State v. Davis ( 2014 )

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of
A p p e l l a t e P r o c e d u r e .
NO. COA13-857
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 4 February 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Iredell County
No. 09 CRS 59431
CHERYLE DHONYALE DAVIS
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 20 July 2012 by
Judge Joe Crosswhite in Iredell County Superior Court. Heard in
the Court of Appeals 8 January 2014.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General Sandra Wallace-Smith, for the State.
Appellate Defender Staples S. Hughes, by Assistant
Appellate Defender Anne M. Gomez, for Defendant.
STEPHENS, Judge.
Procedural History and Evidence
Defendant Cheryle Dhonyale Davis appeals from the judgment
entered upon her conviction of second-degree murder in
connection with the death of her romantic partner, Rodney
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Herron. As discussed herein, we find no error in Defendant’s
trial.
Defendant and Herron had been engaged in a highly volatile,
occasionally violent relationship on and off since 2001, with
Herron sometimes living with Defendant. In February 2009,
following an incident in which Herron choked her, Defendant
bought a handgun. In November 2009, Herron and Defendant were
living together. On the evening of 26 November, Defendant was
sleeping when she heard a voice say several times, “This is your
final hour.” Defendant was unsure where the voice was coming
from or whether she was dreaming, but as she woke up, she heard
the voice tell her to start an argument with Herron. Defendant
went into the living room and began shouting at Herron. An
argument ensued. Eventually, Herron went into the bedroom while
Defendant remained on the sofa in the living room. At some
point, Herron came to the door of the bedroom, standing about
four feet from Defendant. As he turned to walk back into the
bedroom, Defendant, holding the handgun under a pillow, shot
Herron in the back. Defendant called 911, upset and distraught.
When police officers responded to the scene, Defendant was
screaming hysterically and waving the handgun in the air. One
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officer was able to disarm Defendant and place her under arrest.
Herron died as a result of the single gunshot.
Defendant remained in jail from the time of her arrest
until being released on bail in late July 2010. She neither
sought nor received any mental health services during that time,
and there were no reports of any bizarre behavior on her part
during her incarceration. However, in June 2011, Defendant’s
mother drove her to Davis Regional Medical Center (“DRMC”)
because Defendant was talking in the third person and claiming
that the “Holy Ghost” speaking through her. Defendant was
diagnosed with psychotic disorder, prescribed medication, and
referred to a walk-in clinic for aftercare. However, Defendant
did not follow up with outpatient treatment. In October 2011,
Defendant’s family took her to Broughton Hospital. She reported
symptoms of depression, hearing voices, and a belief that Herron
sometimes possessed her body. Defendant was diagnosed with
anxiety disorder, her medication was discontinued, and she was
discharged with instructions to seek outpatient follow-up care.
On 10 March 2012, two days before her murder trial was
scheduled to begin, Defendant went to the emergency room of
DRMC, reporting symptoms of depression and psychosis. She was
involuntarily committed and taken to Broughton Hospital for
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further evaluation, but was released after two days. Following
a 13 March 2012 hearing, the trial court ordered an evaluation
of Defendant’s capacity to proceed to trial pursuant to N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 15A-1002(b)(1) (2011) (“When the capacity of the
defendant to proceed is questioned, the court shall hold a
hearing to determine the defendant’s capacity to proceed.”).
Following her evaluation and a competency hearing in May 2012,
Defendant was found capable of proceeding to trial.
Defendant’s case came on for trial two months later on 9
July 2012. On the morning of 17 July, during presentation of
the State’s case, the State offered Defendant a plea to
voluntary manslaughter with a mitigated sentence. Because
Defendant wanted to discuss the offer with family members who
were not then in court, the testimony continued. After
Defendant spontaneously said, “She stood and she’s going to
continue to stain[,]”1 the trial court called a recess so that
Defendant could confer with defense counsel. Following a brief
discussion, defense counsel reported that Defendant had asked
defense counsel to make a motion to withdraw. Defense counsel
reported to the trial court that Defendant was upset with
1
The meaning of Defendant’s comment is unclear. It is quoted
here exactly as it appears in the trial transcript.
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defense counsel’s trial strategy. Following a discussion with
Defendant and defense counsel, the trial court denied the motion
to withdraw, and the trial proceeded, with the jury ultimately
returning a verdict finding Defendant guilty of second-degree
murder. This appeal followed.
Discussion
Defendant’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court
erred in failing to conduct a second competency hearing sua
sponte during trial. We disagree.
Our General Statutes provide that
[n]o person may be tried, convicted,
sentenced, or punished for a crime when by
reason of mental illness or defect he is
unable to understand the nature and object
of the proceedings against him, to
comprehend his own situation in reference to
the proceedings, or to assist in his defense
in a rational or reasonable manner. This
condition is hereinafter referred to as
“incapacity to proceed.”
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1001(a) (2011). The question of a
defendant’s capacity to proceed (also referred to as
“competency”) can “be raised at any time on motion by the
prosecutor, the defendant, the defense counsel, or the court.”
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N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1002(a).2 “When the capacity of the
defendant to proceed is questioned, the court shall hold a
hearing to determine the defendant’s capacity to proceed.” N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 15A-1002(b) (emphasis added). “[A] trial court has
a constitutional duty to institute, sua sponte, a competency
hearing if there is substantial evidence before the court
indicating that the accused may be mentally incompetent.” State
v. Young, 291 N.C. 562, 568, 231 S.E.2d 577, 581 (1977)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Further, under the Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution, a criminal
defendant may not be tried unless he is
competent. As a result, a trial court has a
constitutional duty to institute, sua
sponte, a competency hearing if there is
substantial evidence before the court
indicating that the accused may be mentally
incompetent. In enforcing this
constitutional right, the standard for
competence to stand trial is whether the
defendant has sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding and has a
rational as well as factual understanding of
the proceedings against him.
In addition, a trial judge is required to
hold a competency hearing when there is a
bona fide doubt as to the defendant’s
2
This statute has been amended with an effective date of 1
December 2013. However, the version quoted and discussed in
this opinion is the version in force and applicable during
Defendant’s trial.
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competency even absent a request. Evidence
of a defendant’s irrational behavior, his
demeanor at trial, and any prior medical
opinion on competence to stand trial are all
relevant to a bona fide doubt inquiry.
State v. Whitted, 209 N.C. App. 522, 527, 705 S.E.2d 787, 791
(2011) (citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets
omitted; some italics added).
On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court was
required to hold a second competency hearing during her trial
because (1) defense counsel questioned Defendant’s competency to
assist in her defense and (2) Defendant’s mental health history
and behavior at trial raised a bona fide doubt about her
competency to proceed. As to defense counsel’s comments, our
careful review of the transcript reveals that defense counsel’s
concern about Defendant’s ability to assist in her defense were
focused on Defendant’s negative attitude toward defense counsel
and her trial strategy, rather than on Defendant’s capacity or
competency. After telling the trial court that Defendant had
asked defense counsel to move to be allowed to withdraw, defense
counsel remarked:
Judge, I have no question about my ability
to continue in this trial. I’m not — I have
had no questions or qualms about what I have
chosen to do strategically in this trial to
this point. My client, however, has
expressed extreme displeasure. I have tried
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to discuss her issues with her. She does
not — she will tell me some of the things
that she has issues with. I tried — I’ve
tried to explain to her why I’m not focusing
on those things and why I have made the
decisions to focus on the issues that I
believe are most important. I think that
she fails to understand or appreciate the
decisions that I have made. She just — I’m
not sure that she’s going to be willing or
able to assist me in the trial of her case.
Not, — I don’t know — we’ve had her — we’ve
had mental health professionals evaluate her
ability to participate in the trial of her
own case and the question of competency was
asked and was answered by the mental health
experts at Central Regional. She was
determined to be competent to stand trial.
However, she is extremely hostile to me, and
I’m not sure why. And, you know, maybe she
can address that a little further with you;
but I’m trying to do the very best I can. I
have prepared witnesses. I am prepared to
put on a defense case. I zealously cross-
examined the witnesses. I have made the
points that I intended to make; and I am
prepared to continue, but she has the right
to participate and, in fact, needs to have
the ability to do that, and I’m just not
sure that she’s able to — because of her
attitude and opinion at this point, able to
assist me in the defense of her case. She
just won’t communicate with me.
(Emphasis added). Where a defendant’s “attitude, rather than a
mental illness or defect, prevent[s] him from assisting in his
own defense[,]” competency under section 15A-1002 is not
implicated. State v. Brown, 339 N.C. 426, 433, 451 S.E.2d 181,
186 (1994).
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Likewise, we conclude that, taken as a whole, Defendant’s
mental health history and behavior at trial did not raise a bona
fide doubt regarding her capacity. While Defendant had a
history of mental health issues, including past diagnoses of,
inter alia, post-traumatic stress disorder, psychotic disorder,
and schizophrenia, she was determined to be competent to assist
in her defense only two months before her trial began. Further,
the doctor who evaluated Defendant at that time concluded that
she did not have a severe mental illness.
Moreover, as Defendant herself notes, “a defendant’s
competency to stand trial is not necessarily static, but can
change over even brief periods of time.” Whitted, 209 N.C. App.
at 528-29, 705 S.E.2d at 792. Defendant notes two occasions of
allegedly “irrational behavior” during her trial: First, on the
fourth day of trial, Defendant apparently made some “disruptive”
gestures during playback of a video recording made by one of the
law enforcement officers who responded to her 911 call just
after she shot Herron. The trial transcript does not further
describe the gestures, but they cannot have been loud or overly
disruptive as counsel for the State, who was playing back the
recording and examining a witness at the time, did not even
notice them.
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Second, on the sixth day of trial, during an off-the-record
discussion between two attorneys for the State, Defendant said,
“She stood and she’s going to continue to stain.” After the
jury was sent out of the courtroom, Defendant then said, “She’s
not going to be Miss Davis’[s] lawyer after today, and I’m
telling you-all that Miss Davis has the holy spirit. So you
just better get it through your heads. Get her someone else.
She’s not going to defend her.” Immediately thereafter,
Defendant asked defense counsel to move to be allowed to
withdraw, as discussed supra, and the trial court gave Defendant
an opportunity to be heard:
THE COURT: All right. [Defendant], I will —
with respect to that request on behalf of
your attorney, I’m going to give you an
opportunity to say anything that you want to
say about that. I think [defense counsel]
has made that motion [to withdraw]. I think
she’s made it on your behalf. I certainly
want to give you a chance to add anything to
that that you would like to add to that.
[]DEFENDANT: I’ve been trying to explain to
[defense counsel] that I’m not in control of
the outburst or the episode that happened
just a few minutes ago and that has happened
prior to me being in the court; and I don’t
know how that I can explain it to her, but
she will need to be further educated or have
more knowledge of what is actually happening
with me in order to be able to defend me
professionally and be able to, you know,
exactly what is happening and what I’m going
to need as far as my defense, and that’s all
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I can say. If she does not know that, then I
would rather have someone else to defend me.
THE COURT: Yes, Ma’am. Well, I know that you
have been evaluated by several doctors who
have provided an opinion; and I’m certain
that’s what [defense counsel] is relying on
as well. What I want to do is, I mean it’s
been almost 45 minutes the Court has been
interrupted again at this point. This is the
second time in this trial the Court has been
interrupted. There’s been several other
times that we have given recesses at other
times to let you have a chance to speak with
[defense counsel] or just to collect your
thoughts on this. I told you early on, every
opportunity — if you need to take a break,
let [defense counsel] know, and we’ll
certainly do that. So we have tried every way
we can to accommodate you; and I want you to
understand that I’m trying to give you every
opportunity to be present and participate in
this trial.
This trial is extremely important to you.
It’s extremely important to your family.
They have been here this entire time. They
have stood by you. They have supported you
in this. However, please understand that I
have to be fair to everyone, and I can’t let
these interruptions continue to interrupt the
trial; and there are — I just want you to
understand that we’re going to try to proceed
in a few minutes. If you do consider or do
continue to cause interruptions in court,
then I'm going to consider other options.
One of those options that I do have to
consider is having you removed from the
courtroom; and I tell you, I don’t want to do
that. That is detrimental to your case. It
is detrimental to [defense counsel]’s ability
to represent you; and I absolutely don’t want
to get there. That’s why I’m continuing to
give you these warnings and give you every
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opportunity. That’s why I let your brother
come back and speak with you for a little
bit. But I want you to understand, I can’t
let those outbursts continue to be disruptive
of the court. That’s not fair to the jury.
It’s not fair to the other people in this
courtroom as well. So I’m doing everything I
can to give you every opportunity to do that.
I also do know at some point this morning, I
don’t even know if there’s been much relevant
discussions on it, I do know there was a new
offer extended by the State. I don’t know if
you’ve had time to discuss that with your
client or with her family. If that’s
something you want to address now or ready to
bring the jury back in and proceed, you know,
but [Defendant], I understand your concern.
I have — I think [defense counsel] is a
wonderful lawyer. Tried several cases with
her. I think she’s doing a great job on your
behalf. But she needs your help. She needs
you to be there and she needs you to help
her. And your family is here to support you,
and you got a lot of people in here to
support you. Okay. So we’re going to try to
continue on. But I guess I’m telling you
that because I don’t want to get to the point
that I have to consider other options, but I
can’t let this matter continue to be
interrupted.
[]DEFENDANT: I understand, Judge.
Trial then proceeded without further interruption that day or
the three remaining days of trial. Defendant gave evidence on
her own behalf and was lucid throughout her testimony. In sum,
Defendant made “gestures” on the fourth day of her trial — the
nature of which are not revealed by the record before this Court
— and spoke a single sentence to herself out loud on one other
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occasion, but otherwise behaved appropriately in court, was able
to respond intelligently to questions from the court, her
counsel, and the State, and displayed no signs of incompetence
or incapacity.
In contrast, in Whitted, where we concluded the trial court
had erred in failing to conduct a competency hearing sua sponte,
the defendant offered the following
substantial evidence indicating that she was
possibly mentally incompetent during her
trial:
• At her first court hearing, the
magistrate noted her past history of mental
illness, specifically paranoid
schizophrenia. Defendant rejected a
favorable pretrial plea offer, remarking
that her appointed counsel worked for the
State.
• After opening statements, the trial
court set a $75,000 cash bond. Defendant
responded with an emotional outburst,
telling the trial court she did not care
whether she got life in prison. She also
told the trial court she was guilty,
stating, “That’s what you want.”
• On the third day of her trial,
Defendant refused to return to the courtroom
because she felt her rights were being
violated, and stated she felt she could rely
on her faith. When Defendant was brought
forcibly into court, handcuffed to a rolling
chair after having been tasered, she chanted
loudly and sang prayers and religious
imprecations, refusing to be silent or
cooperate with trial proceedings.
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• Later, for sentencing, Defendant was
brought back to the courtroom strapped to a
gurney, again singing, crying, screaming[,]
and mumbling as the trial court pronounced
sentence.
Id. at 527-28, 705 S.E.2d at 791-92. Here, Defendant did not
chant, scream, cry hysterically, or have to be restrained like
the defendant in Whitted, nor had she previously been found
incompetent to stand trial. See also State v. McRae, 139 N.C.
App. 387, 533 S.E.2d 557 (2000) (finding the trial court erred
in failing to conduct a competency hearing sua sponte where the
defendant, who suffered from schizophrenia, had been evaluated
at least six times in the preceding year and half and been found
to be competent to stand trial at some points but not at
others).
We conclude that Defendant’s behavior was not substantial
evidence that she might be incompetent such as would raise a
bona fide question about her capacity to proceed. Accordingly,
the trial court did not err in failing to conduct a competency
hearing during Defendant’s trial.
NO ERROR.
Judges STEELMAN and DAVIS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).