State v. Adams ( 2014 )

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA13-1202
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 20 May 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Johnston County
No. 12CRS50894
KIMBERLY DALE ADAMS
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 11 December 2012
by Judge Thomas H. Lock in Johnston County Superior Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 March 2014.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Torrey D. Dixon, for the State.
Amanda S. Zimmer for defendant-appellant.
HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.
Kimberly Dale Adams (“defendant”) appeals from judgment
entered after a jury convicted her for one count of felony
breaking and entering and one count of felony larceny. On
appeal, defendant argues that the trial court: (1) erred by
admitting irrelevant photographs into evidence; (2) erred by
denying defendant’s motion to dismiss because there was
insufficient evidence to establish all elements of breaking and
2
entering; and (3) committed plain error by not instructing the
jury on abandonment as a defense to larceny. Defendant also
argues that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
request an instruction on abandonment as a defense to larceny.
After careful review, we find no error.
Background
The evidence presented at trial tended to establish the
following facts: defendant and a male companion arrived at the
residential home at 185 Winterberry Street in Clayton, North
Carolina on 9 February 2012. A neighbor, Michael Coats (“Mr.
Coats”), testified that from his own home across the street he
saw defendant and the man back into the driveway, open the hatch
of their vehicle, and enter the home through the side door of
the garage. Mr. Coats approached the house and heard either
defendant or her companion opening boxes inside. He then
confronted them. Defendant told Mr. Coats that they were
working with a realtor, that the house was in foreclosure, and
they were considering buying it. Mr. Coats then left the house
and called 911. After Mr. Coats left the house, he saw
defendant put a crate in the back of the vehicle before driving
away.
Two officers responded to the 911 call. Officer Clay Coats
(“Officer Coats”) found the door to the garage open but in a
locked position with signs of possible tampering around the
3
door. Officer Coats testified that he observed a number of
personal belongings in the house. Another officer, Detective
Brad Gillis (“Detective Gillis”), testified that he observed
slight pry marks on every outside door, each of which was
locked. Photographs of pry marks on the front and back doors
were admitted for illustrative purposes during the testimony of
Detective Gillis, over objection by defense counsel that they
were irrelevant.
Defendant was pulled over by Officer Isaiah Ruffin
(“Officer Ruffin”), who had responded to the description of the
vehicle called in by Mr. Coats. Sergeant Robert Raetz, another
officer on the scene, testified that he seized a tote containing
“various items” that was in plain view. The police report
valued these items at one dollar, but in subsequent arrest
warrant they were valued at one hundred dollars. Other officers
arrived and located a screwdriver and laptop in the vehicle.
Defendant was then arrested and charged with felony breaking and
entering and larceny of toys and a container.
At trial, Helen Lambeth (“Ms. Lambeth”) testified for the
State. She and her husband owned the residence at 185
Winterberry Street, but were in default on their mortgage with
Wells Fargo; they received a pre-foreclosure notice from Wells
Fargo in June 2011. They moved out in May 2011, bringing most
of their personal property with them and had not returned to
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reclaim the property left behind. When they moved out of the
house, all of the doors were closed and locked with no damage.
Her family left property in the house because they could not fit
all of their belongings into the small moving vehicle they had
rented and could only use for a limited time. However, Ms.
Lambeth testified that they planned to return and retrieve the
property left behind. Ms. Lambeth further testified that she
did not consent to defendant being present or taking the toys
and container from the house.
At the close of the State’s evidence, defendant moved to
dismiss the charges in part because it was unclear who actually
owned the house at the time of the alleged breaking and
entering. At the close of all evidence, defendant renewed the
motion to dismiss. Both motions were denied. The judge
instructed the jury that the photographs showing pry marks on
the doors were admitted for illustrative purposes only.
The jury found defendant guilty of felony breaking and
entering and felony larceny. Defendant received a consolidated
sentence of eight to nineteen months imprisonment that was
suspended for thirty-six months of supervised probation.
Defendant later entered an untimely pro se notice of appeal.
Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari on 12 December
2013.
Writ of Certiorari
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Defendant concedes that she filed untimely notice of appeal
in contravention of Rule 4 of the North Carolina Rules of
Appellate Procedure. See N.C. R. App. P. 4 (2013). It is well-
established that without proper notice of appeal, this Court
does not acquire jurisdiction to review the appeal. State v.
McCoy, 171 N.C. App. 636, 638, 615 S.E.2d 319, 320, appeal
dismissed, 360 N.C. 73, 622 S.E.2d 626 (2005). However,
defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari in this case
seeking a belated appeal. This Court has previously allowed a
petition for writ of certiorari where a pro se defendant failed
to comply with the requirements of Rule 4. See State v.
Crawford, __ N.C. App. __, __, 737 S.E.2d 768, 769 (2013)
(granting the defendant’s petition writ of certiorari even
though she failed to serve her pro se notice of appeal on the
State).
Based on the foregoing, we allow defendant’s petition for
writ of certiorari and will consider the merits of her appeal.
Discussion
I. Photographic Evidence of Pry Marks
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred when it
admitted irrelevant photographs showing damage to the front and
back doors of the house. We disagree.
“Even though a trial court’s rulings on relevancy
technically are not discretionary and therefore are not reviewed
6
under the abuse of discretion standard applicable to Rule 403,
such rulings are given great deference on appeal.” State v.
Wallace, 104 N.C. App. 498, 502, 410 S.E.2d 226, 228 (1991).
Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as “evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence.” N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 401 (2013). Only relevant evidence is
admissible. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 402 (2013). If the
evidence has no tendency to prove a fact at issue in the case,
the evidence is irrelevant and must be excluded. State v.
Perry, 298 N.C. 502, 510, 259 S.E.2d 496, 501 (1979). There
must be a “reasonable, or open and visible connection, rather
than one which is remote, latent, or conjectural, between the
evidence presented and the fact to be proved by it.” State v.
Bates, 309 N.C. 528, 536, 308 S.E.2d 258, 263-64 (1983)
(alterations in original).
The elements of the crime of breaking or entering are (1)
the breaking or entering (2) of a building (3) without the
consent of the owner or occupant (4) with the intent to commit
any felony or larceny therein. State v. Boone, 297 N.C. 652,
657, 256 S.E.2d 683, 686 (1979); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-54 (2013).
In order for an entry to be unlawful, for the purpose of
felonious breaking and entering, the entry must be without the
7
owner’s consent. State v. Rawlinson, 198 N.C. App. 600, 607,
679 S.E.2d 878, 882 (2009).
Defendant argues that the photographs showing damage to the
front and back doors of the house were irrelevant because it was
established at trial that defendant entered the house through
the garage door. No pictures of the garage door were shown to
the jury. Thus, defendant contends that the photographs of the
front and back doors had no “reasonable, or open and visible”
connection to any facts at issue in the case. We disagree.
The photographs were admitted for illustrative purposes to
explain testimony from Detective Gillis that there were signs of
possible tampering on the doors consistent with forced entry.
Where a proper foundation has been laid, photographs may be used
to illustrate a witness’s testimony and facilitate his
explanation. State v. Swift, 290 N.C. 383, 395, 226 S.E.2d 652,
662 (1976). Here, the photographs explained and illustrated the
degree to which the pry marks were present on the front and back
doors as Detective Gillis testified. Defendant does not contest
that Detective Gillis’s testimony was relevant. Indeed, this
testimony was relevant, because evidence of pry marks on the
doors had a tendency to make it more likely that defendant
entered the building without the owner’s consent and may have
entered the garage door because she had tried to get in through
other doors, but found them to be locked and impenetrable.
8
Because entering a building without the consent of the owner
constitutes an element of the crime charged, the circumstances
surrounding defendant’s entry into the home are material facts,
and Detective Gillis’s testimony made nonconsensual entry more
likely than it would be without the evidence. Thus, because the
photographs were only admitted to illustrate this relevant
testimony, we conclude that the trial court did not err by
admitting them for that purpose.
II. Felonious Intent & Consent to Entry
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by failing
to dismiss the charge of breaking and entering because the State
failed to establish: (1) she had the requisite intent to commit
a felony or larceny at the time of entry; and (2) she did not
have consent to enter the house. We disagree.
We review the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss
de novo on appeal. State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 62, 650
S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007). Under the de novo standard of review, the
reviewing court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes
its own judgment for the lower court’s. Sutton v. N.C. Dep’t of
Labor, 132 N.C. App. 387, 389, 511 S.E.2d 340, 341 (1999).
When a trial court rules on a motion to dismiss, it must
determine whether the State presented substantial evidence of
each essential element of that offense. State v. Davis, 74 N.C.
App. 208, 212, 328 S.E.2d 11, 14 (1985). “Substantial evidence
9
is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71,
78, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980). “In making its determination,
the trial court must consider all evidence admitted, whether
competent or incompetent, in the light most favorable to the
State, giving the State the benefit of every reasonable
inference and resolving any contradictions in its favor.” State
v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172, 192, 451 S.E.2d 211, 223 (1994), cert.
denied, 515 U.S. 1135, 132 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1995).
The element of intent to commit a felony or larceny must
exist at the time of the breaking or entering in order to
convict a defendant on that charge. State v. Freeman, 307 N.C.
445, 450-51, 298 S.E.2d 376, 379-80 (1983). If intent does not
exist at the time of breaking or entering, a defendant would be
guilty of a misdemeanor rather than a felony. N.C. Gen. Stat. §
14-54(b) (2013). Intent is usually inferred from the
circumstances. State v. Bell, 285 N.C. 746, 750, 208 S.E.2d
506, 508 (1974). Our appellate courts have based such
inferences on several factors, including the taking of another’s
property under conditions rendering it unlikely an owner will
ever recover the property, the manner in which the property was
taken, and the fact that the taker held the property in her
possession until it was recovered by the police. See State v.
Smith, 268 N.C. 167, 173, 150 S.E.2d 194, 200 (1966); State v.
10
Sakobie, 157 N.C. App. 275, 284, 579 S.E.2d 125, 131 (2003).
However, evidence that an item was taken is not “positive proof”
that defendant intended to commit a larceny at the moment he
entered the building. State v. Peacock, 313 N.C. 554, 559, 330
S.E.2d 506, 508 (1985).
Defendant first argues that since she entered the house
during the daytime and explained that her motive was to inspect
the house before possibly buying it, the State failed to prove
that she intended to commit a felony or larceny therein.
Defendant contrasts the facts of this case to State v.
Alexander, 18 N.C. App. 460, 197 S.E.2d 272 (1973), where this
Court noted that “in the absence of evidence of other intent or
explanation for breaking and entering, is that the usual object
or purpose of burglarizing a dwelling house at night is theft.”
Alexander, 18 N.C. App. at 462-463, 197 S.E.2d at 273-274.
We find, however, that the State presented sufficient
evidence for a jury to reasonably conclude that defendant
intended to commit a larceny when she entered the house. “The
criminal intent of the defendant at the time of breaking or
entering may be inferred from the acts he committed subsequent
to his breaking or entering the building.” State v. Williams,
330 N.C. 579, 585, 411 S.E.2d 814, 818 (1992). The State
produced the following evidence tending to show that defendant
had the intent to commit larceny before entering the house: (1)
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defendant and the man accompanying her pulled into the driveway
of the house in reverse and opened the hatchback before
entering, indicating that they planned to take something from
the house and put it into their vehicle; (2) Mr. Coats heard one
of the two rummaging through boxes when he approached the house;
and (3) defendant was pulled over with items taken from the
house in her car shortly after she left. We hold that this
evidence was such that a reasonable mind could accept as
adequate to support the conclusion that the requisite intent to
commit a larceny existed at the time of entry, and thus there
was substantial evidence of this element sufficient to survive a
motion to dismiss. See State v. Thompkins, 83 N.C. App. 42, 44,
348 S.E.2d 605, 606 (1986) (evidence that defendant was seen
walking from the house with large objects and that those objects
were missing from the house was substantial evidence of the
element of intent to commit a larceny at the time of a breaking
or entering); State v. Barnett, 141 N.C. App. 378, 383, 540
S.E.2d 423, 427 (2000) (“[T]he evidence need only give rise to a
reasonable inference of guilt for the case to be properly
submitted to the jury.”), aff’d, 354 N.C. 350, 554 S.E.2d 644(2001). Accordingly, defendant’s argument as to the element of
intent is overruled.
Defendant next argues that the State failed to produce a
showing that the breaking or entering was without the consent of
12
the owner or occupant. Williams, 330 N.C. at 585, 411 S.E.2d at
818. In North Carolina, “as between the mortgagor and the
mortgagee, the legal title to the mortgaged premises is vested
in the mortgagee, while the mortgagor is looked upon as the
equitable owner of the land. This relative position continues
until the land is redeemed or until the mortgage is foreclosed.”
Stevens v. Turlington, 186 N.C. 191, 191, 119 S.E. 210, 211-12
(1923). Here, Ms. Lambeth was the mortgagor of the property,
and Wells Fargo was the mortgagee. Although Wells Fargo had
given notice of pre-foreclosure to the Lambeths in June 2011,
foreclosure proceedings had not yet occurred when defendant
entered the home. Thus, because the land was neither redeemed
nor foreclosed, Ms. Lambeth was the equitable owner during the
time period in question. Because Ms. Lambeth testified that she
did not consent to defendant entering the house, we hold that
the State produced substantial evidence that the owner or
occupant did not consent to the entry. Defendant’s argument is
without merit.
III. Instruction on Abandonment
Defendant next argues that the trial court committed plain
error when it did not instruct the jury that abandonment was a
defense to larceny in this case. We disagree.
Because defendant did not object on this ground at trial,
the appropriate standard of review is plain error. State v.
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Black, 308 N.C. 736, 740, 303 S.E.2d 804, 806 (1983). Plain
error arises when the error is “so basic, so prejudicial, so
lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done[.]”
State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983)
(citation and quotation marks omitted).
For error to constitute plain error, a
defendant must demonstrate that a
fundamental error occurred at trial. To show
that an error was fundamental, a defendant
must establish prejudice - that, after
examination of the entire record, the error
had a probable impact on the jury’s finding
that the defendant was guilty. Moreover,
because plain error is to be applied
cautiously and only in the exceptional case,
the error will often be one that seriously
affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.
State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 518, 723 S.E.2d 326, 334 (2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Property that has been abandoned by the owner cannot be the
subject of larceny. State v. Hall, 57 N.C. App. 544, 546, 291
S.E.2d 873, 875 (1982). The party relying on the defense of
abandonment must affirmatively show by clear, unequivocal, and
decisive evidence the intent of the owner to permanently
terminate ownership of the disputed property. State v. West,
293 N.C. 18, 30, 235 S.E.2d 150, 157 (1977). The owner of
personal property may give up his ownership by abandoning the
property, and if he does so, title passes to the first person
who takes possession thereafter. Id.14
Defendant argues the trial court plainly erred in failing
to instruct on abandonment because the evidence supported such
an instruction. Defendant contends that Ms. Lambeth left her
personal property unattended for approximately ten months after
leaving the home, and that she moved to a location not far from
her old home, thus indicating clearly, unequivocally, and
decisively that she abandoned the property left in the previous
residence. We disagree. Ms. Lambeth testified that she did not
intend to terminate her ownership of the property that defendant
took from the home. To the contrary, she testified that she
intended to return to the house and retrieve the items, which
were only left behind temporarily because there was limited
space in the moving vehicle and limited time to use it. Given
this testimony, we conclude that there was not clear,
unequivocal and decisive evidence that Ms. Lambeth permanently
terminated ownership of the property in this case. Thus,
because there was insufficient evidence to support a jury
instruction on the defense of abandonment, the trial court did
not err, let alone commit plain error, by declining to issue
such an instruction. See State v. Napier, 149 N.C. App. 462,
463, 560 S.E.2d 867, 868 (2002); State v. Torain, 316 N.C. 111,
116, 340 S.E.2d 465, 468 (1986) (without error, there cannot be
plain error).
IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
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Defendant’s final argument is that her trial counsel’s
failure to request an instruction on the defense of abandonment
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. To establish a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show
that her trial counsel’s performance was deficient and that this
deficient performance prejudiced defendant. State v. Braswell,
312 N.C. 553, 561-62, 324 S.E.2d 241, 248 (1985). Having found
no error in the trial court’s decision not to instruct on the
defense of abandonment, we hold that defendant has failed to
show that her attorney’s failure to request such an instruction
was deficient or prejudiced her in any way. Thus, defendant’s
argument is without merit.
Conclusion
In sum, the trial court did not commit error: (1) in
admitting photographs for the purpose of illustrating relevant
testimony; (2) by denying defendant’s motion to dismiss; and (3)
by not instructing the jury on abandonment as defense to
larceny. Further, defendant was not denied effective assistance
of counsel when her trial attorney failed to request an
instruction on abandonment.
NO ERROR.
Judges GEER and McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).