State v. Taylor ( 2014 )

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA14-21
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 5 August 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Wake County
No. 11CRS214547
RODNEY NIGEE PLEDGER TAYLOR,
Defendant.
Appeal by defendant from Judgment entered on or about 23
January 2013 by Judge Carl R. Fox in Superior Court, Wake
County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 June 2014.
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper III, by Assistant Attorney
General Kathleen N. Bolton, for the State.
Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate
Defender Constance E. Widenhouse, for defendant-appellant.
STROUD, Judge.
Rodney Taylor (“defendant”) appeals from the judgment
entered after a Wake County jury found him guilty of first
degree murder. We find no error at defendant’s trial.
I. Background
Defendant was indicted for first degree murder on 12 June
2011. He pled not guilty and proceeded to jury trial. Before
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trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress statements he made
to police. He argued that he had been unconstitutionally seized
and that he was subjected to custodial interrogation without the
benefit of Miranda warnings. The trial court denied defendant’s
motion by order entered 17 January 2013.
At trial, the State’s evidence tended to show that on the
evening of 23 June 2011, defendant (also known as “Sponge Bob”),
Alex Walton (also known as “Biz” or “Mr. Business”), and Floyd
Creecy (also known as “Bruno” or “Big Bs”) got together to hang
out and smoke marijuana. All three men were involved in a local
gang named “Bounty Hunters,” which was affiliated with the
larger “Crips” gang.1 The three men went to a store on Poole
Road in east Raleigh to buy some cigars to make “blunts.” They
all rode together in the black Chrysler Pacifica owned by Mr.
Creecy’s wife.
After buying what they needed from the store, the three men
got back into Mr. Creecy’s car and drove back down Poole Road.
Mr. Creecy was driving, defendant was in the passenger seat, and
Mr. Walton was sitting in the back. As they were riding down
Poole Road, defendant said, “There’s Polo,” and told Mr. Creecy
1
Mr. Creecy denied being in a gang, but Mr. Walton testified
that Mr. Creecy was “mentor” to the two younger men in the
“Bounty Hunters.”
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to pull over. There were three individuals walking down the
sidewalk—Darius Johnson (also known as “Polo”), Damal O’Neil,
and Kyonatai Cleveland. Mr. Creecy pulled into a church parking
lot behind them. Defendant exited the car and approached the
three; Mr. Walton then got out and followed defendant.
As defendant and Mr. Walton approached, Mr. Johnson took
out what he had in his pockets, including his cell phone, and
gave it to Ms. Cleveland. He also took out a wine opener that he
had in his pocket, opened a small knife at the end of the
opener, then closed the knife and put the opener back in his
pocket. Defendant said to Mr. Johnson, “Why didn’t you get back
to us?” Mr. Johnson responded, “I don’t know.” Defendant then
said, “Well, I gave you more than enough time.” At that point,
defendant said to Mr. Walton, “Watch out, Biz,” pulled out a
black revolver and began shooting at Mr. Johnson.
During this encounter, Ms. Cleveland called 911. However,
she was unable to tell the operator what was happening because
when they saw the gun, Mr. Johnson and his two friends tried to
run. Mr. Johnson was hit by one bullet in his front left
abdomen. The forensic evidence suggested that the bullet was
fired from a close distance—perhaps less than two feet. After
shooting Mr. Johnson, defendant and Mr. Walton ran back to the
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black Pacifica, which Mr. Creecy had pulled around to the next
street. The gun was still in defendant’s hand when he got back
into Mr. Creecy’s car.
At trial, Mr. O’Neil, Ms. Cleveland, Mr. Walton, and Mr.
Creecy all testified to the events of that night. The three men
all positively identified defendant as the shooter. Mr. Walton
and Mr. Creecy testified that defendant and Mr. Johnson had an
argument approximately a week before the shooting. Mr. Johnson
had been asking defendant about joining the Bounty Hunters.
Defendant told Mr. Johnson to call him. When Mr. Johnson failed
to call him, defendant said that he was going to “bang,” i.e.
shoot, Mr. Johnson.
Defendant was asked to come to the police station to be
interviewed by detectives. He initially denied knowing anything
about the shooting, but later admitted that he was in the SUV.
He said that the shooter was someone named “Chuck.” He later
conceded that there was no one named Chuck but continued to deny
that he was the shooter. Defendant claimed that after the
shooting, he brought the gun back to his house. The detectives
went to defendant’s grandmother’s house, where he was living.
When they arrived, defendant’s grandmother informed them that
she had found a gun in her grandson’s room, under his bed. She
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explained that she did not want the gun in her house, so she
took it outside and hid it in her backyard. The police recovered
the gun—a black .38 caliber revolver. Four spent shell casings
were found in the revolver. Once the gun was recovered and the
interview was complete, defendant was placed under arrest. Upon
being transported to the jail, two deputies searched defendant’s
pockets and found two .38 caliber bullets.
The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder. The
trial court accordingly sentenced defendant to life in prison
without the possibility of parole. Defendant gave notice of
appeal in open court.
II. Motion to Suppress
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress statements he made to police. He
contends that the statements should have been suppressed because
they were fruits of an unconstitutional seizure and taken in
violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
The standard of review in evaluating the
denial of a motion to suppress is whether
competent evidence supports the trial
court’s findings of fact and whether the
findings of fact support the conclusions of
law. However, when . . . the trial court’s
findings of fact are not challenged on
appeal, they are deemed to be supported by
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competent evidence and are binding on
appeal. Conclusions of law are reviewed de
novo and are subject to full review. Under a
de novo review, the court considers the
matter anew and freely substitutes its own
judgment for that of the lower tribunal.
State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 167-68, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011)
(citations and quotation marks omitted).
First, we address defendant’s argument that he was
unconstitutionally seized. Defendant argues that the police
lacked any reasonable suspicion to stop him even though he was
driving a car known to be associated with a murder suspect, at
least once they realized that he was not the suspect they were
initially seeking. Defendant does not contest the findings of
fact relating to the initial stop and detention other than part
of Finding 11, so those findings are binding on appeal.
An investigatory stop must be justified by a
reasonable suspicion, based on objective
facts, that the individual is involved in
criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio and its
progeny have taught us that in order to
conduct a warrantless, investigatory stop,
an officer must have a reasonable and
articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
A court must consider the totality of the
circumstances—the whole picture—in
determining whether a reasonable suspicion
to make an investigatory stop exists. The
stop must be based on specific and
articulable facts, as well as the rational
inferences from those facts, as viewed
through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious
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officer, guided by his experience and
training. The only requirement is a minimal
level of objective justification, something
more than an unparticularized suspicion or
hunch. As a result, the ultimate issue
before the trial court in a case involving
the validity of an investigatory detention
is the extent to which the investigating
officer has a reasonable articulable
suspicion that the defendant might be
engaged in criminal activity.
State v. Mello, 200 N.C. App. 437, 443-44, 684 S.E.2d 483, 488
(2009) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
The suspicion here was not of ongoing criminal activity,
but of connection to a completed murder.
[P]olice are not automatically shorn of
authority to stop a suspect in the absence
of probable cause merely because the
criminal has completed his crime and escaped
from the scene. The precise limits on
investigatory stops to investigate past
criminal activity are more difficult to
define. The proper way to identify the
limits is to apply the same test already
used to identify the proper bounds of
intrusions that further investigations of
imminent or ongoing crimes. That test, which
is grounded in the standard of
reasonableness embodied in the Fourth
Amendment, balances the nature and quality
of the intrusion on personal security
against the importance of the governmental
interests alleged to justify the intrusion.
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228, 83 L.Ed. 2d 604,
611-12 (1985).
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“[I]f police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in
specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was
involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony,
then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspicion.”
Id. at 229, 83 L.Ed. 2d at 612. “It is well settled that
information given by one officer to another is reasonably
reliable information for the purpose of supporting a search or
seizure.” State v. Ellison, 213 N.C. App. 300, 307, 713 S.E.2d
228, 234 (2011), aff’d, 366 N.C. 439, 738 S.E.2d 161 (2013).
Moreover, “[i]t has long been the law that a brief stop of a
suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to
maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more
information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known
to the officer at the time.” State v. McDaniels, 103 N.C. App.
175, 181, 405 S.E.2d 358, 362 (1991) (citation, quotation marks,
and brackets omitted), aff’d per curiam, 331 N.C. 112, 413
S.E.2d 799 (1992).
Here, the trial court found, in relevant part, that:
1. On 24 June 2011, Detective Gory Mendez was
employed with the City of Raleigh as a
detective with the Raleigh Police
Department’s Technical Response Unit.
Detective Mendez has been a detective for
two years, although he has been employed
as a police officer for over eleven years.
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He also worked as a police officer for the
City of Winston-Salem for over two years.
2. On 24 June 2011, Detective Mendez was
attempting to locate a homicide suspect
named Alexander Walton. A vehicle Mr.
Walton was known to operate, a green Dodge
Stratus, was found in North Raleigh in the
parking lot of some apartments . . . .
3. Detective Mendez was assigned to maintain
visual surveillance on the green Dodge
Stratus automobile . . . .
4. Alexander Walton is a light-skinned black
male who is approximately five feet ten
inches tall, weighing 135 pounds and wore
his hair in dreadlocks.
5. Detective Mendez conducted surveillance on
the green Dodge Stratus for an hour or
two.
6. While conducting surveillance on Mr.
Walton, Detective Mendez noticed a suspect
wearing something on or over his hair left
the apartment nearby and went straight to
the Stratus. He entered the vehicle and
sat in the driver’s seat.
7. At that time, Detective Mendez moved his
police car directly behind the green Dodge
Stratus, exited his vehicle wearing a
tactical vest with “RPD” on the front with
his gun drawn at the low-ready position
and approached the vehicle.
8. Detective Mendez ordered the occupant to
show him his hands and exit the vehicle.
9. The occupant got out of the vehicle as
ordered. He was directed to place his
hands on top of the vehicle which he did.
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Detective Mendez holstered his weapon and
attempted to identify the suspect.
10. The suspect had some form of
identification on him and he was
identified as the Defendant, Rodney
Taylor.
11. After the Defendant was identified, he
was detained for “officer safety,” to
control the scene and because the vehicle
was “associated with” Alexander Walton.
The defendant is a light-skinned black
male approximately six feet tall and
weighing approximately 140 pounds. He has
a smallish, thin build and wears his hair
somewhat closely cut with a very thin
beard.
12. Detective Mendez walked the Defendant
over to the curb and sat him down on the
curb where he was detained and remained
there for twenty to twenty-five minutes.
Detective Mendez did not place the
Defendant in handcuffs during his
encounter with the Defendant and the
Defendant was not handcuffed while seated
on the curb.
13. Detective Mendez conducted a “frisk” of
the green Dodge Stratus for “officer
safety” reasons and discovered a backpack
[i]n the rear seat of the vehicle which
contained roughly one-half of a box of
live .38 caliber ammunition.
14. Alexander Walton was subsequently
located and arrested [i]n an apartment in
the immediate area. At that time, the
officers believed Mr. Walton had committed
the homicide they were investigating and
they considered him their suspect.
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When Detective Mendez stopped defendant, he believed that
defendant could be Mr. Walton, who was wanted as a suspect in a
recent homicide. Defendant—who is approximately the same height
and size as Mr. Walton—was driving a car Mr. Walton was known to
operate. Thus, the initial stop was justified. See Hensley, 469
U.S. at 229, 83 L.Ed. 2d at 612. Defendant argues that even if
the initial detention was constitutional, the continued
detention could not be justified once Detective Mendez
discovered that defendant was not Mr. Walton.
After detaining defendant, Detective Mendez “frisked” the
vehicle being driven by defendant and discovered a backpack
containing approximately one-half of a box of live .38 caliber
ammunition. At the time, police were still actively searching
for Mr. Walton. “[A] brief stop of a suspicious individual, in
order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo
momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most
reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the
time.” McDaniels, 103 N.C. App. at 181, 405 S.E.2d at 362(citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). The stop here
lasted approximately twenty to twenty-five minutes: the time it
took to ascertain defendant’s identity, secure the vehicle, and
find Mr. Walton. The police detained defendant—who apparently
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had the keys to and got into the suspect’s vehicle—simply to
maintain the status quo while they searched for Mr. Walton, as
they are permitted to do. See id. Once Mr. Walton was arrested,
the detention ended and Detective Mendez asked defendant if he
would accompany him to the police station. Defendant was not in
handcuffs while being detained. Under these facts, we conclude
that both the initial and continued detention were
constitutional.
Next, we must consider whether the interrogation of
defendant at the police station violated his rights under the
Fifth Amendment. Defendant contends that he unequivocally asked
for an attorney, so continued questioning violated his rights
under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 69 L.Ed. 2d 378 (1978).
Defendant did not raise this argument before the trial court,
either in his written motion or at the motion hearing, so it is
not preserved for our review. N.C.R. App. P. 10(a)(1).
Accordingly, we find no error in the admission of defendant’s
statement taken after he had been detained.
III. Relevance of Text Messages
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Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in
admitting a variety of irrelevant text messages over objection.2
We disagree.
“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule
401 (2013). “Even though a trial court’s rulings on relevancy
technically are not discretionary and therefore are not reviewed
under the abuse of discretion standard applicable to Rule 403,
such rulings are given great deference on appeal.” State v.
Peterson, 205 N.C. App. 668, 674, 695 S.E.2d 835, 840 (2010)
(citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
The contested evidence consists of a series of text
messages sent by defendant to various women and to “Mr.
Business.” The messages to the women were mostly sexual in
nature. The trial court required the State to redact all
incoming messages from anyone other than “Mr. Business,”
totaling 94 of 207 text messages, but allowed the State to
introduce the outgoing messages. The State argues that these
messages show that defendant premeditated and deliberated
2
He does not argue that the unfair prejudice of the messages
outweighed their probative value under Rule 403.
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because within hours of the shooting he “was sending messages to
several recipients indicating he was laughing out loud, was
horny, and wanted to see pictures of girls . . . .” The State
contends that this fact “makes it more probable that he shot
[Mr. Johnson] in a cool state of blood.”
Defendant was charged with first degree murder. To show
that defendant was guilty of the charge, the State had to prove
that defendant intentionally and unlawfully killed Mr. Johnson
with premeditation and deliberation. State v. Clark, ___ N.C.
App. ___, ___, 752 S.E.2d 709, 711 (2013), disc. rev. denied,
___ N.C. ___, 755 S.E.2d 619 (2014). “Generally, premeditation
and deliberation must be proved by circumstantial evidence
because they are not susceptible of proof by direct evidence.”
Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). One of the factors
relevant to determining whether a defendant acted with
premeditation and deliberation is his conduct “before and after
the killing.” State v. Horskins, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 743
S.E.2d 704, 709 (citation and quotation marks omitted), disc.
rev. denied, ___ N.C. ___, 752 S.E.2d 481 (2013).
Although these text messages may not have had great
probative value, we cannot say that “the proffered evidence has
no tendency to prove a fact in issue in the case[.]” State v.
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Coen, 78 N.C. App. 778, 780-81, 338 S.E.2d 784, 786 (emphasis
added), app. dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 317 N.C. 709, 347
S.E.2d 444 (1986). Defendant principally argued at trial that
the shooting was a “mistake” for which he had shown remorse, or
a “reaction” to the fact that Mr. Johnson pulled out the wine
opener. We agree with the State that defendant’s texting
girlfriends within several hours after the killing tends to show
that he acted in a cool state of mind—killing Mr. Johnson did
not seem to shake him or to make him alter his behavior in any
apparent manner. See State v. Singletary, 344 N.C. 95, 106, 472
S.E.2d 895, 901 (1996) (considering, inter alia, evidence that
the defendant “turned and walked away, as if he had done what he
wanted to do” after shooting the victim). Therefore, the
messages had at least some probative value and the trial court
did not err in concluding that they were relevant.
IV. Closing Argument
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred in
failing to intervene ex mero motu during the prosecutor’s
closing argument, which defendant contends was grossly improper
because it misstated the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
The standard of review for assessing alleged
improper closing arguments that fail to
provoke timely objection from opposing
counsel is whether the remarks were so
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grossly improper that the trial court
committed reversible error by failing to
intervene ex mero motu. In other words, the
reviewing court must determine whether the
argument in question strayed far enough from
the parameters of propriety that the trial
court, in order to protect the rights of the
parties and the sanctity of the proceedings,
should have intervened on its own accord
and: (1) precluded other similar remarks
from the offending attorney; and/or (2)
instructed the jury to disregard the
improper comments already made.
State v. Jones, 355 N.C. 117, 133, 558 S.E.2d 97, 107 (2002).
We will not find error in a trial court’s
failure to intervene in closing arguments ex
mero motu unless the remarks were so grossly
improper they rendered the trial and
conviction fundamentally unfair. In
determining whether argument was grossly
improper, this Court considers the context
in which the remarks were made, as well as
their brevity relative to the closing
argument as a whole[.]
State v. Taylor, 362 N.C. 514, 536, 669 S.E.2d 239, 259 (2008)
(citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted), cert.
denied, 558 U.S. 851, 175 L.Ed. 2d 84 (2009).
In a case where the prosecutor misstated the reasonable
doubt standard during his closing argument, our Supreme Court
held that any error was cured by the trial court’s subsequent
correct instruction on reasonable doubt. State v. Jones, 336
N.C. 490, 496, 445 S.E.2d 23, 26 (1994). Similarly, in State v.
Alston, the prosecutor misstated the reasonable doubt standard
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during voir dire, but the Supreme Court held that “any
misstatement in the law by the prosecutor was cured by the trial
court’s subsequent correct jury instruction defining reasonable
doubt.” 341 N.C. 198, 224, 461 S.E.2d 687, 700-01 (1995), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 1148, 134 L.Ed. 2d 100 (1996). There is no
dispute here that the trial court correctly instructed the jury
on reasonable doubt. Therefore, as our Supreme Court did in
Alston and Jones we conclude that, even assuming the prosecutor
misstated the reasonable doubt standard in his closing argument,
“any misstatement in the law by the prosecutor was cured by the
trial court’s subsequent correct jury instruction defining
reasonable doubt.” Id.V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that defendant has
failed to show any error at his trial.
NO ERROR.
Judges STEPHENS and MCCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).