State v. Wilson ( 2015 )

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not
constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted
in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION OF THE NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE CONTROLLING LEGAL AUTHORITY. CITATION IS
D ISFAVORED, BUT M AY BE PERMITTED IN A CCO RDANCE WITH TH E
PROVISIONS OF RULE 30(E)(3) OF THE NORTH CAROLINA RULES OF APPELLATE
P R O C E D U R E .
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA14-638
Filed: 5 May 2015
Onslow County, Nos. 09 CRS 054843-44
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
JARRELL DAMONT WILSON
Appeal by defendant by writ of certiorari from order entered 31 December 2012
by Judge Charles H. Henry in Onslow County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of
Appeals 18 November 2014.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Kimberly N.
Callahan, for the State.
Appellate Defender Staples S. Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Anne
M. Gomez, for defendant-appellant.
STATE V. WILSON
Opinion of the Court
CALABRIA, Judge.
Jarrell Damont Wilson (“defendant”) appeals by writ of certiorari from an order
denying his motion for appropriate relief contending his convictions must be vacated.
We affirm the court’s order. However, we remand for resentencing, since judgment
must be arrested on one of the counts of first degree felony murder pursuant to the
merger doctrine.
I. Background
This is defendant’s second appeal. Defendant’s first appeal may be found at
State v. Wilson, 217 N.C. App. 401, 720 S.E.2d 29 (2011) (unpublished). The facts of
defendant’s underlying offenses are as follows:
On 17 July 2009, Wilson shot and killed Gabriel Ape and
Christopher Watts. Prior to the shooting, Wilson had
received threats from Watts and Ape. Further, Ape had
demanded $60 from Wilson because Wilson broke Ape’s
friend’s telephone. On the evening of the shooting, Watts
and Ape approached Wilson in the parking lot outside a
club while Wilson was in his car, banged loudly on the car
window, and demanded $60 from Wilson. Ape then
punched Wilson through an open window. Wilson drove
away from Ape and Watts, but then stopped the car and
exited with a gun. As the three met near Wilson’s car, a
friend of Wilson’s attempted to intercede and give Ape the
money he demanded. Ape refused the money and he and
Watts rushed at Wilson; Wilson testified that Ape was
wearing a set of brass knuckles. As Ape and Watts
approached Wilson, Wilson fired his weapon once at each
man. Watts and Ape died as a result of gunshot wounds
inflicted by Wilson.
The jury found Wilson guilty of two counts of first-degree
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STATE V. WILSON
Opinion of the Court
murder and two counts of second-degree murder. The trial
court imposed two concurrent sentences of life
imprisonment without parole for the first-degree murder
convictions and arrested judgment on the second-degree
murder convictions.
Wilson, 217 N.C. App. 401, 720 S.E.2d 29.
On 7 December 2012, defendant filed a pro se motion for appropriate relief
(“MAR”), arguing that his second degree murder offenses were invalid as a matter of
law because no indictments were ever issued for those offenses. Defendant also
argued that his first degree murder offenses were also invalid because the trial court
lacked jurisdiction in the absence of the indictments for the underlying felonies of
second degree murder. Defendant further argued that both his trial and appellate
counsel provided ineffective assistance. On 31 December 2012, the trial court entered
an order denying defendant’s MAR.
On 27 December 2013, defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this
Court, requesting review of the trial court’s denial of his MAR. On 14 January 2014,
this Court allowed Wilson’s petition for certiorari, stating that “review shall be
limited to the issue of whether the evidence at trial supported the trial court’s entry
of judgment on two counts of first-degree felony murder.”
II. State’s Motion to Strike
As an initial matter, the State has filed a motion to strike the first argument
of defendant’s brief. Defendant argued that he must be granted a new trial because
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STATE V. WILSON
Opinion of the Court
the trial court violated his constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict by
accepting the jury’s verdicts for both second degree and first degree murder for each
homicide charge. Although defendant claims that he may make this argument “at
any time,” defendant fails to recognize that the scope of his appeal is limited to this
Court’s order allowing his writ of certiorari. This Court allowed certiorari to review
“whether the evidence at trial supported the trial court’s entry of judgment on two
counts of first-degree felony murder[,]” not to determine the validity of any
constitutional claims. This Court is without jurisdiction to review defendant’s first
argument. Therefore, we grant the State’s motion to strike defendant’s first
argument.
III. Felony Murder and Merger
Defendant alternately argues that the trial court’s judgment must be arrested
on one of his two counts of first degree felony murder pursuant to the felony murder
merger rule. We agree.
“Whether to arrest judgment is a question of law, and questions of law are
reviewed de novo on appeal.” State v. Curry, 203 N.C. App. 375, 378, 692 S.E.2d 129,
134 (2010) (citation omitted). Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17(a) (2013), a murder
“committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any . . . other felony
committed or attempted with the use of a deadly weapon shall be deemed to be
murder in the first degree[.]” “When a defendant is convicted of felony murder only,
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STATE V. WILSON
Opinion of the Court
the underlying felony constitutes an element of first-degree murder and merges into
the murder conviction.” State v. Millsaps, 356 N.C. 556, 560, 572 S.E.2d 767, 770
(2002). Consequently, if a defendant is convicted of first degree felony murder and
the underlying felony, the defendant cannot be sentenced separately for the
underlying felony. Id. See also State v. Weeks, 322 N.C. 152, 176, 367 S.E.2d 895,
909 (1988) (“[W]hen the sole basis of a defendant’s conviction of first degree murder
is pursuant to the felony murder rule, no additional sentence may be imposed for the
underlying felony as a separate independent offense, since the underlying felony
merges with the conviction of first degree murder.”).
In Millsaps, the defendant shot and killed two people. The defendant was
subsequently found guilty of two counts of first degree murder pursuant to
premeditation and deliberation as well as two counts of first degree murder pursuant
to the felony murder rule, with the murder of the other victim serving as the
underlying felony for each offense. 356 N.C. at 557, 572 S.E2d at 769. On appeal,
the defendant argued that his first degree murder convictions were validly based only
on felony murder, and therefore he was entitled to a new sentencing hearing at which
only one murder conviction would be submitted. Id. at 568, 572 S.E.2d at 775. The
Supreme Court of North Carolina vacated the defendant’s first degree murder
convictions based upon premeditation and deliberation. Id. at 570, 572 S.E.2d at 777.
However, the Court, applying the merger doctrine, held that the felony murder
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STATE V. WILSON
Opinion of the Court
conviction for the death of one victim merged into the felony murder conviction for
the other victim: “for sentencing purposes the felony murder conviction for the death
of Lenna Lewis . . . merges into defendant's felony murder conviction for the death of
Rhoda Rousseau . . . ; judgment for the felony murder conviction in case number
00CRS334 is arrested[.]” Id.In the instant case, defendant was convicted of first degree murder of Gabriel
Ape pursuant to the felony murder rule. The underlying felony was the second degree
murder of Christopher Watts. Defendant was also convicted of first degree felony
murder of Christopher Watts, with the second degree murder of Gabriel Ape as the
underlying felony. Pursuant to the felony murder merger rule in Millsaps, the
murder conviction resulting in the death of Watts merged into the felony murder
conviction for the death of Ape. For sentencing purposes, since the murder conviction
for the death of Watts merges into the felony murder conviction for the death of Ape,
judgment on one count of first degree felony murder must be arrested.
The State concedes that it is unable to distinguish the facts of the instant case
from the facts in Millsaps and Weeks. The first degree felony murder convictions
should remain undisturbed; however, for sentencing purposes, judgment in case
number 09CRS054844 is arrested. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s denial of
defendant’s motion for appropriate relief, and we remand for resentencing.
AFFIRMED; REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
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STATE V. WILSON
Opinion of the Court
Judges STROUD and McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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