State v. Valentine ( 2014 )

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA13-1370
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 3 June 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Guilford County
No. 11 CRS 95540
MEGHAN JULIA VALENTINE
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 25 April 2013 by
Judge David L. Hall in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in
the Court of Appeals 19 March 2014.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Joseph L. Hyde, Assistant
Attorney General, for the State.
Culbertson & Associates, by K.E. Krispen Culbertson, for
defendant-appellant.
DAVIS, Judge.
Meghan Julia Valentine (“Defendant”) appeals from the order
denying her motion to suppress and the judgment convicting her
of driving while impaired (“DWI”). On appeal, she contends that
the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress all
evidence obtained pursuant to her traffic stop. After careful
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review, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s
motion to suppress.
Factual Background
On the night of 11 December 2012, Defendant was drinking at
Stokeridge Tavern Bar and Grill. After having “four beers and a
shot,” Defendant left the tavern and proceeded southbound on
Highway 68. Sergeant Steven Parr (“Sergeant Parr”) of the
Guilford County Sheriff’s Department was also traveling
southbound on Highway 68 while on patrol. Highway 68 is a two-
lane highway with a posted speed limit of 50 miles per hour.
At 11:35 p.m., Sergeant Parr encountered Defendant south of
the intersection of Highway 68 and Oak Ridge Road where a number
of drinking establishments are located, including Stokeridge
Tavern. After following Defendant for two miles, Sergeant Parr
observed Defendant’s vehicle weaving within her lane of travel
at speeds varying between 40 to 60 miles per hour and began
following her. Sergeant Parr was able to position his vehicle
directly behind Defendant’s vehicle at the intersection of
Highway 68 and Alcorn Road. While stopped at the intersection,
Sergeant Parr ran the license plate number of Defendant’s
vehicle through his computer. He learned that the vehicle was
owned by a female who had a North Carolina identification card
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but did not possess a valid North Carolina driver’s license.
Sergeant Parr was able to see inside Defendant’s vehicle and
determine that the driver was, in fact, female.
Sergeant Parr activated his blue lights and proceeded to
pull over Defendant’s vehicle based on his observations of her
driving and the information he had received from the computer
search. Sergeant Parr proceeded to charge her with driving
while impaired. On 29 August 2012, Defendant was tried and
convicted of driving while impaired in Guilford County District
Court. She appealed her conviction to Guilford County Superior
Court and filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained
during the traffic stop based on her contention that Sergeant
Parr lacked reasonable suspicion to stop her vehicle.
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the superior
court denied Defendant’s motion by order dated 23 April 2013.
Defendant entered an Alford plea, reserving her right to appeal
from the superior court’s denial of her motion to suppress. The
trial court entered a suspended sentence of 60 days imprisonment
and placed Defendant on 24 months of unsupervised probation.
Defendant appealed to this Court.
Analysis
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Defendant's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court
erred in denying her motion to suppress. She contends that
Sergeant Parr lacked reasonable suspicion to make an
investigatory stop of her vehicle. We disagree.
Our review of a trial court's denial of a motion to
suppress is “strictly limited to determining whether the trial
judge's underlying findings of fact are supported by competent
evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on
appeal, and whether those factual findings in turn support the
judge's ultimate conclusions of law.” State v. Cooke, 306 N.C.
132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982).
We first observe that Defendant did not challenge any of
the findings of fact made in the trial court’s order denying her
motion to suppress. Therefore, the trial court’s factual
findings are binding on appeal. State v. Roberson, 163 N.C.
App. 129, 132, 592 S.E.2d 733, 735–36, disc. review denied, 358
N.C. 240, 594 S.E.2d 199 (2004). These findings stated as
follows:
That Sgt. S. G. Parr has over twenty three
years of experience in law enforcement and
has extensive training and experience in
traffic enforcement and estimating speed;
On December 11, 2011 Sgt. Parr was on
routine patrol in the area of Highway 68 in
Guilford County;
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At approximately 11:35 p.m., the defendant,
who was driving southbound on North Carolina
68, drew his attention;
Sgt. Parr observed that the defendant was
weaving within her lane of travel and that
she failed to maintain a constant speed;
That defendant's car varied in speed from 40
mph to 60 mph and the speed limit on NC 68
is 50 mph;
Sgt. Parr noted that there were restaurants
and bars in the nearby area that were open
and served alcoholic beverages;
When Sgt. Parr was able to, he ran the
vehicle's tag number and it showed the
registered owner was a female who only had
an ID card issued by the North Carolina
Department of Motor Vehicles;
The driver of the vehicle appeared to be a
female;
That Sgt. Parr followed the defendant for
approximately two miles and would have
stopped her earlier, but for the narrowness
of the road in that area and concerns for
his own safety, as well as the defendant's;
That the defendant testified that she was
coming from Stoke Ridge [sic] Tavern and
Grill and had four beers and a shot an hour
before being stopped by Sgt. Parr[.]
After making these findings of fact, the trial court made
the following conclusion of law:
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact,
the defendant’s Motion to Suppress is
denied. The Court concludes as a matter of
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law that under the totality of the
circumstances, Sgt. Parr had a reasonable
and articulable suspicion to stop the
defendant.
An officer must have a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity before conducting an investigatory stop of a vehicle.
State v. McArn, 159 N.C. App. 209, 212, 582 S.E.2d 371, 374
(2003). Such reasonable suspicion must “be based on specific
and articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from
those facts, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable,
cautious officer, guided by his experience and training.” State
v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994).
“Factors supporting reasonable suspicion are not to be viewed in
isolation.” State v. Campbell, 188 N.C. App. 701, 706, 656
S.E.2d 721, 725, appeal dismissed, 362 N.C. 364, 664 S.E.2d 311(2008). Rather, a court “must consider the totality of the
circumstances — the whole picture in determining whether a
reasonable suspicion exists.” State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412,
414, 665 S.E.2d 438, 440 (2008) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Defendant argues that Sergeant Parr’s observation of her
vehicle weaving within her lane of travel was not sufficient to
establish reasonable suspicion to perform a lawful traffic stop.
We have previously held that an officer’s observation of such
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weaving, in conjunction with other factors, can create
reasonable suspicion so as to justify an investigatory stop.
State v. Derbyshire, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 745 S.E.2d 886, 893
(2013), disc. review denied, ___ N.C. ___, 753 S.E.2d 785(2014). These additional factors may include, for example,
traveling at an unusual hour or driving in an area with drinking
establishments in close proximity. Id. at ___, 745 S.E.2d at
891; see State v. Watson, 122 N.C. App. 596, 598–600, 472 S.E.2d
28, 29-30 (1996) (holding that reasonable suspicion existed to
justify stop when defendant was weaving back and forth within
his lane for 15 seconds at 2:30 a.m. on road near nightclub);
see also State v. Jacobs, 162 N.C. App. 251, 255, 590 S.E.2d
437, 441 (2004) (holding that defendant’s weaving within his
lane at 1:43 a.m. coupled with fact that he was in area close to
bars was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion to
initiate traffic stop).
Our Supreme Court recently addressed a similar issue in
State v. Otto, 366 N.C. 134, 726 S.E.2d 824 (2012). In Otto,
the Supreme Court held that a state trooper’s personal
observation of a vehicle weaving constantly within its lane of
travel for three-quarters of a mile while traveling at the
posted speed limit of 55 miles per hour at 11:00 p.m. on a
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Friday night established reasonable and articulable suspicion
sufficient to initiate a traffic stop. Id. at 138, 726 S.E.2d
at 828.
In the present case, Sergeant Parr observed Defendant’s
vehicle weaving back and forth in her lane at varying speeds
(some of which were in excess of the posted speed limit) close
to midnight in an area with establishments that served alcohol
in close proximity. Based on the totality of the circumstances,
we are satisfied that reasonable suspicion existed to support
Sergeant Parr’s stop of Defendant’s vehicle. As such,
Defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s order
denying Defendant’s motion to suppress is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Judges ELMORE and McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).