In re Spencer ( 2014 )


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  • An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
    controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
    with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    NO. COA14-142
    NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
    Filed:     2 September 2014
    IN THE MATTER OF:
    JAMES SPENCER                                   Wake County
    No. 13 SPC 05
    Appeal by respondent from order entered 27 June 2013 by
    Judge Jacqueline Brewer in Wake County District Court.                         Heard in
    the Court of Appeals 11 August 2014.
    Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
    Josephine Tetteh, for the State.
    Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein LLP, by Matthew W. Wolfe and
    Robert A. Leandro, for petitioner Holly Hill Hospital.
    Appellate   Defender  Staples   S.   Hughes,  by                        Assistant
    Appellate Defender Mary Cook, for respondent.
    McCULLOUGH, Judge.
    Respondent      James    Spencer      appeals    from      a    trial    court’s
    order, involuntarily committing him to an inpatient facility for
    a period not to exceed sixty (60) days.                     Based on the reasons
    stated     herein,    we   reverse     the   order     of   the   trial     court    and
    remand     this    case    to    the    trial     court     for       the   making   of
    appropriate findings of fact.
    -2-
    I.     Background
    On 19 June 2013, Arlene Midgett filed an affidavit and
    petition for involuntary commitment in Tyrrell County District
    Court.     The affidavit and petition for involuntary commitment
    stated that respondent James Edward Spencer was “mentally ill
    and dangerous to self or others or mentally ill and in need of
    treatment     in     order     to      prevent        further     disability           or
    deterioration that would predictably result in dangerousness.”
    The affidavit also provided that the Sheriff’s Department had
    received    numerous      calls        from    respondent’s           family      about
    respondent’s   erratic       behavior.         Respondent       had    walked     to   a
    cemetery    where   his   mother       and    brother    are    buried      and   told
    deputies that “he was going to sleep on the graves tonight.”
    When   deputies     attempted     to    return    respondent          to   his    home,
    respondent replied that “they had just as well call Hitler from
    the dead and draw guns and go ahead and kill him now.”
    A hearing was held at the 27 June 2013 session of Wake
    County District Court.          Dr. Muhammed Saeed examined respondent
    at Holly Hill Hospital on 24                 and 25    June 2013.          Dr. Saeed
    determined that respondent was mentally ill and suffered from
    chronic schizophrenia with an acute exacerbation.                          Dr. Saeed
    testified that respondent was “very paranoid” and had “grandiose
    -3-
    delusions.”        According to Dr. Saeed, respondent threatened the
    staff of Holly Hill Hospital as they were attempting to give
    respondent his medication.          Consistent with reports contained in
    respondent’s       medical    records,     respondent   threatened       that   he
    would stab the staff with a pen.                Dr. Saeed recommended that
    respondent be committed to inpatient care for a period of sixty
    (60) days.
    Respondent’s sister, Auray Midgett, testified that she had
    a healthcare power of attorney to act on behalf of respondent.
    In   May   2013,    respondent     was   committed    for   six   (6)    days   at
    Washington     County        Hospital     in   Plymouth,    North       Carolina.
    Respondent    was     released     to    outpatient   treatment,     but    began
    calling various state prisons, offices in Washington, D.C. and
    President Barack Obama.            Respondent seemed agitated, and based
    on   his    behavior,        Ms.   Midgett     petitioned   for     involuntary
    commitment on 19 June 2013.
    Angela Spencer, respondent’s daughter, testified that one
    evening prior to his commitment in June 2013, respondent was at
    her home.     Respondent was agitated and paranoid, and Ms. Spencer
    saw him pushing a fingernail file through her cable box.                        She
    called the police and respondent voluntarily left her home.
    -4-
    Respondent      also   testified      at     his   hearing.      He   did    not
    believe he needed to be treated at Holly Hill Hospital, but
    rather, preferred to be treated by a psychiatrist he had seen in
    the past.
    The trial court entered an order on 27 June 2013, finding
    “by clear, cogent and convincing evidence” that “the respondent
    contests commitment.         Stipulate to mental illness, a danger to
    self, and others, and in need of treatment.”                      The trial court
    concluded    that   respondent      was   mentally     ill    and   dangerous     to
    himself and others.          Based on the foregoing,               respondent was
    involuntarily committed to an inpatient facility for a period
    not to exceed sixty (60) days.
    From this order, respondent filed notice of appeal on 25
    July 2013.
    II.    Discussion
    Respondent’s      sole    argument      on   appeal      is   that   the   trial
    court erred by involuntarily committing him when the 27 June
    2013 order was not supported by sufficient written findings of
    fact.   The State and petitioner Holly Hill Hospital agree with
    respondent that the findings made in the involuntary commitment
    order were insufficient and urge our Court to reverse the trial
    -5-
    court’s order and remand this case to the trial court for the
    making of appropriate findings of fact.
    We first note that
    even   though    the   term   for   respondent’s
    involuntary commitment has passed, a prior
    discharge     will    not    render    questions
    challenging     the    involuntary    commitment
    proceeding moot.     When the challenged order
    may form the basis for future commitment or
    may     cause     other     collateral     legal
    consequences for the respondent, an appeal
    of that order is not moot.
    In re Allison, 
    216 N.C. App. 297
    , 299, 
    715 S.E.2d 912
    , 914
    (2011) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
    On appeal of a commitment order our
    function is to determine whether there was
    any   competent   evidence   to  support   the
    “facts” recorded in the commitment order and
    whether the trial court’s ultimate findings
    of mental illness and dangerous to self or
    others   were   supported    by  the   “facts”
    recorded in the order.     We do not consider
    whether the evidence of respondent’s mental
    illness and dangerousness was clear, cogent
    and convincing. It is for the trier of fact
    to determine whether the competent evidence
    offered in a particular case met the burden
    of proof.
    In re Collins, 
    49 N.C. App. 243
    , 246, 
    271 S.E.2d 72
    , 74 (1980)
    (citations omitted).
    Section 122C-268(j) of the North Carolina General Statutes
    provides that
    [t]o support an inpatient commitment order,
    -6-
    the court shall find by clear, cogent, and
    convincing evidence that the respondent is
    mentally ill and dangerous to self, as
    defined in G.S. 122C-3(11)a., or dangerous
    to others, as defined in G.S. 122C-3(11)b.
    The court shall record the facts that
    support its findings.
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-268(j) (2013).
    In the case sub judice, the trial court checked the box on
    the printed form that reads “[b]ased on the evidence presented,
    the Court by clear, cogent and convincing evidence finds these
    other facts: the respondent contests commitment.                         Stipulate to
    mental illness, a danger to self, and others, and in need of
    treatment.”      The trial court did not make additional findings of
    fact or record any facts to supporting these findings.
    It is well established that we may not determine whether
    the evidence was sufficient because the trial court failed to
    make any findings of fact based on the evidence presented at the
    27 June 2013 hearing for us to review.                    See In re Booker, 193
    N.C.    App.    433,    437,     
    667 S.E.2d 302
    ,   304-305    (2008).      Thus,
    because the trial court’s order is insufficient to support the
    trial    court’s       determination     that    respondent      was   dangerous    to
    himself and to others, we reverse the trial court’s order and
    remand    this     case     to    the    trial    court    for     the     making   of
    appropriate findings of fact.              See In re Allison, 216 N.C. App.
    -7-
    at   
    300, 715 S.E.2d at 915
       (reversing       and    remanding   for
    appropriate findings when the trial court failed to make written
    findings    of    fact   or   failed     to   incorporate        by   reference   a
    physician’s report in the respondent’s involuntary commitment
    order).
    III. Conclusion
    Because       the    involuntary         commitment     order       contained
    insufficient findings of fact to support its determination that
    respondent was mentally ill and dangerous to himself and others,
    we reverse the order of the trial court and remand this case to
    the trial court for the making of appropriate findings.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Judges STEELMAN and ERVIN concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-142

Filed Date: 9/2/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014