State v. St. George ( 2014 )


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  • An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
    controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
    with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    NO. COA14-180
    NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
    Filed: 5 August 2014
    STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
    v.                                      Lenoir County
    Nos. 13 CRS 50039
    WARREN STEVEN ST. GEORGE                           13 CRS 700035
    Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 31 July 2013 by
    Judge Charles H. Henry in Lenoir County Superior Court.                         Heard
    in the Court of Appeals 21 July 2014.
    Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Associate Attorney General
    Gayle L. Kemp, for the State.
    Bryan Gates for defendant-appellant.
    HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.
    Defendant     appeals     from    judgments     entered     after    he    was
    convicted     for   driving    while    impaired,      driving    while    license
    revoked, and driving left of center.              Defendant argues the trial
    court erred in denying his motion to suppress.                     After careful
    review, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying
    defendant’s motion to suppress.
    -2-
    On    4   January     2013       at    approximately          9:55    p.m.,       Trooper
    Jackie Rogers stopped defendant for driving left of center on
    Tick Bite Road in Grifton.                   When the trooper asked defendant for
    his license, defendant stated that he did not have a license.
    The trooper        observed that defendant had red, glassy                              eyes, a
    strong      odor    of    alcohol       coming       from   his     person,      and     slurred
    speech.      The trooper formed the opinion “that the defendant had
    consumed     a     sufficient      quantity          of    an   impairing        substance    to
    appreciably         impair        his        mental       and      physical       faculties.”
    Defendant was arrested and charged with driving while impaired,
    driving      while       license    revoked,         and    driving       left     of    center.
    Defendant        pled    guilty    to     driving         while    impaired       in    district
    court, and the State dismissed the other two charges.                                  Defendant
    was sentenced to 18 months in prison.                           Defendant filed written
    notice of appeal to superior court on 8 April 2013.
    Prior to trial in superior court, defendant filed a motion
    to suppress evidence seized during the traffic stop.                                   The trial
    court conducted a hearing on the motion prior to trial on 30
    July 2013 and denied defendant’s motion.                             On 31 July 2013, a
    jury   found       defendant       guilty       of    driving       left    of     center    and
    driving while impaired.                 Defendant entered a no contest plea to
    driving      while       license    revoked.              The     trial    court       sentenced
    -3-
    defendant to 18 months for driving while impaired and to 120
    days    for    driving       while   license    revoked    and   driving      left    of
    center.       Defendant filed timely written notice of appeal on 6
    August 2013.
    Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his
    motion to suppress because the trooper did not have reasonable
    suspicion to stop his vehicle.             This Court’s review of an order
    denying a motion to suppress is “strictly limited to determining
    whether       the    trial    judge’s   underlying        findings    of     fact    are
    supported       by    competent      evidence,    in   which     event     they      are
    conclusively         binding    on    appeal,    and   whether       those     factual
    findings in turn support the judge’s ultimate conclusions of
    law.”     State v. Cooke, 
    306 N.C. 132
    , 134, 
    291 S.E.2d 618
    , 619
    (1982).        “The trial court’s conclusions of law, however, are
    fully reviewable on appeal.”               State v. Hughes, 
    353 N.C. 200
    ,
    208, 
    539 S.E.2d 625
    , 631 (2000).
    Under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer
    is    permitted    to    conduct   a    brief
    investigatory stop of a vehicle and detain
    its occupants without a warrant[.] However,
    in   order    to   conduct   a   warrantless,
    investigatory stop, an officer must have
    reasonable and articulable suspicion of
    criminal activity. The reasonable suspicion
    must arise from the officer’s knowledge
    prior to the time of the stop.
    -4-
    State v. Fields,       ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 
    723 S.E.2d 777
    , 779
    (2012) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
    Citing State v. Otto, 
    366 N.C. 134
    , 138, 
    726 S.E.2d 824
    ,
    828 (2012), defendant contends that “[i]n order for weaving to
    constitute reasonable suspicion for a vehicle stop, it must be
    ‘constant and continual.’”       Defendant also cites Fields, where
    this Court found reasonable suspicion based on weaving “like a
    ball bouncing in a small room” combined with other cars having
    to take evasive measures to avoid an accident.           Fields, ___ N.C.
    App. at ___, 
    723 S.E.2d at 779
    .          Defendant argues there was no
    evidence that other cars were affected in this case, there was
    no   indication   of   the   distance    his   car   travelled   while   the
    trooper followed, and there was no testimony of extreme weaving.
    We are not persuaded.
    In this case, the trial court made the following relevant
    findings of fact:
    1. Master trooper Jackie Rogers, a North
    Carolina highway patrolman of over thirteen
    years of experience, was on routine patrol
    in    northeastern    Lenoir     County  at
    approximately 9:55 p.m. on Friday, January
    4, 2013. Rogers was stopped at a stop sign
    at the intersection of Highland Avenue and
    Contentea Drive near Grifton when he first
    observed the defendant’s motor vehicle.
    2. Trooper Rogers observed a Lincoln back
    out from a driveway located west of his
    -5-
    location on Contentea Drive. This driveway
    was adjacent to a residence that had a
    reputation as being a “liquor house” from
    which one could buy alcohol.
    3. The Lincoln proceeded east on Contentea
    Drive away from Trooper Rogers’ location.
    Contentea Drive[,] at that location[,] is a
    two lane rural highway divided by a double
    yellow line that passes several residences.
    4. The Lincoln[,] as it was being driven
    east[,] drifted one to two feet across the
    center line into the westbound lane at an
    area west of a railroad crossing. After the
    motor vehicle returned to the east bound
    lane, it again crossed the center line as
    the motor vehicle entered a curve in the
    road to the left.    The vehicle crossed the
    center line a third time when it entered a
    long curve to the right.    At that location
    the motor vehicle straddled the center lines
    so that half of the vehicle was in the west
    bound lane.    Because the curve obstructed
    the view of the oncoming lane, the trooper
    decided to activate his blue lights and pull
    the Lincoln over.
    These   findings    are   unchallenged    by   defendant    and   “they    are
    deemed to be supported by competent evidence and are binding on
    appeal.”   State v. Roberson, 
    163 N.C. App. 129
    , 132, 
    592 S.E.2d 733
    , 735–36, disc. review denied, 
    358 N.C. 240
    , 
    594 S.E.2d 199
    (2004).    The evidence indicates that defendant crossed into the
    opposite   lane    of   travel   three   times,   and   that   his   car   was
    halfway in the opposite lane of travel in an area where a curve
    obstructed the view of oncoming traffic.                Similarly, in both
    -6-
    Otto and Fields, the defendants weaved within their own lane of
    travel and crossed the center line.    Otto, 366 N.C. at 135, 
    726 S.E.2d at 826
    ; Fields, ___, N.C. App. at ___, 
    723 S.E.2d at 779
    .
    Accordingly, we conclude the trooper had reasonable suspicion to
    stop defendant’s vehicle, and the trial court did not err in
    denying defendant’s motion to suppress.   Defendant’s argument is
    overruled.
    No error.
    Judges BRYANT and STROUD concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-180

Filed Date: 8/5/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014