State v. Massey ( 2014 )


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  • An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
    controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in
    accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of
    A   p   p    e   l   l   a    t   e       P   r    o   c   e   d    u   r   e   .
    NO. COA14-27
    NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
    Filed: 15 July 2014
    STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
    v.                                    New Hanover County
    No. 13 CRS 5736
    JESSE JOSEPH MASSEY
    Appeal by defendant from order entered 13 August 2013 by
    Judge W. Allen Cobb, Jr., in New Hanover County Superior Court.
    Heard in the Court of Appeals 30 June 2014.
    Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special                Deputy    Attorney
    General Joseph Finarelli, for the State.
    James W. Carter for defendant-appellant.
    BRYANT, Judge.
    Where     the   arguments   presented    on   appeal   have     previously
    been rejected by prior panels of our appellate Courts, we reject
    defendant’s arguments in the instant case.
    On   13    June    2000,    defendant    pled    guilty    to    indecent
    liberties with a child in Pitt County (00 CRS 4855) and was
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    sentenced to 12 to 15 months imprisonment.           The State dismissed
    a statutory rape charge in exchange for defendant’s plea.               On 4
    June 2003, defendant pled guilty to second-degree sexual offense
    in Stanly County (02 CRS 50379) and was sentenced to a term of
    120 to 153 months.        In that case, the State agreed to dismiss
    charges of first-degree sexual offense and indecent liberties.
    On 23 May 2013, defendant received notice of a Satellite-
    Based Monitoring (“SBM”) enrollment hearing.           Defendant filed a
    motion to dismiss the SBM action on 30 July.          At a hearing on 13
    August   2013,   the    trial   court   denied   defendant’s      motion   to
    dismiss and ordered him to enroll in lifetime SBM.                 Defendant
    appeals.
    __________________________________
    Defendant presents four arguments on appeal:                 (I) his SBM
    enrollment violates the state and federal constitutional ex post
    facto clauses because the SBM law was enacted after he pled
    guilty; (II) his SBM enrollment violates his due process rights
    because SBM enrollment was not an enumerated condition of his
    plea agreement; (III) his SBM enrollment violates constitutional
    double jeopardy protections        because it constitutes additional
    punishment   for   his     offenses;    and   (IV)   his   SBM    enrollment
    violates his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment
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    because wearing the monitoring equipment will subject him to
    public scorn.     However, as defendant acknowledges in his brief,
    our appellate courts have           rejected       each of his arguments in
    prior cases, and we are bound by that precedent.                       In re Civil
    Penalty, 
    324 N.C. 373
    , 384, 
    379 S.E.2d 30
    , 36 (1989).
    First,      our   Supreme     Court    overruled       defendant’s      ex      post
    facto argument in State v. Bowditch, 
    364 N.C. 342
    , 
    700 S.E.2d 1
    (2010), because SBM constitutes “a civil, regulatory scheme to
    protect   citizens    of    our   state    from     the    threat   posed      by   the
    recidivist     tendencies    of   convicted        sex    offenders”     and     not   a
    criminal punishment.        Id. at 352, 
    700 S.E.2d at 12
    .                 Defendant
    asks this Court to reconsider Bowditch in light of the United
    States Supreme Court’s subsequent holding in United States v.
    Jones, ___ U.S. ___, 
    132 S. Ct. 945
     (2012), but we are without
    authority to overrule that case.               See Nunn v. Allen, 
    154 N.C. App. 523
    , 530, 
    574 S.E.2d 35
    , 40 (2002) (“This Court has no
    authority to overrule decisions of the North Carolina Supreme
    Court.” (citation omitted)).
    Next, as defendant concedes, we have previously rejected
    his argument that failure to advise a defendant he would be
    subject   to    SBM   registration        as   a    consequence     of    his       plea
    agreement, which was entered into prior to the enactment of the
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    SBM statute, violated the defendant’s due process rights.                               State
    v.   Bare,    
    197 N.C. App. 461
    ,     479—80,     
    677 S.E.2d 518
    ,    531—32
    (2009) (holding that where, as here, the trial court scheduled a
    hearing as to SBM, “the imposition of SBM was not an automatic
    result of [defendant’s] no contest plea”).
    Third, defendant argues that SBM registration violated the
    constitutional           prohibition           against      double      jeopardy,        but
    acknowledges        that       this    argument       lacks    merit      based    on    the
    reasoning adopted in Bowditch.                   See State v. Anderson, 
    198 N.C. App. 201
    ,    204—05,         
    679 S.E.2d 165
    ,     167   (2009)     (holding      that
    because SBM is a civil regulatory scheme, it does not violate
    the double jeopardy clause).
    Finally, defendant argues that SBM enrollment subjects him
    to cruel and unusual punishment, but again acknowledges that our
    courts have already rejected this contention.                              See State v.
    Jarvis,     ___     N.C.    App.      ___,    ___,    
    715 S.E.2d 252
    ,    262    (2011)
    (holding      that       SBM    does     not     constitute       cruel     and    unusual
    punishment because it is a civil regulatory scheme).
    In    sum,        because      all      of     defendant’s      arguments        have
    previously        been     rejected      by     our    appellate       courts,     we    are
    compelled to reject those arguments in this case.                           Accordingly,
    the trial court’s order is affirmed.
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    Affirmed.
    Judges STROUD and HUNTER, Robert N., Jr., concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).