In Re the Purported Will of Shepherd , 235 N.C. App. 298 ( 2014 )

NO. COA 13-1149
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 5 August 2014
IN THE MATTER OF THE Union County
PURPORTED WILL OF RUBY No. 10 E 230
SHAW SHEPHERD,
Deceased.
Appeal by Caveator from Order entered 12 April 2013 by
Judge W. David Lee in Union County Superior Court. Heard in the
Court of Appeals 19 February 2014.
Wall Esleeck Babcock LLP, by Andrew L. Fitzgerald, and
Hickmon & Perrin, PC, by James E. Hickmon, for Caveator.
Helms, Robison & Lee P.A., by R. Kenneth Helms, Jr., and
Aimee E. Brockington, for Propounder.
STEPHENS, Judge.
Factual Background and Procedural History
This appeal arises from a caveat proceeding challenging the
will of Ruby Shaw Shepherd (“Decedent”). Decedent died on 21
February 2010 in Fort Myers, Florida. At the time of her death,
Decedent was a resident of Union County, North Carolina.
Decedent is survived by her husband of nearly thirty years,
Caveator James A. Shepherd, and four children from a previous
marriage, including Propounder Angela Caroline Jeffers Bullock.
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On 7 April 2010, Propounder filed in the Union County
Superior Court clerk’s office an application for probate and
letters testamentary and a document entitled “Last Will and
Testament of Ruby Shaw Shepherd,” which purported to be the will
of Decedent. The purported will made no mention of Caveator and
named Propounder as the executrix of Decedent’s estate. With the
exception of several specific devises of tangible personal
property, the purported will provided that Decedent’s estate was
to be divided equally among her four children. The clerk of
superior court admitted the purported will to probate in the
common form in the Estates Division of the Superior Court of
Union County.1
Caveator filed a verified petition for an elective share on
18 June 2010, seeking a statutory spousal elective share from
the estate of Decedent. In Caveator’s petition for elective
share, he stated that Decedent “died testate . . . and [that]
her Last Will and Testament was probated on April 7, 2010.”
1
Although the application for probate and letters testamentary
are included in the record, the certificate of probate and the
letters testamentary are not. Thus, this Court has no
information in the record to verify the date that the purported
will was admitted to probate. We must assume from the
progression of the probate of the purported will that a
certificate of probate was issued.
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Propounder filed the inventory for Decedent’s estate and an
addendum thereto on 14 September 2010. The inventory indicated
that Decedent’s estate contained total assets in the amount of
$1,894,928.97.
Caveator filed a caveat to the purported will of Decedent
on 29 October 2010. In his petition, Caveator alleged that,
“[u]pon information and belief, [Decedent’s purported will]
. . . is not the Last Will and Testament of Ruby Shaw Shepherd”
because Decedent either did not sign the purported will, or, if
she did, she did so under “undue and improper influence and
duress.” Propounder filed an answer to the caveat on 19 November
2010. Subsequently, an order was entered sua sponte by the clerk
of superior court on 3 December 2010 staying the hearing on
Caveator’s petition for an elective share until the resolution
of the caveat action.2 Propounder appealed from this order to the
trial court.3 The trial court entered an order on 21 January 2011
reversing the clerk’s stay order and remanding the
administration of the estate and the petition for elective share
2
The clerk’s 3 December 2010 order also stayed hearing on a
petition for recovery of estate assets filed by Propounder. No
copy of this petition is included in the record.
3
Although both briefs indicate Propounder appealed the 3
December 2010 order, no copy of the notice of appeal is included
in the record to indicate the date or grounds for said appeal.
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to the clerk for further proceedings consistent with the trial
court’s reversal order. Following the trial court’s reversal of
the stay order, Caveator filed a motion to compel partial
payment of the spousal elective share, to compel payment of
expert fees, for issuance of an order to show cause, for
revocation of Propounder’s letters testamentary, and for
attorneys’ fees. In this motion, Caveator referred to the paper
writing offered for probate as the “Decedent’s purported will.”
Caveator also referred to the paper writing as the purported
will in his memorandum in support of the motion for partial
payment of the spousal elective share; however, Caveator
calculated the spousal elective share based on the value of
property passing according to the probate of Decedent’s
purported will.4 Caveator’s motion for partial payment of the
spousal elective share was continued by the clerk of court until
the parties engaged in mediation. Caveator’s motion for
4
Calculation of the elective share is defined in Article 1A of
Chapter 30 of the North Carolina General Statutes. The share to
which a surviving spouse is entitled is diminished by the
property he or she is already receiving, either under the
probate estate, by intestate succession, or by other means.
Here, Caveator received nothing under the purported will.
However, his share received by intestate succession would be
approximately one-third of the estate. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-
14 (2013). Therefore, the calculation of the elective share
would differ depending on which way Caveator was to receive
property.
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attorneys’ fees was granted, and his remaining motions were
denied.
On 19 December 2012, the clerk of court entered an “Order
Determining Elective Share” whereby the spousal elective share
was calculated to be $36,028.93 and Propounder, as Executrix of
the Estate of Decedent, was ordered to pay the whole amount to
Caveator. The clerk’s order did not mention the caveat
proceeding, and the clerk calculated the elective share based on
the values of the probate estate, wherein no property passed to
Caveator under the purported will.
Following the order for payment of the spousal elective
share, Propounder filed a motion for summary judgment as to the
caveat on 8 March 2013. In her summary judgment motion,
Propounder argued that Caveator was estopped from pursuing the
caveat because his position that the purported will was not
valid was inconsistent with the position he maintained in the
elective share action. Caveator filed a memorandum opposing
Propounder’s motion for summary judgment on 21 March 2013. The
trial court entered an order on 12 April 2013 granting
Propounder’s motion. Caveator appeals.
Discussion
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On appeal, Caveator argues that the trial court (1) erred
in granting summary judgment in favor of Propounder on grounds
that the doctrine of election of remedies bars Caveator from
sustaining the caveat action, and (2) abused its discretion by
holding that the doctrine of judicial estoppel also barred
Caveator from sustaining the caveat action.5 Caveator contends
that the doctrine of election of remedies is not applicable in
the case sub judice because payment of a spousal elective share
and caveat of a will are not inconsistent remedies. Further,
Caveator contends that the doctrine of judicial estoppel is not
applicable in this case because Caveator did not make clearly
inconsistent factual assertions. We agree and reverse the order
of the trial court.
I. Election of Remedies
Caveator argues that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment on the basis of the doctrine of election of
remedies because a petition for payment of a spousal elective
share is not inconsistent with the institution of a caveat
action to contest a will. In contrast, Propounder argues that
5
In support of her motion for summary judgment, Propounder
argued that Caveator was estopped from pursuing the caveat
according to the equitable doctrines of election of remedies and
judicial estoppel. The trial court did not identify the grounds
on which summary judgment was granted in favor of Propounder.
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Caveator is estopped from pursuing the caveat action because it
is predicated on an “opposite and irreconcilable” position from
Caveator’s position in the elective share proceeding. We
conclude that the two remedies are not inconsistent and,
therefore, that the doctrine of election of remedies is not
applicable.
“Our standard of review of an appeal from summary judgment
is de novo; such judgment is appropriate only when the record
shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” In
re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573, 669 S.E.2d 572, 576 (2008)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted; italics added).
“The purpose of the doctrine of election of remedies is to
prevent more than one redress for a single wrong.” Triangle Park
Chiropractic v. Battaglia, 139 N.C. App. 201, 204, 532 S.E.2d
833, 835 (citation omitted), disc. review denied, 352 N.C. 683,
545 S.E.2d 728 (2000). “The whole doctrine of election is based
on the theory that there are inconsistent rights or remedies of
which a party may avail himself, and a choice of one is held to
be an election not to pursue the other. The principle does not
apply to coexisting and consistent remedies.” Pritchard v.
Williams, 175 N.C. 319, 323, 95 S.E. 570, 571 (1918) (internal
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quotation marks omitted). “One is held to have made an election
of remedies when he chooses with knowledge of the facts between
two inconsistent remedial rights.” Lamb v. Lamb, 92 N.C. App.
680, 685, 375 S.E.2d 685, 687 (1989) (citation omitted). “[A]n
election of remedies presupposes a right to elect.” Competitor
Liaison Bureau of NASCAR, Inc. v. Midkiff, 246 N.C. 409, 414, 98
S.E.2d 468, 472 (1957) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). “A party cannot . . . occupy inconsistent positions. .
. . But the doctrine of election applies only where two or more
existing remedies are alternative and inconsistent. If the
remedies are not inconsistent, there is no ground for election.”
Douglas v. Parks, 68 N.C. App. 496, 498, 315 S.E.2d 84, 85
(citation omitted; emphasis added), disc. review denied, 311
N.C. 754, 321 S.E.2d 131 (1984). “It is the inconsistency of the
demands which makes the election of one remedial right an
estoppel against the assertion of the other . . . .” Richardson
v. Richardson, 261 N.C. 521, 530, 135 S.E.2d 532, 539 (1964)
(citation omitted).
A plaintiff is deemed to have made an
election of remedies, and therefore estopped
from suing a second defendant, only if he
has sought and obtained final judgment
against a first defendant and the remedy
granted in the first judgment is repugnant
[to] or inconsistent with the remedy sought
in the second action.
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Triangle Park Chiropractic, 139 N.C. App. at 203–04, 532 S.E.2d
at 835.
Here, the issue is whether the pursuit of an elective share
based on the administration of a testate estate and a will
caveat are alternative and inconsistent remedies. “In general,
the purpose of a caveat is to determine whether the paper[
]writing purporting to be a will is in fact the last will and
testament of the person for whom it is propounded.” Baars v.
Campbell Univ., Inc., 148 N.C. App. 408, 419, 558 S.E.2d 871,
878 (citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted),
disc. review denied, 355 N.C. 490, 563 S.E.2d 563 (2002). The
right to claim an elective share is a statutory right created by
section 30-3.1 which is given to “[t]he surviving spouse of a
decedent who dies domiciled in [North Carolina].” N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 30-3.1 (2013).6 The elective share is calculated as a
share of the decedent’s “Total Net Assets” subtracted by the
“Net Property Passing to Surviving Spouse,” as both terms are
defined by section 30-3.2. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 30-3.1. Thus,
the surviving spouse’s elective share is reduced by the amount
6
Section 30-3.1 was modified by 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 91, §
1.(d), effective 1 October 2013. The modification is not
applicable to the issues on appeal in this case.
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of property he or she is already going to receive. The “Net
Property Passing to Surviving Spouse” includes property “(i)
devised, outright or in trust, by the decedent to the surviving
spouse or (ii) that passes, outright or in trust, to the
surviving spouse by intestacy.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 30-3.2(3c)
(2013). By including both property devised to the surviving
spouse and property passing by intestate succession in the
calculation of the elective share, it is clear from the plain
language of the statute that an elective share may be claimed by
a surviving spouse whether the decedent dies testate or
intestate. See, e.g., Bland v. Harold L. & Audree S. Mills
Charitable Remainder Unitrust, __ N.C. App. __, 754 S.E.2d 259(2014) (unpublished opinion), available at 2014 WL 220557(holding that quasi-estoppel was inapplicable to bar a challenge
to the validity of a trust where distributions received by the
wife were less than the elective share of her husband’s
intestate estate to which she would be entitled absent the
trust); In re Estate of Hendrick, __ N.C. App. __, 753 S.E.2d
740 (2013) (unpublished opinion), available at 2013 WL 6237353(holding that the wife was entitled to an elective share of the
husband’s testate estate where other beneficiaries failed to
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establish grounds barring her entitlement).7 Section 30-3.4(b)
also makes clear that a claim for an elective share is not
dependent on whether the decedent dies testate because it
requires that the claim be made within “six months after the
issuance of letters . . . in connection with the will or
intestate proceeding.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 30-3.4(b) (2013).
Indeed, Propounder concedes in her brief that Caveator was
entitled to pursue an elective share whether Decedent died
testate or intestate. Because the caveat action is meant to
determine whether a purported will is in fact the will of a
decedent and the statutory right to claim an elective share does
not depend on whether a decedent dies with a will, we conclude
that the two remedies are not inconsistent.
In this case, however, Caveator made a specific assertion
in his petition for elective share that Decedent “died testate”
even though he was entitled to pursue an elective share whether
Decedent died testate or not. On its face, this statement is
inconsistent with Caveator’s challenge to the will. Propounder
argues that such inconsistency estops him from pursuing the
7
These opinions are unpublished and, thus, have no precedential
value. N.C.R. App. P. 30(e). Nonetheless, they provide helpful
examples of recent cases in which this Court has acknowledged
the entitlement of a surviving spouse to an elective share in
both testate and intestate estate administrations.
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caveat action as an impermissible election of remedies. We
disagree.
Propounder’s argument is misplaced as applied to the
doctrine of election of remedies. As discussed above, the
elective share proceeding is not an inconsistent and alternative
remedy to the caveat action. Even if the elective share
proceeding were inconsistent with the caveat action, however,
Caveator’s assertion that Decedent died testate is irrelevant to
the clerk’s calculation of the elective share.
“[P]robate is conclusive evidence of the validity of the
will, until it is vacated on appeal or declared void by a
competent tribunal.”8 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28A-2A-12 (2013). When
the clerk of superior court takes proof of a script and admits
it to probate in common form, it is an ex parte proceeding, and
the script “stands as the testator’s will, and his only will,
until challenged and reversed” by caveat. In re Will of Charles,
263 N.C. 411, 415, 139 S.E.2d 588, 591 (1965); see also Walters
v. Baptist Children’s Home of N.C., Inc., 251 N.C. 369, 377, 111
S.E.2d 707, 714 (1959) (“[T]he probate of a will by the [c]lerk
of [s]uperior [c]ourt is . . . conclusive evidence of the
8
This statute was codified as N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31-19 in 2010,
when Decedent died. It was re-codified as N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28A-
2A-12, effective 1 January 2012, by 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 344.
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validity of the will[] until vacated on appeal[] or declared
void by a competent tribunal in a proceeding instituted for that
purpose.”).
Consistent with our statutes and established case law, the
trial court’s 21 January 2011 order, which reversed the stay of
the elective share proceeding until the resolution of the caveat
action, concluded that probate “of the [w]ill is conclusive
unless and until it is vacated on appeal or declared void by a
competent tribunal in a caveat proceeding.” In addition, the
trial court concluded, inter alia, that (1) the will had not
been set aside by the caveat because no determination had been
reached in that proceeding, (2) the filing of the caveat did not
stay the administration of the estate or the elective share
proceeding, and (3) the elective share proceeding should be
remanded to the clerk to proceed accordingly. As a result, the
clerk was obligated on remand to calculate the elective share in
accordance with the probate of Decedent’s purported will,
regardless of Caveator’s assertion in his petition.
Consequently, Caveator had no “right to elect” between
calculation of the elective share on the basis of a testate or
intestate estate administration. See, e.g., Competitor Liaison
Bureau of NASCAR, Inc., 246 N.C. at 414, 98 S.E.2d at 472.
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Though Caveator chose to pursue an elective share, that remedy,
alone, is not inconsistent with a caveat. Moreover, the doctrine
of election of remedies cannot be applied to bar the award of
the elective share to Caveator based solely on the clerk’s
administration of Decedent’s estate as a testate estate. Indeed,
to the extent Caveator could have alleged an inconsistent remedy
in his petition for an elective share, that element of his
petition cannot work to bar his caveat proceeding when the clerk
had no choice but to calculate the elective share based on a
testate estate administration. Accordingly, we hold that the
doctrine of election of remedies does not work to bar Caveator’s
challenge to the will.
II. Judicial Estoppel
Caveator also argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by applying judicial estoppel as a bar to the caveat
action after the trial court ordered payment of the elective
share. In opposition, Propounder contends that judicial estoppel
was properly applied because Caveator asserted inconsistent
factual positions by alleging both the validity and the
invalidity of Decedent’s will. We disagree.
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“[J]udicial estoppel is to be applied in the sound
discretion of our trial courts.” Whitacre P’ship v. Biosignia,
Inc., 358 N.C. 1, 33, 591 S.E.2d 870, 891 (2004). “[A] trial
court’s application of judicial estoppel is reviewed for abuse
of discretion.” Id. at 38, 591 S.E.2d at 894 (citations
omitted). “[W]hen a trial court has acted within its discretion
in applying judicial estoppel, leaving no triable issues of
material fact, summary judgment is appropriate.” Id. at 39, 591
S.E.2d at 895 (citations omitted). “If the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in determining that [judicial estoppel is
applicable], there are no triable issues of fact . . . as a
matter of law, rendering summary judgment appropriate.” Bioletti
v. Bioletti, 204 N.C. App. 270, 274, 693 S.E.2d 691, 694-95
(2010). “Where the essential element of inconsistent positions
is not present, it is an abuse of discretion to bar [the]
plaintiff’s claim on the basis of judicial estoppel.” Estate of
Means v. Scott Elec. Co., 207 N.C. App. 713, 719, 701 S.E.2d
294, 299 (2010) (citation omitted).
“[T]he purpose of the [judicial estoppel] doctrine [i]s to
protect the integrity of the judicial process by prohibiting
parties from deliberately changing positions according to the
exigencies of the moment.” Whitacre P’ship, 358 N.C. at 28, 591
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S.E.2d at 888 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
“[T]he circumstances under which judicial estoppel may
appropriately be invoked are probably not reducible to any
general formulation of principle.” T-Wol Acquisition Co. v. ECDG
South, LLC, N.C. App. , , 725 S.E.2d 605, 612 (2012)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless,
our Supreme Court [has] set forth three
factors which may be considered in
determining whether the doctrine is
applicable: First, a party’s subsequent
position must be clearly inconsistent with
its earlier position. Second, courts
regularly inquire whether the party has
succeeded in persuading a court to accept
that party’s earlier position, so that
judicial acceptance of an inconsistent
position in a later proceeding might pose a
threat to judicial integrity by leading to
inconsistent court determinations or the
perception that either the first or the
second court was misled. Third, courts
consider whether the party seeking to assert
an inconsistent position would derive an
unfair advantage or impose an unfair
detriment on the opposing party if not
estopped.
Id. at __, 725 S.E.2d at 612-13 (citation omitted). “[T]hese
three factors do not establish inflexible prerequisites or an
exhaustive formula for determining the applicability of judicial
estoppel and . . . additional considerations may inform the
doctrine’s application in specific factual contexts.” Whitacre
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P’ship, 358 N.C. at 29, 591 S.E.2d at 889 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). “The first factor, and the only factor
that is an essential element which must be present for judicial
estoppel to apply[,] is that a party’s subsequent position must
be clearly inconsistent with its earlier position.” Wiley v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 164 N.C. App. 183, 188, 594 S.E.2d
809, 812 (2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
“[J]udicial estoppel is limited to the context of inconsistent
factual assertions and . . . the doctrine should not be applied
to prevent the assertion of inconsistent legal theories.”
Whitacre P’ship, 358 N.C. at 32, 591 S.E.2d at 890. When the
record and pleadings are examined as a whole, minor
discrepancies in a position consistently maintained do not
amount to “clearly inconsistent” positions. Harvey v.
McLaughlin, 172 N.C. App. 582, 585, 616 S.E.2d 660, 663 (2005)
(holding that discrepancies in allegations in the plaintiff’s
complaint regarding the date of the onset of injury were not
clearly inconsistent positions where the plaintiff maintained
one position as a whole), disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 289, 628
S.E.2d 250 (2006); see also Estate of Means, 207 N.C. App. at
720, 701 S.E.2d at 299 (holding that differences in allegations
of knowledge of the two defendants in a negligence action which
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were “in general . . . not inconsistent,” and meant to show
separate duties owed by each defendant, were not factually
inconsistent positions).
Here, Caveator stated in his petition for an elective share
that Decedent “died testate” and that “her Last Will and
Testament was probated on April 7, 2010.” Four months later,
however, Caveator stated in his caveat that Decedent “did not .
. . sign and execute said paper writing as her Last Will and
Testament” and that, if she did, it was due to “undue and
improper influence and duress.” Propounder argues that these
statements represent clearly inconsistent factual assertions. We
disagree.
No will is valid unless it complies with the relevant
statutory requirements. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31-3.1. “[T]he [c]lerk
of the [s]uperior [c]ourt has the sole power in the first
instance to determine whether a decedent died testate or
intestate, and if he died testate, whether the script in dispute
is his will.” Walters, 251 N.C. at 376, 111 S.E.2d at 713(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he probate
of a will by the [c]lerk of [s]uperior [c]ourt is a judicial
act, and his certificate is conclusive evidence of the validity
of the will, until vacated on appeal, or declared void by a
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competent tribunal in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.”
Id. at 377, 111 S.E.2d at 714; see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28A-
2A-12; In re Will of Spinks, 7 N.C. App. 417, 173 S.E.2d 1(1970) (upholding the clerk’s denial of a motion by a group of
surviving family members to set aside probate of a holographic
will because there was no inherent or fatal defect appearing on
the face of the will and no caveat action was filed). “And until
so set aside it is presumed to be the will of the testator.”
Walters, 251 N.C. at 377, 111 S.E.2d at 714. In addition, “the
proper execution of [a] will [is] a mixed question of law and
fact.” Burney v. Allen, 127 N.C. 476, 478, 37 S.E. 501, 502
(1900); see also In re Will of Mucci, 287 N.C. 26, 213 S.E.2d
207 (1975) (holding that directed verdict as to whether a will
may be probated is the best procedure when no evidence of
testamentary intent is presented); In re Will of Deyton, 177
N.C. 494, 507, 99 S.E. 424, 430 (1919) (“But the facts must be
found by the jury, in order that we may pass upon the validity
of the paper[ ]writings as the will of the deceased.”); In re
Will of Mason, 168 N.C. App. 160, 606 S.E.2d 921 (holding that
directed verdict is appropriate as to the validity of a will
when there are no evidentiary issues to be resolved), disc.
review denied, 359 N.C. 411, 613 S.E.2d 26 (2005).
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Here, Decedent’s purported will was admitted to probate by
the clerk of superior court before Caveator filed the petition
for an elective share.9 By admitting the purported will to
probate, the clerk made the determination that Decedent died
testate and that the purported will was the last will and
testament of Decedent. See, e.g., Walters, 251 N.C. at 377, 111
S.E.2d at 714. Caveator’s statement in his petition for an
elective share is consistent with the determination made by the
clerk and the legal presumption that the purported will is the
valid will of Decedent until set aside by a caveat action. See
id. Further, as the validity of a will is a mixed issue of law
and fact, Caveator’s statements that Decedent “died testate” and
that “her Last Will” was probated are not factual assertions as
to the will’s validity, and, therefore, judicial estoppel is not
applicable in this case.
III. Receipt of a Benefit
Caveator also argues that estoppel does not otherwise apply
to bar him from pursuing the caveat when he accepted property to
which he was already entitled. Propounder responds that estoppel
does, in fact, apply because Caveator actually received a
9
According to the petition for an elective share, the purported
will was admitted to probate on 7 April 2010.
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“benefit under the will,” which bars him from thereafter seeking
to invalidate it. This response is incorrect.
Although Propounder and Caveator make these arguments in
the context of the doctrine of election of remedies, the cases
cited are more representative of the principle of quasi-
estoppel. In defining quasi-estoppel, or “estoppel by benefit,”
the North Carolina Supreme Court has stated that, “[u]nder a
quasi-estoppel theory, a party who accepts a transaction or
instrument and then accepts benefits under it may be estopped to
take a later position inconsistent with the prior acceptance of
that same transaction or instrument.” Whitacre P’ship, 358 N.C.
at 18, 591 S.E.2d at 881-82 (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). “[T]he essential purpose of quasi-estoppel is to
prevent a party from benefitting by taking two clearly
inconsistent positions.” Id. at 18-19, 591 S.E.2d at 882(citation, internal quotation marks, and ellipsis omitted). In
the context of a will, a party that has “judicially asserted
rights consistent with the validity of the will . . . is
estopped, in a subsequent proceeding, from asserting the
inconsistent position of disputing the will’s validity.” In re
Will of Lamanski, 149 N.C. App. 647, 650, 561 S.E.2d 537, 540
(2002) (citation omitted) [hereinafter Will of Lamanski]. The
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cases cited by Caveator further address the doctrine of quasi-
estoppel in the specific context of a will caveat and its
exceptions.
In In re the Will of Peacock, a decedent’s son instituted a
caveat proceeding after receiving a check under the decedent’s
will. 18 N.C. App. 554, 555, 197 S.E.2d 254, 255 (1973)
[hereinafter Will of Peacock]. In analyzing whether the
decedent’s son could be estopped from pursuing the caveat on
grounds that he had already taken under the will, this Court
observed that the share of the estate to which the decedent’s
son would be entitled would be greater than the amount of the
check he had already received if his caveat proceeding were
successful. Id. at 556, 197 S.E.2d at 255. Specifically, the
Court held that
[the son’s] acceptance of a check for less
than [the amount of his share of the
intestate estate] could in no way prejudice
his sisters in [the] event [the] probate of
the will is subsequently set aside. Nothing
in the circumstances indicates any reason
why it would be inequitable for [the son] to
proceed with his caveat.
Id.Similarly, in In re Will of Smith, this Court held that the
decedent’s daughter was not estopped from pursuing a caveat even
though she received a car under the will. 158 N.C. App. 722,
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724-25, 582 S.E.2d 356, 358 (2003) [hereinafter Will of Smith].
The Court observed that the daughter was entitled to the car
under the will admitted to probate, a prior will, or via
intestate succession. Id. Quoting Will of Peacock, the Court
further reasoned that, because the daughter’s caveat would not
change the disposition of the car, it was not inequitable for
her to receive the car and pursue the caveat. Id.Will of Lamanski arose in a slightly different factual
situation from Will of Smith and Will of Peacock. In Will of
Lamanski, the decedent’s will gave her sister the choice of
certain items of tangible personal property in the decedent’s
home. 149 N.C. App. at 647, 561 S.E.2d at 538. Under that
provision, the decedent’s sister chose specific pieces of
property, some of which were delivered to her pursuant to the
bequest. Id. at 648, 561 S.E.2d at 539. When the executrix of
the decedent’s will failed to deliver the other items, however,
the decedent’s sister filed a caveat despite retaining the items
of tangible personal property that had been delivered to her
under the will. Id. The sister argued that retention of the
tangible personal property should not work to estop her from
pursuing the caveat because, if the will were set aside, she
would be entitled to one-third of the estate, which was more
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than the value of the property she retained. Id. at 651, 561
S.E.2d at 540. Acknowledging the rule set forth in Will of
Peacock and applied in Will of Smith, i.e., that “one cannot be
estopped by accepting that which he would be legally entitled to
receive in any event,” we distinguished the facts in Will of
Lamanski. Id. at 651, 561 S.E.2d at 540-41. Specifically, we
pointed out that the beneficiary in Will of Peacock received
cash in an amount less than he would have received if the will
were set aside. Id. In Will of Lamanski, however, the decedent’s
sister had been given a right to choose from among items of
tangible personal property in the decedent’s home. Id.Otherwise, the sister “would have had no legal right, outside
the will, to the specific personal property which she received
and retained pursuant to the specific bequest.” Id. Thus, the
distinguishing factor in Will of Lamanski was the sister’s
choice of specific property which she would not necessarily
receive if the will were set aside. Id.In this case, unlike Will of Lamanski, Caveator did not
receive a specific bequest. Rather, he asserted his right to an
elective share, consistent with the validity of the will. The
amount of the elective share awarded to Caveator was a cash
amount that was a direct result of the probate of Decedent’s
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will. Modeling our analysis after Will of Peacock, Will of
Smith, and Will of Lamanski, we conclude that, if the will were
set aside, Caveator would be entitled to receive a cash amount
greater than he has already received. He has not exercised a
right under the will to any specific property he would not
otherwise be entitled to receive. Thus, Caveator cannot be
estopped from pursuing the caveat action based on his receipt of
the elective share because he would be entitled to that amount
of cash in any event. Propounder’s argument is overruled.
Conclusion
Propounder argues that the trial court’s order, granting
summary judgment, was appropriate pursuant to the equitable
doctrines of election of remedies and judicial estoppel. We
conclude, as discussed above, that neither doctrine is
applicable here. Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred
in granting summary judgment in favor of Propounder. We thus
reverse that decision.
REVERSED.
Judges BRYANT and DILLON concur.