State v. Griffin ( 2014 )

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA13-1213
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 5 August 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Mecklenburg County
No. 12 CRS 200756
ROBERT DELIMION GRIFFIN
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 19 September 2012
by Judge Eric L. Levinson in Mecklenburg County Superior Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 April 2014.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Staci T. Meyer, Special
Deputy Attorney General, for the State.
Irving Joyner for defendant-appellant.
DAVIS, Judge.
Defendant Robert Delimion Griffin (“Defendant”) appeals
from his conviction of felonious possession of stolen property.
On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to dismiss the charge against him based on the
insufficiency of the evidence. After careful review, we
conclude that Defendant received a fair trial free from error.
Factual Background
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The State presented evidence at trial tending to establish
the following facts: On 5 January 2012, Mariana Rojas (“Ms.
Rojas”) left her apartment for work between 9:00 a.m. and 9:15
a.m. She closed and locked all of her doors before she left.
Later that morning at approximately 11:00 a.m., Officer
Christopher Lyon (“Officer Lyon”) of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Police Department was patrolling the East Boulevard/Remount Road
area of Charlotte and running registration checks on traveling
motorists. While at this location, a Lincoln Town Car driven by
Defendant passed Officer Lyon. Officer Lyon ran a registration
check on the Lincoln and determined that it had an inspection
violation. He then began to pursue the vehicle in order to
perform a traffic stop. However, Officer Lyon had difficulty
catching up to the vehicle, which was traveling in excess of 60
miles per hour in a 45 miles per hour zone, causing him to lose
sight of Defendant’s vehicle.
When Officer Lyon finally caught up to the Lincoln, the
vehicle had turned into the driveway of a residence located at
2712 Kenihill Road. At 11:37 a.m., he performed a traffic stop
by turning on his blue lights and pulling behind Defendant’s
vehicle, which was stopped in the residence’s driveway.
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Officer Lyon could see inside the Lincoln from his vantage
point directly behind the vehicle. He observed that the vehicle
had two occupants and saw the passenger reach under his seat.
Because of this observation, he called for backup, and, as a
result, two other officers were dispatched to his location.
Before either officer arrived, Officer Lyon approached
Defendant — who was sitting in the driver’s seat — and asked for
his driver’s license and registration. In response to Officer
Lyon’s inquiry, Defendant stated that he was “bringing stuff
over to his dad's house [and] that he was coming from Southside
Homes.” Officer Lyon then asked if there were any guns in the
vehicle. Defendant responded “no” but added that Officer Lyon
could “look at my TV and my DVD player. I am going to put them
in my room.”
Once the other officers arrived, Officer Lyon explained to
one of them that he had stopped the vehicle for an inspection
violation and that the car had been speeding. Officer Lyon also
told the other officer that he had observed the passenger of the
vehicle place something under the passenger seat. Officer Lyon
proceeded to write Defendant a ticket for the inspection
violation and asked Defendant to step out of the vehicle so that
he could explain the citation. After doing so, Officer Lyon
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asked if he could search the vehicle as well as conduct a search
of both Defendant and Defendant’s passenger. Both Defendant and
the passenger gave their consent to the searches.
When Defendant’s passenger stepped out of the vehicle, a
“silver check card or credit card [with] . . . the name of
Marina [sic] Rojas” fell down from the passenger seat. Officer
Lyon then searched the vehicle and “found a silver Mac laptop
under the passenger's seat and a flat screen TV in the back seat
as well as a Blue Ray type of DVD player.” He also found two
more credit cards with Ms. Rojas’s name printed on them.
Officer Lyon asked Defendant who the credit cards belonged
to and Defendant responded that “it was his girlfriend's . . .
[and] her name was Marina.” Officer Lyon then returned to his
patrol car and ran the name as it appeared on the card on his
onboard computer. The computer search revealed that in 2008,
Ms. Rojas had reported a car break-in in which her purse, credit
card, and several other items had been stolen.
Officer Lyon then returned to Defendant’s vehicle and asked
Defendant once again the name of his girlfriend. Defendant
responded that her name was “Marina.” Officer Lyon stated that
he wanted to call Ms. Rojas to confirm that Defendant was in
lawful possession of the credit card. Defendant responded that
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Ms. Rojas’s number was stored on his cell phone but that “the
phone was dead.” Officer Lyon retrieved the phone from
Defendant and found that it had simply been manually “turned
off.” Defendant then got out a second cell phone and directed
Officer Lyon to a contact listed as “wifey,” which he stated was
how Ms. Rojas was listed in the phone. Officer Lyon dialed that
telephone number, which resulted in no answer.
Officer Lyon returned to his patrol car, retrieved Ms.
Rojas’s phone number from the 2008 incident report, and dialed
that number. When she answered, he explained why he was calling
and described the items that he had found during the traffic
stop. Ms. Rojas — who was at work — confirmed that the items
belonged to her, including the laptop. She identified the
laptop by providing Officer Lyon with a password, which
successfully started the computer. Ms. Rojas also told Officer
Lyon that she had never dated Defendant and did not know him.
She also told Officer Lyon that she had never given anyone
permission to enter her apartment or take the property that had
been found in Defendant’s vehicle. After speaking with Officer
Lyon, she left work and returned home. Officer Lyon then placed
Defendant under arrest.
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When Ms. Rojas arrived at her home, she was met by two
officers. She noticed that her kitchen door — which she had
shut and locked before leaving that morning — was open. One
officer stayed with Ms. Rojas while the other officer searched
the home. She then entered the residence and identified the
items recovered from Defendant’s vehicle during the traffic stop
as the missing items from her home.
Defendant was charged with larceny after breaking and
entering and felonious possession of stolen goods, and a trial
was held on 17 September 2012 in Mecklenburg County Superior
Court. At the close of all the evidence, Defendant moved to
dismiss the two charges based on the insufficiency of the
evidence. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion.
The jury found Defendant guilty of both charged offenses,
and the trial court arrested judgment on the larceny conviction.
Defendant was sentenced to an active term of imprisonment of 8
to 19 months. Defendant gave notice of appeal in open court.
Analysis
Defendant's only argument on appeal is that the trial court
erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of felonious
possession of stolen property based on the insufficiency of the
evidence. Whether the evidence is sufficient to withstand a
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motion to dismiss is a question of law that is reviewed de novo
on appeal. State v. Bagley, 183 N.C. App. 514, 523, 644 S.E.2d
615, 621 (2007). A defendant's motion to dismiss should be
denied if there is substantial evidence of (1) each essential
element of the offense charged; and (2) defendant being the
perpetrator of the offense. State v. Scott, 356 N.C. 591, 595,
573 S.E.2d 866, 868 (2002). “Substantial evidence is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.” State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78–79,
265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980).
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court is
required to view all the evidence — whether direct,
circumstantial, or both — in the light most favorable to the
State, making all reasonable inferences from the evidence in
favor of the State. State v. Kemmerlin, 356 N.C. 446, 473, 573
S.E.2d 870, 889 (2002). Contradictions and discrepancies are for
the jury to resolve and do not warrant dismissal. State v.
Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 99, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980).
“The essential elements of felonious possession of stolen
property are: (1) possession of personal property, (2) which was
stolen pursuant to a breaking or entering, (3) the possessor
knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe the property to
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have been stolen pursuant to a breaking or entering, and (4) the
possessor acting with a dishonest purpose.” State v. McQueen,
165 N.C. App. 454, 459, 598 S.E.2d 672, 676 (2004) (internal
citation omitted), disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 285, 610 S.E.2d
385 (2005).
First, Defendant contends the State did not present
substantial evidence that he was in “either possession or
constructive possession of stolen property.” We disagree.
“[P]ossession of stolen goods . . . may be either actual or
constructive. Constructive possession exists when the
defendant, while not having actual possession of the goods, . .
. has the intent and capability to maintain control and dominion
over the[m].” State v. Szucs, 207 N.C. App. 694, 698, 701
S.E.2d 362, 365 (2010) (citation, quotation marks, and brackets
omitted). However, mere presence at an area where contraband is
located does not, in and of itself, establish constructive
possession unless there is a “close juxtaposition to the
contraband as to raise a reasonable inference of control.”
State v. Privette, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 721 S.E.2d 299, 309
(citation and quotation marks omitted), disc. review denied, ___
N.C. ___, 724 S.E.2d 532 (2012).
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Defendant contends that he “did not have exclusive control
of [the] property and the fact that he was the driver of the car
in which the property was discovered, without more, was
insufficient to establish the possession element.” Defendant’s
argument lacks merit.
The stolen goods — the laptop, television, and DVD player —
were all found in the backseat and under the front passenger
seat of Defendant’s car when he was stopped by Officer Lyon.
Our Supreme Court has held that “one who has the requisite power
to control access to and use of a vehicle . . . has also the
possession of the known contents thereof.” State v. Eppley, 282
N.C. 249, 254, 192 S.E.2d 441, 445 (1972). Moreover, Defendant
conceded he was aware that the goods were in the backseat of his
vehicle. He told Officer Lyon that he was moving “my stuff”
into his father’s house, referred to the stolen property as “my
T.V. and my DVD player,” and stated that he was going to put
them in his room. Therefore, Defendant’s control of the vehicle
and acknowledgment of the goods’ presence inside the vehicle are
sufficient to raise a reasonable inference that Defendant was in
possession of the stolen property.
Second, Defendant contends the State failed to present
substantial evidence that Defendant “knew or should have known
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that the possession or presence of this property, which was in
his car, resulted from a breaking or entering of an apartment. .
. .” We disagree.
“The doctrine of recent possession is a rule of law
creating the presumption that a person in possession of recently
stolen property is guilty of its wrongful taking and of the
unlawful entry associated with that taking.” McQueen, 165 N.C.
App. at 459, 598 S.E.2d at 676. We have held that the doctrine
of recent possession is applicable to the crime of felonious
possession of stolen property. Id. at 459–60, 598 S.E.2d at676–77. “When the doctrine of recent possession applies in a
particular case, it suffices to repel a motion for nonsuit and
defendant's guilt or innocence becomes a jury question.” State
v. Milligan, 192 N.C. App. 677, 682, 666 S.E.2d 183, 187 (2008)
(citation and quotation marks omitted).
In order for the doctrine of recent possession to apply,
the State must show “(1) the property was stolen, (2) defendant
had possession of the property, subject to his control and
disposition to the exclusion of others, and (3) the possession
was sufficiently recent after the property was stolen, as mere
possession of stolen property is insufficient to raise a
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presumption of guilt.” McQueen, 165 N.C. App. at 460, 598
S.E.2d at 676-77.
Here, as discussed above, the State presented substantial
evidence from which the jury could find that Defendant possessed
stolen property and that he had sole control of it.
Furthermore, the State also presented evidence that Ms. Rojas
left her home for work at 9:00 a.m. on the morning of
Defendant’s arrest and locked all of her doors. Then,
approximately two hours later, Defendant was found in possession
of items stolen from her residence. Upon being contacted by
Officer Lyons, Ms. Rojas then returned home to find her front
door wide open, and she identified the items that were found in
possession of Defendant as items missing from her home.
We believe the doctrine of recent possession applies and
serves to establish that Defendant knew or had reasonable
grounds to believe the items at issue were stolen pursuant to a
breaking or entering. Therefore, the trial court did not err in
denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we conclude that Defendant
received a fair trial free from error.
NO ERROR.
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Judges ELMORE and McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).