Julian v. The Univ. of NC Health Care Sys. , 264 N.C. App. 424 ( 2019 )


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  •               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
    No. COA18-477
    Filed: 19 March 2019
    Orange County, No. 16 CVS 001206
    ALEXANDER JULIAN, III, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
    situated, Plaintiff,
    v.
    THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, d/b/a THE
    UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA HOSPITALS, Defendant.
    Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 28 November 2017 by Judge Michael J.
    O’Foghludha in Orange County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28
    November 2018.
    Lewis & Roberts, PLLC, by Matthew D. Quinn and James A. Roberts, III, for
    plaintiff-appellant.
    Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Derek L.
    Hunter, for defendant-appellee.
    DIETZ, Judge.
    Alexander Julian brought this class action lawsuit against the University of
    North Carolina Health Care System after a visit to one of the system’s hospitals. The
    hospital charges for operating room time in half-hour increments. Julian alleges that
    this billing practice permits the hospital to overcharge patients—Julian, for example,
    was in the operating room for approximately two hours and four minutes but the
    JULIAN V. UNIV. OF NORTH CAROLINA HEALTH CARE SYS.
    Opinion of the Court
    hospital billed him for two and a half hours of operating room time. This, Julian
    claims, is a breach of the contract between the hospital and its patients.
    The trial court dismissed Julian’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to
    state a claim on which relief can be granted. As explained below, we affirm that
    ruling. Julian asserts that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 131E-273—a statute he believes is
    incorporated by law into his contract with the hospital—bars healthcare providers
    from charging for a “component of any health care procedure that was not performed
    or supplied.” Julian contends that the hospital violated this statute by charging him
    for time when he was not actually in the operating room.
    But even assuming that this statute is part of the contract and means what
    Julian claims (the hospital disputes both these points), the “component” of a
    healthcare procedure at issue here is a half-hour block of operating room time. The
    hospital supplied that component to Julian, although he did not use it in full. This is
    no different from charging a patient for a bag of solution used in an intravenous fluid
    drip even though the patient does not use every drop of fluid in the bag. The plain
    language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 131E-273 permits a hospital to bill for these types of
    components of a procedure even if they are only partially used.
    Julian’s express contract claim fails for a similar reason: the terms of the
    contract state that operating room time is billed in “half hour increments” even if only
    a portion of that final half hour block is used. This means the hospital billed Julian
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    JULIAN V. UNIV. OF NORTH CAROLINA HEALTH CARE SYS.
    Opinion of the Court
    precisely as the contract required. Accordingly, Julian’s claims fail as a matter of law
    and the trial court properly dismissed them under Rule 12(b)(6).
    Facts and Procedural History
    On 17 October 2014, Alexander Julian, III arrived at the UNC Ambulatory
    Surgery Center in Chapel Hill for outpatient surgery. Before beginning his surgery,
    Julian entered into a contract with the hospital. Julian concedes that this contract
    included a document that the parties refer to as the “O.R. Charge Rules,” although
    Julian did not receive a copy of that particular document before his surgery. The O.R.
    Charge Rules establish the rates the hospital will charge for operating room services.
    The rules state that the hospital charges patients for operating room time “based on
    half hour increments with time measured from the time the patient enters the room
    until the patient leaves the room.” The charge rules also state that “[i]f the procedure
    goes into the next time increment, the charge is for the next increment of time.”
    In January 2015, Julian received a non-itemized bill from the hospital for his
    surgery. The bill was much higher than Julian expected, so he contacted the hospital
    for additional information. In February 2015, the hospital sent Julian a letter
    explaining that his total operating room time was “2 hours and 4 minutes” and “OR
    time is charged in 30 minutes [sic] increments, making 2 hours and 4 minutes fall
    between the OR time charge of 2:01 to 2:30 hours.” Although Julian concedes in this
    lawsuit that he agreed to be bound by the terms of the O.R. Charge Rules when he
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    JULIAN V. UNIV. OF NORTH CAROLINA HEALTH CARE SYS.
    Opinion of the Court
    signed the contract with the hospital, the parties also acknowledge that Julian did
    not receive a copy of the O.R. Charge Rules when he signed the contract and agreed
    to be bound by its terms. As a result, when Julian received this response from the
    hospital, it was the first time Julian learned that the hospital billed for operating
    room time in half-hour increments.
    In 2016, Julian filed a putative class action against the University of North
    Carolina Health Care System, alleging claims for breach of contract, breach of
    implied-in-fact contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
    dealing. The complaint also requested a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.
    The hospital moved to dismiss the complaint under Rules 12(b)(1), (2), and (6) of the
    North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. After a hearing, the trial court granted the
    hospital’s motion to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
    claim on which relief could be granted. Julian timely appealed.
    Analysis
    The basis of this breach of contract action is the hospital’s practice of charging
    for operating room time in half-hour increments. Julian was in the hospital operating
    room for slightly more than two hours and billed for two hours and thirty minutes of
    operating room usage. Julian alleges that, as a result of this practice, he was charged
    for twenty-six to twenty-eight minutes of operating room time when he was not
    actually in the operating room receiving medical care.
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    JULIAN V. UNIV. OF NORTH CAROLINA HEALTH CARE SYS.
    Opinion of the Court
    The trial court dismissed Julian’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state
    a claim on which relief can be granted. We review that ruling de novo, examining
    “whether the allegations of the complaint, if treated as true, are sufficient to state a
    claim upon which relief can be granted under some legal theory.” Jackson/Hill
    Aviation, Inc. v. Town of Ocean Isle Beach, __ N.C. App. __, __, 
    796 S.E.2d 120
    , 123
    (2017).
    Julian first contends that the hospital’s operating room billing practice violates
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 131E-273, a statute that he contends is incorporated into the terms
    of the parties’ contract. Section 131E-273 prohibits health care providers from
    charging patients for any component of a health care procedure that was not actually
    performed or supplied:
    It shall be unlawful for any provider of health care services
    to charge or accept payment for any health care procedure
    or component of any health care procedure that was not
    performed or supplied. If a procedure requires the informed
    consent of a patient, the charge for any component of the
    procedure performed prior to consent being given shall not
    exceed the actual cost to the provider if the patient elects
    not to consent to the procedure.
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 131E-273. Julian argues that the hospital’s practice of billing for
    operating room time in half-hour increments violates this statute because, unless the
    patient was in the operating room for every minute of that half-hour block of time,
    the hospital necessarily charged the patient for some operating room time that was
    not actually supplied to the patient.
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    JULIAN V. UNIV. OF NORTH CAROLINA HEALTH CARE SYS.
    Opinion of the Court
    Even assuming this statutory provision is incorporated into the contract
    between Julian and the hospital—an issue we need not reach today—we reject
    Julian’s argument that the hospital’s billing practice violates this provision. The flaw
    in Julian’s legal theory is that the half-hour blocks of operating room time are the
    components for which he was charged.
    The term “component” and the phrase “component of any health care
    procedure” are not defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 131E-273 or anywhere else in that
    chapter of the General Statutes. Thus, we give those words their plain meaning.
    Midrex Techs., Inc. v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 
    369 N.C. 250
    , 258, 
    794 S.E.2d 785
    , 792
    (2016). A “component” is “a constituent part” or “one of the parts of something.”
    Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2018). A “procedure” is “a medical treatment or
    operation.” 
    Id. Applying this
    plain meaning of the statute, the intermediate steps within a
    complete healthcare procedure certainly are components of the overall procedure. In
    a cancer surgery, for example, those components might include administering the
    anesthesia, making the incision, removing the tumor, and so on. Julian contends that
    the statute also governs the material components used in the surgery—the operating
    room, the surgical instruments, the gauze, etc.
    But even if we assume that the statute covers charges associated with the
    material components used in a healthcare procedure, that is precisely what the
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    JULIAN V. UNIV. OF NORTH CAROLINA HEALTH CARE SYS.
    Opinion of the Court
    hospital did here. The statute prohibits healthcare providers from charging for
    components that were not “supplied”—it does not prohibit charging for components
    that were supplied but were only partially used during the procedure. Consider, for
    example, a hospital that charges patients for the bags of solution used for an
    intravenous fluid drip. Under Julian’s theory, if a patient used only a portion of the
    fluid in the bag before being disconnected from the IV, the hospital would violate N.C.
    Gen. Stat. § 131E-273 by charging the patient for the bag.
    That it not a reasonable interpretation of what this statute renders unlawful.
    To be sure, if the hospital never provided the patient with a bag of IV solution during
    the procedure, it could not charge the patient for one. But if the hospital used the bag
    during the procedure, it does not violate N.C. Gen. Stat. § 131E-273 by charging the
    patient for it, even if some portion of the solution in the bag went unused.
    The same is true for time in the operating room. The hospital provides access
    to the operating room for patients in half-hour blocks of time. Those blocks of time
    are components of the healthcare procedure. Although Julian did not use the entire
    final half-hour block of time, he used some of that component, just as a patient
    connected to an IV fluid drip might use some of the solution in a fluid bag, but not all
    of it. Thus, the statute, by its plain terms, permitted the hospital to charge Julian for
    that last half-hour block of time because that was a component of the procedure
    supplied to Julian. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in determining that Julian’s
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    JULIAN V. UNIV. OF NORTH CAROLINA HEALTH CARE SYS.
    Opinion of the Court
    claim for breach of contract based on a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 131E-273 fails
    as a matter of law.
    Julian next argues that the hospital breached the parties’ contract because the
    contract states that the patient will only be charged for “clinic facility, drugs, and
    drug administration, and any tests you receive during your visit” and that the patient
    will be charged for use of the operating room based “on the amount of time the OR is
    used.” (Emphasis added). Julian contends that the hospital breached these provisions
    because he “was billed for 28 minutes of operating room time” that he did not actually
    receive or use.
    This argument fails because the language of the contract, which is incorporated
    into the complaint, expressly refutes it.1 The provision of the contract governing
    charges for operating room time states that patients will be billed “based on the
    amount of time the OR is used” but then immediately follows that statement with the
    explanation that “[t]he charge is based on half hour increments”:
    1. OR Time Charges
    Definition – The charge for the use of the operating room
    is currently based on the amount of time the OR is used,
    regardless of OR site. The charge is based on half hour
    increments with time measured from the time the patient enters
    the room until the patient leaves the room. (Total time from 1-
    30 minute is the first step, 31-60 minutes the second, etc.).
    1  Although the O.R. Charge Rules were not attached to Julian’s complaint, Julian concedes
    that this document is part of the contract that is the subject matter of the lawsuit and thus the trial
    court properly considered it when evaluating the hospital’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Oberlin Capital, L.P.
    v. Slavin, 
    147 N.C. App. 52
    , 60–61, 
    554 S.E.2d 840
    , 847 (2001).
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    JULIAN V. UNIV. OF NORTH CAROLINA HEALTH CARE SYS.
    Opinion of the Court
    Calculation of Charge – A specified or set charge based
    upon the length of the case is established for each ½ hour
    increment of time. If the procedure goes into the next
    increment, the charge is for the next increment of time . . .
    (Boldface in original).
    In other words, the parties’ contract states that it is based on “time the OR is
    used” but defines how that use is calculated as being in “half hour increments.”
    Julian’s complaint alleges that he was billed in half hour increments, and that, after
    spending approximately two hours and two to four minutes in the operating room,
    was billed for five half-hour increments. This is precisely what the contract requires.
    Accordingly, the trial court properly determined that this breach of contract claim
    also fails as a matter of law.
    We acknowledge that it is healthcare providers, not patients, who choose how
    to draw these lines. Here, for example, the hospital decided to use half-hour
    increments instead of, say, 10-minute increments, or 5-minute ones. Julian certainly
    believes that smaller increments would be more reasonable, and many other patients
    likely would agree. But Julian concedes that he is not challenging (and cannot
    challenge) the reasonableness of that decision because our precedent precludes that
    claim. See Shelton v. Duke Univ. Health Sys., 
    179 N.C. App. 120
    , 123, 
    633 S.E.2d 113
    ,
    115 (2006).
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    JULIAN V. UNIV. OF NORTH CAROLINA HEALTH CARE SYS.
    Opinion of the Court
    Julian also argues that the hospital’s billing practice permits it to “double bill”
    patients and inflate healthcare costs. In Julian’s case, for example, he left the
    operating room and went to a recovery room, resulting in charges for “being in two
    places at the same time.” But this is a policy argument, not a contract one. If the
    parties to a contract assent to a billing structure that permits “double billing” or
    billing for time “in two places at once,” it is not a breach of contract when that type of
    billing occurs—that is the nature of freedom of contract. If Julian believes that
    hospitals ought to be prohibited from offering these contract terms to their patients,
    he must take that up with the other branches of government. The role of the courts
    is limited to interpreting contract law as it exists, not to rewriting it to rein in rising
    healthcare costs. Fagundes v. Ammons Dev. Grp., Inc., __ N.C. App. __, __, 
    796 S.E.2d 529
    , 533 (2017).
    In sum, because Julian’s contract claims failed to state a claim on which relief
    could be granted as a matter of law, the trial court properly dismissed them under
    Rule 12(b)(6). And, because Julian’s remaining claims all necessarily depend on the
    breach of contract claims (and Julian does not contend otherwise on appeal), the trial
    court properly dismissed the complaint in its entirety.2 We therefore affirm the trial
    court’s order.
    2 Julian’s appellate brief only addresses the two contract arguments analyzed in this opinion.
    Thus, even if there were other arguments that could be made with respect to the remaining claims,
    Julian abandoned those arguments by failing to raise them in his brief. See N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6).
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    JULIAN V. UNIV. OF NORTH CAROLINA HEALTH CARE SYS.
    Opinion of the Court
    Conclusion
    For the reasons explained above, we affirm the trial court’s order.
    AFFIRMED.
    Judges STROUD and MURPHY concur.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 18-477

Citation Numbers: 826 S.E.2d 553, 264 N.C. App. 424

Filed Date: 3/19/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023