State v. Spruill and Chapman ( 2014 )


Menu:
  •                                          NO. COA14-369
    NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
    Filed: 18 November 2014
    STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
    v.                                             Edgecombe County
    Nos. 13 CRS 51229—30
    KAWANA SPRUILL and RICHARD CONOLEY
    CHAPMAN
    Appeal       by    defendants     from    judgments       entered     18   December
    2013    by    Judge       Walter   H.     Godwin,       Jr.,    in   Edgecombe      County
    Superior Court.           Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 September 2014.
    Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy                             Attorney
    General David J. Adinolfi II, for the State.
    Smith, James, Rowlett & Cohen, LLP, by Seth R. Cohen, for
    defendant-appellants.
    BRYANT, Judge.
    Because the jury was presented with substantial evidence of
    each essential element of the charge that defendants operated or
    placed       into    operation      an     electronic        machine    to      conduct   a
    sweepstakes         through      the     use     of     an     entertaining       display,
    including      the       entry   process    or   the     “reveal”      of   a   prize,    we
    affirm the trial court’s denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss
    and find no error in the judgment of the trial court.
    -2-
    On 23 April 2013, a magistrate in Edgecombe County issued
    arrest     warrants       for     defendants        Kawana       Spruill        and     Richard
    Conoley    Chapman        on    the    charge      of   violating      North          Carolina
    General    Statutes,       section       14-306.4       (“Electronic        machines       and
    devices for sweepstakes prohibited”).                       The matter came on for
    trial before a jury in Edgecombe County Superior Court on 17
    December    2013,        the    Honorable       Walter      H.    Godwin,        Jr.,    Judge
    presiding.
    The      evidence          presented     at     trial    tended        to    show     that
    defendant Chapman was the owner of Past Times Business Center
    (“Past Times”), an internet café, located at 2100 St. Andrews
    Street, Tabor City, and defendant Spruill was the manager.                                   An
    undercover officer with the Tabor City Police Department went to
    Past Times to determine if the café was operating an electronic
    sweepstakes       in    violation      of    N.C.    Gen.    Stat.    14-306.4.             The
    undercover officer testified that he went to Past Times on 11
    April     2013,        equipped       with   a      surveillance       camera.              The
    surveillance video was played for the jury while the officer
    narrated.     The officer presented the cashier with $25.00.                               The
    cashier presented the officer with a disclaimer which states, in
    part:
    I understand that I am purchasing computer
    time to be used at this location.   I also
    -3-
    realize that I can request to participate in
    the promotional game for free. . . .
    . . .
    I understand that I am not gambling. I am
    playing a promotional game in which the
    winners are predetermined.    The games have
    no effect on the outcome of the prizes won.
    The undercover officer played internet games with the names
    “Keno,”       “Lucky’s    Loot,”    Lucky’s   Loot     bonus   round    named    “Pot
    O’Gold,” “Lucky Sevens,” “Lucky Ducks,”                  and “Lucky Lamb.”        The
    undercover officer testified that his understanding was “[y]ou
    cannot win any more money than what it says you're already going
    to win before the game starts. So it's irrelevant what you click
    on.”     The lead investigator, Detective Sergeant Bruce Edwards,
    testified that Past Times’ electronic games used a pre-reveal
    system.        The     pre-reveal   system    showed     the   prize    amount    the
    patron would win prior to the patron playing a game.                      Once the
    game was completed, the prize amount revealed prior to the start
    of     the    game     would   be   displayed        again.     Kevin    Morse,     a
    representative from the video game manufacturer Figure Eight,
    testified that the software used to make the electronic games
    available in Past Times was developed and controlled by Figure
    Eight and that Past Time paid a user licensing fee to access the
    games        via   the    internet.          Morse     distinguished      a     “true
    -4-
    sweepstakes,” where        the prize is revealed after the game is
    completed, from the electronic games used in Past Times, where
    the prize is revealed before a game is played.                   At Past Times,
    the patron has the option of whether to play the game after the
    prize has been revealed.         If the patron does not timely choose
    to play a game, the system prompts the next reveal opportunity.
    At the close of the evidence, the jury returned verdicts
    against Chapman and Spruill finding each “[g]uilty of operating
    or placing into operation an electronic machine or device for
    the purpose of conducting a sweepstakes through the use of an
    entertaining       display,    including      the    entry    process      or    the
    revealing of a prize[.]”          The trial court entered judgment in
    accordance with the jury verdicts.             Spruill was sentenced to an
    active term of 45 days.         The sentence was suspended, and she was
    placed on unsupervised probation for a period of 12 months.
    Chapman was also sentenced to an active term of 45 days.                        This
    sentence     was   suspended,    and     he   was    placed     on   unsupervised
    probation for a period of 36 months.              Both defendants appeal.
    ____________________________________
    On    appeal,   defendants    argue      the    trial     court    erred    in
    denying their motion to dismiss.              Defendants contend that there
    was   not    substantial      evidence     they     conducted    a      sweepstakes
    -5-
    through the use of an entertaining display, including the entry
    process or the revealing of a prize in violation of N.C. Gen.
    Stat. § 14-306.4.       We disagree.
    “We review denial of a motion to dismiss criminal charges
    de novo, to determine whether there is substantial evidence (1)
    of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser
    offense    included     therein,     and   (2)    of    defendant's        being   the
    perpetrator of such offense.”              State v. Mobley, 
    206 N.C. App. 285
    , 291, 
    696 S.E.2d 862
    , 866 (2010) (citation and quotations
    omitted).     “[T]he trial court must analyze the evidence in the
    light most favorable to the State and give the State the benefit
    of every reasonable inference from the evidence. . . .                             The
    trial    court   does    not    weigh    the    evidence,     consider      evidence
    unfavorable      to     the     State,     or     determine          any    witness'
    credibility.”         State    v.   Trogdon,    216    N.C.   App.    15,    25,   
    715 S.E.2d 635
    , 641 (2011) (citations and quotations omitted).
    Pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes, section                           14-
    306.4,
    it shall be unlawful for any person to
    operate,   or  place   into   operation,  an
    electronic machine or device to do either of
    the following:
    (1) Conduct a sweepstakes through the
    use   of   an  entertaining   display,
    including the entry process or the
    -6-
    reveal of a prize.
    (2) Promote a sweepstakes that is
    conducted   through   the   use   of  an
    entertaining   display,   including  the
    entry process or the reveal of a prize.
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-306.4(b) (2013).                          “Entertaining display” is
    defined      as    “visual       information,           capable      of   being       seen       by   a
    sweepstakes entrant, that takes the form of actual game play, or
    simulated         game    play    .   .    .   .”        
    Id. § 14-306.4(a)(3).
                     An
    entertaining display can be “[a]ny [] video game not dependent
    on skill or dexterity that is played while revealing a prize as
    the    result       of    an     entry     into     a    sweepstakes.”            
    Id. § 14-
    306.4(a)(3)(i).                 “Sweepstakes”           is     defined     as     “any       game,
    advertising scheme or plan, or other promotion, which, with or
    without payment of any consideration, a person may enter to win
    or become eligible to receive any prize, the determination of
    which is based upon chance.”                   
    Id. § 14-
    306.4(a)(5).
    Defendants contend that because the prize is revealed to
    the patron prior to any opportunity to play a game, they have
    not    run   afoul        of    the   plain     meaning        of    N.C.G.S.     §    14-306.4.
    Previously, games were used to reveal the sweepstakes prize.
    But,    according          to     Figure       Eight         representative       Morse,          the
    software accessible from Past Times was changed to incorporate
    -7-
    the pre-reveal feature, specifically, to operate in compliance
    with N.C.G.S. § 14-306.4.
    [N]o sooner is a lottery defined, and
    the definition applied to a given state of
    facts, than ingenuity is at work to evolve
    some scheme of evasion which is within the
    mischief, but not quite within the letter of
    the definition. But, in this way, it is not
    possible to escape the law's condemnation,
    for it will strip the transaction of all its
    thin and false apparel and consider it in
    its very nakedness. It will look to the
    substance and not to the form of it, in
    order to disclose its real elements and the
    pernicious tendencies which the law is
    seeking to prevent. The Court will inquire,
    not into the name, but into the game,
    however skillfully disguised, in order to
    ascertain if it is prohibited[.] It is the
    one playing at the game who is influenced by
    the hope enticingly held out, which is often
    false    or  disappointing,   that  he  will,
    perhaps and by good luck, get something for
    nothing, or a great deal for a very little
    outlay. This is the lure that draws the
    credulous    and    unsuspecting   into   the
    deceptive scheme, and it is what the law
    denounces as wrong and demoralizing.
    Hest Technologies, Inc. v. State ex rel. Perdue, 
    366 N.C. 289
    ,
    289—90, 
    749 S.E.2d 429
    , 430—31 (2012) (citing State v. Lipkin,
    
    169 N.C. 265
    , 271, 
    84 S.E. 340
    , 343 (1915)), cert. denied, ___
    U.S. ___, ___ L. Ed. 2d ___ (2013).
    It is undisputed that with the use of computers accessing
    the internet, defendants operated a sweepstakes wherein a prize
    was revealed to a patron not dependent upon the patron’s skill
    -8-
    or   dexterity    in    playing       a    video    game.        See    N.C.G.S.       §    14-
    306.4(a)(3)(i).        That the video game did not have to be played
    or played to completion is not determinative.                          Defendants appear
    to define “game” only as that interaction between patron and
    computer    which      occurs    after       the    sweepstakes         prize    has       been
    revealed and the patron presses the “game” button.                         We disagree.
    Under the pre-reveal format, entry and participation in the
    sweepstakes,     through        the       pre-reveal,       is   a     prerequisite          to
    playing a video game.           Thus, the sweepstakes takes place during
    the initial stages of any game played.                      That the sweepstakes is
    conducted at the beginning of a game versus its conclusion makes
    no   significant        difference:         the      sweepstakes         prize        is    not
    dependent upon the skill or dexterity of the patron; it is a
    game of chance.         And, in conjunction, the electronic video game
    is a display which entices the patron to play.
    Section 14-306.4 seeks to prevent the use of entertaining
    displays    in   the    form    of    video        games    to   conduct      sweepstakes
    wherein    the   prize    is    determined         by   chance.         See     
    id. § 14-
    306.4(b)(1).     Therefore, when viewed in the light most favorable
    to the State, it is clear that the jury was presented with
    substantial evidence of each essential element of the charge
    that defendants operated or placed into operation an electronic
    -9-
    machine   to   conduct     a   sweepstakes    through   the   use   of   an
    entertaining display, including the entry process or the reveal
    of a prize.    See id.; see also 
    Trogdon, 216 N.C. App. at 25
    , 715
    S.E.2d at 641.      Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s denial of
    defendants’ motion to dismiss the charge and find no error in
    the judgment of the trial court.          
    Mobley, 206 N.C. App. at 291
    ,
    696   S.E.2d   at   866.       Accordingly,   defendant’s     argument   is
    overruled.
    No error.
    Chief Judge McGEE and Judge STROUD concur.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-369

Filed Date: 11/18/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/18/2014