In re: S.P. & J.P. ( 2019 )


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  •                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
    No. COA18-1190
    Filed: 1 October 2019
    Surry County, Nos. 17 JA 48-49
    IN THE MATTER OF: S.P. and J.P.
    Appeal by Respondent-Father from order entered 21 August 2018 by Judge
    William F. Southern, III in Surry County District Court. Heard in the Court of
    Appeals 5 September 2019.
    Susan Curtis Campbell for petitioner-appellee Surry County Department of
    Social Services.
    Peter Wood for respondent-appellant father.
    James N. Freeman, Jr. for guardian ad litem.
    MURPHY, Judge.
    Respondent-Father (“Edouard”1) appeals from an order appointing the
    Johnsons as guardians of his minor children, Arthur and Cesar. Because no oral
    testimony was received at the hearing, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand
    for further proceedings.
    BACKGROUND
    1 Pseudonyms are used for all relevant persons throughout this opinion to protect the juveniles’
    identities and for ease of reading.
    IN RE: S.P. & J.P.
    Opinion of the Court
    On 11 July 2017, the Surry County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) filed
    petitions alleging that Arthur and Cesar were neglected juveniles. DSS alleged the
    children did not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline from their parents and
    lived in an environment injurious to their welfare due to their parents’ significant
    substance abuse. DSS obtained nonsecure custody of the children and placed them
    with the Johnsons, a couple related to the children’s mother.
    After a hearing on 17 August 2017, the trial court entered an order on 12
    September 2017 adjudicating the children to be neglected juveniles. In its disposition
    order, entered the same day, the trial court continued custody of the children with
    DSS, ordered the parents to comply with the Family Services Case Plans they had
    entered into with DSS, and granted the parents bi-weekly supervised visitation with
    the children.
    The trial court entered review hearing orders on 31 January 2018 and 22
    March 2018. It found the children were doing well in their placement with the
    Johnsons and that the parents were making only limited progress on the
    requirements of their case plans. The trial court continued custody of the children
    with DSS and directed they remain in placement with the Johnsons. The parents
    were ordered to comply with DSS requests and the provisions of their case plans and
    to submit to immediate drug screening. The trial court modified visitation to two
    visits per month to be supervised by the Johnsons.
    -2-
    IN RE: S.P. & J.P.
    Opinion of the Court
    On 27 June 2018, the trial court conducted a permanency planning hearing.
    The trial court entered its order from that hearing on 23 July 2018 and entered an
    amended order on 21 August 2018. In that order, the trial court found the parents
    had not made satisfactory progress on their case plans. The trial court set the
    primary plan for the children as guardianship and the secondary plan as reunification
    and appointed the Johnsons as guardians of the children. The trial court relieved
    DSS from further responsibility in the case, discharged the guardian ad litem for the
    children, released the parents’ appointed counsel, and held no further hearings were
    required in the case. The parents were granted a minimum of one two-hour visit with
    the children each month, to be supervised by the Johnsons, and the Johnsons were
    authorized to expand visitation in their discretion. Edouard filed timely notice of
    appeal.
    ANALYSIS
    Edouard argues the trial court erred by (1) delegating “its judicial
    responsibility by granting the [Johnsons] excessive discretion over [his] visitation
    rather than setting specific terms[,]” (2) “awarding guardianship to nonparents
    without verifying that the guardians understood the legal significance and had
    adequate resources[,]” and (3) terminating “juvenile court custody without [following]
    the mandates of [N.C.G.S.] § 7B-911 or opening a case under . . . Chapter 50.”
    -3-
    IN RE: S.P. & J.P.
    Opinion of the Court
    We first address Edouard’s argument challenging the trial court’s decision to
    award guardianship to the Johnsons. Our review of a permanency planning hearing
    is well established:
    This Court’s review of a permanency planning order is
    limited to whether there is competent evidence in the
    record to support the findings and whether the findings
    support the conclusions of law. If the trial court’s findings
    of fact are supported by any competent evidence, they are
    conclusive on appeal. The trial court’s conclusions are
    reviewable de novo on appeal.
    In re P.O., 
    207 N.C. App. 35
    , 41, 
    698 S.E.2d 525
    , 530 (2010) (internal citations and
    quotation marks omitted).
    N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.1(j) states:
    (j) If the court determines that the juvenile shall be placed
    in the custody of an individual other than a parent or
    appoints an individual guardian of the person pursuant to
    G.S. 7B-600, the court shall verify that the person receiving
    custody or being appointed as guardian of the juvenile
    understands the legal significance of the placement or
    appointment and will have adequate resources to care
    appropriately for the juvenile.
    N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.1(j) (2017).
    We have previously addressed the requirement of testimony at the
    permanency planning hearing to support a permanency planning order. In re J.T.,
    
    252 N.C. App. 19
    , 
    796 S.E.2d 534
    (2017); In re D.Y., 
    202 N.C. App. 140
    , 
    688 S.E.2d 91
    (2010); In re D.L., 
    166 N.C. App. 574
    , 
    603 S.E.2d 376
    (2004). In In re J.T., at the
    permanency planning hearing, the trial court heard statements from attorneys and
    -4-
    IN RE: S.P. & J.P.
    Opinion of the Court
    “accepted into evidence court reports submitted by the guardian ad litem and a DSS
    social worker and incorporated those reports by reference in its orders.” In re 
    J.T., 796 S.E.2d at 536
    . We stated that “reports incorporated by reference in the absence
    of testimony are insufficient to support the trial court’s findings of fact.”       
    Id. Accordingly, we
    held that “[b]ecause the trial court did not hear evidence at either of
    the permanency planning hearings, the findings in the court’s orders were
    unsupported by competent evidence, and its conclusions of law were in error.” 
    Id. In so
    holding, we found support in In re D.Y. and In re D.L.:
    The determinative facts of the present case are
    indistinguishable from those in this Court’s prior decisions
    in In re D.Y., 
    202 N.C. App. 140
    , 
    688 S.E.2d 91
    (2010), and
    In re D.L., 
    166 N.C. App. 574
    , 
    603 S.E.2d 376
    (2004), in
    which court reports were the only admissible evidence
    offered by DSS at the permanency planning hearings. The
    trial court’s findings of fact thus were based only on the
    court reports, prior orders, and the arguments of counsel.
    In both cases, this Court held that the trial court’s
    conclusions of law were in error without additional
    evidence offered to support the trial court’s findings of fact,
    and this Court reversed the permanency planning orders.
    
    Id. at 21,
    796 S.E.2d at 536 (citations omitted).
    This case is indistinguishable from the aforementioned cases. Here, the only
    evidence before the trial court consisted of the reports offered by DSS and the
    guardian ad litem. The trial court heard no testimony at the permanency planning
    hearing. The entirety of the evidentiary portion of the permanency planning hearing
    consists of the following:
    -5-
    IN RE: S.P. & J.P.
    Opinion of the Court
    THE COURT: If we can have the preparers of the report
    sworn?
    (The preparers of the report were sworn.)
    The trial court then asked if DSS had anything further, whereupon counsel presented
    their arguments to the court. While the trial court could consider the reports as
    evidence, these reports and arguments made by counsel alone, without testimony, are
    insufficient to support the trial court’s findings of fact. See In re 
    J.T., 796 S.E.2d at 536
    . Thus, the trial court’s conclusions of law were erroneous. We vacate the order
    and remand for further proceedings. Because we must vacate the trial court’s order,
    we need not address Edouard’s remaining arguments.
    CONCLUSION
    For the reasons stated herein, the trial court’s order is vacated and remanded.
    VACATED AND REMANDED.
    Chief Judge McGEE and Judge COLLINS concur.
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-1190

Filed Date: 10/1/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/1/2019