Meduri v. Meduri ( 2014 )

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA14-107
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 15 July 2014
JOSHUA JORDAN MEDURI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. Buncombe County
No. 11 CVD 1038
NATASHA SERRAO MEDURI,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal by Plaintiff from order entered 9 September 2013 by
Judge Susan Dotson-Smith in District Court, Buncombe County.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 June 2014.
Mary Elizabeth Arrowood for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Emily Sutton Dezio, P.A., by Emily Sutton Dezio, for
Defendant-Appellee.
McGEE, Judge.
Joshua Jordan Meduri (“Plaintiff”) and Natasha Serrao
Meduri (“Defendant”) were married on 12 December 2004. Two
children were born of the marriage, Arella in 2006, and Aurora
in 2008 (“the children”). Plaintiff and Defendant separated on
25 February 2010, and entered into a “Contract of Separation and
Property Settlement Agreement” (“the agreement”) on 29 October
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2010. Plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce on 28 February
2011. The trial court entered a divorce judgment on 23 May 2011
(“the divorce”), and incorporated the agreement into the divorce
judgment.
The section of the agreement on physical custody of the
children states:
PHYSICAL CUSTODY:
A. [Plaintiff] shall have physical custody
of the minor children and be entitled
to placement at all times except when
[Defendant] is entitled to visitation
as below described:
B. [Defendant] shall be entitled to
visitation every other weekend from
6:00 p.m. Friday to 6:00 p.m. Sunday;
C. Exchanges shall be at [Plaintiff’s]
residence;
D. Such other arrangements [as] are
mutually agreeable to [Plaintiff and
Defendant].
Defendant filed a “Motion to Modify Custody Agreement” on 2
November 2012, and requested that the trial court award joint
legal and physical custody of the children to Plaintiff and
Defendant. At a hearing on 24 and 25 July 2013, the parties
testified that, Plaintiff and Defendant maintained a flexible
visitation schedule at times, as provided for under subsection
D. of the agreement. Defendant testified that originally
Plaintiff had physical custody, with Defendant having visitation
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every other weekend from Friday evening to Sunday evening. From
the date of separation until about a month prior to the divorce,
Defendant testified she lived in a very small residence and the
children only stayed overnight occasionally. Defendant worked
as a wedding photographer, which made it difficult for Defendant
to spend time with the children every other weekend. In 2011,
Plaintiff attended school from mid-February through mid-June,
which was both before and after the divorce. During that time,
Defendant sometimes provided daytime care for Aurora, as well as
afterschool care for both children. Plaintiff and Defendant
agreed Defendant needed to be more consistent in visiting the
children and needed to have a greater presence in the children’s
lives. Plaintiff testified that after Defendant’s sporadic
visitation during the summer of 2011, Plaintiff and Defendant
agreed to a six-month trial period of visitation, with Defendant
having visitation every Thursday and Friday nights.
Plaintiff and Defendant, along with the children’s paternal
and maternal grandparents, were Jehovah’s Witnesses. During
their marriage, Plaintiff and Defendant raised the children in
that faith. After the divorce, Plaintiff remarried and had a
child with his new wife in September 2011. Plaintiff began to
separate himself from the Jehovah’s Witness religion, and began
to attend the Universal Unitarian Church with his second wife.
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Plaintiff and Defendant discussed Plaintiff’s change in
religion. They decided the children would participate in each
parent’s religion during each parent’s time with the children.
Plaintiff occasionally allowed Defendant to take the children to
the Jehovah’s Witness Kingdom Hall during Plaintiff’s custodial
time. Plaintiff testified they would eventually allow the
children to choose the religion the children would follow.
Plaintiff’s religious change was not a problem between Plaintiff
and Defendant, but it did cause a rift between Plaintiff and his
mother. Plaintiff eventually decided he did not want the
children to have any involvement with the Jehovah’s Witness
religion during his custodial time.
During spring break in April 2012, the children went on a
trip with Defendant and the children’s maternal grandparents.
The children were not returned to Plaintiff on time, which
caused Arella to miss some school. The grandparents said the
children were returned late because the children were sick.
There was a dispute about how, and if, Plaintiff had been
informed the children would be returning late. After this
incident, Plaintiff was no longer comfortable with the modified
visitation schedule. In April 2012, Plaintiff and Defendant
reverted to the original schedule set out in the agreement, with
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Defendant having physical custody of the children every other
weekend.
In Defendant’s motion, she argued that Plaintiff’s choice
to revert to the more limited visitation schedule constituted a
substantial change of circumstances, and warranted modification
of the custody agreement. At that hearing, Defendant testified
she was also concerned that Plaintiff had had the children
vaccinated without first consulting her because, when Plaintiff
and Defendant were married, they had decided the children would
not be vaccinated.
The trial court entered a final custody order on 9
September 2013, and concluded there had been a material and
substantial change in circumstances that affected the welfare of
the children, and that modifying the prior custody order was in
the best interests of the children. The trial court awarded
joint physical and legal custody of the children to Plaintiff
and Defendant. Plaintiff appeals.
Motion to Strike
We first address Defendant’s “Motion to Strike” filed with
this Court on 10 February 2014. A portion of Defendant’s
testimony from the 24-25 July 2013 hearing was not recorded,
apparently due to malfunctioning equipment. Plaintiff included
an “Addendum Narrative to Transcript” in the record, purporting
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to accurately reflect the content of Defendant’s missing
testimony. However, when Plaintiff sent the proposed record to
Defendant, Defendant objected to some of the content of
Plaintiff’s narrative, and requested changes. Plaintiff did not
respond, and filed the record without including Defendant’s
proposed narration in the record. Plaintiff failed to properly
settle the record on appeal. Rule 11 of the North Carolina
Rules of Appellate Procedure mandates settlement of the record
by agreement or by certain other approved means. When an
appellee objects to a proposed narration, as is the case in this
instance, the appellant and appellee must first attempt to reach
mutual agreement and, then, if mutual agreement is not reached,
pursue other means of settling the record. N.C.R. App. P. 11(c)
(2014). Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant’s objections and
thus made no effort to reach an agreement on the narration.
Instead, Plaintiff filed the record, certifying that the record
on appeal was settled, when, in fact, it had not been settled.
Failure to properly settle the record is a violation of Rule 9
of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. N.C.R. App.
P. 9; Higgins v. Town of China Grove, 102 N.C. App. 570, 572,
402 S.E.2d 885, 886 (1991).
Plaintiff states in his “Settlement of Record:”
“[Defendant] requested ‘additions’ to the narrative be added to
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the Record on Appeal, which is objected to by [Plaintiff], and
pursuant to Rule 11 those additions are not included in the
printed record on appeal.” However, Plaintiff cites to no
portion of Rule 11 supporting his decision, and we can find
none. It was Plaintiff’s duty, as Appellant, to insure that the
record was complete and settled. Hill v. Hill, 173 N.C. App.
309, 322, 622 S.E.2d 503, 512 (2005) (citation omitted).
Violations of Rules 9 and 11 of the North Carolina Rules of
Appellate Procedure can lead to serious sanctions. Higgins, 102
N.C. App. at 572, 402 S.E.2d at 886. We grant Defendant’s
motion to strike the contested portions of Plaintiff’s
narrative.
I.
We first consider whether the relevant findings of fact are
supported by substantial evidence and whether those findings
support the trial court’s conclusion that there had been a
substantial change in circumstances that affected the welfare of
the children, and that modification of the custody order was in
the children’s best interests. The trial court found that the
children needed to have a “more predictable and consistent
schedule” and a schedule that “compliment[ed] their school hours
and that requires a change to the custody agreement.” Because
we find, at the time the trial court entered its order, that the
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children’s schedule was predictable and consistent and
complimented the children’s school hours and, because the
modified schedule did not increase predictability or consistency
in relation to the children’s school hours or otherwise, we
reverse.
II.
Plaintiff first argues that several of the trial court’s
findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence. We
agree in part.
“When reviewing a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a
motion for the modification of an existing child custody order,
the appellate courts must examine the trial court’s findings of
fact to determine whether they are supported by substantial
evidence.” Shipman v. Shipman, 357 N.C 471, 474, 586 S.E.2d
250, 253 (2003) (citation omitted). “Substantial evidence has
been defined as ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” McConnell
v. McConnell, 151 N.C. App. 622, 626, 566 S.E.2d 801, 804 (2002)
(citation omitted). “‘In a custody proceeding, the trial
court’s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if there is
evidence to support them, even though the evidence might sustain
findings to the contrary.’” Senner v. Senner, 161 N.C. App. 78,
83, 587 S.E.2d 675, 678 (2003) (citations omitted).
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In the present case, the trial court made the following
relevant findings of fact:
8. Since the entry of the May 23, 2011
Divorce Judgment which incorporated the
parties’ separation agreement, there have
been substantial and material changes in
circumstances as follows:
a. That [Plaintiff and Defendant] did
not follow the separation agreement and
[Plaintiff] would allow [Defendant] to
pick the . . . children up from school.
. . . .
d. That the visitation schedule was
extremely fluid at times and resulted
in inconsistent visitation for the
children by both [Plaintiff and Defendant].
e. It is in the children's best
interests to have a more predictable
and consistent schedule. When the children
were younger, they benefited from the
flexibility contemplated by the initial
agreement and practiced initially. The
families had more in common and
therefore the flexibility worked
better.
. . . .
g. The children are now school age and
in need of a schedule which compliments
their school hours and that requires a
change to the custody agreement.
h. Both [Plaintiff and Defendant]
agree, and the [c]ourt finds, because of
the children’s age, it is important to have
a consistent schedule and routine.
i. [Plaintiff] has re-married and
separated himself from the original
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faith of his family, [Defendant’s]
family and the children’s history.
[Plaintiff’s] decision to explore a
different faith community has changed
the nature of events (both family and
religious) in which the children can
participate.
j. [Plaintiff has made medical
decisions without consulting
[Defendant]. This has directly affected
the children in that they are now
vaccinated against [Defendant’s] wishes.
k. The children are confused because of
the differences in the homes and the
rules that have been put in place to
respect [Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s]
choices. These constraints have
altered visitation with extended relatives
and that change has affected the children.
l. The lack of a consistent routine has
caused confusion for the children as to
when they can see their parents.
m. One [child’s] concerns may have
manifested itself as digestive and
intestinal issues.
n. The children have experienced
confusion over the development of one
parent staying in the religion in which
[the children] were raised and the
other parent changing his belief system.
. . . .
s. Even though at separation,
[Defendant’s] contact was restricted by
her own actions, by the date of the
divorce, [Plaintiff and Defendant]
were sharing the children on a more
regular and weekly basis. [Plaintiff’s]
changing of his faith and the Spring
Break incident in April 2012, resulted
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in [Plaintiff] relying on the custody
order in place which stated that
[Defendant] have the children every
other weekend.
t. [Plaintiff and Defendant] were in
agreement to raise the . . . children
as Jehovah’s Witnesses during the[ir]
marriage and after the[ir] separation.
Even after [Plaintiff] first became
engaged in September, 2011, he still
allowed the . . . children to attend
the Kingdom Hall of Jehovah’s Witnesses
with [Defendant], regardless of whose
scheduled time it was on.
u. [Plaintiff] changed the religious
upbringing of the . . . children in the
fall of 2011, and decided that the
children would not attend their Kingdom
Hall of Jehovah’s Witnesses with
[Defendant] or the grandparents during
[Plaintiff’s] custodial time.
. . . .
9. The foregoing substantial and material
changes in circumstances which have affected
the welfare of the children warrant this
[c]ourt to modify the May 23, 2012 Judgment
by awarding joint physical and legal custody
of the . . . children to Defendant and
Plaintiff.
We first note that the trial court’s finding of fact number
nine is actually a conclusion of law, and we must treat it as
such. In re R.A.H., 182 N.C. App. 52, 60, 641 S.E.2d 404, 409
(2007) (citations omitted). Also, finding of fact number eight:
“Since the entry of the May 23, 2011 Divorce Judgment which
incorporated the parties’ separation agreement, there have been
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substantial and material changes in circumstances[,]” when
considered in its entirety, is a conclusion of law. To the
extent the trial court made determinations that certain findings
of fact constituted bases for ruling there had been substantial
and material changes in circumstances, those determinations were
conclusions of law. The individual alphabetized subsections of
finding of fact number eight, except as indicated below,
represent the trial court’s relevant findings of fact.
Plaintiff contests finding of fact 8.a., which states:
“That [Plaintiff and Defendant] did not follow the separation
agreement and [Plaintiff] would allow [Defendant] to pick the
. . . children up from school.” When determining the
evidentiary basis for this finding, the agreement must be
considered in its entirety. While the agreement stated that
Defendant was entitled to visitation with the children every
other weekend, and exchanges of the children should occur at
Plaintiff’s residence, the agreement also stated that “[s]uch
other arrangements [as] [were] mutually agreeable to [Plaintiff
and Defendant]” would be allowed. Therefore, Plaintiff and
Defendant did, in fact, follow the agreement when they made
mutually agreeable deviations from the agreement. Thus, this
portion of the finding is not supported by substantial evidence.
However, the portion stating that: “[Plaintiff] would allow
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[Defendant] to pick the . . . children up from school[,]” is
supported by substantial evidence.
Plaintiff next challenges the trial court’s finding of fact
8.d., which states: “That the visitation schedule was extremely
fluid at times and resulted in inconsistent visitation for the
children by both [Plaintiff and Defendant].” We agree the
visitation schedule was at times “fluid,” but disagree with the
characterization of the schedule as “extremely fluid.” The
visitation schedule had been in place since October 2011, but
the testimony at trial focused primarily on the visitation
schedule following Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s divorce. At the
time of the divorce, Plaintiff was in school ‒ from mid-February
until mid-June ‒ and Defendant sometimes provided daytime care
for Aurora, as well as afterschool care for both children.
During that time, Defendant had a small residence and did not
have overnight visits with the children every other weekend as
scheduled. Defendant’s career as a wedding photographer, which
often required her to work on weekends, also made it difficult
for her to visit the children on weekends. This inconsistent
visitation continued through the summer of 2011. In an attempt
to have Defendant visit more consistently with the children, and
be more of a presence in the children’s lives, Plaintiff and
Defendant mutually agreed to modify the schedule, allowing
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Defendant custody of the children every Thursday and Friday
night.
The evidence does not support the finding that the
“visitation schedule was extremely fluid at times and resulted
in inconsistent visitation for the children by both [Plaintiff
and Defendant].” There was no evidence Plaintiff had ever been
inconsistent in his visitation, and Defendant’s inconsistent
visitation was not a result of the schedule – had Defendant
wanted to keep the children every other weekend as was agreed
upon in the schedule, she had that opportunity. Rather, because
of the flexibility permitted in the agreement, Defendant and
Plaintiff mutually agreed for Defendant to have visitation every
Thursday and Friday, thereby increasing the time Defendant spent
with the children, and increasing consistency since Defendant
had not been taking advantage of all of her scheduled visitation
with the every other weekend schedule.
In April 2012, Plaintiff and Defendant resumed the original
every other weekend schedule set out in the agreement, and
Defendant maintained a consistent visitation schedule. There
was no evidence, after that time, that Defendant’s career
continued to prevent her from seeing the children on weekends.
Therefore, although the visitation schedule was “fluid” at times
to accommodate Defendant’s schedule, it resulted in a more
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consistent and more frequent visitation schedule for Defendant.
Furthermore, since April 2012, the visitation schedule has been
entirely consistent: Defendant has physical custody of the
children every other weekend, as Plaintiff and Defendant had
initially agreed in the agreement.
Plaintiff next challenges finding of fact 8.e., which
states: “It is in the children’s best interests to have a more
predictable and consistent schedule. When the children were
younger, they benefited from the flexibility contemplated by the
initial agreement and practiced initially. The families had
more in common and therefore the flexibility worked better.” We
note that any ultimate finding that considered what was in the
best interests of the children was a conclusion of law and not a
finding of fact. R.A.H., 182 N.C. App. at 60, 641 S.E.2d at
409. We hold that there is substantial evidence to support the
rest of this finding of fact.
Plaintiff next challenges finding of fact 8.g., which
states: “The children are now school age and in need of a
schedule which compliments their school hours and that requires
a change to the custody agreement.” The portion of this finding
stating that the children are now of school age and in need of a
schedule complimenting their school hours is a reasonable
statement, though we are uncertain what evidence was presented
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to the trial court in support of this finding. Furthermore, one
of the children was already attending school at the time of the
divorce. The portion of this finding stating that the
children’s status as school-age children requires a change to
the agreement is a conclusion of law.
Plaintiff also contests finding of fact 8.l., which states:
“The lack of a consistent routine has caused confusion for the
children as to when they can see their parents.” It is unclear
from the evidence before the trial court what the basis was for
this finding of fact. However, it is clear the children were in
a very consistent routine, as originally agreed to by Plaintiff
and Defendant, from April 2012 until the 24-25 July 2013
hearing.
Finally, Plaintiff challenges finding of fact 8.m., which
states: “One [child’s] concerns may have manifested itself as
digestive and intestinal issues.” We hold there was not
substantial evidence that the agreement, as it was originally
written, caused a digestive or intestinal issue that the child
may have suffered. In any event, a finding that these issues
“may” have been connected to the child’s “concerns” is
speculative only.
We consider the above findings of fact that we have
determined are supported by substantial evidence, along with the
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unchallenged findings of fact, in our analysis below.
III.
In Plaintiff’s second argument, he contends the trial court
erred in finding “that there had been a substantial and material
change in circumstances since the entry of the prior order of
May 23, 2011[.]” We agree.
“‘[T]he modification of a custody decree must be supported
by findings of fact based on competent evidence that there has
been a substantial change of circumstances affecting the welfare
of the child, and the party moving for such modification assumes
the burden of showing such change of circumstances.’” Pulliam
v. Smith, 348 N.C. 616, 618-19, 501 S.E.2d 898, 899 (1998)
(citation omitted).
[C]ourts must consider and weigh all
evidence of changed circumstances which
affect or will affect the best interests of
the child, both changed circumstances which
will have salutary effects upon the child
and those which will have adverse effects
upon the child. In appropriate cases,
either may support a modification of custody
on the ground of a change in circumstances.
Id. at 619, 501 S.E.2d at 899.
Defendant, as the moving party, had the burden of showing
there had been a substantial change affecting the welfare of the
children. Defendant has not met this burden. Reviewing the
relevant findings of fact that are supported by substantial
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evidence, the trial court’s conclusion that there was a
substantial change in circumstances is based upon the following.
First, the trial court seems to have primarily relied on its
findings and conclusion that the schedule had been “fluid” and
that the children now needed a more predictable and consistent
schedule. The extent to which the schedule had been “fluid” in
the past was because of Defendant’s initial lack of
participation in the children’s lives, and then because
Plaintiff decided to accommodate Defendant’s schedule to allow
more predictable and consistent visitation between Defendant and
the children. While Defendant’s access to the children
decreased in April 2012 because of the return to the express
terms of the agreement, the schedule since April 2012 has been
more predictable and more consistent from the standpoint of the
children.
Second, the trial court found that Plaintiff’s marriage and
his separation from the Jehovah’s Witness faith “has changed the
nature of events (both family and religious) in which the
children can participate.” There is no evidence to support the
finding that Plaintiff’s marriage affected, or will negatively
affect, the welfare of the children. Since Plaintiff’s
marriage, his wife has become involved with the children and
attends parent-teacher conferences. Plaintiff’s marriage was
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not a substantial change that has affected the welfare of the
children. The trial court found that Plaintiff’s change of
religion caused confusion in the children “because of the
differences in the homes and the rules that ha[d] been put in
place to respect both [Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s] choices.”
According to the trial court, this impacted the children’s
relationships with their grandparents, “and that change has
affected the children[,]” but has not indicated how confusion
on the part of the children has negatively impacted the
children, nor how the change in relationship with their
grandparents “has affected” them. Defendant agreed at the 24-25
July 2013 hearing that she and Plaintiff had worked out the
issues surrounding Plaintiff’s change of faith and how to handle
that change with respect to the children.
Finally, in finding of fact 8.j., the trial court found:
“[Plaintiff] has made medical decisions without consulting
[Defendant]. This has directly affected the children in that
they are now vaccinated against [Defendant’s] wishes.” This
finding is supported by substantial evidence; however, there is
no indication or finding that vaccinating the children
negatively impacted the children.
The relevant findings of fact supported by the evidence do
not support a conclusion that there has been “‘a substantial
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change of circumstances[.]’” Pulliam, 348 N.C. at 618-19, 501
S.E.2d at 899 (citation omitted). Because the findings of fact
do not support the conclusion that there has been a substantial
change of circumstances, we reverse and remand to the trial
court for action consistent with this opinion.
IV.
Plaintiff also argues that Defendant failed to prove a
connection between the alleged substantial change in
circumstances and the welfare of the children, and that the
trial court’s findings and conclusions do not support its
ruling. We agree. “[B]efore a child custody order may be
modified, the evidence must demonstrate a connection between the
substantial change in circumstances and the welfare of the
child[.]” Shipman, 357 N.C. at 478, 586 S.E.2d at 255.
Even assuming, arguendo, there has been a substantial
change in circumstances, the trial court has not indicated how
any such change has affected the welfare of the children. The
trial court’s primary basis for modifying the schedule ‒ greater
predictability and consistency ‒ has not been improved by the
modification since the children’s schedule, as provided in the
agreement, is clearly predictable and consistent: Defendant has
physical custody every other weekend. As indicated above, there
are no findings that Plaintiff’s marriage, his change of faith,
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or his decision to vaccinate the children, had an adverse impact
on the welfare of the children. Because the findings of fact do
not support a conclusion that any alleged substantial change in
circumstances has affected the welfare of the children, we
reverse and remand on this basis, as well. Though it is
conceivable that the positive advances Defendant has made in
parenting, and her increased involvement in the children’s
lives, could lead to a conclusion supporting a modified schedule
to provide Defendant more time with the children, that is not
the basis alleged by Defendant for the custody modification
order before us.
For the reasons stated above, we find that the trial court
erred in concluding there was a substantial change in
circumstances affecting the welfare of the children that
warranted modification of the prior child custody agreement.
Reversed and remanded.
Judges HUNTER, Robert C. and ELMORE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).