Rutherford Electric Membership Corp. v. 130 of Chatham, LLC ( 2014 )


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  •                                 NO. COA14-134
    NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
    Filed: 2 September 2014
    RUTHERFORD ELECTRIC MEMBERSHIP
    CORPORATION,
    Petitioner,
    v.                                   Rutherford County
    No. 13 SP 95
    130 OF CHATHAM, LLC,
    Respondent.
    Appeal by petitioner from order entered 30 October 2013 by
    Judge Hugh B. Lewis in Rutherford County Superior Court.                Heard
    in the Court of Appeals 14 August 2014.
    Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein, LLP, by W. Edward Poe, Jr.,
    Thomas N. Griffin, III, and Benjamin Sullivan; and Law
    Offices of Elizabeth T. Miller, by Elizabeth T. Miller, for
    Petitioner-appellant.
    Roberts & Stevens, P.A., by Ann-Patton Hornthal and William
    Clarke; Sigmon, Clark, Mackie, Hanvey & Ferrell, PA, by
    Forrest Ferrell and Amber Reinhardt; and Kilpatrick,
    Townsend & Stockton, LLP, by Steven J. Levitas, for
    Respondent-appellee.
    HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.
    Petitioner     Rutherford    Electric     Membership      Corporation
    (“Rutherford Electric”) appeals from an order dismissing their
    petition to condemn easements for a power line across Respondent
    130   of   Chatham   LLC’s   (“Chatham”)    tract   of   land   (“Box   Creek
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    Wilderness”) that spans across Rutherford and McDowell Counties
    After careful review, we reverse the trial court’s order.
    I. Facts & Procedural History
    Rutherford      Electric      filed     a    special       proceeding    petition
    with the Rutherford County Superior Court on 24 January 2013 and
    filed an amended petition on 15 February 2013.                       Both petitions
    were filed pursuant to Chapter 40A of                       the General Statutes,
    which allow for a private company to petition for exercise of
    eminent   domain    “for    the    public    use       of   benefit.”       N.C.   Gen.
    Stat. §§ 40A-3(a), 40A-20 (2013).                Chatham answered the amended
    petition on 1 April 2013, which included a motion to dismiss
    under   N.C.   R.   Civ.    P.    12(b)(1)       for    lack    of   subject   matter
    jurisdiction, stating that “[a] portion of the property subject
    of the Amended Petition lies in McDowell County, and the Clerk
    of Court for Rutherford County has no jurisdiction over property
    in McDowell County.”         The petition concerned a single tract of
    land that lay in both Rutherford and McDowell counties.                             The
    petition’s     stated    purpose    was     to    condemn       easements    so    that
    Rutherford Electric may construct power lines and extend its
    service to additional customers.                Rutherford Electric also filed
    a separate petition to condemn easements for a second tract of
    land also owned by Chatham that is entirely in McDowell County
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    (“Copperleaf”).
    The   Rutherford    County    Clerk      of    Court     appointed     three
    citizens of Rutherford County as commissioners to appraise and
    determine the value of just compensation for the tract at issue
    pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 40A-25 (2013).                 A hearing date of
    28   May   2013   was   also   set       in   the    order     appointing     the
    commissioners.     The hearing took place on 28 May 2013 and the
    three   commissioners   returned     a     value    of   $71,686.00   for    the
    easement on the tract of land at issue via a written report on
    24 June 2013.     Both parties appealed for a de novo jury trial on
    the amount of just compensation.
    A trial on the merits was set for August 2013.                 Rutherford
    Electric also filed a separate petition for the Copperleaf tract
    in McDowell County on 5 June 2013 to condemn certain land under
    Chapter 40A of the General Statutes.               Chatham responded to the
    petition on 24 June 2013.      The parties consented to an order to
    consolidate the cases for trial which was filed on 20 September
    2013.   The order set a trial date of 30 September 2013.
    On 24 September 2013, Chatham filed a Motion to Dismiss the
    present matter for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.                     Judge
    Lewis heard arguments on the motion to dismiss on 30 September
    2013.   Judge Lewis then adjourned court and stated that he would
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    rule on Chatham’s motion to dismiss the next morning.
    Judge Lewis then granted Chatham’s motion to dismiss and
    explained the rationale for his decision.                 Rutherford Electric
    made a motion under Rule 59(e) for leave to amend its petition
    to include only the land in Rutherford County and to alter the
    petition it filed in McDowell County concerning the Copperleaf
    tract to include the McDowell County portions of the Box Creek
    Wilderness.      The trial court denied the motion and declined to
    hear the other case concerning the Copperleaf tract.                 The trial
    court filed written orders granting Chatham’s motion to dismiss
    and motion to amend on 30 October 2013. The trial court’s order
    did     not   indicate      whether     Rutherford     Electric’s   claim   was
    dismissed with or without prejudice.             Rutherford Electric filed
    timely written notice of appeal from the orders on 15 November
    2013.
    II. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review
    Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to N.C. Gen.
    Stat. § 7A-27(b) (2013) (stating a right of appeal lies with
    this Court from the final judgment of a superior court).
    “A      motion   to     dismiss     for   lack     of   subject   matter
    jurisdiction is reviewed de novo pursuant to Rule 12 of the
    North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.”                 Johnson v. Antioch
    -5-
    United Holy Church, Inc., 
    214 N.C. App. 507
    , 510, 
    714 S.E.2d 806
    , 809 (2011); see also Burgess v. Burgess, 
    205 N.C. App. 325
    ,
    327, 
    698 S.E.2d 666
    , 668 (2010).                 Further, when an argument
    presents an issue of statutory interpretation, full review is
    appropriate,     and   the    trial    court’s    conclusions     of    law   are
    reviewed de novo.      Romulus v. Romulus, 
    216 N.C. App. 28
    , 32, 
    715 S.E.2d 889
    , 892 (2011) (citations omitted).              “If the language of
    the statute is clear, this Court must implement the statute
    according to the plain meaning of its terms.”              Whitman v. Kiger,
    
    139 N.C. App. 44
    , 46, 
    533 S.E.2d 807
    , 808 (2000), aff’d per
    curiam,   
    353 N.C. 360
    ,    
    543 S.E.2d 476
      (2001)   (citation     and
    quotation marks omitted).
    “Under de novo review, we examine the case with new eyes.”
    Templeton Properties LP v. Town of Boone, ___ N.C. App. ___,
    ___, 
    759 S.E.2d 311
    , 317 (2014).                “[D]e novo means fresh or
    anew; for a second time, and an appeal de novo is an appeal in
    which the appellate court uses the trial court’s record but
    reviews the evidence and law without deference to the trial
    court’s rulings.”       Parker v. Glosson, 
    182 N.C. App. 229
    , 231,
    
    641 S.E.2d 735
    ,   737    (2007)    (quotation     marks    and    citations
    omitted).
    -6-
    The        second    issue       on   appeal        is   whether   the     trial   court
    improperly       denied    a        request       for    leave    to   amend     Rutherford
    Electric’s complaint under N.C. R. Civ. P. 59, and is reviewed
    under     an     abuse     of       discretion          standard.         House     Healers
    Restorations,       Inc.       v.    Ball,    112       N.C.    App.   783,     785–86,   
    437 S.E.2d 383
    , 385 (1993) (“Leave to amend should be granted when
    ‘justice so requires,’ or by written consent of the adverse
    party . . . . The granting or denial of a motion to amend is
    within the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose decision
    is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.” (internal
    citation omitted)).             “When discretionary rulings are made under
    a misapprehension of the law, this may constitute an abuse of
    discretion.”       Gailey v. Triangle Billiards & Blues Club, Inc.,
    
    179 N.C. App. 848
    , 851, 
    635 S.E.2d 482
    , 484 (2006); Bartlett
    Milling Co., L.P. v. Walnut Grove Auction and Realty Co., Inc.,
    
    192 N.C. App. 74
    , 89, 
    665 S.E.2d 478
    , 490 (2008) (holding that
    refusal    to    grant     a    motion       to    amend       “without   any    justifying
    reason and without a showing of prejudice to the defendant is
    considered an abuse of discretion.” (citation omitted)).
    III. Analysis
    Rutherford Electric asks this Court to reverse the trial
    court based on a reading of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 40A-20 and other
    -7-
    sections within Chapter 40A allowing for a condemnation action
    involving     property           in   multiple       counties.         Chatham        points
    primarily to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 40A-25 within Chapter 40A, which
    allows an answer to the petition for condemnation and allows the
    county     clerk     to     appoint        three     commissioners       to     value    the
    property who “shall be [residents] of the county wherein the
    property     being        condemned        lies . . . .”         
    Id. These three
    commissioners      are      required        to     take   an   oath    to     “fairly    and
    impartially appraise the property in the petition.”                             N.C. Gen.
    Stat. § 40A-26 (2013).
    While        there      is    apparent         conflict    between        statutes    in
    Chapter    40A     on     whether      a    multi-county       private        condemnation
    action may be filed, we reverse the trial court because the
    trial court very clearly did have subject matter jurisdiction
    over at least the portions of the Box Creek Wilderness that were
    in Rutherford County and did not grant Rutherford Electric’s
    motion to amend its pleading.                    See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 40A-20,
    40A-21, 40A-25, 40A-28, 40A-67 (2013).                     This Court leaves to the
    General    Assembly        whether     or     not    Chapter     40A   contemplates        a
    multi-county private condemnation action via the procedure that
    Rutherford Electric attempted here and would urge the General
    Assembly to clarify the procedure to avoid future issues of this
    -8-
    type.1
    A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
    The trial court’s proper action in this matter, rather than
    dismissing   the     entire     claim    under   Chapter        40A   for    want   of
    subject   matter    jurisdiction        would    be   to   encourage        or   allow
    Rutherford Electric to amend its claim under Rule 15 or Rule 59
    of the Rules of Civil Procedure or to dismiss only the portion
    of the claim for which it thought jurisdiction was lacking.
    While    courts   shall    “not   take    jurisdiction”         when    it    is    not
    granted, likewise courts “must take jurisdiction” when there is
    an express grant.        Cohens v. State of Virginia, 
    6 Wheat. 264
    , 
    19 U.S. 264
    , 404 (1821); Union Pac. R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive
    Engineers & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, Cent. Region, 
    558 U.S. 67
    , 71 (2009) (“[W]hen jurisdiction is conferred, a court
    may not decline to exercise it.”).
    Section 40A-20 provides a procedure for a private condemnor
    to file a petition for condemnation with the county clerk of
    court    where    “the   real   estate    described        in   the    petition     is
    1
    An example where the General Assembly has provided clear
    procedural instructions for a multi-county tract is in the
    payment of excise taxes charged on parcels that span multiple
    counties. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-228.30(a) (2013). Another
    example where the General Assembly provided jurisdiction to a
    clerk of court for a single parcel spanning multiple counties is
    also found in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28A-17-1 (2013).
    -9-
    situated.”     N.C. Gen. Stat. § 40A-20.                  The procedure outlined in
    Chapter 40A is a special proceeding, a variation of a routine
    civil   action,      where    the    county       clerk    of   court    is    given    the
    authority to appoint three commissioners who value the property
    after taking evidence.              N.C. Gen. Stat. § 40A-26.                  After the
    commissioners        complete       their     inquiry,          they    ascertain       the
    compensation the condemnor must make to the property owners and
    report their award to the county clerk of court.                          
    Id. Service of
    orders, notices, and any other papers are the same as those
    made in other special proceedings found in the General Statutes.
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 40A-24 (2013).
    A party may appeal the clerk’s order to the superior court
    under   N.C.    Gen.       Stat.    § 40A-29      (2013).         De    novo    appellate
    jurisdiction is then granted to the superior court from the
    clerk’s order and such jurisdiction provides for a jury trial to
    resolve questions of fact such as the value of the property.
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 40A-29; see also High v. Pearce, 
    220 N.C. 266
    ,
    271, 
    17 S.E.2d 108
    , 112 (1941) (“Since 1868 the clerk of the
    court   has    had    no    power    except       that    which    is    given    him   by
    statute.       Where        judicial    power       or     jurisdiction         has    been
    conferred upon him, his court is one of limited jurisdiction,
    both as to subject matter and the territory in which it may be
    -10-
    exercised.” (citation omitted)).
    There     is    no   violation      of    due    process    when       a       plaintiff
    follows     the      statutory    procedure       allowed       for     in       a    special
    proceeding nor is there want of subject matter jurisdiction for
    either the clerk of court or the trial court.                           See N.C. Gen.
    Stat. § 40A-20.            In tandem,      Sections 40A-20 and 40A-29 very
    clearly provide the clerk of court and the trial court with
    jurisdiction over at least the Rutherford County portion of the
    Box Creek Wilderness property.
    B. Motion to Amend
    Rutherford Electric sought to amend its petition under Rule
    59 after the trial court granted Chatham’s motion to dismiss.
    In so doing,         Rutherford Electric          stated that they moved for
    amendment because “the interest of our members also requires a
    speedy adjudication by this Court . . . .”                        We hold that this
    satisfied N.C. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(9), which allows for amending
    judgments when a reason was previously recognized as a ground
    for   a   new     trial.       These   reasons        include    when    “the         ends   of
    justice will be met.”             Sizemore v. Raxter, 
    58 N.C. App. 236
    ,
    236, 
    293 S.E.2d 294
    , 294 (1982).                  The motion to amend is also
    considered        with     a    general        understanding          that       “[l]iberal
    amendment       of   pleadings    is   encouraged        by     the    Rules         of   Civil
    Procedure in order that decisions be had on the merits and not
    -11-
    avoided   on    the   basis   of   mere    technicalities.”      Phillips     v.
    Phillips, 
    46 N.C. App. 558
    , 561, 
    265 S.E.2d 441
    , 443 (1980)
    (citation      omitted).      Further,     “[t]he   philosophy   of   Rule   15
    should apply not only to pleadings but also to motions where
    there is no material prejudice to the opposing party.”                  Taylor
    v.   Triangle    Porsche-Audi,     Inc.,    27   N.C.   App.   711,   714,   
    220 S.E.2d 806
    , 809 (1975), cert. denied, 
    289 N.C. 619
    , 
    223 S.E.2d 396
    (1976).
    In response to Rutherford Electric’s motion, Judge Lewis
    stated at the hearing:
    The issue is in all three matters [sic] the
    fact that you are dealing in the arenas of
    due process and by consequence subject
    matter jurisdiction.
    The request is basically to preempt due
    process that is outlined in Chapter 40A,
    which through all of the eleven pages of
    text that I was reading is premised on the
    North Carolina Constitution relating to
    property-like rights, and that is to be
    strictly adhered to.
    There is not an ability to agree, consent,
    to circumvent that process.    You need to
    follow the statutes in the timeline as
    designated in the statutes period on all
    properties.   The one property that you’re
    asking for me to take a look at outside of
    Rutherford County has not even had any
    hearings or proceedings or orders signed by
    the Clerk in the other county.
    The timeline of how things occur and move to
    -12-
    Superior   Court  are   designated  in  the
    statutes. They need to be followed in order
    to protect the citizens, the owners of that
    property, period.
    As to the amendment issue, that is also
    denied because you need to make sure that
    all the T’s are crossed and all the I’s are
    dotted in all proceedings, because the issue
    of   subject  matter  jurisdiction   can  be
    brought up at all times, it can not be
    waived. For this to be clean and brought to
    a final end for both tables so that it
    doesn’t come back because there haven’t been
    some – because someone raises subject matter
    jurisdiction at a later time, even though
    they do not voice it now, is imperative.
    That’s what justice requires.   That is what
    necessary is.
    I’m denying both of the condemnor’s request
    [sic] at this point in time. The one order
    will stand.    An additional order denying
    those requests will also need to be drafted
    by your table as well.
    Thereafter, the trial court filed an order which stated that
    Rutherford Electric made an oral motion pursuant to N.C. R. Civ.
    P. 59(e) seeking leave to amend under N.C. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
    The trial court stated that the “oral motion was made subsequent
    to the Court having found that [Rutherford Electric] had no
    authority    to    condemn        the   property    as     described   in   this
    condemnation      action    and    entering    a   final   dismissal   of   this
    action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the North Carolina Rules of
    Civil Procedure.”          The trial court then concluded its order by
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    stating “[a]fter hearing arguments of counsel, the Court in its
    discretion DENIES the Petitioner’s oral motion.”
    The    foregoing    constitutes     an   abuse     of     discretion.       The
    trial court had jurisdiction to hear at least a portion of the
    case.       Three private citizens from Rutherford County were chosen
    to provide a valuation of certain property in Rutherford County.
    While there was also property in McDowell County which may or
    may not have been properly included in the action, Rutherford
    Electric sought leave to amend to correct their misunderstanding
    of    the    statute.      Rather   than     grant       leave    to   amend   their
    pleading, the trial court instead denied their motion.                      In doing
    so,   the     trial   court    misapprehended      its    ability      to   hear   the
    present matter, and also provided no rationale for denying the
    motion under N.C. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
    “A trial court abuses its discretion only where no reason
    for the ruling is apparent from the record.”                        JPMorgan Chase
    Bank,   Nat’l     Ass’n   v.   Browning,     ___   N.C.    App.     ___,    ___,   
    750 S.E.2d 555
    , 561 (2013) (citation omitted).                     “A motion to amend
    may be denied for ‘(a) undue delay, (b) bad faith, (c) undue
    prejudice, (d) futility of amendment, and (e) repeated failure
    to    cure    defects     by   previous    amendments.’”            Strickland      v.
    Lawrence, 
    176 N.C. App. 656
    , 666–67, 
    627 S.E.2d 301
    , 308 (2006)
    -14-
    (quoting Carter v. Rockingham Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 
    158 N.C. App. 687
    , 690, 
    582 S.E.2d 69
    , 72 (2003)).
    Here,      the      trial    court   did     not     address     any    of     these
    categories and simply denied the motion after misapprehending
    the     law.       This     constitutes      an    abuse     of      discretion,      and
    accordingly, the trial court is reversed.                         We remand to the
    trial    court     with    instructions      to    allow    Rutherford       Electric’s
    motion to amend its action to remove the McDowell County portion
    of    the      petition     from    its    Box    Creek     Wilderness       claim    and
    thereafter       proceed     with    the   trial    on     the    Rutherford       County
    portions of the Box Creek Wilderness tract in Rutherford County
    Superior Court.
    IV. Conclusion
    For the reasons stated above, the decision of the trial
    court is
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    Judges STEELMAN and GEER concur.