Plasman v. Decca Furniture (USA), Inc. ( 2017 )


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  •              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
    No. COA16-777
    Filed: 16 May 2017
    Catawba County, No. 12 CVS 2832
    CHRISTIAN G. PLASMAN, in his individual capacity and derivatively for the benefit
    of, on behalf of and right of nominal party BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC, Plaintiffs,
    v.
    DECCA FURNITURE (USA), INC., DECCA CONTRACT FURNITURE, LLC,
    RICHARD HERBST, WAI THENG TIN, TSANG C. HUNG, DECCA FURNITURE,
    LTD., DECCA HOSPITALITY FURNISHINGS, LLC, DONGGUAN DECCA
    FURNITURE CO., LTD., DARREN HUDGINS, DECCA HOME, LLC, and ELAN BY
    DECCA, LLC, Defendants,
    and BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC, Nominal Defendant,
    v.
    CHRISTIAN J. PLASMAN a/k/a BARRETT PLASMAN, Third-Party Defendant.
    Appeal by plaintiffs and third-party defendant from order entered 26 February
    2016 by Judge Louis A. Bledsoe, III in Catawba County Superior Court. Heard in the
    Court of Appeals 21 February 2017.
    Law Offices of Matthew K. Rogers, PLLC, by Matthew K. Rogers, for plaintiffs-
    appellants and third-party defendant-appellant.
    McGuireWoods LLP, by Robert A. Muckenfuss, Jodie H. Lawson, and Andrew
    D. Atkins, for defendants-appellees.
    ZACHARY, Judge.
    BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC V. DECCA FURNITURE (USA), INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    This appeal comes to the Court as the result of a bitter corporate dispute that
    has yet to reach the discovery phase nearly five years after the action was filed.
    Plaintiff Christian G. Plasman (Plasman) and third-party defendant Christian J.
    Plasman (Barrett) (collectively with Plasman, the Plasmans) appeal from an order of
    the North Carolina Business Court1 holding them in civil contempt of court.
    The contempt order was entered after the Plasmans failed to comply with a
    Business Court order enforcing the terms of a preliminary injunction entered against
    them in federal court. On appeal, the Plasmans argue that the Business Court lacked
    jurisdiction to enter the contempt order while their appeal from the order enforcing
    the injunction was pending in this Court.               The Plasmans then make a series of
    arguments that attack the sufficiency of the contempt order itself. After careful
    review, we conclude that the Business Court retained jurisdiction to enter the
    contempt order, and that the order should be affirmed in its entirety.
    I. Background
    In April 2002, Plasman formed Bolier & Company, LLC (Bolier), a closely held
    North Carolina company offering residential furniture designs that were also suited
    for use in the hospitality industry. Shortly thereafter, Plasman partnered with Decca
    1  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(a)(3) (2015) provides for direct appeal to the North Carolina Supreme
    Court from certain interlocutory orders entered by a Business Court Judge in an action designated as
    a mandatory complex business case on or after 1 October 2014. See N.C. Sess. Law 2014-102, § 9
    (“Section 1 of this act becomes effective October 1, 2014, and applies to actions designated as mandatory
    complex business cases on or after that date.”). Because this action was designated as a mandatory
    complex business case before 1 October 2014, the appeal is properly before this Court.
    -2-
    BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC V. DECCA FURNITURE (USA), INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    Furniture, Ltd. (Decca China), which manufactured Bolier’s furniture lines. Decca
    China then formed Decca Furniture (USA), Inc. (Decca USA) to own Decca China’s
    interest in Bolier. Richard Herbst (Herbst) was Decca USA’s president at all relevant
    times.
    In August 2003, Plasman and Herbst executed an operating agreement that
    granted Decca USA a 55% majority ownership interest in Bolier, and that allowed
    Plasman to retain a 45% minority ownership interest for himself. The operating
    agreement also vested Decca USA with the authority to make all employment
    decisions related to Bolier. In November 2003, Plasman entered into an employment
    agreement with Bolier, which provided that Plasman could be terminated without
    cause. Plasman executed the employment agreement on his own behalf, and Herbst
    signed on behalf of Decca USA and Bolier. Thereafter, Plasman served as President
    and CEO of Bolier, and his son, Barrett, worked as Bolier’s operations manager.
    According to defendants, despite the significant investments of Decca USA and
    Decca China in Bolier’s operations, they sustained losses in excess of $2 million
    between 2003 and 2012. As a result, Decca USA terminated the employment of
    Plasman and Barrett on 19 October 2012. The Plasmans, however, refused to accept
    their terminations and continued to work out of Bolier’s office space. During this time,
    the Plasmans set up a new bank account in Bolier’s name, and they diverted
    approximately $600,000.00 in Bolier customer payments to that account. From these
    -3-
    BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC V. DECCA FURNITURE (USA), INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    diverted funds, the Plasmans paid themselves, respectively, approximately $33,170.49
    and $17,021.66 in salaries and personal expenses. Plasman also wrote himself a
    $12,000.00 check, dated 5 December 2012, from the new account for “Bolier Legal
    Fees.” Decca USA eventually changed the locks to Bolier’s offices.
    On 22 October 2012, the Plasmans filed the instant action in Catawba County
    Superior Court alleging claims for, inter alia, corporate dissolution, breach of contract,
    fraud, constructive fraud, and trademark as well as copyright infringement.          Two
    days later, the action was designated as a mandatory complex business case and
    assigned to the North Carolina Business Court. After removing the case to the United
    States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, Decca USA moved
    Judge Richard L. Vorhees for a preliminary injunction against the Plasmans. On 27
    February 2013, Judge Vorhees entered an order (the injunction) that enjoined the
    Plasmans from acting on Bolier’s behalf in any manner.           Judge Vorhees further
    ordered the Plasmans to return all diverted funds to Bolier within five business days,
    and to provide Decca USA with an accounting of those funds. Judge Voorhees did not
    require Decca USA to post a security bond pursuant to Rule 65(c) of the Federal Rules
    of Civil Procedure, but the injunction did contain various terms that were meant to
    protect Plasman’s rights as a minority owner of Bolier while the litigation continued.
    One week after the injunction was entered, the Plasmans filed their “Response
    to Court Order” in federal court, which challenged certain provisions of the injunction
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    BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC V. DECCA FURNITURE (USA), INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    and stated that “Plaintiffs have fully complied to the best of their ability with the
    Court Order signed on February 27, 2013.” Shortly thereafter, the Plasmans filed
    another motion that sought to have the federal court provide additional safeguards
    protecting “Plaintiffs Chris Plasman and Bolier . . . pending final resolution of the
    merits.” This motion also sought to “clarify the . . . [injunction] . . . to specifically
    permit [the Plasmans] to retain funds paid to Chris Plasman and Barrett Plasman for
    wages earned and Bolier . . . expenses paid (including the $12,000.00 paid as
    reimbursement for legal expenses) prior to January 14, 2013[.]” Although Judge
    Vorhees never ruled on these motions, the Plasmans neither appealed the injunction
    nor properly sought to have it reconsidered.
    The action was remanded to the North Carolina Business Court in September
    2014 when Judge Voorhees dismissed the Plasmans’ federal copyright claims and
    declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims that remained.
    Upon remand, the parties filed competing motions for consideration by Judge Louis A.
    Bledsoe, III.    In a document entitled “Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Preliminary
    Injunction, to Dissolve Portions of the Preliminary Injunction and Award Damages,
    and Motion for Sanctions[,]” the Plasmans moved Judge Bledsoe to, inter alia, amend
    and dissolve certain portions of the injunction. In contrast, Decca USA sought to
    enforce the injunction’s terms. Contending that the Plasmans were in willful violation
    of the injunction, Decca USA moved Judge Bledsoe to hold the Plasmans in civil
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    BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC V. DECCA FURNITURE (USA), INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    contempt and to impose sanctions against them. After conducting a hearing on the
    parties’ motions, Judge Bledsoe entered an order on 26 May 2015 (the 26 May Order)
    denying the Plasmans’ motion, and reasoning that because the preliminary injunction
    was carefully crafted and narrowly tailored, it should not be “modified, amended, or
    dissolved in any respect.”2 Although Judge Bledsoe declined to hold the Plasmans in
    contempt, he did grant Decca USA’s motion to enforce the injunction’s requirements.
    To that end, the Plasmans were ordered to pay Decca USA $62,191.15 plus interest
    and to provide the accounting required by the injunction.
    On 25 June 2015, the Plasmans filed notice of appeal from the 26 May Order.
    Defendants later filed with this Court a motion to dismiss the Plasmans’ appeal,
    arguing that the 26 May Order was not immediately appealable because it was an
    interlocutory order that did not affect a substantial right of the Plasmans.
    In July 2015, the Business Court, sua sponte, directed the parties to “submit
    short briefs advising the Court whether this case may proceed with further pleadings
    and discovery, and to a determination on the merits, or whether this case must be
    stayed pending resolution” of the Plasmans’ interlocutory appeal from the 26 May
    Order. The case was temporarily stayed to allow for the parties’ submissions. On 22
    September 2015, while the Plasmans’ appeal was pending in this Court, defendants
    2   We also note that, pursuant to the 26 May Order, Judge Bledsoe dismissed claims that were
    purportedly brought directly in Bolier’s name. Judge Bledsoe found that, as a 45% owner of Bolier,
    Plasman was “not authorized to bring direct claims in Bolier’s name, and must instead bring such
    claims, if at all, as derivative claims on Bolier’s behalf as one of its members.”
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    BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC V. DECCA FURNITURE (USA), INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    filed a motion in the Business Court seeking to have the Plasmans held in contempt
    for failure to comply with the 26 May Order.
    In October 2015, Judge Bledsoe entered an order that reflected his
    consideration of a stay pending appeal. Relying in part on this Court’s decision in
    RPR & Assocs., Inc. v. Univ. of N. Carolina-Chapel Hill, 
    153 N.C. App. 342
    , 344, 
    570 S.E.2d 510
    , 512 (2002), cert. denied and disc. review denied, 
    357 N.C. 166
    , 
    579 S.E.2d 882
    (2003), Judge Bledsoe determined that he had the authority to determine whether
    the 26 May Order was immediately appealable. Exercising that authority, Judge
    Bledsoe found that “no substantial right of the Plasmans was affected by the May 26
    Order” because it “simply ordered [the Plasmans] to comply with the never-appealed,
    legally valid and binding, 2013 [Injunction] Order requiring [the Plasmans] to return
    money that the Federal Court found they had diverted from Bolier.” Consequently,
    Judge Bledsoe dissolved the temporary stay that he had entered in July 2015, and
    determined that the “action [would] proceed in th[e Business] Court during the
    pendency of the Plasmans’ appeal unless otherwise ordered by the Court[.]”
    After holding a show cause hearing on defendants’ contempt motion, Judge
    Bledsoe entered an order on 26 February 2016 (the Contempt Order) concluding that
    the Plasmans were in civil contempt of court because of their willful noncompliance
    with the 26 May Order. The Contempt Order contained a finding that repeated Judge
    Bledsoe’s previous determination that “the appeal of the May 26 Order was
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    BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC V. DECCA FURNITURE (USA), INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    interlocutory, did not affect a substantial right, and . . . did not stay the case.” The
    Plasmans filed notice of appeal from the Contempt Order on 24 March 2016.
    Roughly eight months later, in November 2016, this Court filed an opinion that
    dismissed the Plasmans’ interlocutory appeal from the 26 May Order. See Bolier &
    Co., LLC v. Decca Furniture (USA), Inc., __ N.C. App. __, 
    792 S.E.2d 865
    (2016) (Bolier
    I). This Court reached three conclusions in support of its holding that the Plasmans
    had failed to demonstrate the loss of a substantial right absent immediate review of
    the 26 May Order:
    First, we conclude that Judge Voorhees’ Order was, in fact,
    appealable. It is well settled that preliminary injunction
    orders issued by a federal court are immediately appealable.
    ...
    Second, Plaintiffs contend that their subsequent filings in
    federal court tolled their deadline for appealing Judge
    Voorhees’ Order. We disagree. . . .
    Had Plaintiffs intended to seek reconsideration of Judge
    Voorhees’ Order so as to toll their deadline for appealing the
    preliminary injunction, they were required to file a motion
    that unambiguously sought such relief. However, they
    failed to do so. While Plaintiffs may have held out hope that
    the federal court would nevertheless modify its preliminary
    injunction as a result of their motion, it was still incumbent
    upon them to protect their appeal rights during the interim
    by taking an appeal of Judge Voorhees’ Order to the Fourth
    Circuit within the thirty-day deadline provided by Rule 4 of
    the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. . . .
    Finally, we reject Plaintiffs’ argument that [the 26 May]
    Order was independently appealable. The specific aspects
    of [the 26 May] Order cited by Plaintiffs as depriving them
    -8-
    BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC V. DECCA FURNITURE (USA), INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    of a substantial right are essentially identical to the
    preliminary injunction terms contained in Judge Voorhees’
    Order, which Plaintiffs never appealed. Thus, because
    Judge Bledsoe’s Order merely enforces the preliminary
    injunction entered by Judge Voorhees, our consideration of
    the substantive issues raised by Plaintiffs in the present
    appeal would enable them to achieve a “back door” appeal
    of Judge Voorhees’ Order well over three years after its
    entry.
    Id. at __, 792 S.E.2d at 872 (internal citations omitted). In sum, the Bolier I Court
    determined that the 26 May Order “simply reiterate[d] that [the Plasmans were] . . .
    bound to comply with the federal preliminary injunction that was entered on 27
    February 2013.” Id. at __, 792 S.E.2d at 873.
    The Plasmans now appeal from the Contempt Order.
    II. Trial Court’s Jurisdiction To Enter The Contempt Order
    As an initial matter, we address the Plasmans’ argument that their appeal from
    the 26 May Order stayed all proceedings in the Business Court and left the trial court
    without jurisdiction to enter the Contempt Order.
    Under North Carolina law, the longstanding general rule is that an appeal
    divests the trial court of jurisdiction over a case until the appellate court returns its
    mandate. E.g., Bowen v. Hodge Motor Co., 
    292 N.C. 633
    , 635, 
    234 S.E.2d 748
    , 749
    (1977); Upton v. Upton, 
    14 N.C. App. 107
    , 109, 
    187 S.E.2d 387
    , 388 (1972). Our
    legislature has codified this rule at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-294 (2015), which provides that:
    When an appeal is perfected as provided by this Article it
    stays all further proceedings in the court below upon the
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    BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC V. DECCA FURNITURE (USA), INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    judgment appealed from, or upon the matter embraced
    therein, unless otherwise provided by the Rules of Appellate
    Procedure;3 but the court below may proceed upon any other
    matter included in the action and not affected by the
    judgment appealed from. . . .
    Pending the appeal, the trial judge is functus officio, 
    Bowen, 292 N.C. at 635
    , 234
    S.E.2d at 749, which is defined as being “without further authority or legal competence
    because the duties and functions of the original commission have been fully
    accomplished.” Black’s Law Dictionary 743 (9th ed. 2009).
    For over a century, the Supreme Court has recognized that an appeal operates
    as a stay of all proceedings at the trial level as to issues that are embraced by the order
    appealed. E.g., Bohannon v. Virginia Trust Co., 
    198 N.C. 702
    , 
    153 S.E. 263
    (1930);
    Pruett v. Charlotte Power Co., 
    167 N.C. 598
    , 
    83 S.E. 830
    (1914). This is section 1-294
    in a nutshell, for the statute itself draws a distinction between trial court’s inability
    to rule on matters that are inseparable from the pending appeal and the court’s ability
    to proceed on matters that are “not affected” by the pending appeal. See N.C. Gen.
    Stat. § 1-294 (2015).          This jurisdictional issue often arises in the context of
    interlocutory orders.
    In Veazey v. Durham, our State’s high court examined the question of the
    circumstances under which the appeal of an interlocutory order operates as a stay of
    the proceedings in the trial court. 
    231 N.C. 357
    , 
    57 S.E.2d 377
    (1950). Speaking
    3   The Supreme Court has yet to create exceptions to the general rule codified at section 1-294.
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    BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC V. DECCA FURNITURE (USA), INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    through Justice Ervin, the Supreme Court drew a clear distinction between the effect
    of immediately appealable and nonappealable interlocutory orders on a trial court’s
    continuing jurisdiction:
    When a litigant takes an appeal to the Supreme Court from
    an appealable interlocutory order of the Superior Court and
    perfects such appeal in conformity to law, the appeal
    operates as a stay of all proceedings in the Superior Court
    relating to the issues included therein until the matters are
    determined in the Supreme Court. G.S. Sec. 1-294. . . .
    But this sound principle is not controlling upon the record
    in the case at bar. . . .
    There is no more effective way to procrastinate the
    administration of justice than that of bringing cases to an
    appellate court piecemeal through the medium of successive
    appeals from intermediate orders. The rules regulating
    appeals from the Superior Court to the Supreme Court are
    designed to forestall the useless delay inseparable from
    unlimited fragmentary appeals, and to enable courts to
    perform their real function, i.e., to administer ‘right and
    justice * * * without sale, denial, or delay.’ N.C. Const. Art.
    I, Sec. 35.
    This being true, a litigant cannot deprive the Superior Court
    of jurisdiction to try and determine a case on its merits by
    taking an appeal to the Supreme Court from a
    nonappealable interlocutory order of the Superior Court. A
    contrary decision would necessarily require an acceptance
    of the paradoxical paralogism that a party to an action can
    paralyze the administration of justice in the Superior Court
    by the simple expedient of doing what the law does not allow
    him to do, i.e., taking an appeal from an order which is not
    appealable. . . .
    [W]hen an appeal is taken to the Supreme Court from an
    interlocutory order of the Superior Court which is not
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    BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC V. DECCA FURNITURE (USA), INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    subject to appeal, the Superior Court need not stay
    proceedings, but may disregard the appeal and proceed to
    try the action while the appeal on the interlocutory matter
    is in the Supreme Court.
    
    Id. at 363-64,
    57 S.E.2d at 382-83 (emphasis added and internal citations omitted).
    Justice Ervin then carefully reiterated that an improper interlocutory appeal never
    deprives a trial court of jurisdiction over a case:
    We close this opinion with an admonition given by this
    Court to the trial bench three-quarters of a century ago:
    “But certainly when an appeal is taken as in this case from
    an interlocutory order from which no appeal is allowed by
    The Code, which is not upon any matter of law and which
    affects no substantial right of the parties, it is the duty of
    the Judge to proceed as if no such appeal had been taken.”
    
    Id. at 367,
    57 S.E.2d at 385 (quoting Carleton v. Byers, 
    71 N.C. 331
    , 335 (1874)).
    In this matter, the parties agree that the contempt order is interlocutory.
    Ordinarily, “there is no right of immediate appeal from interlocutory orders and
    judgments.” Travco Hotels, Inc. v. Piedmont Nat. Gas Co., 
    332 N.C. 288
    , 291, 
    420 S.E.2d 426
    , 428 (1992) (citation omitted). However, an interlocutory order is subject
    to immediate review4 when it “affects a substantial right that ‘will clearly be lost or
    irremediably adversely affected if the order is not review[ed] before final judgment.’ ”
    Edmondson v. Macclesfield L-P Gas Co., 
    182 N.C. App. 381
    , 391, 
    642 S.E.2d 265
    , 272
    4 Immediate review of interlocutory orders is also available when the trial court certifies,
    pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, that there is no just reason to
    delay appeal of its order or judgment. Sharpe v. Worland, 
    351 N.C. 159
    , 161-62, 
    522 S.E.2d 577
    , 579
    (1999).
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    BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC V. DECCA FURNITURE (USA), INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    (2007) (quoting Blackwelder v. Dept. of Human Res., 
    60 N.C. App. 331
    , 335, 
    299 S.E.2d 777
    , 780 (1983)); see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-277(a) (2015) (“An appeal may be taken from
    every judicial order or determination of a [trial] judge . . . which affects a substantial
    right claimed in any action or proceeding[.]”); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(3) (2015)
    (providing a right of appeal from any interlocutory order that, inter alia, affects a
    substantial right).
    “Essentially a two-part test has developed—the right itself must be substantial
    and the deprivation of that substantial right must potentially work injury to [the
    appellant] if not corrected before appeal from final judgment.” Goldston v. Am Motors
    Corp., 
    326 N.C. 723
    , 726, 
    392 S.E.2d 735
    , 736 (1990). Our Supreme Court has adopted
    the dictionary definition of “substantial right”: “ ‘a legal right affecting or involving a
    matter of substance as distinguished from matters of form: a right materially affecting
    those interests which a [person] is entitled to have preserved and protected by law: a
    material right.’ ” Oestreicher v. Am. Nat. Stores, Inc., 
    290 N.C. 118
    , 130, 
    225 S.E.2d 797
    , 805 (1976) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2280 (1971)).
    Even so, “the ‘substantial right’ test for appealability of interlocutory orders is more
    easily stated than applied. It is usually necessary to resolve the question in each case
    by considering the particular facts of that case and the procedural context in which
    the order from which appeal is sought was entered.” Waters v. Qualified Pers., Inc.,
    
    294 N.C. 200
    , 208, 
    240 S.E.2d 338
    , 343 (1978).
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    BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC V. DECCA FURNITURE (USA), INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    Apart from the muddy waters of the substantial right test, there is also the
    issue of what authority a trial court possesses to rule on the interlocutory nature of an
    appeal.    Veazy states that the “[trial c]ourt need not stay proceedings, but may
    disregard the appeal and proceed to try the action while the appeal on the interlocutory
    matter is in the Supreme 
    Court.” 231 N.C. at 364
    , 57 S.E.2d at 383 (emphasis added).
    Before an interlocutory appeal is properly “disregarded” and the action proceeds, a
    substantial right analysis must be conducted at the trial level during the pendency of
    the appeal. To that end, a line of cases from this Court establishes that a trial judge
    is authorized to determine if an attempted appeal is of a nonappealable interlocutory
    order and to decide whether the trial court has jurisdiction to proceed once an appeal
    has been noticed. See, e.g., T&T Dev. Co. v. S. Nat. Bank of S.C., 
    125 N.C. App. 600
    ,
    603, 
    481 S.E.2d 347
    , 349 (1997) (“[B]ecause plaintiffs had no right to appeal the
    granting of the motion in limine, the trial court was not deprived of jurisdiction and
    did not err in calling the case for trial.”); Velez v. Dick Keffer Pontiac GMC Truck, Inc.,
    
    144 N.C. App. 589
    , 591, 
    551 S.E.2d 873
    , 875 (2001) (recognizing that “a litigant cannot
    deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to determine a case on its merits by appealing
    from a nonappealable interlocutory order of the trial court”).
    In RPR & Assocs., this Court established the parameters of the authority of the
    trial court in making this determination, stating:
    Because the trial court had the authority to determine
    whether its order affected defendant’s substantial rights or
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    BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC V. DECCA FURNITURE (USA), INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    was otherwise immediately appealable, the trial court did
    not err in continuing to exercise jurisdiction over this case
    after defendant filed its notice of appeal. The trial court’s
    determination that the order was nonappealable was
    reasonable in light of established precedent and the
    repeated denials by the appellate courts of this State to stay
    proceedings. Although this Court ultimately held that
    defendant’s appeal affected a substantial right, it also held
    that defendant was not immune to suit. Defendant states
    no grounds, nor has it produced any evidence to
    demonstrate how it was prejudiced by the trial court’s
    exercise of jurisdiction over this 
    case. 153 N.C. App. at 349
    , 570 S.E.2d at 515. With the decision in RPR & Assocs., the
    concepts of reasonableness and prejudice are injected into the analysis.
    This Court recently applied RPR & Assocs.’ analytical framework in the context
    of a civil contempt order. See SED Holdings, LLC v. 3 Star Properties, LLC, __ N.C.
    App. __, 
    791 S.E.2d 914
    (2016). In SED Holdings, the plaintiff secured an injunction
    that prohibited the defendants from selling or disposing of certain pools of residential
    mortgage loans. Id. at __, 791 S.E.2d at 917. The defendants appealed the injunction.
    
    Id. This Court
    determined that the interlocutory appeal affected a substantial right,
    but ultimately affirmed the injunction. SED Holdings, LLC v. 3 Star Properties, LLC,
    __ N.C. App. __, __, __, 
    784 S.E.2d 627
    , 630, 632 (2016) (“SED I”).
    While the appeal in SED I was pending, the defendants failed to comply with
    the injunction, prompting the trial court to hold a series of contempt proceedings. SED
    Holdings, __ N.C. App. at __, 791 S.E.2d at 917. In a show cause order, the trial court
    specifically “concluded . . . that: (1) the injunction did not affect a substantial right of
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    BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC V. DECCA FURNITURE (USA), INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    defendants and was thus not immediately appealable, and (2) the trial court retained
    jurisdiction to enforce the terms of its injunction while defendants’ appeal was pending
    in [the] Court [of Appeals].” Id. at __, 791 S.E.2d at 918. Before the decision in SED
    I was filed, the trial court entered an order holding the defendants in civil contempt.
    
    Id. On appeal
    to this Court, the defendants argued that the contempt order was a
    nullity, as their appeal from the injunction in SED I divested the trial court of
    jurisdiction to hold contempt proceedings on the defendants’ willful noncompliance
    with the injunction’s terms. 
    Id. In rejecting
    the defendants’ argument, this Court recognized that
    [a]t the very least, RPR & Assocs. stands for two general
    propositions: (1) a trial court properly retains jurisdiction
    over a case if it acts reasonably in determining that an
    interlocutory order is not immediately appealable, and (2)
    that determination may be considered reasonable even if
    the appellate court ultimately holds that the challenged
    order is subject to immediate review.
    Id. at __, 791 S.E.2d at 920. The SED Holdings Court then reasoned as follows:
    It is clear that injunctive orders entered only to maintain
    the status quo pending trial are not immediately
    appealable. Then again, reasonable minds may disagree as
    to whether a particular injunction simply maintains the
    status quo. Beyond that, our courts have taken a flexible
    approach with respect to the appealability of orders
    granting injunctive relief. Most relevant to this case, orders
    affecting a party’s ability to conduct business or control its
    assets may or may not implicate a substantial right. . . .
    Because the injunctive relief was designed to maintain the
    status quo, and given that established precedent regarding
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    BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC V. DECCA FURNITURE (USA), INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    the appealability of such orders is equivocal, the trial court
    reasonably concluded that its injunction was not
    immediately appealable. While this Court eventually held
    in SED I that defendants’ appeal affected a substantial
    right, that decision was not dispositive of whether the trial
    court acted reasonably in determining that the appeal had
    not divested it of jurisdiction. RPR & 
    Assocs., 153 N.C. App. at 348
    , 570 S.E.2d at 514. As such, the trial court was not
    functus officio. This Court also held that the trial court’s
    ruling on SED’s motion for injunctive relief was not
    erroneous. Defendants therefore cannot demonstrate how
    they were “prejudiced by the trial court’s [decision to
    continue to] exercise . . . jurisdiction over this case” by
    enforcing its injunction. 
    Id. Accordingly, pursuant
    to the
    principles announced in RPR & Assocs., we conclude that
    the trial court retained jurisdiction to enter orders related
    to the contempt proceedings in this case while defendants’
    interlocutory appeal was pending in this Court.
    Id. at __, 791 S.E.2d at 921-22 (internal citations omitted).
    Applying the principles of Veazy as well as the analytical framework established
    in RPR & Assocs. and reaffirmed in SED Holdings to the present case, we conclude
    that Judge Bledsoe properly retained jurisdiction to enter the Contempt Order while
    the Plasmans’ appeal from the 26 May Order was pending in this Court. After the
    Plasmans noted their appeal from the 26 May Order, Judge Bledsoe, sua sponte,
    addressed the issue of whether the Business Court’s jurisdiction was stayed pending
    the appeal. Upon careful consideration of the parties’ briefs and arguments on this
    issue, Judge Bledsoe unequivocally concluded that the 26 May Order did not affect
    any substantial right of the Plasmans. According to Judge Bledsoe, the 26 May Order
    was not immediately appealable because it “simply ordered [the Plasmans] to comply
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    BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC V. DECCA FURNITURE (USA), INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    with the never-appealed” injunction order. Judge Bledsoe reiterated this conclusion
    in the Contempt Order.
    This Court agreed with Judge Bledsoe’s analysis, and specifically refused to
    allow the Plasmans to mount a collateral attack on the injunction via the 26 May
    Order that was entered to enforce it. See Bolier I, __ N.C. App. at __, 792 S.E.2d at
    872. Consequently, unlike in SED Holdings, it is irrelevant whether the injunction at
    issue maintained the status quo or went further. The May 26 Order, which was the
    subject of the contempt proceedings, was not an injunction; it was an enforcement
    mechanism. Given the procedural context of this case, and the Business Court’s
    careful attention to the effect (or lack thereof) of the Plasmans’ appeal from the 26
    May Order on its jurisdiction, Judge Bledsoe’s decision to proceed with the case was
    proper and reasonable. So too was Judge Bledsoe’s determination that the Plasmans’
    pending interlocutory appeal did not deprive him of jurisdiction to enforce the 26 May
    Order. Furthermore, the Plasmans have not, and cannot, demonstrate that they were
    prejudiced by Judge Bledsoe’s decision to enforce an order that directed the Plasmans
    to comply with a prior, never-appealed injunction.
    Nevertheless, the Plasmans argue that this Court’s recent decision in Tetra
    Tech Tesoro, Inc. v. JAAAT Tech. Servs., LLC, __ N.C. App. __, 
    794 S.E.2d 535
    (2016)
    should control our analysis. In Tetra Tech, after not getting paid for its work on
    construction projects at Fort Bragg, the plaintiff sued the defendant-general
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    BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC V. DECCA FURNITURE (USA), INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    contractor and the trial court later entered an injunction that required the general
    contractor “to segregate funds related to the construction projects and not to pay those
    funds out without court approval.” Id. at __, 794 S.E.2d at 537. The defendant moved
    the trial court, pursuant to Rules 59 and 60 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil
    Procedure, to modify the injunction. 
    Id. Although the
    trial court refused to modify
    the injunction in the manner requested by the defendant, the court did modify the
    injunction’s terms. 
    Id. The defendant
    filed notice of appeal from the denial of its
    motion to modify and from the underlying injunction “on the ground that the time to
    appeal that order was ‘tolled’ by its motion to modify, which purportedly was filed
    under Rules 59 and 60.” Id. at __, 794 S.E.2d at 538. Roughly two months later, the
    trial court “issued orders holding [the defendant] in contempt for violating the
    preliminary injunction and dismissing [the defendant’s] counterclaims with prejudice
    as a sanction.” 
    Id. The defendant
    also appealed from those orders. 
    Id. On appeal
    , this Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the
    defendant’s “appeal from the preliminary injunction order because [it] did not appeal
    that order within thirty days and its motion to modify the preliminary injunction
    order, purportedly brought under Rules 59 and 60 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, did
    not toll the time to appeal.” Id. at __, 794 S.E.2d at 540. However, the Tetra Tech
    Court went on to conclude that the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to
    modify the injunction affected a substantial right and was immediately appealable,
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    BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC V. DECCA FURNITURE (USA), INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    and that the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s requested modifications to the
    injunction did not constitute an abuse of discretion. 
    Id. Finally, the
    Tetra Tech Court
    vacated the contempt and sanctions orders because the defendant’s appeal from the
    denial of its motion to modify the injunction divested the trial court’s jurisdiction over
    the matter. Id. at __, 794 S.E.2d at 541.
    In holding that “the trial court lacked jurisdiction to conduct a contempt
    proceeding and impose sanctions[,]” 
    id., the Tetra
    Tech Court relied on Joyner v.
    Joyner, 
    256 N.C. 588
    , 
    124 S.E.2d 724
    (1962), in which our Supreme Court addressed
    an order for alimony pendente lite and child custody and held that the order was not
    enforceable by contempt while the order was on appeal. The Tetra Tech Court then
    distinguished its holding from the decision in SED Holdings as follows:
    This Court recently held that there is an exception to the
    Joyner rule: “a trial court properly retains jurisdiction over
    a case if it acts reasonably in determining that an
    interlocutory order is not immediately appealable.” SED
    Holdings, LLC v. 3 Star Prop., LLC, __ N.C. App. __, __, 
    791 S.E.2d 914
    , 920 (2016). The analysis in SED Holdings
    turned on the fact that the injunction at issue merely
    maintained the status quo. That is not the case here. This
    injunction was a mandatory one; it forced a business to
    segregate its funds, imposed controls on the business’s
    operations, and forced the business to conduct an
    accounting and provide the results of that accounting to the
    opposing party. Thus, when [the defendant] appealed the
    denial of its motion to modify that injunction, the trial court
    was divested of jurisdiction to enforce it.
    Tetra Tech, __ N.C. App at __ 
    n.3, 794 S.E.2d at 541
    n.3.
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    BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC V. DECCA FURNITURE (USA), INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    Despite the Plasmans’ argument to the contrary, Tetra Tech is easily
    distinguished from the present case. To begin, the decision in Joyner—the only case
    upon which the Tetra Tech Court relied in vacating the contempt order at issue—was
    rendered upon the “general rule . . . that a duly perfected appeal or writ of error divests
    the trial court of further jurisdiction of the cause in which the appeal has been taken.”
    
    Joyner, 256 N.C. at 591
    , 124 S.E.2d at 726. The Joyner Court, unlike Judge Bledsoe,
    apparently had no reason to address the effect of an appeal of a nonappealable
    interlocutory order on a trial court’s jurisdiction. In addition, Tetra Tech involved an
    appeal from the denial of a motion to modify an injunction that imposed substantial
    restrictions on the defendant’s ability to conduct its business and required the
    defendant to provide extensive accountings to the plaintiff. Here, the underlying
    injunction simply restored the status quo by requiring the Plasmans to provide an
    accounting of the diverted funds, and to return those funds to Decca USA’s (or Bolier’s)
    corporate coffers. Finally, this case involves a trial court’s decision to enforce the
    terms of an interlocutory order after citing RPR Assocs. and making a specific
    determination that the order was not immediately appealable, whereas Tetra Tech
    involved no such determination. Indeed, the Tetra Tech Court may have reached a
    different decision on the contempt order at issue had it not determined that the
    defendant’s motion to modify was not immediately appealable.
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    BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC V. DECCA FURNITURE (USA), INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    Because the decisions in Veazy, RPR Assocs., and SED Holdings control our
    analysis, we conclude that the Plasmans’ appeal from the 26 May Order, which Judge
    Bledsoe and this Court determined was not immediately appealable, did not divest the
    Business Court of jurisdiction over the case. As a result, Judge Bledsoe was not
    functus officio when the Plasmans noted their appeal from the 26 May Order, and the
    Contempt Order was properly entered. See Onslow Cty. v. Moore, 
    129 N.C. App. 376
    ,
    387-88, 
    499 S.E.2d 780
    , 788 (1998) (rejecting a party’s argument that, under Joyner,
    “the appeal of an underlying judgment stays contempt proceedings until the validity
    of the judgment is determined[,]”` and concluding that “[b]ecause the order issuing the
    injunction was interlocutory and no substantial right of [the party] was affected by
    the denial of immediate appellate review, the trial court was not divested of
    jurisdiction and could therefore properly hold [him] in contempt for violating the
    injunction”).
    III. Scope Of Plasmans’ Appeal
    Because the Plasmans purport to raise eight issues on appeal, we must
    determine whether all of those issues are properly before us. The “Issues Presented”
    section of the Plasmans’ principal brief lists the following issues for our consideration:
    I. Whether The Trial Court Erred In Considering An
    Appealed Order And Finding Plasman In Contempt Of An
    Appealed Order?
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    BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC V. DECCA FURNITURE (USA), INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    II. Whether The Trial Court Erred In Finding That The
    Purpose Of The Preliminary Injunction Order Is Still
    Served By Requiring Payment Of Money To Decca USA?
    III. Whether The Trial Court Erred By Finding Failure To
    Pay Money To Defendants After Proper Appeal Amounts To
    Willful, Bad Faith Non-Compliance?
    IV. Whether The Trial Court Erred By Finding That
    Appellants Diverted Bolier’s Money And Directing That
    Decca USA Be Paid?
    V. Whether The Trial Court Erred By Failing To Find That
    The Federal Court Did Not Issue Required Rule 65 Security,
    And Failing To Find That Decca USA Has Continuously
    Deprived Plasman Of Statutorily Protected Member-
    Manager Rights?
    VI. Whether The Trial Court Erred By Failing To Find That
    Decca USA Failed To Perform Material Terms Of The
    Preliminary Injunction Thereby Rendering The Injunction
    Unenforceable?
    VII. Whether The Trial Court Erred In Requiring The
    Appellants To Pay Interest While Appellants Waited On
    Clarification Of The Court’s Order?
    VIII. Whether The Trial Court Erred In Considering Jointly
    Titled Assets And IRAs Exempt From Collection To
    Determine Appellants Ability To Comply With Order?
    (All Caps Omitted).
    Issue I has already been addressed and resolved in Section II above. After a
    careful review of the Plasmans’ principal brief, we conclude that Issues IV, V, and VII
    have not been properly argued or presented. As a result, those arguments are deemed
    abandoned. See N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (“Issues not presented in a party’s brief, or in
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    BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC V. DECCA FURNITURE (USA), INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    support of which no reason or argument is stated, will be taken as abandoned.”).
    Issues II, III, VI, and VIII have been specifically argued on appeal, and each issue is
    addressed below.
    IV. Discussion of the Contempt Order’s Merits
    A. Appellate Jurisdiction
    The Contempt Order is interlocutory, as it did not resolve all matters before the
    trial court in this case. See 
    Veazey, 231 N.C. at 362
    , 57 S.E.2d at 381 (“An interlocutory
    order is one made during the pendency of an action, which does not dispose of the case,
    but leaves it for further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the
    entire controversy.”) (citation omitted).     As noted above, interlocutory orders are
    generally not appealable unless certified by the trial court pursuant to Rule 54(b) or
    unless a substantial right of the appellant would be lost or jeopardized absent
    immediate review. See, e.g., Larsen v. Black Diamond French Truffles, Inc., __ N.C.
    App. __, __, 
    772 S.E.2d 93
    , 95 (2015).    “The appeal of any contempt order . . . affects
    a substantial right and is therefore immediately appealable.” Guerrier v. Guerrier,
    
    155 N.C. App. 154
    , 158, 
    574 S.E.2d 69
    , 71 (2002) (citing Willis v. Power Co., 
    291 N.C. 19
    , 30, 
    229 S.E.2d 191
    , 198 (1976)).        Accordingly, the Plasmans’ appeal of the
    Contempt Order is properly before this Court.
    B. Standard of Review and Generally Applicable Law
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    BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC V. DECCA FURNITURE (USA), INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    “In contempt proceedings[,] the judge’s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal
    when supported by any competent evidence and are reviewable only for the purpose
    of passing on their sufficiency to warrant the judgment.” Clark v. Clark, 
    294 N.C. 554
    ,
    571, 
    243 S.E.2d 129
    , 139 (1978)(citation omitted). Our review of a contempt order,
    therefore, “is limited to determining whether there is competent evidence to support
    the findings of fact and whether the findings support the conclusions of law.”
    Middleton v. Middleton, 
    159 N.C. App. 224
    , 226, 
    583 S.E.2d 48
    , 49 (2003) (citations
    and internal quotation marks omitted).
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 5A-21(a) (2015) provides:
    Failure to comply with an order of a court is a continuing
    civil contempt as long as:
    (1) The order remains in force;
    (2) The purpose of the order may still be served by
    compliance with the order;
    (2a) The noncompliance by the person to whom the
    order is directed is willful; and
    (3) The person to whom the order is directed is able
    to comply with the order or is able to take reasonable
    measures that would enable the person to comply
    with the order.
    Civil contempt is designed to coerce compliance with a court order. Adkins v. Adkins,
    
    82 N.C. App. 289
    , 293, 
    346 S.E.2d 220
    , 222 (1986).
    C. Whether The Order’s Purpose May Be Served By Compliance
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    BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC V. DECCA FURNITURE (USA), INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    The Plasmans argue that the purpose of the 26 May Order can no longer be
    served by requiring them to return to Decca USA the funds they diverted from Bolier
    after their terminations took effect. In making this argument, the Plasmans assert
    that the 26 May Order “erroneously and impermissibly awarded damages, not a fine
    permitted by contempt[.]” The Plasmans also contend that the payment of money was
    not necessary to avoid irreparable harm to Decca USA, i.e., “[t]here is no evidence that
    [Decca] USA needed [the] purported . . . ‘diverted money’ to preserve [its] majority
    control of Bolier.” These arguments are wholly lacking in merit.
    Whether the issuance of the injunction was necessary to avoid irreparable harm
    to Decca USA was an issue ripe for Judge Vorhees’ consideration in federal court. See
    Pashby v. Delia, 
    709 F.3d 307
    , 320 (4th Cir. 2013) (recognizing that “parties seeking
    preliminary injunctions [must] demonstrate that (1) they are likely to succeed on the
    merits, (2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm, (3) the balance of hardships tips
    in their favor, and (4) the injunction is in the public interest”). But the 26 May Order
    is not an injunction; it is an order entered to enforce an injunction. In the Contempt
    Order, Judge Bledsoe specifically found “that the purpose of the May 26 Order to
    enforce the Federal Court [Injunction] Order’s directive that the Plasmans return the
    diverted funds to Decca USA [] may still be served by compliance with the Order.”
    This finding was in harmony with this Court’s conclusion in Bolier I that Judge
    Bledsoe entered the 26 May Order “simply [to] enforc[e] the ruling in Judge Voorhees’
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    BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC V. DECCA FURNITURE (USA), INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    Order ordering [the Plasmans] to return to Decca USA all of the funds that the
    Plasmans had diverted from Bolier.” Bolier I, __ N.C. App. at __, 792 S.E.2d at 872.
    Our review of the record reveals that the Plasmans have yet to return the
    diverted funds. We need say little more than that the purpose of the 26 May Order—
    to enforce compliance with the injunction’s terms, including the requirement that
    funds diverted from Bolier’s bank accounts be returned to Decca USA—could still be
    served by compliance with the 26 May Order. To address the Plasmans’ arguments
    any further would permit them to mount an impermissible collateral attack on the
    underlying injunction. We refuse, as did the Bolier I Court, to “enable [the Plasmans]
    to achieve a ‘back door’ appeal of Judge Vorhees’ Order well over three years after its
    entry.” Id. at __, 792 S.E.2d at 872.
    D. Willful Noncompliance
    The Plasmans next argue that Judge Bledsoe erroneously found that their
    noncompliance with the 26 May Order was willfill. Curiously, the Plasmans assert
    that the time frame in which they could appeal the injunction was tolled by the
    subsequent motions for modification and clarification, a contention that the Bolier I
    Court squarely rejected. See Bolier I, __ N.C. App. at __, 792 S.E.2d at 872. Beyond
    that, the Plasmans argue that they acted in good faith and pursuant to “proper legal
    process,” and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter any ruling—including the
    Contempt Order—once notice of appeal from the 26 May Order was given. According
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    BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC V. DECCA FURNITURE (USA), INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    to the Plasmans, their “understanding that [the appeal] divested the trial court of
    jurisdiction to continue contempt proceedings necessarily prevented [them] from being
    found in willful, bad faith disobedience.” We disagree.
    As an initial matter, we have already concluded above that the trial court did
    have jurisdiction to enter the Contempt Order. Furthermore, the record supports
    Judge Bledsoe’s finding that the Plasmans were in willfill noncompliance of the 26
    May Order at the time the Contempt Order was entered.
    “ ‘Willful’ has been defined as disobedience which imports knowledge and a
    stubborn resistance, and as something more than an intention to do a thing. It implies
    doing the act purposely and deliberately, indicating a purpose to do it, without
    authority—careless whether [the contemnor] has the right or not—in violation of
    law[.]” Hancock v. Hancock, 
    122 N.C. App. 518
    , 523, 
    471 S.E.2d 415
    , 418 (1996)
    (citation and other internal quotations marks omitted). The term willfulness “involves
    more than deliberation or conscious choice; it also imports a bad faith disregard for
    authority and the law.” Forte v. Forte, 
    65 N.C. App. 615
    , 616, 
    309 S.E.2d 729
    , 730
    (1983) (citations omitted). Consequently, “[w]illfulness in a contempt action requires
    either a positive action (a ‘purposeful and deliberate act’) in violation of a court order
    or a stubborn refusal to obey a court order (acting ‘with knowledge and stubborn
    resistance’).” 
    Hancock, 122 N.C. App. at 525
    , 471 S.E.2d at 419 (citation omitted).
    In the present case, Judge Bledsoe made the following findings:
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    BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC V. DECCA FURNITURE (USA), INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    {17} . . . In the P.I. Order, the Federal Court first ordered
    the Plasmans to return to Decca USA’s Bank of America
    lockbox all of Bolier & Co.’s monies, including but not
    limited to customer payments, diverted to them. . . . This
    requirement arose out of the Plasmans’ purported removal
    of Bolier funds from Decca USA accounts between the date
    of their employment termination on October 19, 2012 and
    the date when they were finally locked out of Bolier’s
    premises on January 14, 2013. The Plasmans used these
    funds to pay their purported wages, expenses, and
    attorney’s fees after their employment was terminated.
    {18} The Plasmans did not return the funds as ordered by
    the Federal Court, and after the matter was remanded to
    this Court, the Court, in its May 26 Order, granted Decca
    USA’s Motion to Enforce [the Federal Court’s P.I.] Order . .
    ..
    {19} The Plasmans have not yet returned to Decca USA the
    diverted funds. The Plasmans never appealed the Federal
    Court P.I. Order and only filed a response to [the] Court
    Order seeking clarification as to the order to repay diverted
    funds. The Federal Court did not respond to the Plasmans’
    Response prior to remand. On June 25, 2015, the Plasmans
    filed a Notice of Appeal of this Court’s May 26 Order,
    including the portions of the Order enforcing the Federal
    Court P.I. Order’s requirement that the Plasmans return
    the diverted funds.
    {20} This Court subsequently concluded that because the
    May 26 Order “simply ordered [the] Plasmans to comply
    with the never-appealed, legally valid and binding, 2013
    P.I. Order,” the appeal of the May 26 Order was
    interlocutory, did not affect a substantial right, and
    therefore did not stay the case. . . .
    {21} After this Court concluded that the case was not stayed,
    the Plasmans continued not to comply with the May 26
    Order and again filed a motion to clarify this Court’s
    holding. The Court again affirmed its conclusion that the
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    BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC V. DECCA FURNITURE (USA), INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    appeal of the May 26 Order did not stay the case or affect a
    substantial right. . . . The Plasmans have continued to
    refuse to comply with the May 26 Order’s directive to return
    the diverted funds.
    {22} After the Court issued the Show Cause Order, the
    Plasmans, rather than complying with the Show Cause
    Order’s instruction to submit evidence for in camera review
    or making a good faith effort to seek clarification,
    submitted, only minutes before the filing deadline, a
    document entitled Objections to Show Cause Production,
    Notice of Conditional Intent to Comply with Show Cause,
    and Request for Clarification (“Request”). The Court found
    that filing to be “procedurally improper, substantively
    without merit, and completely baseless as a purported
    excuse [not] to comply with the clear terms of the Court’s
    Show Cause Order. . . .”
    {23} While the May 26 Order found that the Plasmans’
    response to the Federal Court’s P.I. Order reflected “a
    genuine dispute (or at least the Plasmans’ genuine
    confusion) concerning [their obligations],” . . . the Court
    finds that the Plasmans’ belabored and continuing refusal
    to return the diverted funds in the face of this Court’s
    repeated directives to do so reflects “knowledge and stubborn
    resistance” to the May 26 Order. The Court also finds that
    the Plasmans have acted with a “bad faith disregard for
    authority and the law” by improperly seeking to reargue the
    merits of the May 26 Order in this Court and the Court’s
    conclusion that the matter is not stayed pending appeal. The
    Court therefore finds that the Plasmans are in willful
    noncompliance of the May 26 Order.
    (Emphasis added and internal citations omitted).
    As summarized above, the Plasmans did not comply with the injunction’s terms.
    Although the 26 May Order enforced the injunction and identified the exact amount
    of funds to be returned—$62,192.15 plus applicable interest—the Plasmans
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    BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC V. DECCA FURNITURE (USA), INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    repeatedly filed motions in the Business Court that sought clarification of what was
    already clear: they were required to return the diverted funds to Decca USA. The
    Plasmans also stubbornly refused to accept Judge Bledsoe’s conclusions that the
    appeal from the 26 May Order did not divest the Business Court’s jurisdiction over
    the case, and that the trial level proceedings would not be stayed. The record is replete
    with instances in which the Plasmans acted with “knowledge” of and “stubborn
    resistance” to the 26 May Order’s clear directives. 
    Hancock, 122 N.C. App. at 525
    , 471
    S.E.2d at 419. Accordingly, Judge Bledsoe’s finding that the Plasmans were in willful
    noncompliance with that order is supported by competent evidence.
    E. Decca USA’s Purported Noncompliance with the Injunction and 26
    May Order
    The Plasmans also argue that the injunction and the 26 May Order are no
    longer enforceable because Decca USA has refused to comply with both orders’
    requirement that the Plasmans be provided with certain information concerning
    Bolier’s operations. We disagree.
    In making this argument, the Plasmans simply complain about relief they have
    not obtained from Judge Bledsoe regarding disputes outside the scope of this appeal.
    According to the Plasmans, “Judge Bledsoe has repeatedly failed to find that [Decca
    USA] has not provided [Chris] Plasman with the information or access to Bolier. To
    the contrary, Judge Bledsoe has repeatedly stayed discovery, refused to compel [Decca
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    BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC V. DECCA FURNITURE (USA), INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    USA] to provide information.” The Plasmans also argue that the Business Court was
    required to “issue [an] adequate [Rule 65] security bond” before the injunction could
    be enforced.
    The gravamen of these contentions is that the 26 May Order lacked essential
    findings and was erroneous. Even assuming that Judge Bledsoe should have made
    certain findings concerning Decca USA’s compliance with the injunction, those
    findings would be immaterial to a determination of whether the Plasmans had
    complied with their own obligations under the injunction.         Furthermore, “[a]n
    erroneous order is one ‘rendered according to the course and practice of the court, but
    contrary to law, or upon a mistaken view of the law, or upon an erroneous application
    of legal principles.’ ” Daniels v. Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co., 
    320 N.C. 669
    , 676, 
    360 S.E.2d 772
    , 777 (1987) (citation omitted). “An erroneous order may be remedied by
    appeal; it may not be attacked collaterally.” 
    Id. (citation omitted).
    This Court has
    already dismissed the Plasmans appeal in Bolier I. Thus, regardless of whether the
    26 May Order was properly issued or not, it could not simply be ignored by the
    Plasmans. Even if Decca USA has not complied with its responsibilities under the
    injunction (as enforced by the 26 May Order), the Plasmans’ obligation to return the
    diverted funds remains in place. Accordingly, this argument is without merit.
    F. The Plasmans’ Ability To Comply With The 26 May Order
    Finally, the Plasmans argue that Judge Bledsoe improperly considered their
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    BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC V. DECCA FURNITURE (USA), INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    jointly-held bank accounts and their individually-held investment retirement
    accounts (IRAs) in assessing the Plasmans’ present ability to comply with the 26 May
    Order. Once again, we disagree.
    “In determining a contemnor’s present ability to pay, the appellate courts of
    this state have directed trial courts to ‘take an inventory of the property of the
    plaintiff; find what are his assets and liabilities and his ability to pay and work—an
    inventory of his financial condition.’ ” Gordon v. Gordon, 
    233 N.C. App. 477
    , 484, 
    757 S.E.2d 351
    , 356 (2014) (quoting Bennett v. Bennett, 
    21 N.C. App. 390
    , 393-94, 
    204 S.E.2d 554
    , 556 (1974)). “Considering how a contemnor pays his expenses is an
    important part of this analysis.” 
    Id. “The majority
    of cases have held that to satisfy
    the ‘present ability’ test defendant must possess some amount of cash, or asset readily
    converted to cash.” McMiller v. McMiller, 
    77 N.C. App. 808
    , 809, 
    336 S.E.2d 134
    , 135
    (1985). However, “[t]he standard is not having property free and clear of any liens,
    but rather that one has the present means to comply with the court order and hence
    to purge oneself of the contempt.” 
    Adkins, 82 N.C. App. at 291
    , 346 S.E.2d at 222.
    “Reasonable measures may well include liquidating equity in encumbered assets.” 
    Id. at 291-92,
    346 S.E.2d at 222.
    The Plasmans rely exclusively on Spears v. Spears, __ N.C. App. __, 
    784 S.E.2d 485
    (2016) to argue that jointly-titled assets—here, joint checking and savings
    accounts—cannot be used to determine a party’s ability to comply with a contempt
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    BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC V. DECCA FURNITURE (USA), INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    order. In Spears, this Court vacated a contempt order because, inter alia, the trial
    court faulted the defendant-husband “for failing to force his second wife to sell their
    beach house despite the fact that defendant testified that they owned the house as
    tenants by the entirety.” Id. at __, 784 S.E.2d at 496. However, the Spears Court
    simply recognized the statutory rule that a husband cannot not force his wife to sell,
    lease, transfer, or otherwise liquidate certain real property when that property is held
    as a tenancy by the entireties. 
    Id. (citing N.C.
    Gen. Stat. § 39-13.6(a) (2013) (“Neither
    spouse may bargain, sell, lease, mortgage, transfer, convey or in any manner
    encumber any property so held without the written joinder of the other spouse.”)).
    Spears has no application here, for the protections afforded real property held
    by spouses as tenants by the entirety do not apply in this instance. Therefore, the
    jointly-held bank accounts at issue were properly considered in Judge Bledsoe’s
    evaluation of the Plasmans’ ability to comply.
    We reach the same conclusion concerning the individual IRAs held by the
    Plasmans.    Indeed, this Court has previously held that a trial court properly
    considered funds in a defendant’s retirement account in determining that the
    defendant had the present ability to pay alimony arrears and purge himself of civil
    contempt. Tucker v. Tucker, 
    197 N.C. App. 592
    , 597, 
    679 S.E.2d 141
    , 144 (2009)
    (“Thus, the trial court properly considered the assets that defendant had available at
    the time of the hearing to satisfy the $10,000.00 payment towards the alimony arrears
    - 34 -
    BOLIER & COMPANY, LLC V. DECCA FURNITURE (USA), INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    and specifically based its conclusion regarding defendant’s ability to pay upon the fact
    that defendant had available, inter alia, $6,200.00 from his 401K account and a
    $2,000.00 cashier's check, which together would comprise $8,200.00 of the
    $10,000.00.”).     Accordingly, Judge Bledsoe’s inventory of the Plasmans’ financial
    condition properly took account of their jointly-held bank accounts and their
    individual IRAs, and it was not error to consider these assets when assessing the
    Plasmans’ present ability to comply with the 26 May Order and return the diverted
    funds to Bolier.
    V. Conclusion
    For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction
    to hold the Plasmans in civil contempt, and that the Contempt Order should be
    affirmed in its entirety.
    AFFIRMED.
    Judges BRYANT and INMAN concur.
    - 35 -