State v. Meza-Rodriguez ( 2014 )

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA13-1190
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 3 June 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Wake County
No. 11CRS216911
MIGUEL ANTONI MEZA-RODRIGUEZ
Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 20 March 2013 by
Judge Michael J. O’Foghludha in Wake County Superior Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 March 2014.
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Deputy
Attorney General Kimberly D. Potter, for the State.
Appellate Defender Staples S. Hughes, by Assistant
Appellate Defender Andrew DeSimone, for Defendant-
appellant.
DILLON, Judge.
Miguel Antoni Meza-Rodriguez (“Defendant”) appeals from a
conviction for first-degree murder. For the following reasons,
we find no reversible error.
I. Background
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On 9 August 2011, Defendant was indicted on one count of
first-degree murder. Defendant was tried on this charge at the
18 March 2013 Criminal Session of Wake County Superior Court.
The State’s evidence tended to show that Pedro Fernandez
discovered that his mother was having an affair with Santiago
Hernandez-Arredondo. Mr. Fernandez asked Chris Reina, Alfredo
Acosta, and Defendant to help him beat up Mr. Hernandez-
Arredondo and promised to pay Defendant $500 for his assistance.
After hearing from Mr. Fernandez about his plans, Defendant and
the others agreed to “help [Mr. Fernandez] go and beat him
down.”
Mr. Fernandez initially contacted Mr. Hernandez-Arredondo
by phone under the pretense that he needed a quote from him for
a construction job. Mr. Fernandez did not tell him his real
name but used the alias “Jorge” or “George.” On the morning of
17 July 2011, Mr. Fernandez drove Mr. Acosta, Mr. Reina, and
Defendant to meet up with Mr. Hernandez-Arredondo at a
lumberyard. Mr. Fernandez brought a table leg and a baseball
bat to use in the beating. Mr. Reina testified that it was his
understanding that Defendant would hold a gun on Mr. Hernandez-
Arredondo, while the others beat and robbed him.
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When they arrived at the lumberyard, Mr. Fernandez became
concerned because of the number of cars in the area, so he asked
Mr. Hernandez-Arredondo to follow him to the house that needed
the work. Not having planned for this, Mr. Fernandez drove to
the first house he saw with a “for sale” sign in the yard and
pulled into the driveway, followed by Mr. Hernandez-Arredondo.
Mr. Fernandez and Mr. Hernandez-Arredondo got out of their
respective vehicles and began talking, as they walked towards
the house. The others stayed in the car. After about five
minutes, Defendant told Mr. Reina and Mr. Acosta that he was
going to get out of the car and point the gun at Mr. Hernandez-
Arredondo. Defendant exited out of the car, tucked the gun in
the waistline of his pants, and walked up to Mr. Fernandez and
Mr. Hernandez-Arredondo as they talked.
During their conversation, Mr. Hernandez-Arredondo asked
Mr. Fernandez for his real name but he responded that his real
name was “George.” Mr. Hernandez-Arredondo then asked if Mr.
Fernandez’s name was “George” or “Pedro.” Defendant then called
Mr. Hernandez-Arredondo by an offensive name and shot him in the
face.
Mr. Fernandez and Defendant returned to the car, but
Defendant went back to retrieve Mr. Hernandez-Arredondo’s
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wallet, as he lay on the ground. Mr. Fernandez then drove away
from the scene, while Defendant counted the money from Mr.
Hernandez-Arredondo’s wallet, giving Mr. Reina $50 of the $400
he got. Mr. Fernandez then drove the four of them to a
restaurant, where they were joined by Mr. Fernandez’s father and
uncle. Mr. Fernandez paid Defendant the $500. Defendant was
subsequently interviewed by police during the investigation and
told them that he slept late on Sunday, 17 July 2011, and stayed
at home until 2 p.m. that day. Defendant did not testify or
offer any evidence at trial.
On 20 March 2013, a jury found Defendant guilty of first-
degree murder based on the felony murder rule. The trial court
sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment without parole.
Defendant gave notice of appeal in open court.
II. Argument
On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court
committed reversible error by allowing Mr. Fernandez to testify
regarding his motive to kill, (2) the trial court committed
plain error by admitting evidence regarding the victim’s good
character, and (3) the trial court committed plain error by
admitting evidence regarding his alleged alcohol and drug use
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before and after the killing. We address each argument in turn
below.
A. Testimony Regarding Defendant’s Motive
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in allowing
Mr. Fernandez to give speculative testimony regarding
Defendant’s motive or intent to kill Mr. Hernandez-Arredondo.
Specifically, Defendant points to the following testimony from
Mr. Fernandez, which he contends represents Mr. Fernandez’s
opinion regarding Defendant’s motives or intentions when
Defendant shot Mr. Hernandez-Arredondo:
[Prosecutor]. And when you got back in the
car, did you ask [Defendant] why he did it?
[Mr. Fernandez]. No.
Q. Do you have any idea why [Defendant] did
that?
[Defense Counsel]: Objection. Calls for
speculation.
THE COURT: Overruled.
[Prosecutor]. Do you know why [Defendant]
did that?
A. I think because the man recognized me.
He say my name. And I don’t know if
[Defendant] got nervous and shot him by
accident. Because it was not part of the
plan to shoot anyone.
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From the record, it appears that Defendant objected to the
admission of this evidence and the trial court overruled his
objection. Therefore, this argument is properly preserved for
our review. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1).
North Carolina Courts have generally held that a witness’s
opinion of another person’s intention on a particular occasion
has been generally inadmissible. State v. Patterson, 288 N.C.
553, 566, 220 S.E.2d 600, 610 (1975), death sentence vacated,
428 U.S. 904, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1211 (1976); Ballard v. Ballard, 230
N.C. 629, 634, 55 S.E.2d 316, 320 (1949); State v. Vines, 93
N.C. 493, 496-97 (1885). Additionally,
[t]he burden is on the party who asserts
that evidence was improperly admitted to
show both error and that he was prejudiced
by its admission. The admission of evidence
which is technically inadmissible will be
treated as harmless unless prejudice is
shown such that a different result likely
would have ensued had the evidence been
excluded.
State v. Taylor, 154 N.C. App. 366, 372, 572 S.E.2d 237, 242
(2002) (citing State v. Gappins, 320 N.C. 64, 68, 357 S.E.2d
654, 657 (1987)); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(a) (2011).
We note that Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder
based on the felony murder rule and the underlying felony of
robbery with a firearm. Our Supreme Court has stated that
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“[f]elony murder, by its definition, does not require ‘intent to
kill’ as an element that must be satisfied for a conviction.”
State v. Cagle, 346 N.C. 497, 517, 488 S.E.2d 535, 548 (citation
omitted), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1032, 139 L. Ed. 2d 614 (1997).1
Also, intent to kill is not an element of robbery with a
firearm. State v. Kearns, 27 N.C. App. 354, 356, 219 S.E.2d
228, 230 (1975), disc. review denied, 289 N.C. 300, 222 S.E.2d
700 (1976).
Defendant, however, argues that – although intent to kill
or motive is not an element of the crime of felony murder – Mr.
Fernandez’s opinion testimony was evidence which tended to show
that Defendant was the person who pulled the trigger. See State
v. Van Landingham, 283 N.C. 589, 600, 197 S.E.2d 539, 546 (1973)
(stating that “[e]vidence of motive is relevant as a
circumstance to identify an accused as the perpetrator of an
offense[.]” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). However,
even assuming that Mr. Fernandez’s testimony had this effect, we
do not believe Defendant was prejudiced by its admission because
of the other evidence presented that put the gun in Defendant’s
1
Our Supreme Court has recognized that motive is not an
element of felony murder but can be relevant as to sentencing in
a felony murder conviction. See State v. Irwin, 304 N.C. 93,
107, 282 S.E.2d 439, 448 (1981). Defendant raises no issues as
to sentencing.
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hands. For example, the key aspect of Mr. Fernandez’s testimony
which incriminates Defendant as being the shooter is not his
statement regarding Defendant’s intent or motive, but rather his
statement that he actually saw Defendant pull the trigger.
Accordingly, Defendant’s argument is overruled.
B. Testimony Regarding the Victim’s Good Character
Defendant next contends that the trial court’s admission of
the victim’s daughter’s testimony regarding the good character
of Mr. Hernandez-Arredondo was inadmissible, as Defendant had
not challenged the victim’s character. Defendant concludes that
this error amounted to plain error and he is entitled to a new
trial, as this testimony tended to distract the jury, created
sympathy for the victim and excited prejudice against Defendant,
allowing the jury to decide the case not on what happened but
upon the characters of Defendant and the victim.
The trial transcripts shows that the victim’s daughter
Anabel Hernandez testified that the victim was responsible,
hard-working, provided for his family, non-violent, concerned
about her education, concerned about his community, and ran his
own construction business. The record shows that Defendant
failed to object to this testimony regarding the victim’s
character. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1). Therefore, review for
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plain error is appropriate. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(4). To
establish plain error, Defendant must show
that a fundamental error occurred at trial.
See [State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300
S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983)]. To show that an
error was fundamental, a defendant must
establish prejudice that, after examination
of the entire record, the error “had a
probable impact on the jury’s finding that
the defendant was guilty.” See id.(citations and quotation marks omitted) . .
. . Moreover, because plain error is to be
“applied cautiously and only in the
exceptional case,” Odom, 307 N.C. at 660,
300 S.E.2d at 378, the error will often be
one that “seriously affect[s] the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings,” Odom, 307 N.C. at 660, 300
S.E.2d at 378[.]
State v. Lawrence, ____ N.C. ___, ___, 723 S.E.2d 326, 334
(2012). Therefore, “[i]n order to prevail under a plain error
analysis, Defendant must establish not only that the trial court
committed error, but that absent the error, the jury probably
would have reached a different result.” State v. Steen, 352
N.C. 227, 269, 536 S.E.2d 1, 25-26 (2000) (citation and
quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1167, 148 L.
Ed. 2d 997 (2001).
After examining all of the evidence presented, we note that
Ms. Hernandez’s testimony was only a small portion of the
evidence from one of the eleven witnesses presented by the State
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against Defendant. Given the overwhelming evidence of
Defendant’s guilt presented by the State, including testimony
from Defendant’s friends Mr. Fernandez and Mr. Reina that
Defendant pointed the handgun at the victim, shot the victim in
the face, and returned to take the victim’s wallet, we cannot
say that any error in the admission of this testimony “had a
probable impact on the jury’s finding that Defendant was
guilty,” see Lawrence, ___ N.C. at ___, 723 S.E.2d at 334, and
its exclusion would have resulted in a different result at
trial. Accordingly, we find no plain error; and Defendant’s
argument is overruled.
C. Testimony Regarding Defendant’s Alleged Alcohol and Drug Use
Lastly, Defendant contends that the trial court committed
plain error in admitting irrelevant and prejudicial “other
crimes” evidence that Defendant sought drugs before the killings
and drank alcohol and snorted cocaine afterwards. As Defendant
did not object at trial to the introduction of this testimony,
we review this argument under a plain error standard of review.
See N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(4); Lawrence, ____ N.C. at ___, 723
S.E.2d at 334; Steen, 352 N.C. at 269, 536 S.E.2d at 25-26.
Even assuming arguendo that it was error for the trial
court to allow testimony regarding Defendant’s alcohol and drug
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use, we again conclude that it did not rise to the level of
plain error. The highlighted testimony regarding Defendant’s
alcohol and drug use was only a small portion of the testimony
from two of the numerous witnesses the State put forth in this
case. In contrast to Defendant’s argument that the evidence
against him was not “particularly strong[,]” a thorough
examination of the whole record contains overwhelming evidence
of Defendant’s guilt; and we are not persuaded that the jury’s
verdict would have probably been different if the evidence of
Defendant’s drug and alcohol use had not been admitted.
Accordingly, Defendant failed to show plain error.
For the foregoing reasons, we find no reversible error in
Defendant’s trial.
NO ERROR.
Judge BRYANT and Judge STEPHENS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).