Lasecki v. Lasecki , 246 N.C. App. 518 ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA15-253
Filed: 5 April 2016
Iredell County, No. 13 CVD 1797
KEVIN S. LASECKI, Plaintiff,
v.
STACEY M. LASECKI, Defendant.
Appeal by plaintiff from order entered on 28 August 2014 by Judge Edward L.
Hedrick, IV in District Court, Iredell County. Heard in the Court of Appeals on 9
September 2015.
Homesley, Gaines & Dudley, LLP, by Edmund L. Gaines and Christina
Clodfelter, for plaintiff-appellant.
Katherine Freeman, PLLC, by Katherine Freeman, for defendant-appellee.
STROUD, Judge.
Kevin S. Lasecki (“plaintiff”) appeals from an order in which the trial court
ordered specific performance of his prospective support obligations under a
separation agreement, requiring that he pay $2,900.00 monthly in child support,
$1,385.00 monthly in alimony, and $9,592.50 in attorneys’ fees. The trial court also
entered money judgments of $54,432.31 for child support and alimony arrearages and
$16,623.45 for an unpaid joint credit card debt. Plaintiff argues that (1) the trial
court erred in awarding the two money judgments; (2) the trial court erred in ordering
LASECKI V. LASECKI
Opinion of the Court
specific performance of $2,900.00 monthly in child support; (3) competent evidence
does not support the trial court’s findings as to the children’s reasonable needs; (4)
the trial court erred in ordering specific performance of $1,385.00 monthly in alimony;
and (5) the trial court erred in awarding $9,592.50 in attorneys’ fees. We affirm in
part, vacate in part, and remand.
I. Background
Plaintiff and Stacey M. Lasecki (“defendant”) married in 1993, and three
children were born to the marriage. On 24 August 2012, plaintiff and defendant
separated and executed a Separation Agreement, which resolved issues of child
custody, equitable distribution, child support, alimony, and attorneys’ fees. In the
Separation Agreement, the parties agreed that plaintiff would pay defendant
$2,900.00 per month in child support and $3,600.00 per month in alimony. The
parties also agreed that plaintiff would pay a joint credit card debt. The parties
further agreed that in the event that either party breached the Separation
Agreement, that party would be liable for the other party’s attorneys’ fees.
On 1 August 2013, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that his income had
significantly decreased since the Separation Agreement’s execution and requested
that the trial court issue an order setting his child support obligation pursuant to the
North Carolina Child Support Guidelines. On 19 September 2013, defendant
answered and counterclaimed for specific performance of plaintiff’s child support and
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alimony obligations under the Separation Agreement. Defendant also sought specific
performance of payment of child support and alimony arrearages, payment of the
unpaid joint credit card debt, attorneys’ fees, and “such other and further relief as to
the court may seem just, fit and proper.”
On 1 May 2014, plaintiff’s employer terminated his employment. On 17 and
18 July 2014, while plaintiff was still unemployed and seeking a new job, the trial
court held a hearing on the pending claims. On or about 21 July 2014, Frontline
Products, LLC (“Frontline”) offered plaintiff a job in Arizona, which plaintiff
immediately accepted. On 23 July 2014, plaintiff moved to reopen the case to allow
additional testimony regarding his new employment and income. On 14 August 2014,
the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion. On 28 August 2014, the trial court entered
an order concluding that the $2,900.00 monthly child support amount set forth in the
Separation Agreement was reasonable and that plaintiff was able to pay the full
$2,900.00 monthly amount in child support and a reduced amount of $1,385.00
monthly in alimony. The trial court ordered as specific performance that plaintiff pay
these monthly amounts as well as $9,592.50 for defendant’s attorneys’ fees and
awarded money judgments of $54,432.31 for the child support and alimony
arrearages and $16,623.45 for the unpaid joint credit card debt.
On 3 September 2014, plaintiff moved for a new trial arguing that the trial
court should consider his new employment and income and that it erred in imputing
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to him an annual income of $150,000.00. On 10 September 2014, the trial court
denied plaintiff’s motion. On 23 September 2014, plaintiff gave timely notice of
appeal from the trial court’s 28 August 2014 order.
II. Child Support and Alimony Arrearages and Joint Credit Card Debt
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in granting defendant two money
judgments in its order: (1) $54,432.31 in damages for the child support and alimony
arrearages; and (2) $16,623.45 in damages for failure to pay the unpaid joint credit
card debt pursuant to the Separation Agreement. Relying exclusively on NCNB v.
Carter, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in awarding these money
judgments, because in her pleadings, defendant requested only specific performance
of these unpaid amounts. See NCNB v. Carter, 71 N.C. App. 118, 121-23, 322 S.E.2d
180, 183-84 (1984). We distinguish Carter.
In Carter, the defendants appealed from the trial court’s ruling denying their
post-verdict motion for treble damages and attorneys’ fees pursuant to the Unfair and
Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Id. at 121, 322 S.E.2d at 183; see also N.C. Gen. Stat.
ch. 75 (2013). This Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling:
[T]he relief granted must be consistent with the claims
pleaded and embraced within the issues determined at
trial, which presumably the opposing party had the
opportunity to challenge. Simply put, the scope of a lawsuit
is measured by the allegations of the pleadings and the
evidence before the court and not by what is demanded.
Hence, relief under [North Carolina Rule of Civil
Procedure] 54(c) is always proper when it does not operate
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to the substantial prejudice of the opposing party. Such
relief should, therefore, be denied when the relief
demanded was not suggested or illuminated by the
pleadings nor justified by the evidence adduced at trial.
In the present case, neither the pleadings nor the
evidence adduced at trial suggested that the defendants
were proceeding on an unfair and deceptive trade practice
claim. Defendants tried their case without reference to or
reliance upon G.S. 75-1.1 et seq. Similarly, [the plaintiff]
defended its case solely as a defense to common law fraud,
and it did not litigate or assert any defenses to an unfair
and deceptive trade practice claim. To permit defendants
to change legal theories after the trial and verdict would
not only deprive [the plaintiff] of a jury determination on
that claim, but would subject [the plaintiff] to liability on a
claim which it had no opportunity to evaluate or defend.
Unquestionably proof of fraud necessarily constitutes a
violation of G.S. 75-1.1, and under ordinary circumstances
defendants would be entitled automatically to treble the
damages fixed by the jury. However, fundamental fairness
and due process required that [the plaintiff] be illuminated
as to the substantive theory under which defendants were
proceeding and to the possibility of the extraordinary relief
sought prior to defendant’s post-verdict motion for treble
damages.
Carter, 71 N.C. App. at 121-22, 322 S.E.2d at 183 (citations, quotation marks, and
brackets omitted). The defendants did not request or raise the issue of treble
damages until after the verdict. See id., 322 S.E.2d at 183.
In contrast, here, defendant specifically requested in her counterclaims that
plaintiff pay the child support and alimony arrearages and the unpaid amount owed
on the joint credit card. Although plaintiff requested an order for specific
performance, she also requested “such other and further relief as to the court may
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seem just, fit and proper.” In addition, at the hearing, defendant’s counsel cross-
examined plaintiff specifically on the issues of the child support and alimony
arrearages and the unpaid amount owed on the joint credit card. By awarding these
unpaid amounts as money judgments, the trial court did not grant relief which “was
not suggested or illuminated by the pleadings nor justified by the evidence adduced
at trial.” See id. at 122, 322 S.E.2d at 183; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 54(c) (2013)
(“Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final
judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings.”).
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in awarding these unpaid
amounts as money judgments.
III. Child Support
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in ordering specific performance of
the Separation Agreement’s entire child support obligation. Plaintiff specifically
contends that the trial court erroneously imputed income to plaintiff in determining
the proper child support amount.
A. Standard of Review
In Pataky v. Pataky, this Court established the following test for determining
the appropriate amount of child support where the parties have executed an
unincorporated separation agreement:
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[I]n an initial determination of child support where the
parties have executed an unincorporated separation
agreement that includes provision for child support, the
court should first apply a rebuttable presumption that the
amount in the agreement is reasonable and, therefore, that
application of the guidelines would be inappropriate. The
court should determine the actual needs of the child at the
time of the hearing, as compared to the provisions of the
separation agreement. If the presumption of
reasonableness is not rebutted, the court should enter an
order in the separation agreement amount and make a
finding that application of the guidelines would be
inappropriate. If, however, the court determines by the
greater weight of the evidence that the presumption of
reasonableness afforded the separation agreement
allowance has been rebutted, taking into account the needs
of the children existing at the time of the hearing and
considering the factors enumerated in the first sentence of
G.S. § 50-13.4(c), the court then looks to the presumptive
guidelines established through operation of G.S. § 50-
13.4(c1) and the court may nonetheless deviate if, upon
motion of either party or by the court sua sponte, it
determines application of the guidelines would not meet or
would exceed the needs of the child or would be otherwise
unjust or inappropriate.
Pataky v. Pataky, 160 N.C. App. 289, 305, 585 S.E.2d 404, 414-15 (2003) (emphasis
added and quotation marks, footnote, and ellipsis omitted), aff’d per curiam, 359 N.C.
65, 602 S.E.2d 360 (2004). The first sentence of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.4(c) provides:
Payments ordered for the support of a minor child
shall be in such amount as to meet the reasonable needs of
the child for health, education, and maintenance, having
due regard to the estates, earnings, conditions, accustomed
standard of living of the child and the parties, the child care
and homemaker contributions of each party, and other
facts of the particular case.
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N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.4(c) (2013) (emphasis added).
In conducting this two-part analysis, the trial court must make findings of fact
and conclusions of law. Pataky, 160 N.C. App. at 305-06, 585 S.E.2d at 415.
“[F]indings of fact by the trial court supported by competent evidence are binding on
the appellate courts even if the evidence would support a contrary finding.
Conclusions of law are, however, entirely reviewable on appeal.” Scott v. Scott, 336
N.C. 284, 291, 442 S.E.2d 493, 497 (1994) (citation omitted).
B. Imputation of Income
The trial court may impute income to a party only upon finding that the party
has “deliberately depressed his income or deliberately acted in disregard of his
obligation to provide support”:
Generally, a party’s ability to pay child support is
determined by that party’s actual income at the time the
award is made. A party’s capacity to earn may, however,
be the basis for an award where the party deliberately
depressed his income or deliberately acted in disregard of
his obligation to provide support.
Before earning capacity may be used as the basis of
an award, there must be a showing that the actions
reducing the party’s income were taken in bad faith to
avoid family responsibilities. Yet, this showing may be met
by a sufficient degree of indifference to the needs of a
parent’s children.
McKyer v. McKyer, 179 N.C. App. 132, 146, 632 S.E.2d 828, 836 (2006) (citations and
quotation marks omitted), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 356, 646 S.E.2d 115 (2007);
see also Pataky, 160 N.C. App. at 306-08, 585 S.E.2d at 415-16 (holding that the trial
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court had erroneously imputed the income that the defendant had made at his last
job absent evidence of bad faith); Bowers v. Bowers, 141 N.C. App. 729, 732, 541
S.E.2d 508, 510 (2001). In addition, in order to award the remedy of specific
performance, the trial court generally must find that that “such relief is feasible”:
As a general proposition, the equitable remedy of
specific performance may not be ordered unless such relief
is feasible; therefore courts may not order specific
performance where it does not appear that defendant can
perform. In the absence of a finding that the defendant is
able to perform a separation agreement, the trial court may
nonetheless order specific performance if it can find that
the defendant has deliberately depressed his income or
dissipated his resources.
In finding that the defendant is able to perform a
separation agreement, the trial court is not required to
make a specific finding of the defendant’s “present ability
to comply” as that phrase is used in the context of civil
contempt. In other words, the trial court is not required to
find that the defendant possesses some amount of cash, or
asset readily converted to cash[,] prior to ordering specific
performance.
Condellone v. Condellone, 129 N.C. App. 675, 682-83, 501 S.E.2d 690, 695-96
(citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted), disc. review denied, 349 N.C. 354,
517 S.E.2d 889 (1998).
In sum, where the parties have executed an unincorporated separation
agreement, the trial court must examine whether the presumption of reasonableness
afforded the separation agreement has been rebutted, “taking into account the needs
of the children existing at the time of the hearing and considering the factors
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enumerated in the first sentence of G.S. § 50-13.4(c)[.]” Pataky, 160 N.C. App. at 305,
585 S.E.2d at 415. If the trial court concludes that the parties have not rebutted this
presumption, the trial court should then determine to what extent the supporting
parent “is able to perform” under the agreement. Condellone, 129 N.C. App. at 682-
83, 501 S.E.2d at 695-96. The trial court may then order specific performance and
require the supporting parent to pay that amount. See id., 501 S.E.2d at 695-96. But
the trial court may not impute income to the supporting parent absent a finding that
the supporting parent “deliberately depressed his income or deliberately acted in
disregard of his obligation to provide support.” McKyer, 179 N.C. App. at 146, 632
S.E.2d at 836 (citation omitted); see also Pataky, 160 N.C. App. at 306-07, 585 S.E.2d
at 415-16; Bowers, 141 N.C. App. at 732, 541 S.E.2d at 510.
The trial court based its conclusion of law that the $2,900.00 monthly amount
set forth in the Separation Agreement was reasonable on numerous detailed findings
of fact:
7. Plaintiff remarried approximately two weeks before
the hearing and lives with his Wife. His Wife is employed
at Granger Corporation.
8. The [plaintiff] and his current Wife live in a 4
bedroom, 2.5 bath home in Morrison Plantation. The home
is rented for $1,650.00 per month and Plaintiff’s Wife pays
the entire rent. The home is currently occupied by
Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s Wife, and her two children in addition
to his three children when they visit. He desires more time
with his children, closer to fifty percent (50%). The three
children attend public school and those schools are close to
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Plaintiff’s home.
9. Since the date of separation the Plaintiff has never
been in town enough to exercise his 15 nights per month,
until his recent unemployment. When employed, he
generally visited every other weekend. His attempt to
name the children’s schools at trial was inaccurate. He
exercised a week of visitation in July and took the children
to the beach for his wedding.
10. During the marriage and after the date of separation
the Defendant has been the primary caretaker for the
minor children. During the marriage Plaintiff travelled
extensively, while Defendant generally stayed home with
the children. Near the date of separation, Defendant held
a part-time job of approximately 8 hours per week.
....
13. At the time the parties entered into the Separation
Agreement the Plaintiff travelled with his work 75% to
80% of the time. He was employed with Bath Solutions,
Inc. and was employed with that company for
approximately 4 years. Prior to that employment, Plaintiff
was employed with another company in sales for
approximately 19 years. That company was named Dial
and later Henkle. Plaintiff’s job was also in sales and at
the end of his career with that company he was earning
$150,000.00 per year.
14. Pursuant to the Separation Agreement paragraph
16(e) the Plaintiff received an IRA with Davidson Wealth
Management in the amount of $185,000.00 and he has
maintained that asset, although he has taken some
distributions since the division of property. Even after the
distributions, the account has a current balance of
approximately $180,000.00. He received two boats
pursuant to the Separation Agreement and has sold both
of them. A few months after the date of separation he
received net proceeds of $2,000.00 for one of them and
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recently received $13,600.00 for the other.
15. On May 13, 2013, the [plaintiff] lost his job with BSI
due to soft sales and the companies’ hiring of a family
member. Within one week he found a job with Phoenix
Sales and Distribution. Although his travel was cut
significantly, Plaintiff continued to travel frequently with
his employment. His annual income with this employment
was $160,000.00. In August 2013 Plaintiff was offered a
position in sales with Frontline with an annual salary of
$255,000.00. Plaintiff asked Defendant and the children to
move to Arizona but she declined. Because he did not wish
to move away from his children, he declined the position.
In January 2014 Plaintiff’s salary was cut with Phoenix
Sales to $80,000.00. Plaintiff was terminated from
Phoenix Sales on May 1, 2014. He continued to cover the
children on his health insurance through a COBRA plan at
a cost of $580.00 per month. As of the date of trial, the
Plaintiff learned that he could add his children to a policy
at his Wife’s employment for an additional $250.00 per
month. Plaintiff has applied for unemployment [benefits]
but has yet to receive benefits. The expected benefits
would be $350.00 per week. Plaintiff has looked for
employment through friends in the industry. He has
contacted his previous employer, Henkle/Dial. He has also
contacted Frontline and is hopeful that he can secure a
position with that company. This job prospect is favorable
and he has again asked Defendant to move with the
children to Arizona. Defendant does not intend to move to
Arizona.
16. In 2013 the parties were offered an early pension
distribution from Henkle also known as Dial, a former
employer of the Plaintiff. This pension had been divided
by a QDRO pursuant to paragraph 16(h) of the Separation
Agreement. Plaintiff accepted the offer and received
$46,636.99. Defendant did not accept the offer and retains
her interest in the pension plan.
17. The Defendant and the minor children lived in the
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marital home until it was sold by short sale in July of 2013.
18. When Plaintiff was employed he was paid every two
weeks. He did not comply with his obligations under the
Separation Agreement. He did send to Defendant [one
half] of his net pay 2 times per month. The two extra pay
checks Plaintiff received per year he kept for himself.
....
22. In 2013 the Plaintiff had the following deposit
accounts:
Account Balance 1/1/13 Balance
11/12/13
[Checking account] $29,794.65 $13,567.96
IRA [account 1] $198,693.13 $187,919.44
IRA [account 2] $20,526.69 $23,296.16
Roth IRA [account] $3,886.75 $4,262.35
Total $252,901.22 $229,045.91
23. In Plaintiff’s [checking account], he had an ending
balance during the following months as outlined below:
Date Ending Balance
9/30/13 $18,862.12
10/23/13 $15,165.52
11/20/13 $15,827.20
12/20/13 $12,889.85
1/23/14 $49,692.19
2/20/14 $35,864.01
3/21/14 $31,774.86
The funds creating these balances included wages and
early retirement distributions.
24. Defendant is employed with Hawthorns Holding
Group and Davidson Pizza Company. She serves as a
manager for Davidson Pizza Company and completes tasks
associated with accounts payable with Hawthorns Holding
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Group. She earns $12.00 [per hour] and works
approximately 30 hours per week. She has had this
employment since August 27, 2013.
25. Defendant has taken three distributions from the
IRA that she was distributed under the Separation
Agreement. In 2013 she took $12,000.00 to $15,000.00 and
in . . . 2014 she has taken $9,600.00. Her original division
under paragraph 16(e) [of the Separation Agreement] was
approximately $162,000.00.
26. In 2011 Plaintiff’s wages, salaries and tips were
$286,505.00; in 2012 $264,446.00; in 2013 $182,288.00 (in
addition the Plaintiff took IRA distributions in the sum of
$28,821.00 and a pension distribution in the sum of
$46,637.00).
27. Plaintiff’s reasonable monthly expenses excluding
his support obligations under the Separation Agreement
living separate and apart from the Defendant can be found
in the following table:
Expense Amount Comment
Rent $825.00 [one half] current
amount [because]
shared with Wife who
is employed
Health Insurance $250.00 Incremental addition to
Wife’s plan
Food Expense $200.00 Plaintiff’s 6/12/14
Affidavit
Truck Lease $615.00
Car Insurance $150.00 No boats remain
Cell Phone $50.00 Plaintiff’s 6/2/14
Affidavit
Uninsured $75.00 Plaintiff’s 6/12/14
Medical Expenses Affidavit
Direct TV $75.00
Electricity $135.00
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Life Insurance $230.00
Gasoline $300.00 Higher of Plaintiff’s
Affidavits
Clothing and $150.00
Household Goods
Dog $50.00 Lower of Plaintiff’s
food/maintenance Affidavits
Internet Service $50.00 Lower of Plaintiff’s
Affidavits
Water $85.00 Higher of Plaintiff’s
Affidavits
Entertainment $300.00
Lawn $150.00
Maintenance
TOTAL $3,690.00
28. The parties presented little evidence regarding the
past expenses or current actual needs of the minor
children. The Separation Agreement reveals that each of
the parties had an automobile at the date of separation and
the parties had two boats. They had college savings plans
for the two older children. They lived in a home which
suffered the risk of foreclosure. Plaintiff communicates
with the oldest daughter electronically. Within the
Separation Agreement the parties agreed that the
appropriate sum to be paid by Plaintiff to Defendant was
$2,900.00 per month. The children attend public school.
The Court is able to estimate some of the reasonable needs
of the minor children by comparing them to the reasonable
needs of the Plaintiff. The reasonable needs of the minor
children living primarily with the Defendant can be found
in the following table:
Expense Amount Comment
Rent $825.00 [one half] of total
similar fixe[d] expense
of Plaintiff
Health Insurance $0.00 Provided by Plaintiff
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Food Expense $600.00 3 x Plaintiff, assumes
each teenage child eats
as much as Plaintiff
Truck Lease $615.00 Assumes [one half] total
fixed expense similar to
Plaintiff plus a car for
17 [year] old child [one
half] value of Plaintiff
Car Insurance $225.00 Assumes [one half] total
fixed expense similar to
Plaintiff plus a car for
17 [year] old child [one
half] value of Plaintiff
Cell Phone $100.00 Each teenage (2) child
with same cell phone as
Plaintiff
Uninsured $225.00 3 x Plaintiff
Medical Expenses
Direct TV $37.50 [one half] fixed expense
of Plaintiff attributed to
children
Electricity $67.50 [one half] fixed expense
of Plaintiff attributed to
children
Gasoline $450.00 Assumes [one half] total
fixed expense similar to
Plaintiff plus a car for
17 [year] old child
Clothing and $450.00 3 x Plaintiff
Household Goods
Dog $25.00 [one half] fixed expense
food/maintenance of Plaintiff attributed to
children
Internet Service $25.00 [one half] fixed expense
of Plaintiff attributed to
children
Water $42.50 [one half] fixed expense
of Plaintiff attributed to
children
Entertainment $900.00 3 x Plaintiff
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Lawn $75.00 [one half] fixed expense
Maintenance of Plaintiff attributed to
children
TOTAL $4,662.50
29. The children have generally been covered by medical
insurance throughout their lives by policies provided by
Plaintiff’s employer. The parties’ estates can be found
above. Each is now renting a home. Their primary assets
appear to be retirement [accounts] divided pursuant to the
Separation Agreement. Plaintiff has continued to
contribute to retirement plans after the date of separation.
The Plaintiff has enjoyed high earnings and the children
enjoyed the benefit of his earnings throughout the
marriage and most of the separation. His payments to
Defendant under the Separation Agreement can be found
above. The accustomed standard of living of the parties
and the children were high prior to the separation of the
parties and it has been comfortable since the separation.
Defendant contributed as a homemaker during the
marriage. Plaintiff’s lowest salary was $80,000.00 just
prior to his recent termination. Defendant is currently
earning as much as she has since the date of separation,
$18,720.00. It would therefore be reasonable for Plaintiff to
provide for not less than 81% of the needs of the minor
children.[1] Pursuant to the Separation Agreement the
Plaintiff [must] pay the Defendant $2,900.00 per month.
Eighty-one percent of the reasonable needs found above are
over $3,776.62 per month. Considering these factors, [t]he
Court cannot find that the amount of support provided for
in the parties’ Agreement is unreasonable.
(Emphasis added.) The trial court concluded that plaintiff had failed to rebut the
1Plaintiff argues that the “record is devoid of any evidence of as to how it would be reasonable
for Plaintiff to provide for not less than 81% of the needs of the minor children with no income.”
Because we are vacating the portion of the order in which the trial court ordered plaintiff to pay
$2,900.00 monthly in child support, as discussed below, we do not address this issue.
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Pataky presumption and thus ordered that he pay $2,900.00 per month in child
support in accordance with the Separation Agreement, as described in the following
conclusions of law:
3. The legal obligation of married parents to support a
minor child may be [e]stablished through execution and
acknowledgement of a written Separation Agreement. No
Agreement between the parents can fully deprive the
Courts of their authority to protect the best interests of
minor children. Either party to an unincorporated
Separation Agreement may seek a Court Order to establish
child support pursuant to N.C.G.S. [§] 50-13.4 in an
amount, scope or duration different from that provided in
the unincorporated Agreement. When a valid,
unincorporated Separation Agreement determines a
parent’s child support obligations, in a subsequent action
for child support, the court must base the parent’s
prospective child support obligation on the amount of
support provided under the Separation Agreement rather
than the amount of support payable under the child
support guidelines unless the Court [d]etermines, by the
greater weight of the evidence, taking into account the
child’s needs and factors enumerated in the first . . .
sentence of N.C.G.S. [§] 50-13.4(c), that the amount of
support under the Separation Agreement is unreasonable.
Taking into account the children’s needs and factors
enumerated in the first sentence of N.C.G.S. [§] 50-13.4(c)[,]
the parties have failed to prove that the amount of support
under the Separation Agreement is unreasonable and the
Plaintiff should pay Defendant child support in the amount
of $2,900.00 per month.
4. The Court is not finding that Plaintiff is voluntarily
suppressing his income in a bad faith attempt to avoid his
child support obligation. The Court is not imputing income
to the Plaintiff. The Court is setting child support pursuant
to [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 50-13.4(c) and pursuant to those
factors which include the needs of the children, the estate
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and earnings of Plaintiff and the presumption created by
the Separation Agreement.
(Emphasis added.)
In Finding of Fact 30, the trial court next examined plaintiff’s current ability
to comply with his contractual obligations under the Separation Agreement in
determining what amounts of child support and alimony to order as specific
performance:
Plaintiff was regularly employed during the marriage
earning $150,000.00. At and after the date of separation
he was earning significantly more. At times during his four
years with BSI he earned well in excess of $200,000.00 per
year. Within a week of his severance he found a job earning
$160,000.00 per year. While holding that job he turned
down an offer of $255,000.00 per year and has a good
prospect with a job with that employer. It is feasible for
Plaintiff to earn $150,000.00 and with those earnings to
support Defendant and their children. Based upon his
experience, contacts in the industry and prior job
performance[,] he has the ability to quickly find employment
earning at least $150,000.00 per year.[2] Earning
$150,000.00 annually is $12,500.00 per month. The
following table outlines the Plaintiff’s current ability to
comply with his contractual obligations under the
Separation Agreement.
Item Amount Comments
Likely potential gross $12,500.00
income
2 Plaintiff also argues that the “trial court’s finding that ‘it is feasible for Plaintiff to earn
$150,000 and with those earnings to support Defendant and their children’ and that Plaintiff ‘has the
ability to quickly find employment earning at least $150,000’ is not supported by the evidence and
cannot stand.” Because we are vacating the portions of the order in which the trial court ordered
plaintiff to pay $2,900.00 monthly in child support and $1,385.00 monthly in alimony, as discussed
below, we do not address this issue.
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Federal Tax obligation ($2,878.71) IRS Publication
15
Social Security and ($956.25) .0765
Medicare
North Carolina Income ($688.75) Publication NC-
Tax 30
Plaintiff’s reasonable ($3,690.00) See above
expenses
Plaintiff’s child ($2,900.00) As ordered
support obligation herein
Total Remaining $1,386.29
(Emphasis added.)
In determining what amounts of child support and alimony to order as specific
performance, as a practical matter, the trial court imputed $150,000.00 in annual
income to plaintiff despite its statement that “[t]he Court is not imputing income to
the Plaintiff.” It is undisputed that as of the date of trial, plaintiff was unemployed
and had no income. The trial court concluded that plaintiff was unable to “comply
with an order requiring specific performance of a payment of all of the remaining
damages suffered by Defendant due to Plaintiff’s breach of the [Separation]
Agreement.” Accordingly, the trial court ordered as specific performance that
plaintiff pay $2,900.00 per month in child support and $1,385.00 per month in
alimony, or $1,386.29 rounded down, rather than the full $3,600.00 monthly alimony
amount, as set forth in the Separation Agreement.
On 3 September 2014, plaintiff moved for a new trial on the following two
grounds: (1) “Newly discovered evidence based upon the Plaintiff having received a
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job offer which he has accepted and which will involve his moving to Arizona”; and
(2) “Insufficiency of evidence to justify the verdict and the verdict is contrary to law
in that the evidence presented did not justify the Court basing its verdict upon finding
that the Plaintiff had the present capacity to earn $150,000 per year.” On 10
September 2014, the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion, noting the following:
Since the court found that the presumption
established by the agreement of the parties was not
rebutted[,] the court never considered the North Carolina
Child Support Guidelines. Since the court did not use the
Child Support Guidelines to establish [plaintiff’s]
obligation to pay child support[,] the court did not
improperly use plaintiff’s earning capacity or imputed
income to establish child support. The court considered his
earnings of 0, but also considered all of the other factors
outlined in N.C.G.S. [§] 50-13.4(c) and the needs of the
children at the time of the hearing and the parties’
unincorporated agreement.
(Emphasis added.)
It appears that the trial court divided its child support analysis into two parts:
(1) whether plaintiff rebutted the Pataky presumption; and (2) what amount of child
support plaintiff was “able to perform[.]” See Pataky, 160 N.C. App. at 305, 585
S.E.2d at 414-15; Condellone, 129 N.C. App. at 682-83, 501 S.E.2d at 695-96. The
trial court ostensibly declined to impute income to plaintiff during the first part of its
analysis, yet it did impute an annual income of $150,000.00 to plaintiff during the
second part of its analysis even though it found that plaintiff was not “voluntarily
suppressing his income in a bad faith attempt to avoid his child support obligation.”
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But nothing in McKyer, Pataky, or Bowers suggests that the rule that the trial
court cannot impute income absent a finding of bad faith is limited to a particular
part of the trial court’s child support determination. See McKyer, 179 N.C. App. at
146, 632 S.E.2d at 836 (“Before earning capacity may be used as the basis of [a child
support] award, there must be a showing that the actions reducing the party’s income
were taken in bad faith to avoid family responsibilities.”); Pataky, 160 N.C. App. at
306-07, 585 S.E.2d at 415-16; Bowers, 141 N.C. App. at 732, 541 S.E.2d at 510.
Rather, we hold that this rule applies throughout the entire child support
determination.
We find it especially instructive that this Court in Pataky, even after it had
held that the trial court had erred in failing to apply a presumption of reasonableness
to the parties’ separation agreement, decided to address the issue of imputation of
income and held that the trial court had erred in imputing income to the supporting
parent absent evidence of bad faith. See Pataky, 160 N.C. App. at 306-08, 585 S.E.2d
at 415-16. In its discussion, this Court did not suggest that this rule would be
inapplicable should the trial court on remand determine that the separation
agreement amount was reasonable. See id., 585 S.E.2d at 415-16. Accordingly, we
hold that the trial court erred in basing its child support award upon plaintiff’s
earning capacity when it had found that plaintiff was not “voluntarily suppressing
his income in a bad faith attempt to avoid his child support obligation.” See id. at
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306-07, 585 S.E.2d at 415-16; McKyer, 179 N.C. App. at 146, 632 S.E.2d at 836;
Bowers, 141 N.C. App. at 732, 541 S.E.2d at 510.
Defendant emphasizes that the trial court did not violate the rule in
Condellone that “[i]n the absence of a finding that the [supporting parent] is able to
perform a separation agreement, the trial court may nonetheless order specific
performance if it can find that the [supporting parent] ‘has deliberately depressed his
income or dissipated his resources.’ ” See Condellone, 129 N.C. App. at 682, 501
S.E.2d at 695-96 (quoting Cavenaugh v. Cavenaugh, 317 N.C. 652, 658, 347 S.E.2d
19, 23 (1986)). Defendant argues that the trial court did not need to find that plaintiff
had deliberately depressed his income or dissipated his resources, because it did not
order him to pay more than it found that he had the ability to pay. Although we agree
that the trial court did not violate this particular rule in Condellone for the reason
defendant gives, we note that nothing in Condellone or Cavenaugh vitiates the related
yet distinct rule that in determining child support, the trial court cannot impute
income absent a finding of bad faith, as held in McKyer, Pataky, and Bowers.
Compare Condellone, 129 N.C. App. at 682-83, 501 S.E.2d at 695-96, and Cavenaugh,
317 N.C. at 658, 347 S.E.2d at 23, with McKyer, 179 N.C. App. at 146, 632 S.E.2d at
836, Pataky, 160 N.C. App. at 306-07, 585 S.E.2d at 415-16, and Bowers, 141 N.C.
App. at 732, 541 S.E.2d at 510. In fact, our Supreme Court in Cavenaugh cited to
Quick v. Quick for the companion rule to the McKyer rule that in determining the
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proper amount of alimony, the trial court cannot impute income absent a finding of
bad faith. See Cavenaugh, 317 N.C. at 657, 347 S.E.2d at 23 (“Cf. Quick v. Quick, 305
N.C. 446, 290 S.E.2d 653 (1982) (if supporting spouse deliberately depresses income
or dissipates resources, then capacity to earn rather than actual income may be the
basis for an alimony award).”). In Quick, our Supreme Court stated this rule more
strongly:
[T]here are no findings to indicate whether the trial court
believed that defendant was deliberately depressing his
income or whether he was indulging in excessive spending
in disregard of his marital obligation to support his
dependent spouse. Absent those factors, our law requires
that the ability of defendant to pay alimony is ordinarily
determined by his income at the time the award is made.
Quick, 305 N.C. at 456-57, 290 S.E.2d at 660 (emphasis added). Therefore, because
the trial court based its child support award on plaintiff’s earning capacity, we vacate
that portion of the trial court’s order and remand the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.
We also note that on or about 21 July 2014, only three days after the close of
the 17 and 18 July 2014 hearing, Frontline extended an offer to plaintiff to work as a
salesman in Arizona, and plaintiff immediately accepted. The salary in Frontline’s
offer was one percent of all of plaintiff’s sales, with a yearly guaranteed draw of
$110,000.00. The trial court had taken the case under advisement at the close of the
hearing on 18 July 2014 and had not yet announced a ruling. On 23 July 2014,
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plaintiff moved to reopen the case to allow testimony regarding this new employment
and income, and although the trial court had still not entered an order, on 14 August
2014, the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion. On 28 August 2014, the trial court
entered the order which is on appeal, and on 3 September 2014, plaintiff moved for a
new trial, again seeking to present evidence of plaintiff’s actual income in his new
job; the trial court denied this motion as well. Although plaintiff did not appeal from
the orders on the post-trial motions and has not challenged them on appeal, we cannot
help but note that if the trial court had allowed the evidence of plaintiff’s actual
income in his new job to be presented and considered, most of the issues addressed
by this appeal would have been eliminated and there would have been no need for
remand on those issues. Plaintiff accepted the new job only days after the hearing
and even before the trial court had announced its rulings, and with newly available
income information, the order could have been based upon plaintiff’s actual income.
We would also imagine that plaintiff’s move to Arizona to begin the new employment
would affect his visitation schedule with the children and travel costs associated with
visitation, which are additional factors the trial court may need to consider when
addressing the child support issue.
Defendant argues that the fact that plaintiff got a new job with Frontline after
the trial renders plaintiff’s argument as to the trial court’s imputation of income moot.
See Ass’n for Home & Hospice Care of N.C., Inc. v. Div. of Med. Assistance, 214 N.C.
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App. 522, 525, 715 S.E.2d 285, 287-88 (2011) (“A case is ‘moot’ when a determination
is sought on a matter which, when rendered, cannot have any practical effect on the
existing controversy.”) (citation omitted). If plaintiff’s new job with Frontline paid
him an annual salary of $150,000.00, the amount imputed by the trial court, there
may have been no practical reason for plaintiff to raise this argument on appeal,
although it still may not really be legally moot. But we do not know exactly what
plaintiff’s new salary is since the amount is based on his sales, with a yearly
guaranteed minimum of $110,000.00; his actual income could be substantially more
depending upon sales, or it could be up to $40,000.00 annually less than the
$150,000.00 used by the trial court. In addition, there may be changes to visitation
and travel expenses for visitation associated with plaintiff’s move to Arizona.
Accordingly, this issue did not become moot because plaintiff accepted the job with
Frontline.
C. Evidence of Children’s Reasonable Needs
Plaintiff next argues that competent evidence does not support the trial court’s
findings as to the children’s reasonable needs. Although we are vacating the portion
of the trial court’s order awarding $2,900.00 per month in child support because the
trial court’s determination was based upon imputation of income to plaintiff, we
address this issue as it likely to arise on remand.
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In determining whether the child support amount in a separation agreement
is reasonable, the trial court “should determine the actual needs of the child at the
time of the hearing, as compared to the provisions of the separation agreement.”
Pataky, 160 N.C. App. at 305, 585 S.E.2d at 414. “In order to determine the
reasonable needs of the child, the trial court must hear evidence and make findings
of specific fact on the child’s actual past expenditures and present reasonable
expenses.” Atwell v. Atwell, 74 N.C. App. 231, 236, 328 S.E.2d 47, 50 (1985). In
Atwell, this Court vacated a child support award because the trial court had failed to
make a finding as to the actual past expenditures of the child and the evidence did
not support its finding as to the present reasonable expenses of the child:
The record is devoid of any finding relating to the actual
past expenditures of the minor child. Although there is a
finding ostensibly relating to the present reasonable
expenses of the child, i.e., that the wife’s needs for
“maintenance” of the child are “no less than $500.00 per
month,” this finding is not supported by the evidence. The
wife’s affidavit sets the child’s individual monthly needs at
$308.63. There is no other evidence regarding the child’s
individual financial needs. Perhaps the trial court was
estimating what portion of the fixed household expenses
was attributable to the child. However, as discussed, there
is no evidence apportioning the expenses, and factual
findings must be supported by evidence, and not based on
speculation.
Id. at. 236-37, 328 S.E.2d at 50-51. Similarly, in Loosvelt, this Court held that the
trial court erred when it partially based its determination of the children’s reasonable
needs upon the supporting parent’s “shared family expenses”:
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The trial court’s order seems to “divide the father’s
wealth” by basing child support upon a number calculated
by adding one-third of plaintiff’s “shared family expenses”
to the child’s historical individual expenses. The order also
finds that plaintiff resided in Los Angeles, California, but
fails to make any findings of fact as to how plaintiff’s
expenses incurred in California, which apparently do not
include any child-related expenditures, relate to the
expenses of raising a child, even the child of a wealthy
parent, in Charlotte, North Carolina.
Loosvelt v. Brown, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 760 S.E.2d 351, 362 (2014) (citation
omitted).
Like in Loosvelt, in Finding of Fact 28, as quoted above, the trial court
estimated the children’s reasonable needs “by comparing them to the reasonable
needs” of plaintiff and indicated in its table that it was basing its estimations of the
children’s expenses upon assumptions related to plaintiff’s expenses, not upon any
competent evidence as to the children. See id., 760 S.E.2d at 362. Plaintiff argues
that this “calculation of the present reasonable needs of the children based on
[p]laintiff’s expenses is speculation[,]” especially given the trial court’s finding that
the children live primarily with defendant, not plaintiff. We agree and direct the trial
court on remand to “hear evidence and make findings of specific fact on the
[children’s] actual past expenditures and present reasonable expenses.” See Atwell,
74 N.C. App. at 236, 328 S.E.2d at 50.
IV. Alimony
A. Standard of Review
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Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in ordering specific performance
of $1,385.00 monthly in alimony because it erred in imputing income to him as part
of its determination that it was feasible for him to pay this amount in alimony.
“[F]indings of fact by the trial court supported by competent evidence are binding on
the appellate courts even if the evidence would support a contrary finding.
Conclusions of law are, however, entirely reviewable on appeal.” Scott, 336 N.C. at
291, 442 S.E.2d at 497 (citation omitted). “The remedy [of specific performance] rests
in the sound discretion of the trial court[] and is conclusive on appeal absent a
showing of a palpable abuse of discretion.” Harborgate Prop. Owners Ass’n v.
Mountain Lake Shores Dev. Corp., 145 N.C. App. 290, 295, 551 S.E.2d 207, 210 (2001)
(citation omitted), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 301, 570 S.E.2d
505-07 (2002).
B. Analysis
Like in the context of child support, as discussed above, when establishing an
alimony obligation, the trial court may not impute income to the supporting spouse
unless it finds that “the supporting spouse is deliberately depressing his or her
income or indulging in excessive spending because of a disregard of the marital
obligation to provide support for the dependent spouse”:
Consideration must be given to the needs of the dependent
spouse, but the estates and earnings of both spouses must
be considered. It is a question of fairness and justice to all
parties. Unless the supporting spouse is deliberately
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depressing his or her income or indulging in excessive
spending because of a disregard of the marital obligation to
provide support for the dependent spouse, the ability of the
supporting spouse to pay is ordinarily determined by his or
her income at the time the award is made. If the supporting
spouse is deliberately depressing income or engaged in
excessive spending, then capacity to earn, instead of actual
income, may be the basis of the award.
....
[T]here are no findings to indicate whether the trial court
believed that defendant was deliberately depressing his
income or whether he was indulging in excessive spending
in disregard of his marital obligation to support his
dependent spouse. Absent those factors, our law requires
that the ability of defendant to pay alimony is ordinarily
determined by his income at the time the award is made.
Quick, 305 N.C. at 453-57, 290 S.E.2d at 658-60 (emphasis added and citation and
quotation marks omitted); see also Kowalick v. Kowalick, 129 N.C. App. 781, 787, 501
S.E.2d 671, 675 (1998) (“To base an alimony obligation on earning capacity rather
than actual income, the trial court must first find that the party has depressed her
income in bad faith.”). Additionally, as discussed above, “the equitable remedy of
specific performance may not be ordered unless such relief is feasible; therefore courts
may not order specific performance where it does not appear that defendant can
perform.” Condellone, 129 N.C. App. at 682, 501 S.E.2d at 695 (citation and quotation
marks omitted).
In Finding of Fact 30, as quoted above, the trial court imputed an annual
income of $150,000.00 to plaintiff and concluded that plaintiff had the ability to pay
$1,385.00 monthly in alimony in addition to his child support obligation. But the
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trial court found that plaintiff was not voluntarily suppressing his income. Absent a
finding that plaintiff was “deliberately depressing his income” or “indulging in
excessive spending in disregard of his marital obligation to support his dependent
spouse[,]” “our law requires that the ability of [plaintiff] to pay alimony is ordinarily
determined by his income at the time the award is made.” See Quick, 305 N.C. at
456-57, 290 S.E.2d at 660; Kowalick, 129 N.C. App. at 787, 501 S.E.2d at 675.
Although the parties in Quick and Kowalick had not executed a separation
agreement, those cases do not suggest that the court should treat the determination
of ability to pay for purposes of specific performance of a separation agreement any
differently. See Quick, 305 N.C. at 453-57, 290 S.E.2d at 658-60; Kowalick, 129 N.C.
App. at 787, 501 S.E.2d at 675. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in
imputing income to plaintiff in determining the proper amount of alimony and
therefore vacate that portion of the order.
V. Attorneys’ Fees
A. Standard of Review
“[Q]uestions of contract interpretation are reviewed as a matter of law and the
standard of review is de novo.” Price & Price Mech. of N.C., Inc. v. Miken Corp., 191
N.C. App. 177, 179, 661 S.E.2d 775, 777 (2008). “The remedy [of specific performance]
rests in the sound discretion of the trial court[] and is conclusive on appeal absent a
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showing of a palpable abuse of discretion.” Harborgate Prop. Owners, 145 N.C. App.
at 295, 551 S.E.2d at 210 (citation omitted).
B. Analysis
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in ordering specific performance of
$9,592.50 in attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff does not challenge the trial court’s conclusion
of law that defendant was entitled to attorneys’ fees under the Separation Agreement;
rather, plaintiff contends that the trial court erroneously imputed income to him in
determining that it was “feasible” for him to pay this amount. See Condellone, 129
N.C. App. at 682, 501 S.E.2d at 695 (citation omitted). Accordingly, we review this
issue for an abuse of discretion. See Harborgate Prop. Owners, 145 N.C. App. at 295,
551 S.E.2d at 210.
“[T]he public policy of this State encourages settlement agreements and
supports the inclusion of a provision for the recovery of attorney’s fees in settlement
agreements.” Bromhal v. Stott, 341 N.C. 702, 705, 462 S.E.2d 219, 221 (1995). We
revisit this Court’s discussion in Condellone of the prerequisites of ordering specific
performance of a separation agreement:
As a general proposition, the equitable remedy of
specific performance may not be ordered unless such relief
is feasible; therefore courts may not order specific
performance where it does not appear that defendant can
perform. In the absence of a finding that the defendant is
able to perform a separation agreement, the trial court may
nonetheless order specific performance if it can find that
the defendant has deliberately depressed his income or
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dissipated his resources.
In finding that the defendant is able to perform a
separation agreement, the trial court is not required to
make a specific finding of the defendant’s “present ability
to comply” as that phrase is used in the context of civil
contempt. In other words, the trial court is not required to
find that the defendant possesses some amount of cash, or
asset readily converted to cash[,] prior to ordering specific
performance.
Condellone, 129 N.C. App. at 682-83, 501 S.E.2d at 695-96 (citations, quotation
marks, and brackets omitted).
In the Separation Agreement, the parties agreed: “If either party breaches any
of the provisions of this Agreement, then the breaching party shall be required to pay
reasonable attorney fees for the party whose contractual rights hereunder were
violated by said breach.”
The trial court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law on
this issue:
31. Plaintiff has breached the Agreement. Defendant
has incurred reasonable attorney fees in response to that
breach. Pursuant to the Separation Agreement Defendant
is entitled to recover these fees. Five attorneys have
worked for the Defendant in this litigation. . . . In light of
the rates charged in the area and the complexity of the
work[,] the rates charged by the attorneys are reasonable.
Some of the time was devoted to the divorce of the parties
which was not necessitated by Plaintiff’s breach. The
following table contains the reasonable attorney fees
incurred by Defendant related to Plaintiff’s breach of the
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agreement.[3]
....
32. Plaintiff has retained significant assets in the form
of retirement savings which will make it difficult for
Defendant to collect a money judgment. He rents his
dwelling and leases his vehicle. While failing to comply
with the terms of the contract he has chosen to buy jewelry
for others, undertake the obligations of a new marriage and
take vacations. He has continued since the date of
separation to contribute to retirement savings plans in the
sum of $231.00 per month according to his June 2, 2014
affidavit while refusing to perform under the contract.
Excluding Defendant’s claims for attorney fees, she is
obtaining significant money judgments against the
plaintiff as a result of this Order, which may also inhibit
her ability to collect upon another judgment. In light of
Plaintiff’s maintenance of a large checking account
balance[,] he has the ability to comply with an Order for the
payment of Defendant’s attorney fees.
(Emphasis added.) Based on these findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial
court ordered the specific performance of $9,592.50 in attorneys’ fees.
Plaintiff argues that no evidence supported the trial court’s finding that he had
the ability to pay the attorneys’ fees amount since he was unemployed at the time of
the hearing and the trial court’s finding of fact as to his checking account balance
history only covered September 2013 to March 2014, or a few months before the July
2014 hearing. But the trial court made numerous detailed findings of fact regarding
3For the sake of brevity, we omit the trial court’s table and note that in it, the trial court made
many detailed findings of fact regarding defendant’s reasonable attorneys’ fees, which neither party
challenges on appeal, and calculated a total amount of $9,592.50.
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plaintiff’s financial situation and employment history and prospects, as quoted above,
in addition to its finding that plaintiff maintained a significant checking account
balance (ranging from $12,889.85 to $49,692.19). The award of attorneys’ fees did
not rely upon or require any imputation of income to plaintiff, as the trial court clearly
considered the plaintiff’s financial assets and checking account balances. Payment of
the attorneys’ fees is also a one-time expense, unlike the child support and alimony
payments which are ongoing prospective obligations. In addition, we note that the
trial court need not make a specific finding of a party’s present ability to comply, as
that phrase is used in the civil contempt context. See id. at 683, 501 S.E.2d at 696
(“In finding that the [supporting spouse] is able to perform a separation agreement,
the trial court is not required to make a specific finding of the [supporting spouse’s]
‘present ability to comply’ as that phrase is used in the context of civil contempt. In
other words, the trial court is not required to find that the [supporting spouse]
possesses some amount of cash, or asset readily converted to cash[,] prior to ordering
specific performance.”) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). But
despite the fact that the trial court was not required to find that plaintiff had assets
available to pay the attorneys’ fees as in a civil contempt order, the trial court
nonetheless did make findings that plaintiff had assets available to pay the attorneys’
fees. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering
the specific performance of attorneys’ fees.
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VI. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and vacate in part the trial court’s
order. We affirm the portions of the order in which the trial court awarded money
judgments for the child support and alimony arrearages and unpaid joint credit card
debt and ordered specific performance of defendant’s attorney’s fees. We vacate the
portions of the order in which the trial court ordered specific performance of $2,900.00
monthly in child support and $1,385.00 monthly in alimony. We therefore remand
the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and
direct that if either party requests to present additional evidence for the trial court’s
consideration on remand as may be needed to address the issues discussed in this
opinion, the trial court shall allow presentation of evidence, although the trial court
may in its discretion set reasonable limitations on the extent of new evidence
presented.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
Judges CALABRIA and INMAN concur.
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