
State v. Dorman, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 737 S.E.2d 452, 471
(2013) (citation omitted).
The State relies, in part, on Lynn to support its
contention that the State is not required to conduct an
additional investigation to locate evidence favorable to a
defendant. In Lynn, the defendant shot his girlfriend’s husband
several times while the husband slept. 157 N.C. App. at 218,
578 S.E.2d at 630. The defendant was arrested and charged with
conspiracy to commit first degree murder, attempted first degree
murder, and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill.
Id. The defendant made an unsuccessful pretrial motion
requesting the trial court to “order the State to conduct an
inquiry to determine who, if anyone, had previously treated [the
defendant’s girlfriend] for emotional or psychological
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problems.” Id. at 219, 578 S.E.2d at 631. This Court found
that the defendant failed to allege that information about the
girlfriend’s mental health was either in the State’s possession
or in the possession of persons acting on the State’s behalf,
and the denial of the defendant’s motion did not prevent him
from exploring the issue at trial. Id. at 222, 578 S.E.2d at
632. Therefore, “the trial court did not err by denying [the]
defendant’s pretrial motion to require the State to investigate
in order to learn the identities of any mental health
professionals with whom [the girlfriend] had previously sought
treatment.” Id. at 223, 578 S.E.2d at 633.
In the instant case, in his pretrial motion, defendant
requested an order from the trial court “commanding the
prosecution to inquire of the complaining witness . . . as to
the identities and contact information of any and all mental
health and medical professionals and requiring the disclosure of
any and all mental health and related medical records of the
complaining witness . . . to the defense[.]” In the
alternative, defendant requested that the trial court conduct an
in camera inspection of Ms. Quinn’s mental health and related
medical records and disclose to the defense any favorable and
material evidence. Defendant did not allege that the requested
information was in the State’s possession, nor did he allege
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that it was in the possession of anyone acting on behalf of the
State. On appeal, defendant acknowledges that the request
presented in his motion is substantially similar to the pretrial
motion in Lynn, and concedes that he is unable to distinguish
his motion in any meaningful way from the motion in Lynn.
Although the trial court specifically found that the
district attorney did not have the records of Ms. Quinn’s mental
health treatment in her possession, and had only learned of Ms.
Quinn’s mental health treatment after defendant filed his
pretrial motion, the trial court granted defendant’s motion.
However, the State “is under a duty to disclose only those
matters in its possession and is not required to conduct an
independent investigation to locate evidence favorable to a
defendant.” Foushee, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 758 S.E.2d at 52
(citation and internal quotations omitted). Therefore, since
the State did not have Ms. Quinn’s mental health treatment
records in its possession, nor did it have any notice that Ms.
Quinn had participated in mental health treatment until after
defendant had filed his pretrial motion, we hold that the State
does not have a duty “to create or continue to develop
additional documentation regarding an investigation[,]” Dorman,
___ N.C. App. at ___, 737 S.E.2d at 471, and the denial of
defendant’s motion will not prevent him from exploring the issue
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at trial. Lynn, 157 N.C. App. at 222, 578 S.E.2d at 632. We
therefore reverse the trial court’s order.
Reversed.
Judges ELMORE and STEPHENS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).