State v. Valencia ( 2014 )

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitte d in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA14-516
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 2 December 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Randolph County
No. 11 CRS 50969
REYNA PATRICIA VALENCIA
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 16 September 2013
by Judge Richard W. Stone in Randolph County Superior Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 October 2014.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Christopher W. Brooks, for the State.
Cooley Law Office, by Craig M. Cooley, for defendant-
appellant.
HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.
Reyna Valencia (“defendant”) appeals from judgment entered
after a jury convicted her of felony death by motor vehicle,
reckless driving, and two counts of felonious restraint.
Defendant’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court
erred by denying her motion to dismiss the two charges of
felonious restraint where the evidence showed that the minor
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victims willingly entered defendant’s vehicle and were not
induced to do so by fraud.
After careful review, we find no error.
Background
On Saturday, 19 February 2011, brothers J.S. and R.S.1 were
playing soccer at their home and noticed defendant, their
uncle’s girlfriend, drinking beer and socializing in the
backyard. The boys were 14 and 12 years old, respectively.
After playing soccer for thirty to forty five minutes, J.S. and
R.S. went to the front cul-de-sac to play basketball. Defendant
left the backyard and got into her car to run errands. She
approached the boys in her vehicle and asked them through the
driver’s side window if they wanted to go with her to run
errands for the evening’s party. The boys declined defendant’s
offer twice. Defendant told them that she hated being alone and
that the boys’ mother had given them permission to go with
defendant. It is undisputed that the boys’ mother did not give
defendant permission to take them with her to run errands.
However, believing that their mother had given them permission,
J.S. and R.S. got into defendant’s car, and the three drove away
1
Pseudonyms will be used to protect the identity and privacy of
the minor victims in this case.
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from the house. Inside the vehicle, J.S. noticed a bottle of
Bud Light beer in the driver’s side cup holder.
Defendant first stopped at her cousin’s house to invite her
relatives to the party. Defendant invited the boys into the
house, but they decided to stay in the car. After ten minutes,
they walked to a nearby park. They walked back to the house
after about thirty minutes and found defendant “drinking beer
and having a good time.” When defendant was finished, she drove
the boys to another apartment where she stopped for five to ten
minutes. J.S. and R.S. waited in the car during the second
stop.
After running the first two errands, defendant drove onto
Highway 220. Soon thereafter, defendant lost control of the
vehicle. An eyewitness testified that defendant had been
“swerving all over the road” and “wasn’t competent of driving.”
Defendant caused the vehicle to swerve off the right embankment,
fly up into the air, and land on its roof against a street sign.
J.S. was able to crawl away from the accident relatively
unharmed, but R.S. was declared deceased by paramedics shortly
after they arrived at the scene. Defendant was airlifted to
Wake Forest Baptist Hospital in Winston-Salem, North Carolina.
Nurses collected three vials of blood, which revealed that
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defendant’s blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”) was .18.
Officers of the Asheboro Police Department obtained a search
warrant to seize the vials. Subsequent chemical analysis by the
State Bureau of Investigation also showed a BAC of .18.
Defendant was arrested and charged with felony death by
vehicle, driving while impaired, reckless driving, felony
restraint, and involuntary manslaughter. At the close of all
evidence at trial, defendant moved to dismiss the felonious
restraint charges. She argued that the State presented
insufficient evidence of one element of the charge – an unlawful
restraint. The State claimed that by tricking the boys into
getting into her vehicle, defendant unlawfully restrained them
through fraud. The trial court denied defendant’s motion. The
jury found defendant guilty of felony death by motor vehicle,
reckless driving, and two counts of felonious restraint.
Discussion
Defendant’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court
erred by denying her motion to dismiss the charges of felonious
restraint. We disagree.
“This Court reviews the trial court’s denial of a motion to
dismiss de novo.” State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 62, 650
S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007). To defeat a motion to dismiss, the State
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must present “substantial evidence (1) of each essential element
of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein,
and (2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator of such offense.”
State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455 (2000)
(quotation omitted). “Substantial evidence is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” State v. Denny, 361 N.C. 662, 664-665,
652 S.E.2d 212, 213 (2007) (quotation marks omitted). “When
reviewing a defendant’s motion to dismiss for insufficiency of
the evidence, the evidence must be considered in a light most
favorable to the State and the State must be given the benefit
of every reasonable inference arising therefrom.” State v.
Sakobie, 157 N.C. App. 275, 281, 579 S.E.2d 125, 129 (2003)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-43.3 (2013):
A person commits the offense of felonious
restraint if he unlawfully restrains another
person without that person’s consent, or the
consent of the person’s parent or legal
custodian if the person is less than 16
years old, and moves the person from the
place of the initial restraint by
transporting him in a motor vehicle or other
conveyance.
Defendant only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
proving that R.S. and J.S. were “unlawfully restrained.” This
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Court has held that “the requirement for ‘restraint’ for a
charge of kidnapping is the same as the requirement of
‘restraint’ for a charge of felonious restraint.” State v.
Lalinde, __ N.C. App. __, __, 750 S.E.2d 868, 873 (2013), review
allowed, __ N.C. __, 758 S.E.2d 878 (2014). Thus, caselaw
defining “restraint” in the context of a kidnapping is
applicable to the issue of what constitutes “restraint” for
these purposes.
Our Supreme Court has held that “[t]he term ‘restraint,’
while broad enough to include a restriction upon freedom of
movement by confinement, connotes also such a restriction, by
force, threat or fraud, without a confinement.” State v.
Fulcher, 294 N.C. 503, 523, 243 S.E.2d 338, 351 (1978).
Furthermore, “restraint can also occur when one person’s freedom
of movement is restricted due to another’s fraud or trickery.”
Lalinde, __ N.C. App. at __, 750 S.E.2d at 873 (quotation marks
omitted). To establish the element of “restraint” by fraud, the
burden is on the State to show that the defendant’s “fraud or
trickery directly induced the victim to be removed to a place
other than where the victim intended to be.” State v. Davis,
158 N.C. App. 1, 13, 582 S.E.2d 289, 297 (2003). Furthermore,
“felonious restraint . . . does not require the State to prove
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defendant’s purpose for the restraint.” State v. Stinson, 127
N.C. App. 252, 258, 489 S.E.2d 182, 186 (1997).
Here, it is undisputed that defendant tricked R.S. and J.S.
into going with her to run errands by falsely stating that their
mother had given them permission. Defendant concedes that she
used “fraud” and a “fib” in convincing the boys to go with her.
However, she contends that she did not unlawfully restrain them
in the vehicle for two reasons: (1) the boys actually wanted to
run errands with her; and (2) she did not have an “evil intent”
behind the misrepresentation. We find these arguments
unpersuasive.
First, contrary to defendant’s argument, the State
presented substantial evidence that neither R.S. nor J.S. wanted
to get into the vehicle. This Court has held that fraud can
amount to an “unlawful restraint” where it causes the victim to
be in “a place or places other than where [the victim] wanted to
be.” State v. Sturdivant, 304 N.C. 293, 306, 283 S.E.2d 719,
729 (1981). Defendant contends that because the boys entered
her vehicle when they found out they had permission from their
mother, the only thing stopping them from doing so initially was
a lack of permission, not a desire to stay. However, J.S.
testified that the boys did not decline the offer twice because
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they did not have permission, but because they did not want to
go with defendant to run errands. Specifically, he testified
that he told defendant, “No, we don’t want to go. We just want
to stay here and play.” J.S.’s testimony shows that the boys
wanted to continue playing basketball in their driveway before
they were induced by defendant’s fraud to get into her vehicle.
Taking this evidence in the light most favorable to the State,
this evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find
an “unlawful restraint.” See Sturdivant, 304 N.C. at 306, 283
S.E.2d at 728; Lalinde, __ N.C. App. at __, 750 S.E.2d at 873-
74.
Furthermore, it is irrelevant that defendant did not have
an “evil intent” behind the misrepresentation. “The distinction
between felonious restraint and [kidnapping] is that the former
does not require the state to prove defendant’s purpose for the
restraint.” Stinson, 127 N.C. App. at 258, 489 S.E.2d at 186.
Because the intent underlying defendant’s fraudulent inducement
is not an element of the crimes charged, defendant’s benign
motives in tricking the boys does not render the trial court’s
denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss erroneous.
Conclusion
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Because the State presented substantial evidence that
defendant unlawfully restrained R.S. and J.S. by fraudulently
inducing them to stop playing basketball and run errands with
her, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of her motion
to dismiss the charges of felonious restraint.
NO ERROR.
Judges DILLON and DAVIS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).