In re Bullock ( 2014 )

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA14-149
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 5 August 2014
IN THE MATTER OF:
LAWRENCE BULLOCK, III,
Respondent Granville County
No. 11 SPC 84
Appeal by respondent from order entered 15 October 2013 by
Judge Robert H. Hobgood in Granville County Superior Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 May 2014.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Adam M. Shestak, for the State.
Peter Wood, for respondent.
CALABRIA, Judge.
Lawrence Bullock, III (“respondent”) appeals from an order
recommitting him to the forensic unit at Central Regional
Hospital for a period not to exceed 365 days. We affirm.
I. Background
In August 1999, respondent was found not guilty by reason
of insanity (“NGRI”) for the offenses of first degree burglary
and second degree kidnapping. Respondent was involuntarily
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committed to Dorothea Dix Hospital, and is currently committed
to the forensic unit at Central Regional Hospital. Respondent
has remained hospitalized continuously, subject to periodic
recommitment hearings, since 1999.
During respondent’s most recent recommitment hearing on 20
September 2013, Beth Ridgway, M.D. (“Dr. Ridgway”), one of
respondent’s treating physicians, testified regarding
respondent’s mental condition. Dr. Ridgway testified that
respondent was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar
type, which caused him to suffer from psychosis, hypersexual
tendencies, and delusions, and that respondent had a personality
disorder that predisposed him to violent behavior, residual
psychosis, and antisocial behavior. Dr. Ridgway indicated that
respondent’s symptoms were diminished by medication, but never
fully subsided.
Respondent sometimes refused to take his medication, and
his condition deteriorated rapidly on those occasions.
According to both Dr. Ridgway and respondent’s sister,
respondent has expressed his belief that he does not have a
psychological condition that requires medication. Dr. Ridgway
indicated that she believed respondent would not comply with his
medication regimen without medical supervision, and that it was
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unlikely that family members would be able to compel respondent
to remain on his medication if he refused to comply.
Dr. Ridgway also testified regarding respondent’s history
of violent and disruptive behavior. According to witnesses,
respondent had assaulted staff and other patients on several
occasions between 2002 and 2009. Specifically, in 2005,
respondent attempted to choke one of the nurses, and later
indicated that he had intended to kill or render the nurse
unconscious for the purpose of sexually assaulting her.
Respondent also punched another patient in the face in August
2013 (the “August 2013 assault”). Dr. Ridgway testified that
respondent had lost grounds privileges due to his disruptive
behavior, and she was treating him in the forensic maximum unit
at Central Regional Hospital. According to Dr. Ridgway,
respondent was a danger to the community even while properly
medicated, and she recommended that respondent be recommitted
for one year.
Respondent’s sister testified regarding short visits
respondent had made to her home and family events during his
hospitalization. Respondent had briefly visited her twice
outside the hospital for Thanksgiving 2012 and March 2013.
During those visits, respondent was accompanied by a hospital
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staff member. Respondent’s sister also testified that
respondent had attended her daughter’s wedding ceremony in
August 2011, and also attended an aunt’s funeral in November
2011. Respondent also attended a concert at the Durham
Performing Arts Center in April 2013 with family members.
Respondent’s sister often spoke with him about taking his
medications, but respondent indicated that he did not believe he
needed his medications, and that he believed his medications
caused his diabetes. She believed respondent did need the
medication. Respondent’s sister further testified that she did
not notice any change in respondent, and that he behaved
appropriately and interacted appropriately with her two foster
children. She also indicated that while she was in respondent’s
presence, she never felt any threat or danger from him.
Respondent also testified on his own behalf. He asserted
that he never struck a nurse, and believed that his diabetes was
intentionally caused by his medication. Respondent claimed that
in the August 2013 assault, he hit the patient twice with his
fists because the patient had hung up the phone on respondent’s
niece. Respondent also claimed that the August 2013 assault was
the first time he had ever become violent with another patient.
He indicated that he would remain on his medication, and that he
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had a plan to live with his brother and seek outpatient mental
health treatment if he were released.
After the hearing, the trial court entered an order finding
that respondent had a history of rapid decompensation after his
medication was adjusted or stopped, which caused him to become
violent. The trial court also made findings regarding
respondent’s belief that he did not require medication and his
history of violent behavior during his hospitalization. The
court further found that respondent was unlikely to continue his
prescribed medication if he were discharged or conditionally
released, and that respondent’s original offenses and his
assaults on hospital staff and other patients all occurred in
the “relevant past.” The trial court concluded that respondent
failed to show that he no longer suffered from a mental illness
or that he was no longer dangerous to others, and recommitted
respondent for a period not to exceed 365 days. Respondent
appeals.
II. Findings of Fact
Respondent first argues that the trial court erred in
entering an order of recommitment because he demonstrated, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that he was no longer a danger to
himself or others. We disagree.
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The trial court has the authority to determine whether the
competent evidence offered in a particular case met the burden
of proof. In re Hayes, 151 N.C. App. 27, 31-32, 564 S.E.2d 305,
308 (2002). Furthermore, it is “not the function of this Court
to reweigh the evidence on appeal.” In re Bullock, ___ N.C.
App. ___, ___, 748 S.E.2d 27, 30, disc. review denied, ___ N.C.
___, 752 S.E.2d 149 (2013) (citation omitted). Therefore, we do
not consider whether respondent presented evidence sufficient to
meet his burden of proof.
Respondent also contends that several of the trial court’s
findings and conclusions of law were not supported by competent
evidence. Specifically, respondent challenges the trial court’s
findings that respondent did not believe that he needed to take
medication; that based upon respondent’s history and beliefs
regarding his medication, there was little chance that
respondent would take his medications outside of the hospital;
and that there was a reasonable probability that respondent
would inflict, attempt to inflict, or threaten to inflict
serious bodily harm on others if discharged or conditionally
released. However, respondent merely states that he disputes
these findings, and does not explain why these findings are
erroneous. Therefore, this argument is deemed abandoned. See
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N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (2013) (“Issues not presented in a
party’s brief, or in support of which no reason or argument is
stated, will be taken as abandoned.”).
Respondent also challenges several findings as not
supported by competent evidence. Specifically, respondent
disputes findings that he threatened to kill his 1998 victim,
that he assaulted another patient by punching him in the face
“multiple times,” and that he choked a nurse. Dr. Ridgway
testified that respondent threatened to either kill or hurt his
1998 victim, and that respondent tried to choke the nurse.
Respondent testified that he hit the patient in the August 2013
assault twice. While respondent challenges these findings as
“misleading” based upon mere choice of words, the fact remains
that there was evidence to support the trial court’s findings
that respondent threatened to kill his 1998 victim and that he
struck the patient more than once during the August 2013
assault.
While respondent is correct that the evidence at the
hearing showed that he attempted to choke a nurse in the 2005
assault, this error is harmless. See In re T.M., 180 N.C. App.
539, 547, 638 S.E.2d 236, 240 (2006) (stating that where there
are “ample other findings of fact” to support the trial court’s
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conclusion, findings not supported by evidence constituted
harmless error). The trial court also found that the incidents
involving respondent’s 1998 victim, the 2005 assault, and the
August 2013 assault, as well as three other assaults on a nurse
and two patients in 2008, 2009, and 2010, occurred in the
relevant past. Therefore, there were “ample other findings of
fact” to support the trial court’s conclusion that respondent
remained dangerous to others. Id.III. Conditional Release
Next, respondent argues that the trial court erred by
failing to consider respondent’s conditional release as an
option. We disagree.
Respondent cites In re Hayes (Hayes II), 199 N.C. App. 69,
681 S.E.2d 395 (2009), to support his position. In Hayes II,
the trial court ordered the respondent recommitted for inpatient
treatment after hearing evidence from several psychologists and
psychiatrists who differed as to the respondent’s mental illness
and risk for violence. Id. at 71-74, 681 S.E.2d at 397-399.
The respondent’s counsel made no argument for conditional
release. Id. at 76, 681 S.E.2d at 400. The trial court found
that the respondent would “be dangerous to others in the future
if unconditionally released with no supervision at this time.”
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Id. at 74, 681 S.E.2d at 399. The trial court failed to mention
conditional release in its findings. Id. at 77, 681 S.E.2d at
400. This Court indicated that it was apparent from the record
that the trial court believed its only options were to either
recommit the respondent or to unconditionally release him. Id.
at 70, 681 S.E.2d at 396. This Court accordingly held it was
necessary to reverse and remand the case for the trial court’s
consideration of conditional release. Id. at 85, 681 S.E.2d at
405.
In the instant case, however, respondent’s counsel did
argue the option of conditional release in his closing, and the
trial court made findings regarding the possibility of
conditional release. The trial court specifically found that
Due to Respondent’s past violent acts, the
current, persistent symptoms of his
schizoaffective disorder including paranoia
and delusions, and his belief that he does
not need antipsychotic medication, there is
a reasonable probability that Respondent
will inflict, attempt to inflict, or
threaten to inflict serious bodily harm on
another if discharged or conditionally
released at this time.
The trial court also made several findings giving specific
reasons why respondent requires the direct supervision of
psychiatric staff. Because the trial court specifically
considered conditional release, and found that respondent’s
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conditional release would result in danger to others, this
argument is overruled.
IV. Conclusion
In conclusion, we hold that the trial court did not err in
entering an order for recommitment because its findings of fact
were supported by competent evidence. Additionally, the trial
court properly considered conditional release as an option for
respondent. The trial court’s order recommitting respondent to
Central Regional Hospital for a period of 365 days is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges BRYANT and GEER concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).