McLaughlin v. Bailey ( 2019 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA18-665
Filed: 5 February 2019
Mecklenburg County, No. 12 CVS 1017
IVAN MCLAUGHLIN AND TIMOTHY STANLEY, Plaintiffs,
v.
DANIEL BAILEY, in his Official Capacity as Sheriff of Mecklenburg County, and
OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.
Appeal by plaintiff Timothy Stanley from order entered 16 February 2018 by
Judge Lisa C. Bell in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County. Heard in the Court of
Appeals 16 January 2019.
Kennedy, Kennedy, Kennedy and Kennedy, LLP, by Harvey L. Kennedy and
Harold L. Kennedy, III, for plaintiff-appellant.
Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP, by Sean F. Perrin, for defendants-appellees.
STROUD, Judge.
The background of this case can be found in this Court’s prior opinion of
McLaughlin v. Bailey, 240 N.C. App. 159, 771 S.E.2d 570 (2015), aff’d, 368 N.C. 618,
781 S.E.2d 23 (2016). The prior appeal was filed in this same case and addressed the
same claims and issues. See id. In 2008, plaintiff was a deputy sheriff working in
the Mecklenburg County Sheriff’s Department. Id. at 160, 771 S.E.2d at 573.
Defendant Daniel Bailey was elected as sheriff, and defendant then terminated
plaintiff’s employment. See id. at 160-61, 771 S.E.2d at 573. Plaintiff Timothy
Stanley filed this lawsuit alleging he had been terminated for unlawful reasons. See
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Opinion of the Court
id. at 161, 771 S.E.2d at 573. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, and
the trial court granted summary judgment for defendants, dismissing plaintiff
Stanley’s claims. Id. at 161-62, 771 S.E.2d 573. Plaintiff Stanley appealed, and this
Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. See id., 240 N.C. App. 159, 771 S.E.2d 570.
Plaintiffs then petitioned the North Carolina Supreme Court for discretionary
review, and the Supreme Court affirmed this Court’s opinion in January of 2016. See
McLaughlin v. Bailey, 368 N.C. 618, 781 S.E.2d 23.
In November of 2017, plaintiff Stanley filed a motion with the trial court under
Rule 60(b)(6) for relief from judgment, arguing he was entitled to resurrect his claim
based upon the United State Supreme Court’s opinion in Heffernan v. City of
Patterson, N.J., 136 S. Ct. 1412, 194 L. Ed 2d 508 (2016), which was decided after the
North Carolina Supreme Court had affirmed the dismissal of his claim. Plaintiff
alleged the Heffernan case “is now controlling.” On 16 February 2018, the trial court
entered an order denying plaintiff’s motion. Plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff Stanley contends that the summary judgment for defendants
dismissing his claim should be overturned based on Heffernan. Defendants contend
Heffernan is not applicable to plaintiff Stanley’s claims and his motion was untimely
filed. But we need not address the trial court’s substantive rationale for denial of the
Rule 60(b)(6) motion or the timing of the motion because the trial court did not have
the discretion to allow the Rule 60(b)(6) motion. See generally D & W, Inc. v.
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Opinion of the Court
Charlotte, 268 N.C. 720, 722-23, 152 S.E.2d 199, 202 (1966) (“In our judicial system
the Superior Court is a court subordinate to the Supreme Court. Upon appeal our
mandate is binding upon it and must be strictly followed without variation or
departure. No judgment other than that directed or permitted by the appellate court
may be entered.”).
This Court normally reviews a trial court’s order denying a motion under Rule
60(b)(6) for abuse of discretion:
General Statute 1A-1, Rule 60(b)(6) is equitable in
nature and authorizes the trial judge to exercise his
discretion in granting or withholding the relief sought. Our
Supreme Court has indicated that this Court cannot
substitute what it considers to be its own better judgment
for a discretionary ruling of a trial court, and that this
Court should not disturb a discretionary ruling unless it
probably amounted to a substantial miscarriage of justice.
Further, a judge is subject to reversal for abuse of
discretion only upon a showing by a litigant that the
challenged actions are manifestly unsupported by reason.
Huggins v. Hallmark Enterprises, Inc., 84 N.C. App. 15, 25, 351 S.E.2d 779, 785
(1987) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
But in this instance, the trial court had no discretion to allow plaintiff’s motion,
see generally D & W, Inc., 268 N.C. at 722-23, 152 S.E.2d at 202, even if it had
determined plaintiff’s argument that Heffernan somehow changed the law in a way
which would affect plaintiff’s claim, though ultimately that is not what the trial court
determined. The exact same legal issue, with no factual distinctions, argued by
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Opinion of the Court
plaintiff in the Rule 60(b)(6) motion was argued in the first appeal and the North
Carolina Supreme Court ruled on it; that ruling is the law of the case:
The questions raised in the present appeal must be viewed
in the light of the rule that a decision of this Court on
former appeal constitutes the law of the case in respect to
questions therein presented and decided, both in
subsequent proceedings in the trial court and on
subsequent appeal when the same matters are involved.
Collins v. Simms, 257 N.C. 1, 3, 125 S.E.2d 298, 300 (1962). While plaintiff Stanley
claims that the United States Supreme Court ruling in Heffernan changed the law
applicable to his claim, that contention is misplaced because his claim was already
over.1 Again,
[i]n our judicial system the Superior Court is a court
subordinate to the Supreme Court. Upon appeal our
mandate is binding upon it and must be strictly followed
without variation or departure. No judgment other than
that directed or permitted by the appellate court may be
entered. Otherwise, litigation would never be ended, and
the supreme tribunal of the state would be shorn of
authority over inferior tribunals.
D & W, Inc., 268 N.C. at 722-23, 152 S.E.2d at 202.
Since the trial court had no authority to rule upon plaintiff Stanley’s Rule 60
motion, we must determine whether the trial court’s order is simply erroneous, void,
or irregular:
1Plaintiff has not presented any argument as to whether Heffernan would have retroactive effect upon
his case, and we have not considered this issue. The trial court’s order appears to assume that
Heffernan could have retroactive effect but determined that Heffernan did not change the law
applicable to plaintiff’s claim.
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Opinion of the Court
The contention has some procedural significance, and leads
to the inquiry as to whether the judgment is erroneous,
irregular or void. The question is not without difficulty.
The decisions in this and other jurisdictions establish no
strict lines of demarcation, in this category of judgments,
for determining whether particular judgments are
erroneous, irregular or void. We have held judgments of
Superior court which were inconsistent and at variance
with, contrary to, and modified, corrected, altered or
reversed prior mandates of the Supreme Court in the
respective causes, especially where they amounted to
insubordination, to be unauthorized and void. But we have
held judgments, which indicated the judge misunderstood
and misinterpreted the opinion of this Court on former
appeal and gave it broader significance or narrower scope
than we intended, to be erroneous. Judgments of the lower
court have been held to be erroneous in a number of cases
where its rulings were inconsistent with prior appellate
decisions. The Supreme Court has, in at least two cases,
held judgments by the lower court to be irregular where
they undertook to modify prior opinions of Supreme Court.
Upon the plainest principle, the courts, whose
judgments and decrees are reviewed by an appellate court
of errors, must be bound by and observe the judgments,
decrees and orders of the latter court, within its
jurisdiction. Otherwise the courts of error would be
nugatory and a sheer mockery. There would be no judicial
subordination, no correction of errors of inferior judicial
tribunals, and every court would be a law unto itself. But
there is no rule of thumb for classifying non-conforming
judgments as to whether they are erroneous, irregular or
void. Of course general principles apply. But decisions
have undoubtedly taken into consideration the
circumstances of the particular case, and the necessity for
doing justice.
Collins, 257 N.C. at 7–8, 125 S.E.2d at 303–04 (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
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Opinion of the Court
Here, the trial court’s order conformed to the Supreme Court’s prior holding,
since the motion was denied, albeit for the wrong reason. But the trial court had no
authority to do otherwise and should have simply denied plaintiff’s motion based on
the law of the case since the issue raised by the Rule 60(b) motion was specifically
addressed previously and affirmed by the Supreme Court. See McLaughlin, 368 N.C.
618, 781 S.E.2d 23. However, the trial court had jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s Rule
60(b) motion so the order is not void. See generally Collins, 257 N.C. at 7–8, 125
S.E.2d at 303–04. In theory a proper Rule 60 motion could raise some issue not
addressed by the prior appeal and the trial court might have the discretion to grant
the motion, although that did not happen here. Furthermore, both in the trial court
and on appeal, defendants responded to the substance of plaintiff Stanley’s motion
without arguing it was barred by the law of the case from the prior appeal, so “[t]he
trial court was doubtless misled in the matter by the way in which it was presented.”
Cannon v. Cannon, 226 N.C. 634, 637, 39 S.E.2d 821, 823 (1946). Thus, taking “into
consideration the circumstances of the particular case, and the necessity for doing
justice[,]” we will characterize the trial court’s order analysis simply as erroneous
since the trial court “misunderstood and misinterpreted the opinion[s] of [this Court
and the Supreme Court] on former appeal and gave [them] … narrower scope than
we intended[.]” Collins, 257 N.C. at 8, 125 S.E.2d at 303–04. The trial court’s
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Opinion of the Court
rationale was in error only because it had no authority to consider the issue presented
— nor does this Court, so we will not address the substance of the motion. See
generally D & W, Inc., 268 N.C. at 722-23, 152 S.E.2d at 202.
We conclude the order is erroneous to the extent that it addresses the
substance of plaintiff’s motion. See generally Lea Co. v. N.C. Board of Transportation,
323 N.C. 697, 374 S.E.2d 866 (1989) (affirming the trial court’s denial of a Rule 60(b)
motion “to reopen a prior judgment for the purpose of making additional findings and
conclusions as to whether plaintiff should be awarded compound interest as an
element of just compensation for defendant’s taking of an interest in plaintiff’s
property by inverse condemnation” because “[t]he mandate of this Court in the second
appeal of this case affirmed a judgment of the trial court granting plaintiff simple
interest on its award at the rate of 11% per annum for the time between defendant’s
taking of plaintiff's property and entry of the judgment awarding compensation. As
the trial court noted, our mandate did not include a remand for consideration of an
award of compound interest; rather, it affirmed a judgment awarding simple interest,
which was all the plaintiff had sought.” The trial court “had no authority to modify
or change in any material respect the decree affirmed.” (citations and quotation
marks omitted)).2 But because the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion, which is the
2This case can be contrasted with McNeil v. Hicks, where the defendant Allstate Insurance Company
“moved for relief from the order of partial summary judgment pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1 Rule
60(b)(6) (1990), and for an order dismissing all claims against Allstate without prejudice. . . . in light
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Opinion of the Court
correct result, we affirm the order. See generally Hughey v. Cloninger, 297 N.C. 86,
95-96, 253 S.E.2d 898, 903-04 (1979) (affirming where a lower court, this Court,
“reached the right result but for the wrong reason”).
AFFIRMED.
Judges DIETZ and BERGER concur.
of the North Carolina Supreme Court’s recent holding in Andersen v. Baccus” because in that case the
motion was filed while the action was still pending before the Courts. See McNeil v. Hicks, 119 N.C.
App. 579, 459 S.E.2d 47 (1995).
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