State v. Edwards ( 2014 )

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA14-49
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 1 July 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,
Plaintiff,
v. Wake County
No. 11 CRS 211595
WILLIAM DAMIEON EDWARDS,
Defendant.
Appeal by William Damieon Edwards from judgment entered 21
May 2013 by Judge Michael J. O’Foghludgha in Wake County
Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 May 2014.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Solicitor General
Gary R. Govert, for the State.
PARISH & COOKE, by James R. Parish, for defendant.
ELMORE, Judge.
This case arises out of the shooting death of Jay Waheed
Ammeri (Mr. Ammeri) on 19 May 2011 at the New York Style Pizza
restaurant in Raleigh. William Damieon Edwards (defendant) was
charged with first degree murder and possession of a firearm by
a felon in connection with this shooting death and was tried
before a jury. The jury found defendant guilty of first degree
murder. Defendant pled guilty to the firearm offense, and the
-2-
trial court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment without
parole plus 14-17 months on the firearms charge, to be served at
the expiration of the life sentence. After thorough review, we
find that defendant received a fair trial, free from error.
I. Background
The facts of this case are largely undisputed. Evidence at
trial tended to show, in relevant part, that at approximately
8:03 p.m. on 19 May 2011 defendant shot and killed Mr. Ammeri.
Defendant’s wife, Teresa Edwards (Mrs. Edwards), testified to
having had a year-long extramarital affair with Mr. Ammeri, who
was also married. In the summer of 2010, defendant learned of
his wife’s affair. Waheeda Ammeri (Mrs. Ammeri), Mr. Ammeri’s
wife, testified that sometime between July and September of
2010, defendant and his friend, William Nelson (Mr. Nelson),
confronted her at the Ammeri residence. Defendant asked Mrs.
Ammeri, “[d]o you know if your husband is cheating on you?” Mr.
Nelson testified that defendant “proce[ed] to tell [Mrs. Ammeri]
that his wife and her husband was having an affair.” The then
seven-months pregnant Mrs. Ammeri responded that Mr. Ammeri was
“absolutely not” having an affair because “[h]e’s not that type
of person.” That same afternoon, Mr. Nelson drove defendant to
Mr. Ammeri’s car lot because defendant wanted Mr. Nelson to
-3-
“beat [Mr. Ammeri’s] tail.” Mr. Nelson testified that he did not
physically assault Mr. Ammeri at that time, but he told Mr.
Ammeri to “leave [Mrs. Edwards] alone, to go on about his
business, she [is]n’t worth it, you know, to just let her go.”
Mrs. Edwards testified that she ended the affair with Mr.
Ammeri after she learned defendant confronted Mrs. Ammeri at the
Ammeri residence. Prior to that incident, Mrs. Edwards alleged
that she was unaware that Mr. Ammeri was married. Although
defendant learned of his wife’s affair in the summer of 2010, it
was not until January 2011 that Mrs. Edwards herself admitted to
defendant that she had had sex with Mr. Ammeri. In response,
defendant, who was intoxicated, choked his wife, pushed her
down, and broke the humerus bone in her arm. Mrs. Edwards was
prescribed hydrocodone pills for pain associated with the broken
arm. Mrs. Edwards forgave defendant and testified that their
marriage was “great” in the following months.
On 19 May 2011, defendant took two of Mrs. Edward’s
hydrocodone pills before going to the VA hospital for a follow-
up doctor’s appointment. During his appointment, defendant was
diagnosed with sarcoidosis, a condition that causes chronic
inflammation of certain organs. Mr. Nelson testified that he
spoke with defendant at 5:10 p.m. that afternoon and defendant
-4-
was not intoxicated. Defendant’s bank records indicate that at
5:14 p.m. he purchased Colt 45 beer, an alcoholic beverage
containing twelve percent alcohol. At 7:32 p.m., Mr. Nelson
testified that he received a second call from defendant, who now
sounded highly intoxicated and was “babbling.” During that
call, defendant told Mr. Nelson that he was “going to go in
there and take care of it.” At 7:53 p.m., the men spoke again
for nine minutes. Defendant then entered the back door of the
pizza shop with a pistol in hand and, after conversing briefly
with Mr. Ammeri, shot him in the heart. At 8:06 p.m., defendant
called Mr. Nelson, said “it’s done,” and hung up.
Defense witness, forensic psychiatrist Dr. George Patrick
Corvin, testified that defendant’s cognitive functioning and
impulse control were greatly impaired when he committed the
murder due to defendant’s consumption of alcohol and
hydrocodone, the problems in his marriage, and the stress over
his recent diagnosis.
Dr. Corvin opined that defendant was operating in a state of
alcoholic “blackout” when he shot Mr. Ammeri. A “blackout” can
occur when one’s blood alcohol level rises fast enough that the
temporal lobe circuitry becomes dysfunctional. Forensic
psychiatrist Dr. Mark Hazelrigg interviewed defendant after the
-5-
shooting and testified for the State. In Dr. Hazelrigg’s
opinion, defendant had the cognitive capacity to form a specific
intent to kill Mr. Ammeri because defendant 1) willingly
purchased and consumed Colt 45, 2) drove to Mr. Ammeri’s place
of business, 3) called Mr. Nelson and stated that he’s “going to
take care of it,” and 4) informed Mr. Nelson “it’s done.”
During closing arguments, defense counsel argued that defendant
committed an “impulsive killing” and therefore requested that
the jury find defendant guilty of second degree murder.
However, the jury returned a guilty verdict for first degree
murder, which defendant now appeals.
II. Analysis
Defendant argues the trial court erred by denying his
request to give his proposed jury instructions on first degree
murder. We disagree.
Defendant preserved this argument for appellate review when
he objected to the trial court’s decision to deny his request
for the supplemental instructions and instead used the pattern
jury instructions. See N.C.P.I.—Crim. 206.13. On appeal of the
trial court’s refusal to use proposed jury instructions,
[t]he party asserting error bears the burden
of showing that the jury was misled or that
the verdict was affected by [the]
instruction . . . . [I]t is not enough for
-6-
the appealing party to show that error
occurred in the jury instructions; rather,
it must be demonstrated that such error was
likely, in light of the entire charge, to
mislead the jury.
State v. Blizzard, 169 N.C. App. 285, 297, 610 S.E.2d 245, 253
(2005) (citation and quotation omitted). If a defendant
requests instructions that are “correct in law and supported by
the evidence, the court must give the instruction in substance,”
not verbatim. State v. Ball, 324 N.C. 233, 238, 377 S.E.2d 70,
73 (1989). “‘[W]hether the trial court instructs using the exact
language requested by counsel is a matter within its discretion
and will not be overturned absent a showing of abuse of
discretion.’” State v. Lewis, 346 N.C. 141, 145, 484 S.E.2d
379, 381 (1997) (quoting State v. Herring, 322 N.C. 733, 742,
370 S.E.2d 363, 369 (1988)).
Defendant requested that the trial court supplement
portions of the pattern jury instructions to instruct the jury
on factors that could show a lack of intent, premeditation, and
deliberation, including the mental condition of the defendant,
as follows:
Premeditation involves the idea of prior
consideration. State v. Exum, 138 N.C. 599(1905).
. . .
-7-
[D]efendant acted with deliberation, which
means that he weighed the consequences of
his actions and acted while in a cool state
of mind or with a fixed purpose, and not as
a result of a sudden impulse without the
exercise of reasoning powers. See State v.
Hunt, 330 N.C. 425, 429 (1991).
Deliberation indicates reflection, a
weighing of consequences of the act in more
or less calmness. State v. Exum, 138 N.C.
599 (1905). Deliberation refers to a
steadfast resolve and deep-rooted purpose,
or a design formed after carefully
considering the consequences. State v.
Thomas, 118 N.C. 1113 (1896).
. . .
Likewise, the absence of either
premeditation or deliberation may be
inferred from circumstances, such as the
mental or emotional condition of the
defendant at the time of the killing. The
true test is not the duration of time as
much as it is the extent of the reflection.
State v. Buchanan, 287 N.C. 408,215 S.E.2d
80 (1975)). [sic]
. . .
[T]he intent to kill must arise from a fixed
determination previously formed after
weighing the matter. (State v. Myers, 309
N.C. 78, 305 S.E.2d 506, 509 (1983)). The
true test of deliberation, is the extent of
the reflection upon the matter as opposed to
the duration of the time of the reflection.
State v. Buchanan, 287 N.C. 408, 418, 215
S.E.2d 80 (1975)). [sic] In common terms,
to premeditate a killing the killer must ask
himself, “Shall I kill him?”. [sic] The
intent to kill aspect is found if the killer
answers, “Yes, I shall.” The deliberation
-8-
part of the crime requires a thought like,
“Wait, what about the consequences?[] Well,
I’ll do it anyway.”
The trial court declined to give defendant’s jury
instructions and instead instructed the jury utilizing the North
Carolina pattern jury instructions. As to the element of
intent, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
Third, that the defendant intended to kill
the victim. Intent is a mental attitude
seldom provable by direct evidence. It must
ordinarily be proved by circumstances from
which it may be inferred. Intent to kill
may be inferred from the nature of the
assault, the manner in which it was made,
the conduct of the parties, and other
relevant circumstances.
Defendant proposed adding: “Likewise, the absence of intent to
kill may also be inferred from relevant circumstances, such as
the mental condition of the defendant at the time of the
assault.”
As to the elements of premeditation and deliberation, the
trial court instructed:
Fourth, that the defendant acted with
premeditation, that is, that the defendant
formed the intent to kill the victim over
some period of time, however short, before
the defendant acted.
And fifth, that the defendant acted with
deliberation, which means that the defendant
-9-
acted while the defendant was in a cool
state of mind. This does not mean that
there had to be a total absence of passion
or emotion. If the intent to kill was
formed with a fixed purpose, not under the
influence of some suddenly aroused, violent
passion, it is immaterial that the defendant
was in a state of passion or excited when
the intent was carried into effect.
Initially, we note that defendant does not contend that the
instructions provided by the trial court were incorrect.
Instead, he suggests that the pattern instructions were
inadequate because they failed to communicate that “defendant’s
abilities to specifically intend to kill, premeditate, and
deliberate were significantly impaired.” Also, defendant’s
brief fails to cite any case demonstrating that the trial
court’s instructions, without defendant’s requested additions,
were in error. Further, defendant does not allege in his brief
that any error by the trial court misled the jury. Blizzard,
supra.
After reviewing defendant’s instructions, it is evident
that he sought to emphasize that the absence of intent,
premeditation and deliberation may be inferred from the
circumstances, likely to advance the theory that he was guilty
of only second degree murder due to his mental state and
-10-
intoxication. Our Courts have held that the portions of
defendant’s requested instructions constituted restatements of
the same directives as included in the pattern instructions and
are therefore unnecessary. See, e.g., State v. Wallace, 351
N.C. 481, 525, 528 S.E.2d 326, 353, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1018,
121 S. Ct. 581, 148 L. Ed. 2d 498 (2000) (finding no error in
the trial court’s rejection of very similar instructions
proposed by the defendant because the “[d]efendant’s proposed
instructions merely articulate[d] variations on the
definition.”) A review of the pattern instructions shows they
provide an accurate definition of intent, premeditation, and
deliberation. “Defendant’s proposed instructions merely
articulate variations on [these] definition[s].” Id.In addition, defendant failed to recognize that the trial
court also instructed the jury on diminished mental capacity,
stating: “if you find that the defendant was intoxicated or was
drugged or lacked mental capacity, you should consider whether
this condition affected the defendant’s ability to formulate the
specific intent which is required for conviction of first-degree
murder.” Accordingly, the jury was adequately instructed that
defendant’s mental state and level of intoxication were
relevant. We find no merit in defendant’s argument that it was
-11-
error for the trial court to instruct using the pattern jury
instructions because the instructions “did not address the
defense evidence” that “defendant’s abilities to specifically
intend to kill, premeditate, and deliberate were significantly
impaired.” Because the trial court’s instructions substantively
stated that which defendant requested, we overrule defendant’s
argument.
No error.
Judges McGEE and HUNTER, Robert C., concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).