State v. Daniels ( 2014 )


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  • An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
    controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
    with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    NO. COA13-1197
    NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
    Filed: 3 June 2014
    STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
    v.                                      Pitt County
    No. 12CRS000156
    DARRYL WAYNE DANIELS
    Defendant
    Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 26 February 2013
    by Judge Quentin T. Sumner in Pitt County Superior Court.                     Heard
    in the Court of Appeals on 20 March 2014.
    Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Deputy
    Attorney General Charles G. Whitehead, for the State.
    Michael J. Reece, for Defendant-appellant.
    DILLON, Judge.
    Darryl      Wayne     Daniels      (“Defendant”)       appeals      from     a
    conviction for possession of stolen goods.                   For the following
    reasons, we find no error in Defendant’s trial and remand for
    correction of a clerical error.
    I.   Background
    -2-
    On or about 23 January 2012, Defendant was indicted on one
    count of felonious possession of stolen goods.                          Defendant was
    tried on this charge at the 18 February 2013 Criminal Session of
    Pitt County Superior Court.                The State’s evidence tended to show
    that on 16 November 2011, Joseph Vick broke into the residence
    of Mr. Linwood Baker and stole approximately $200,000 in cash,
    coins, and some pistols.              Justin Page was an accomplice to Mr.
    Vick in the theft.           Mr. Baker had hidden the money in a closet,
    packaged in twenty bank envelopes, holding approximately $10,000
    each.1       As soon as he discovered the theft, Mr. Baker contacted
    police.
    Mr.    Vick    and    Mr.     Page     split    the     money    evenly,      each
    receiving      ten   envelopes       or    approximately,        $100,000.     Several
    days later, Mr. Vick was arrested.                     He initially lied to the
    police, stating that he only stole $100,000 from Mr. Baker and
    kept     $80,000,     giving    only       $20,000    to   Mr.    Page.      Mr.     Vick
    explained that he told this lie in hopes that Mr. Page would not
    get caught with the other $100,000 and he could get some share
    of it when he got out of jail.                    Ultimately, however, Mr. Vick
    confessed      to    the    police    that    the     amount     he   had   stolen    was
    1
    Mr. Baker explained                  at trial that he had inherited
    approximately $251,000 in                 a certificate of deposit when his
    mother died in 2009.
    -3-
    $200,000.       At   trial,         Mr.    Vick    and        Mr.    Baker     consistently
    testified     that     they     had       stolen       $200,000        from    Mr.     Baker,
    splitting the money evenly.               As to his share, Mr. Page testified
    he spent $10,000 on drugs and hid the remaining $90,000 inside a
    shed on his neighbor’s property.
    Eventually, Mr. Page was arrested on 21 November 2011 for
    his   involvement      in     the   theft.         Mr.    Page’s       bond    was     set   at
    $500,000, and he called Defendant, a bail bondsman, from the
    Pitt County Detention Center.                   Over a series of phone calls,
    Defendant and Mr. Page discussed the circumstances surrounding
    Mr. Page’s charges and bail.                    In explaining his charges, Mr.
    Page told Defendant that he went to get a haircut and a guy that
    rode with him to the barbershop broke into a man’s house and
    because he did not turn that individual in to police “[t]hey
    charged me with everything they charged him with[.]”
    Defendant told Mr. Page that it would take $40,000 for him
    to get out on bond.            Mr. Page offered Defendant $35,000 cash.
    Mr. Page explained that he wanted Defendant to come and get him
    out of jail and he would show him where the cash was hidden.
    Defendant     refused,      explaining          that     he    would    need     the    money
    before   he   agreed     to    bond       Mr.   Page     out    of     jail.      Defendant
    explained to Mr. Page that he should wait until the next day and
    -4-
    get his bond reduced for only $2,500.                Mr. Page explained to
    Defendant that he wanted to get out that day, so he could go to
    the   methadone     clinic    and     not    go   through        drug   withdrawal
    symptoms.     Mr. Page then explained in detail to Defendant the
    location of the hidden money in a shed behind his neighbor’s
    house.      Defendant   asked    if   the    money   was    on    someone     else’s
    property and Mr. Page confirmed that it was but his neighbors
    were on vacation.       Defendant told Mr. Page that was “a serious
    theft” and “breaking and entering” but Mr. Page explained that
    it was in an open trailer shed, with no door.                    After the second
    call, Mr. Page further explained where to find the money and
    Defendant agreed to go.         Defendant again asked Mr. Page if there
    was anyone at his neighbor’s house and Mr. Page reassured him
    that there was no one there and he would not have hidden the
    money there if they were.           Mr. Page told Defendant that he had
    hidden   in   the   shed     nine     envelopes,     with    $10,000     in    each
    envelope, and for Defendant to get four of those envelopes and
    bail him out of jail.           During the last phone call, Defendant
    talked to Mr. Page, who directed him to the location of the shed
    where the money was hid in.             Defendant commented to Mr. Page
    that he was “just uncomfortable, man” and “this is like—this is
    like me trespassing on somebody else’s property” but Mr. Page
    -5-
    reassured him that, “I’m giving you permission, man.”               After
    indicating that he had found something, Defendant told Mr. Page
    that he would be calling the jail to bail him out.               Defendant
    did not speak to Mr. Page again that night. Cell phone mapping
    records showed that around 9:30 p.m. on the night in question
    Defendant’s cell phone was in the area of the neighbor’s shed.
    The   next   day,   on   22   November   2011,   Detective    Charles
    Mitchell, with the Pitt County Sheriff’s Department, one of the
    investigators in the theft at Mr. Baker’s house, received a call
    from attorney Earl Brown regarding Mr. Page.         Detective Mitchell
    told Mr. Brown that only $20,000 was needed to make Mr. Baker
    whole and if the money was returned then Mr. Page’s bond could
    be reduced.   Mr. Brown then met with Mr. Page at the jail and
    told him of this fact.       Mr. Page told Mr. Brown to speak with
    Defendant as “[h]e knew where all the money was.”        About an hour
    later, Mr. Brown delivered to Detective Mitchell two envelopes
    containing approximately, $10,000 each.          Mr. Page’s bond was
    reduced; Defendant posted bond for Mr. Page and he was released.
    Prior to his release, Mr. Page did not speak with Defendant and
    did not pay Defendant his premium for posting his bail.
    The next day, on 23 November 2011, after he had got home,
    Mr. Page checked his neighbor’s shed and discovered that all of
    -6-
    the $90,000 that he had hidden was gone.            Mr. Page’s electronic
    monitoring device, received as part of his release from jail,
    confirmed that he went to his neighbor’s barn that morning.              Mr.
    Page immediately called Mr. Brown explaining the situation and
    told him that Defendant was the “only person that knew where”
    the money was hidden and “[n]obody else took it.”            Mr. Page also
    called Defendant but Defendant told Mr. Page that he did not go
    to the barn that night.
    The same day, detectives from the Pitt County Sheriff’s
    Department came to Mr. Page’s home.           When police had agreed to
    release Mr. Page,      they believed that only $100,000 had been
    stolen   from   Mr.   Baker   in   the   break-in   based   on   Mr.   Vick’s
    statements.     However, after listening to the phone calls between
    Mr. Page and Defendant, they believed that Mr. Page had received
    $100,000, as his share of the theft.            Detectives searched the
    shed but did not find any money.           Mr. Page told detectives that
    his share of the theft was $100,000 but explained how he had
    told Defendant where the money was located to make his bond to
    get out of jail and now the money was gone.            Mr. Page testified
    that he had not told anyone but Defendant where he hid the
    money.    A week after Mr. Page met with detectives, Defendant
    came to his home and demanded $2,500 for the bond premium and
    -7-
    Mr.   Page    paid   him.      At    the    close      of   the   State’s    evidence,
    Defendant raised a motion to dismiss based on insufficiency of
    the evidence and his motion was denied by the trial court.
    Defendant      put     forth    the       following     evidence      at     trial:
    Terrance      Smith,   Defendant’s          business        partner    in    his       bail
    bondsman business, testified that on the evening of 21 November
    2011, he received a three-way call from Defendant and wrote down
    some directions while Defendant talked to Mr. Page on the phone.
    Defendant wanted to go and see if there was $35,000 in a shed
    and use that money to bail Mr. Page out of jail.                             Mr. Smith
    drove   Defendant      to    the    location      of   the    shed,    based      on    the
    directions he had written down.                  Upon arriving, they both got
    out of the truck; and Mr. Smith went into the shed and retrieved
    two   envelopes      which    he    saw    on    the   ground.        The    next      day,
    Defendant called Mr. Smith and told him to take the money to
    Attorney Earl Brown, as they were working on a bail reduction
    for Mr. Page.
    Attorney Earl Brown, testified that at some point on 22
    November 2011, he received a voice message from Defendant saying
    that Mr. Page desired his services to seek a reduction in his
    bond.        Mr.   Brown     called       Detective     Mitchell,      the       charging
    officer, to ask about the possibility of a bond reduction.                               He
    -8-
    was told that $20,000 was needed to make the victim whole.                  Mr.
    Brown then met with Mr. Page at the jail and told him that he
    needed to produce the $20,000 that belonged to the victim to
    reduce his bond.        After some reluctance, Mr. Page hired Mr.
    Brown for the limited-purpose of bond reduction, and instructed
    him that Defendant would give him the money.                   Mr. Brown then
    gave Defendant a call regarding the money.               Later that day, at
    the direction of Defendant, Mr. Smith arrived at Mr. Brown’s
    office and delivered a package containing $20,000, which Mr.
    Brown promptly took to Detective Mitchell.                The next day, Mr.
    Brown    received   a   phone   call    from    Mr.     Page   “ranting”     and
    complaining that he had been robbed and someone had taken his
    money.    At the end of the presentation of all the evidence,
    Defendant again raised his motion to dismiss, which was denied
    by the trial court.
    On or about 26 February 2013, a jury found Defendant guilty
    of   felonious   possession     of   stolen    goods.      The   trial     court
    sentenced Defendant to a term of 6 to 8 months imprisonment.
    The trial court suspended this sentence, ordered Defendant to
    serve an active term of 30 days imprisonment, placed Defendant
    on 60 months of supervised probation, and ordered Defendant to
    pay a total of $72,089.50 in restitution.               The trial court also
    -9-
    ordered     Defendant   to   surrender     his    bail    bondsmen       license.
    Defendant    gave   notice   of   appeal   in    open    court.     On   appeal,
    Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his
    motion to dismiss, as the evidence was insufficient to support a
    conviction for felony possession of stolen goods; and (2) there
    is a clerical error in the judgment that should be remanded for
    correction.
    II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
    Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying
    his motion to dismiss as there was insufficient evidence to show
    (1) he knew or had reasonable grounds to believe that the money
    hidden in the shed may have been stolen or (2) that he had a
    “dishonest purpose” when he took the money from the shed.
    The standard of review for a trial court’s denial of a
    defendant’s motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence
    is well established:
    A defendant’s motion to dismiss should be
    denied if there is substantial evidence of:
    (1) each essential element of the offense
    charged, and (2) of defendant’s being the
    perpetrator   of    the   charged  offense.
    Substantial evidence is relevant evidence
    that a reasonable mind might accept as
    adequate to support a conclusion.
    State v. Johnson, 
    203 N.C. App. 718
    , 724, 
    693 S.E.2d 145
    , 148
    (2010) (citations and quotation marks omitted).                   Additionally,
    -10-
    “[t]he      Court    must    consider      the     evidence      in    the     light   most
    favorable      to    the    State    and    the    State    is     entitled      to    every
    reasonable          inference       to     be     drawn     from       that     evidence.
    Contradictions and discrepancies do not warrant dismissal of the
    case but are for the jury to resolve.”                     State v. Phillpott, ___
    N.C.    App.    ___,       ___,    
    713 S.E.2d 202
    ,    209       (2011)    (citation
    omitted),      disc. review denied, 
    365 N.C. 544
    , 
    720 S.E.2d 393
    (2012).
    Defendant was convicted of felonious possession of stolen
    goods.      The essential elements of felonious possession of stolen
    goods are:          “(1) possession of personal property; (2) having a
    value in excess of [$1,000.00]; (3) which has been stolen; (4)
    the possessor knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe
    the property was stolen; and (5) the possessor acting with a
    dishonest purpose.”           State v. Martin, 
    97 N.C. App. 19
    , 25, 
    387 S.E.2d 211
    , 214 (1990); see also 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-71.1
    ,-72
    (2011).        Defendant          challenges      whether     the      State     put     for
    sufficient evidence of elements four and five of this offense.
    A.   Element Four: Knew or Had Reasonable Grounds to Know
    Defendant contends that he did not know or did not have
    reasonable grounds to conclude that the money was stolen because
    no reasonable person would conclude that someone had $35,000
    -11-
    from a breaking and entering in Pitt County; Mr. Page never told
    him that it was stolen; Mr. Page freely discussed the money in
    front   of    third-parties     at     the   jail,    while     talking       with
    Defendant; and Mr. Page’s hiding place for the money was no more
    unusual than Mr. Baker’s hiding place in an old suitcase.
    This Court has stated that “[w]hether the defendant knew or
    had reasonable grounds to believe that the [goods] were stolen
    must necessarily be proved through inferences drawn from the
    evidence.”     State v. Brown, 
    85 N.C. App. 583
    , 589, 
    355 S.E.2d 225
    , 229 (citation omitted), disc. review denied, 
    320 N.C. 172
    ,
    
    358 S.E.2d 57
     (1987).      In some cases, convictions for possession
    of stolen goods have been upheld “when knowledge was at issue
    have contained some evidence of incriminating behavior on the
    part of the accused.”       State v. Allen, 
    79 N.C. App. 280
    , 285,
    
    339 S.E.2d 76
    , 79, aff’d per curiam, 
    317 N.C. 329
    , 
    344 S.E.2d 789
     (1986).
    Defendant’s       argument        overlooks      crucial        direct     and
    circumstantial evidence, and the reasonable inferences from that
    evidence,    put   forth   by   the    State.     Several      of    Mr.     Page’s
    statements to Defendant over the phone should have indicated to
    Defendant that the money in the shed was stolen:                    (1) Mr. Page
    told Defendant he was charged and in jail in connection with a
    -12-
    possible larceny and/or breaking and entering in a man’s house;
    (2) his bond was set at $500,000; (3) he wanted to get out
    quickly    to    go   to   the   methadone        clinic;   (4)    he    had    recently
    hidden a large amount of money, $90,000, in his neighbor’s shed;
    (5)   he   told   Defendant      he   had    to    trespass   on    the       neighbor’s
    property to get the money; (6) he said that he did not want a
    friend or relative to retrieve the money for him because he did
    not “want them to know nothing about nothing[;]” (7) he wanted
    Defendant to use $40,000 of that money to bail him out that
    night, rather than staying in jail overnight and potentially
    having     his    bond     reduced    at     his    first   appearance;          (8)    he
    explained to Defendant that the money was not on his property
    because “I don’t want it on my property. You know what I’m
    saying[;]” (9) he explained to Defendant that he would not have
    hidden the money in the shed unless his neighbors were gone on
    vacation; and (10) he told Defendant that the money belonged to
    his brother, explaining, “you know what I mean.”                          It could be
    reasonably       inferred    from     this    evidence      that        Mr.    Page    had
    recently been involved in a breaking and entering serious enough
    to warrant a bail of $500,000; he was a drug addict but did not
    hesitate to pay $35,000 to potentially get out of jail that day;
    he had recently hidden a large amount of money on his neighbor’s
    -13-
    property because he did not want it in his immediate possession
    and did not want his neighbors or family to know about it; he
    encouraged Defendant to trespass on the neighbor’s property to
    retrieve the money for his bail; and he gave an inconsistent
    story about the ownership of the money saying first that it was
    his    money   then    it    was    his    brother’s    money.     See   State   v.
    Haskins, 
    60 N.C. App. 199
    , 201-02, 
    298 S.E.2d 188
    , 189-90 (1982)
    (in finding that the defendant had or reasonably should have had
    knowledge regarding the stolen nature of the guns, the Court
    noted the defendant’s inconsistent stories on how he obtained
    the guns).
    Defendant’s own statements             regarding his apprehension to
    retrieve the money from the shed show that he was aware that the
    retrieval of this money involved some “incriminating behavior”
    on the part of Mr. Page.             See Allen, 79 N.C. App. at 285, 
    339 S.E.2d at 79
    .          See also State v. Weakley, 
    176 N.C. App. 642
    ,
    652,    
    627 S.E.2d 315
    ,    322     (2006)     (concluding      that    the
    circumstantial evidence tended to show that the defendant knew
    or should have known the goods were stolen after considering a
    witness’s and the defendant’s incriminating statements regarding
    the circumstance and nature of the stolen goods).                     When viewed
    in    the   light     most   favorable      to    the   State,   Defendant’s     own
    -14-
    statements     and        his    conversations       with       Mr.     Page    and        the
    reasonable    inferences         therefrom,       show   that     Defendant      knew       or
    reasonably should have known that the money he retrieved had
    been stolen by Mr. Page.                 See Martin, 
    97 N.C. App. at 25
    , 
    387 S.E.2d at 214
    .
    B.      Element Five: Dishonest Purpose
    Defendant     contends       that     there       was    no     evidence       of    a
    dishonest purpose in him taking the money because as soon as he
    learned that it was stolen he turned it in to authorities.
    “[W]hether someone is acting with a dishonest purpose is a
    question of intent.”             Brown, 85 N.C. App. at 586, 
    355 S.E.2d at 228
    .    Additionally,
    the “dishonest purpose” element of the crime
    of possession of stolen property can be met
    by a showing that the possessor acted with
    an intent to aid the thief, receiver, or
    possessor of stolen property. The fact that
    the defendant does not intend to profit
    personally by his action is immaterial. It
    is sufficient if he intends to assist
    another wrongdoer in permanently depriving
    the true owner of his property.
    State   v.   Parker,       
    316 N.C. 295
    ,    305-06,      
    341 S.E.2d 555
    ,       561
    (1986).
    Contrary      to     Defendant’s       contentions,            the   direct         and
    circumstantial       evidence,      and     reasonable         inferences      from    that
    evidence, put forth by the State were sufficient to show that
    -15-
    Defendant took possession of the stolen money with a dishonest
    purpose.      As noted above, there was substantial evidence put
    forth by the State to show that Defendant knew or reasonably
    should have known that the money was stolen.                          Circumstantial
    evidence put forward by the State showed that Defendant went to
    the shed at Mr. Page’s direction; got the stolen $90,000 from
    the shed; and turned at least part of the money, $20,000 over to
    authorities,      so   that       Mr.   Page,    the    person     that      originally
    assisted in stealing the money, could make bail; and kept the
    remaining    stolen     money,      $70,000.           Whether   it    was     $90,000,
    $70,000, or the $20,000 turned over to Detective Mitchell, the
    evidence shows that Defendant intended to keep or use this money
    to the detriment of its true owner, Mr. Baker.                            As evidence
    showed that Defendant acted with a dishonest purpose in keeping
    stolen   money,    and,      at   least   by     aiding   Mr.    Page,       the   person
    responsible    for     the    theft,      in    posting    bail,      this    would    be
    sufficient under Parker, to show that his intent was “to assist
    another wrongdoer in permanently depriving the true owner of his
    property.”     316 N.C. at 305-06, 
    341 S.E.2d at 561
    .
    Defendant further argues that under the State’s theory that
    if Defendant had a dishonest purpose in turning the money over
    for a bail reduction “a person who found money, learned it was
    -16-
    stolen, turned it in and received a reward would be guilty of
    possession of stolen goods since by receiving the reward they
    received a benefit.”        Defendant’s hypothetical in support of his
    argument    is    based   only   on    his    arguments   at   trial,    and    the
    evidence he put forward, and views the evidence in the light
    most favorable to Defendant; and, therefore, this argument has
    no merit in our analysis where we are to view the evidence in
    the light most favorable to the State.
    In    sum,    the    evidence,    when     viewed    in   the   light     most
    favorable to the State, see Phillpott, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 
    713 S.E.2d at 209
    , showed that the State put for sufficient evidence
    to establish these elements of felonious possession of stolen
    goods.     We hold that the trial court properly denied Defendant’s
    motions to dismiss.          See Johnson, 203 N.C. App. at 724, 
    693 S.E.2d at 148
    .2
    III. Clerical Error
    Both    Defendant     and   the    State     point   us   to    a   possible
    clerical error in the judgment regarding the term of Defendant’s
    probation.       N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343.2(d)(4)(2011) states that
    2
    Because we find sufficient evidence of each contested
    element of felonious possession of stolen goods, we need not
    address Defendant’s argument that the State also did not provide
    sufficient evidence to show that the goods were stolen pursuant
    to felonious breaking and entering.
    -17-
    “[u]nless     the    court     makes        specific    findings         that   longer      or
    shorter      periods    of    probation        are     necessary[,]”        a   defendant
    convicted of a felony and sentenced to intermediate punishment
    should receive a term of probation no greater than 36 months.
    This statute goes on to state that “[i]f the court finds at the
    time    of    sentencing       that     a     longer    period      of     probation        is
    necessary,      that    period        may    not     exceed     a   maximum      of        five
    years[.]”      N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343.2(d).                 Here, in determining
    that Defendant’s probationary term would be for five years, the
    trial   court    found       “that    the     extent    of    the   probation      is      due
    directly to rehabilitation of the Defendant.”                            On the written
    judgment,      however,       while     Defendant’s          term   of     probation         is
    indicated to be for 60 months, the Court failed to indicate that
    its finding that a longer period of probation was necessary
    pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343.2(d), as it had found in
    open court.         Both Defendant and the State say this discrepancy
    amounts to a clerical error in the judgment, and we agree.                                  See
    State v. Smith, 
    188 N.C. App. 842
    , 845, 
    656 S.E.2d 695
    , 696-97
    (2008) (stating that “[w]hen, on appeal, a clerical error is
    discovered      in    the    trial     court’s       judgment       or    order,      it    is
    appropriate to remand the case to the trial court for correction
    -18-
    because of the importance that the record speak the truth”).      As
    such, we remand for correction of the clerical error.   See 
    id.
    For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in Defendant’s
    trial and remand for correction of a clerical error.
    NO ERROR; REMAND FOR CORRECTION OF A CLERICAL ERROR.
    Judge STROUD and Judge HUNTER, JR. concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).