State v. Gurkin , 234 N.C. App. 207 ( 2014 )

NO. COA13-1220
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 3 June 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Martin County
No. 09 CRS 0413
ALBERT GREY GURKIN, SR.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 7 February 2013
by Judge Wayland J. Sermons, Jr., in Martin County Superior
Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 March 2014.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General Richard L. Harrison, for the State.
Rudolf Widenhouse & Fialko, by M. Gordon Widenhouse, Jr.,
for defendant-appellant.
McCULLOUGH, Judge.
Defendant appeals from judgment entered 7 February 2013
after a Martin County jury found him guilty of second-degree
murder. For the following reasons, we find no prejudicial
error.
I. Background
Defendant, Albert Grey Gurkin, Sr., was indicted for first-
degree murder on 17 August 2009. Defendant was tried at the 28
January 2013 Criminal Session of Martin County Superior Court,
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the Honorable Wayland J. Sermons, Jr., presiding.
Prior to the start of jury selection, the trial court
inquired as to whether counsel had any objections and no
objections were raised. Jury selection began with the trial
court selecting six prospective jurors for voir dire. All six
prospective jurors were passed to the defense. The trial court
excused one venire member and the defense accepted the remaining
five. The trial court then directed the clerk to call seven
prospective jurors. This modified process continued without
objection until a full jury was accepted.
During the voir dire of prospective juror Ms. McNeil,
McNeil stated she overheard some discussion in the jury room
about the case. Specifically, she overheard a few prospective
jurors discussing whether they knew defendant or what the case
was about. During the State’s voir dire questioning, the
following exchange took place:
MR. EDWARDS: Have you -- since this
happened, do you recall having a
conversation with anyone about the case?
JUROR NO. 7/MS. MCNEILL: Not really. Just,
you know wondering what it was about when I
was sitting in the jury room.
During defense counsel’s voir dire questioning, the following
exchange took place:
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MR. DUPREE: You mentioned something that
I’m going to ask you a couple of questions
about. You said in the jury room where
you’ve all got so much free time over the
last few days there was some discussion
about what was going on or what the case was
about?
JUROR NO. 7/MS. MCNEILL: Yes, a little bit.
MR. DUPREE: What kind of discussion did you
hear?
JUROR NO. 7/MS. MCNEILL: Did we –- did
anybody know him, you know, Grey, know him
personally and what happened, that sort of
thing. I know you said not to do that, but
they did.
THE COURT: I sure did.
MR. DUPREE: Would you say that was quite a
few people asking each other about –-
JUROR NO. 7/MS. MCNEILL: No, not a lot.
Just a few.
MR. DUPREE: Just people in your circle?
JUROR NO. 7/MS. MCNEILL: Just a little bit
around me.
MR. DUPREE: Well, obviously, you knew, and
you’re an accomplished person who has had a
long career, what the Judge’s specific
instructions were. Do you feel like that
that disobeyance, that discussion, had any
impact on you?
JUROR NO. 7/MS. MCNEILL: No, because nobody
knew much about it.
MR. DUPREE: . . . In its entire capacity,
do you think any of those discussions would
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have caused any impact on the ability to sit
on this jury?
JUROR NO. 7/MS. MCNEILL: No.
MR. DUPREE: Now, other than asking about
what was –- if anybody knew him or knew them
or whatever, what else was discussed that
you heard?
JUROR NO. 7/MS. MCNEILL: That’s about it.
It was the same thing. It was what I read
in the paper or on the news.
MR. DUPREE: They talked about that, the
coverage that had been applied to the media?
JUROR NO. 7/MS. MCNEILL: A little bit. But
–- (shaking her head back and forth.)
Based on these exchanges, defense counsel made a motion for
mistrial. After the court asked defense counsel whether he
intended to offer any evidence in support of his motion, he
requested to examine the 57 remaining members of the jury pool
that may have been in the room at the time of the alleged
improper discussion. That request, along with the motion for
mistrial, was denied. The trial court declined to excuse Ms.
McNeill for cause and the defense used one of its peremptory
challenges to excuse her.
The evidence at trial tended to show the following:
defendant and Jewel Gurkin, the victim, had a contentious
marriage. They would often go days without speaking to one
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another. A main point of contention was the contents of
defendant’s will. Defendant wanted to leave all of his money to
Jewel and all of his land to his son, Grey Gurkin, Jr. Jewel
was unhappy about defendant leaving the land to his son. Jewel
told others about her troubles with defendant and that she
feared “something was going to happen.”
The night before Jewel’s death, she and defendant engaged
in a heated argument about defendant’s will. The next morning,
defendant went into the bathroom to shave and brush his teeth.
While defendant was washing his eyes with a hot washcloth, Jewel
touched defendant in his lower back with a stun gun. Defendant
turned around and pushed Jewel up against the cabinets in an
attempt to keep her from using the stun gun again. Defendant
was able to use his left hand to push the stun gun into Jewel’s
side. Defendant had no memory of what he did with his right
hand. Jewel “snatched back” and the stun gun burned defendant’s
fingers. According to defendant, the next thing he knew, they
were on the floor.
Defendant noticed blood in the corner of Jewel’s mouth and
discovered she was not breathing. When defendant realized Jewel
was dead, he wrapped her in a blanket, tied her hands and feet
together, and carried her down to a pond on his property. He
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moved some sticks and limbs around and laid her on the ground.
Police were alerted when Jewel failed to show up for work. They
were unable to find her. That night, defendant stayed with his
son and told him what he had done. Sometime between midnight
and 5:00 a.m., defendant moved and unwrapped the body so it
could be found. After moving the body, defendant was immediately
apprehended by the police, who had been searching for the body
all day.
An autopsy revealed the cause of death to be strangulation.
The state’s expert testified that it can take approximately ten
seconds of compression on the neck for a person to lose
consciousness and approximately five minutes to cause death.
At the close of the evidence, the trial court instructed
the jury on first-degree murder, second-degree murder, voluntary
manslaughter, and acquittal. Defense counsel requested
instructions on self-defense and imperfect self-defense, which
the trial court denied. The jury returned a verdict finding
defendant guilty of second-degree murder and the trial court
entered a judgment sentencing defendant to a term of 189 to 236
months in prison. Defendant gave notice of appeal in open
court.
II. Discussion
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Defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1)
whether the trial court abused its discretion by declining to
inquire into alleged improper discussions by prospective jurors;
(2) whether the trial court plainly erred in deviating from the
statutory procedure for passing jurors to defendant during jury
selection; (3) whether the trial court plainly erred in omitting
an instruction on involuntary manslaughter; and (4) whether the
trial court properly denied defendant’s requested instructions
on self-defense and imperfect self-defense.
A. Jury Misconduct
Defendant first asserts that the trial court abused its
discretion by declining to make an inquiry into alleged improper
discussions by prospective jurors. Specifically, defendant
argues that when such jury misconduct is alleged, the trial
court must conduct an investigation into the alleged misconduct
and does not have the discretion to decline to do so.
In reviewing a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a
motion for mistrial on the basis of juror misconduct, we review
for abuse of discretion. State v. Bonney, 329 N.C. 61, 73, 405
S.E.2d 145, 152 (1991). The trial court’s decision should only
be overturned where the error is so serious that it
substantially and irreparably prejudiced the defendant, making a
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fair and impartial verdict impossible. Id.“The determination of the existence and effect of jury
misconduct is primarily for the trial court whose decision will
be given great weight on appeal.” Id. at 83, 405 S.E.2d at 158.
When jury misconduct is alleged, the trial court is vested with
the “discretion to determine the procedure and scope of the
inquiry.” State v. Burke, 343 N.C. 129, 149, 469 S.E.2d 901,
910 (1996).
Defendant relies on State v. Harris, 145 N.C. App. 570, 551
S.E.2d 499 (2001), disc. review denied, 355 N.C. 218, 560 S.E.2d
146 (2002), for the contention that an absolute duty to
investigate juror misconduct is imposed upon the trial court
when such misconduct is alleged. Specifically, defendant cites
to the following sentence: “Where juror misconduct is alleged .
. . the trial court must investigate the matter and make
appropriate inquiry.” Harris, 145 N.C. App. at 576, 551 S.E.2d
at 503. Defendant’s reliance on this quote ignores the
immediately following sentence from Harris: “However, there is
no absolute rule that a court must hold a hearing to investigate
juror misconduct upon an allegation.” Id. at 576-77, 551 S.E.2d
at 503. Indeed, this Court has held that only “[w]hen there is
substantial reason to fear that the jury has become aware of
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improper and prejudicial matters, the trial court must question
the jury as to whether such exposure has occurred and, if so,
whether the exposure was prejudicial.” State v. Black, 328 N.C.
191, 196, 400 S.E.2d 398, 401 (1991) (emphasis added). Further,
“[a]n examination of the juror involved in alleged misconduct is
not always required, especially where the allegation is
nebulous.” Harris, 145 N.C. App. at 577, 551 S.E.2d at 503.
Our Supreme Court has held that “‘[i]n the event of some
contact with a juror it is the duty of the trial judge to
determine whether such contact resulted in substantial and
irreparable prejudice to the defendant. It is within the
discretion of the trial judge as to what inquiry to make.’”
Burke, 343 N.C. at 149, 469 S.E.2d at 911 (emphasis added)
(quoting State v Willis, 332 N.C. 151, 173, 420 S.E.2d 158, 168
(1992)).
The trial court acted within its discretion in declining to
conduct any further inquiry into the alleged improper
discussions of prospective jurors and limiting the scope of its
inquiry to the lines of questioning quoted above. When asked by
the court, defense counsel could not say how defendant was
prejudiced. Ms. McNeill stated that from what she overheard, no
prospective juror indicated that he or she either knew defendant
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or anything about the case. Based upon Ms. McNeill’s responses
and the trial court’s observations, the trial court was
satisfied that the alleged statements of prospective jurors did
not give rise to a substantial reason to fear that the jury was
prejudiced. It was well within the trial court’s discretion
when it limited its inquiry to a consideration of Ms. McNeill’s
voir dire and determined that there was no prejudice to
defendant. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not
err in refusing to conduct any further inquiry.
B. Jury Selection Procedure
Defendant next asserts that the trial court erred in
deviating from the statutory procedure for passing jurors to
defendant during jury selection. Defendant argues that
deviation from the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1214
entitles him to a new trial. We disagree.
Although defendant failed to object to the procedure
utilized at trial, “when a trial court acts contrary to a
statutory mandate . . . the right to appeal the court’s action
is preserved.” State v. Love, 177 N.C. App. 614, 623, 630
S.E.2d 234, 240, disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 580, 636 S.E.2d
192 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). In reviewing a
trial court’s deviation from the statutory procedure for the
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passing of jurors to the defendant where defendant failed to
object to the procedure, we review for plain error. State v.
Stroud, 147 N.C. App. 549, 564, 557 S.E.2d 544, 553 (2001). Our
Supreme Court recently clarified how the plain error rule is to
be applied in North Carolina:
For error to constitute plain error, a
defendant must demonstrate that a
fundamental error occurred at trial. To
show that an error was fundamental, a
defendant must establish prejudice that,
after examination of the entire record, the
error had a probable impact on the jury’s
finding that the defendant was guilty.
State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 518, 723 S.E.2d 326, 334,
(2012) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Further, the plain error rule is to be applied cautiously and
only in exceptional cases, and the error will often be one that
“seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings[.]” Id. (quotation marks and
citations omitted).
The procedure for passing prospective jurors to a defendant
during jury selection is governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1214,
which provides in pertinent part:
(d) The prosecutor must conduct his
examination of the first 12 jurors seated
and make his challenges for cause and
exercise his peremptory challenges. If the
judge allows a challenge for cause, or if a
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peremptory challenge is exercised, the clerk
must immediately call a replacement into the
box. When the prosecutor is satisfied with
the 12 in the box, they must then be
tendered to the defendant. . . .
. . . .
(f) Upon the calling of replacement jurors,
the prosecutor must examine the replacement
jurors and indicate satisfaction with a
completed panel of 12 before the replacement
jurors are tendered to a defendant. . . .
This procedure is repeated until all parties
have accepted 12 jurors.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1214(d) and (f) (2013). It is undisputed
that the trial court violated the statutorily mandated procedure
for jury selection. Despite this violation, “a new trial does
not automatically follow a finding of statutory error.” State
v. Garcia, 358 N.C. 382, 406, 597 S.E.2d 724, 742-43 (2004),
cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1156, 161 L. Ed. 2d 122 (2005). Our
Supreme Court has “consistently required that defendants
claiming error in jury selection procedures show prejudice in
addition to a statutory violation before they can receive a new
trial.” Id. at 406, 597 S.E.2d at 743.
The procedure for jury selection is designed to “ensure the
empanelment of an impartial and unbiased jury.” Love, 177 N.C.
App. at 623, 630 S.E.2d at 241 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Defendant, both in his brief and reply brief, asserts
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a claim of prejudice on the basis that the trial court deviated
from the statutory procedure. However, defendant fails to show,
nor does he argue, “jury bias, the inability to question
prospective jurors, inability to assert peremptory challenges,
nor any other defect which had the likelihood to affect the
outcome of the trial.” Id.Defendant’s basis for prejudice on appeal is that he
exhausted his peremptory challenges. We are not persuaded by
this argument. Defendant’s bare assertion that he was prejudiced
in this manner fails to meet his “heavier burden of showing that
the error rises to the level of plain error.” Lawrence, 365
N.C. at 516, 723 S.E.2d 333.
Defendant also contends that deviation from the statutory
procedure constitutes reversible error per se. To support this
contention, defendant relies on Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S.
648, 95 L. Ed. 2d 622 (1987). However, whatever support
defendant draws from Gray is limited to capital cases.
Accordingly, because defendant has failed to show prejudice, we
hold that the trial court’s deviation from the statutory
procedure does not warrant a new trial.
C. Instruction on Involuntary Manslaughter
Defendant’s third contention is that the trial court erred
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by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense
of involuntary manslaughter. Defendant argues that because the
evidence suggests he acted with at most culpable negligence, the
trial court should have instructed the jury on involuntary
manslaughter. We disagree.
Because defendant did not request an instruction on
involuntary manslaughter and did not object to the instructions
given at trial, we review for plain error. State v. McCollum,
157 N.C. App. 408, 412, 579 S.E.2d 467, 469 (2003), aff’d, 358
N.C. 132, 591 S.E.2d 519 (2004). As noted above, the plain
error rule is to be applied cautiously, and only in exceptional
cases where a fundamental error occurred such that the error had
a probable impact on the jury’s finding that the defendant was
guilty. Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 518, 723 S.E.2d at 334.
The distinguishing difference between second-degree murder
and manslaughter is the presence of malice in second-degree
murder and its absence in manslaughter. McCollum, 157 N.C. App.
at 412, 579 S.E.2d at 470. Defendant argues that the evidence
showed he acted recklessly and with a disregard for human life
and did not intend to kill Jewel. Thus, defendant argues, an
instruction on involuntary manslaughter was necessary. However,
malice can be implied where a defendant acted so recklessly or
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wantonly “as to manifest depravity of mind and disregard for
human life. In such a case, the homicide cannot be involuntary
manslaughter, even if the assailant did not intend to kill the
victim.” Id. at 412-13, 579 S.E.2d at 570 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
We find McCollum to be squarely on point with our case. In
that case, as here, the trial court submitted first-degree
murder, second-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and
acquittal to the jury, who returned a verdict of second-degree
murder. The defendant did not request an instruction on
involuntary manslaughter, nor did he object to the lack of such
an instruction. This Court held that when the jury returned a
verdict of second-degree murder, it necessarily negated a
finding of the absence of malice:
When the jury convicted defendant of second-
degree murder and rejected voluntary
manslaughter, it necessarily found that
defendant acted with malice. A finding of
malice precludes a finding of either
voluntary manslaughter or involuntary
manslaughter. Any asserted error in failing
to instruct on involuntary manslaughter was
harmless and does not rise to the level of
plain error.
McCollum, 157 N.C. App. at 414, 579 S.E.2d at 471 (citation
omitted). In finding defendant guilty of second-degree murder,
the jury necessarily found beyond a reasonable doubt that
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defendant acted with malice, rejecting the absence of malice
necessary for involuntary manslaughter. The jury had an
opportunity to find an absence of malice and did not. Thus, it
cannot be said that had the jury been instructed on involuntary
manslaughter, the jury would have reached a different verdict.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not plainly err in
failing to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter.
D. Self-Defense and Imperfect Self-Defense Instruction
Defendant’s final argument is that the trial court erred in
denying his request to instruct the jury on self-defense and
imperfect self-defense. Because defendant requested jury
instructions on self-defense and imperfect self-defense, we
review de novo. State v. Cruz, 203 N.C. App. 230, 235, 691
S.E.2d 47, 50 (2010).
Perfect self-defense excuses a killing completely when it
is shown at the time of the killing that:
(1) it appeared to defendant and he believed
it to be necessary to kill the deceased
in order to save himself from death or
great bodily harm; and
(2) defendant’s belief was reasonable in that
the circumstances as they appeared to him
at the time were sufficient to create
such a belief in the mind of a person of
ordinary firmness; and
(3) defendant was not the aggressor in
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bringing on the affray, i.e., he did not
aggressively and willingly enter into the
fight without legal excuse or
provocation; and
(4) defendant did not use excessive force,
i.e., did not use more force than was
necessary or reasonably appeared to him
to be necessary under the circumstances
to protect himself from death or great
bodily harm.
State v. Bush, 307 N.C. 152, 158, 297 S.E.2d 563, 568 (1982).
An instruction on imperfect self-defense arises when only the
first two of the above elements are shown. Id. at 159, 297
S.E.2d at 568.
A defendant is entitled to an instruction on self-defense
only where there is “any evidence in the record from which it
can be determined that it was necessary or reasonably appeared
to be necessary for him to kill his adversary in order to
protect himself from death or great bodily harm.” Id. at 160,
297 S.E.2d at 569. It is for the trial court to determine as a
matter of law “whether there is any evidence that the defendant
reasonably believed it to be necessary to kill his adversary in
order to protect himself from death or great bodily harm.” Id.In determining whether a self-defense instruction should have
been given, we examine the facts in the light most favorable to
the defendant. State v. Moore, 111 N.C. App. 649, 654, 432
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S.E.2d 887, 889 (1993).
At no point during the trial did defendant testify that he
thought it was necessary or reasonably necessary to kill Jewel
in order to protect himself from death or great bodily harm.
Defendant only testified that his wife was holding a stun gun
and that he pushed her up against the bathroom cabinets to keep
her from using the stun gun. Defendant was able to push the
stun gun into Jewel’s side and ultimately subdued her. He did
not state that he feared for his life or that he feared he might
suffer great bodily harm at any time during the altercation.
Defendant’s testimony does not suggest, neither explicitly nor
implicitly, that it was necessary or reasonably necessary to
kill his wife in order to avoid death or great bodily harm.
We find that the evidence taken in the light most favorable
to defendant fails to show any circumstances that would suggest
that defendant reasonably believed it was necessary or
reasonably necessary for him to kill Jewel in order to avoid
death or great bodily harm. Because defendant failed to satisfy
the required elements for an instruction on self-defense or
imperfect self-defense, we hold that the trial court did not err
in refusing to submit those issues to the jury.
III. Conclusion
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For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the trial
court did not commit prejudicial error.
No prejudicial error.
Judges ELMORE and DAVIS concur.