Laws v. Laws ( 2014 )

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA14-55
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 19 August 2014
PATRICIA LAWS,
Plaintiff
v. Alamance County
No. 03 CVD 2839
ROBERT K. LAWS,
Defendant
Appeal by defendant from order entered 26 June 2013 by
Judge Kathryn Whitaker Overby in Alamance County District Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 May 2014.
No brief filed for plaintiff-appellee.
Fairman Law PLLC, by Kelly S. Fairman, for defendant-
appellant.
CALABRIA, Judge.
Robert K. Laws (“defendant”) appeals from the trial court’s
order modifying child support for his minor child Nathaniel.1
The court ordered that Nathaniel’s mother, Patricia Laws
(“plaintiff”), would be entitled to claim him as a dependent for
state and federal tax purposes. We affirm.
1
“Nathaniel” is a pseudonym used to protect the identity of the
minor child.
-2-
Plaintiff and defendant were married on 17 May 1991 and
separated on 17 December 2003. During their marriage, they had
two children, Taylor, who was born in 1992, and Nathaniel, who
was born in 1997. The first order governing child support
between the parties was entered on 4 April 2004.
On 27 April 2009, the trial court entered an order (“the 27
April 2009 order”) which, inter alia, modified child support to
permit defendant to claim Nathaniel as a dependent for federal
and state tax purposes “for the year 2010 until modified by this
court.” This modification was based upon a finding by the trial
court that plaintiff had no taxable income.
On 27 October 2009, the trial court entered a modification
order which reduced defendant’s child support obligation. The
court found that the modification was appropriate because Taylor
had begun living with defendant. The trial court’s order also
noted that “all other provisions of the previous order remain in
full force and effect.”
On 6 October 2010, the trial court entered a modification
order which increased defendant’s child support obligation. The
court found that the modification was appropriate because Taylor
had reached the age of majority and plaintiff recently obtained
sole physical custody of Nathaniel, who lived with plaintiff.
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Once again, the trial court’s order noted that “all other
provisions of the previous order remain in full force and
effect.”
On 16 May 2013, plaintiff filed a motion to modify child
support. Specifically, plaintiff sought to have the trial court
modify the portion of its 27 April 2009 order that permitted
defendant to claim Nathaniel as a dependent for federal and
state tax purposes. In support of her motion to modify,
plaintiff made three claims: (1) that although defendant paid
child support, “it is many times late and seldom the correct
amount;” (2) that Nathaniel, “being a teenager has requirements
that far exceed the stipulated child support amount;” and (3)
that Nathaniel resides with her full time.
On 26 June 2013, the trial court entered an order granting
plaintiff’s motion to modify. The court found that “[a]s of the
date of this hearing, the oldest child is twenty-one years old,
and cannot be claimed as a dependent for the plaintiff’s state
and/or federal tax purposes.” The court also found that “[t]he
youngest child continues to live with the Plaintiff.” Based on
these findings, the court concluded that there was a substantial
change in circumstances pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.7justifying the modification of child support and returned to
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plaintiff the right to claim the child as a dependent for tax
purposes. Defendant appeals.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by granting
plaintiff’s motion to modify when the court’s findings did not
support its conclusion that there had been a substantial change
of circumstances since the entry of the last child support
order. We disagree.
A child support order “may be modified or vacated at any
time, upon motion in the cause and a showing of changed
circumstances by either party . . . .” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-
13.7(a) (2013). “‘[M]odification of a child support order
involves a two-step process. The court must first determine a
substantial change of circumstances has taken place; only then
does it proceed to . . . calculate the applicable amount of
support.’” Trevillian v. Trevillian, 164 N.C. App. 223, 224-25,
595 S.E.2d 206, 207 (2004) (quoting McGee v. McGee, 118 N.C.
App. 19, 26-27, 453 S.E.2d 531, 535-36 (1995)). “The moving
party has the burden of showing changed circumstances.” Thomas
v. Thomas, 134 N.C. App. 591, 592, 518 S.E.2d 513, 514 (1999)
(citation omitted).
“Child support orders entered by a trial court are accorded
substantial deference by appellate courts and our review is
-5-
limited to a determination of whether there was a clear abuse of
discretion.” Leary v. Leary, 152 N.C. App. 438, 441, 567 S.E.2d
834, 837 (2002). “The modification [of a child support] order
must be supported by findings of fact, based upon competent
evidence, that there has been a substantial change of
circumstances affecting the welfare of the child.” Ebron v.
Ebron, 40 N.C. App. 270, 271, 252 S.E.2d 235, 236 (1979). The
trial court’s “determination of whether changed circumstances
exist is a conclusion of law.” Brooker v. Brooker, 133 N.C. App.
285, 289, 515 S.E.2d 234, 237 (1999).
In the instant case, the trial court’s modification order
included the following relevant findings of fact:
7. The last child support order was signed
by Judge G. Wayne Abernathy on April 27,
2009. The Court allowed the Defendant to
claim the youngest child as a dependent for
both state and federal tax purposes for the
year 2010 and until modified by this Court.
8. In 2009, both children lived with the
Plaintiff.
9. As of the date of this hearing, the
oldest child is twenty-one years old, and
cannot be claimed as a dependent for the
plaintiff’s state and/or federal tax
purposes.
10. The youngest child continues to live
with the Plaintiff.
-6-
Based upon these findings, the court concluded that “[t]here are
facts justifying this Court to modify Judge G. Wayne Abernathy’s
April 27, 2009 order based upon a substantial change in
circumstances pursuant to the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. §
50-13.7.”
The trial court’s finding, that the 27 April 2009 order was
the last child support order in the case, is not supported by
the record. Subsequent child support modification orders were
entered on 27 October 2009 and 6 October 2010. Both of those
orders specifically indicated that “all other provisions of the
previous order remain in full force and effect.” Based upon
this record, the actual last child support order between
plaintiff and defendant was entered 6 October 2010.
It is well established that when “modifying a child
support order the trial court should consider only changes in
circumstances since entry of the most recent order.” Newman v.
Newman, 64 N.C. App. 125, 128, 306 S.E.2d 540, 542 (1983).
Thus, in the instant case, the trial court’s order will still be
upheld so long as its findings support the conclusion that a
substantial change in circumstances has occurred since 6 October
2010.
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The only finding included in the trial court’s order which
suggests a substantial change in circumstances is the finding
that Taylor could not be claimed as a dependent for income tax
purposes. On 6 October 2010, Taylor was eighteen years old. At
that time, plaintiff was still entitled to claim Taylor as a
dependent for purposes of federal and state taxes through the
2010 tax year. See 26 U.S.C. § 152(c)(3)(A)(i) (2013)(defining
as a dependent a qualifying child that “has not attained the age
of 19 as of the close of the calendar year in which the taxable
year of the taxpayer begins”); 17 N.C.A.C. 6C.0123 (2014)
(“State and Federal definitions of dependent . . . are the
same[.]”).
Thus, the trial court’s finding that Taylor was no longer
able to be claimed as a dependent for tax purposes reflected a
change that occurred after the entry of the previous child
support order on 6 October 2010. This finding adequately
supported the trial court’s conclusion that a substantial change
in circumstances had occurred, justifying a modification of the
previous child support order. Accordingly, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by granting plaintiff’s motion to amend
and returning to plaintiff the right to claim Nathaniel as a tax
dependent. The trial court’s order is affirmed.
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Affirmed.
Judges BRYANT and GEER concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).