In re K.M.C. ( 2014 )


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  • An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
    controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
    with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    NO. COA13-1414
    NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
    Filed: 20 May 2014
    IN THE MATTER OF:                             Randolph County
    Nos. 10 JA 34, 13 JA 05
    K.M.C. and H.D.C., III1
    TWO MINOR CHILDREN.
    Appeal by Respondent-parents from order entered 7 October
    2013 by Judge Scott C. Etheridge in Randolph County District
    Court.    Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 May 2014.
    Erica Glass for Petitioner Randolph County Department of
    Social Services.
    Sydney Batch for Respondent-mother.
    Richard Croutharmel for Respondent-father.
    Ellis & Winters LLP, by Lenor Marquis Segal, for Guardian
    ad Litem.
    STEPHENS, Judge.
    Factual and Procedural Background
    1
    We use initials and pseudonyms in this opinion to protect the
    juveniles’ identities and for ease of reading.
    -2-
    Respondent-parents appeal from an order adjudicating their
    two     children,       K.M.C.     (“Kim”)      and    H.D.C.,      III     (“Henry”)
    (collectively,         “the     juveniles”),    as     neglected    and     dependent
    juveniles.      Kim was born in January 2010, and Henry was born in
    September 2011.          In October 2012, Respondent-parents, Kim, and
    Henry were evicted from their home in Asheboro.                           In December
    2012,    they    moved     into    the   home    of    the   juveniles’      paternal
    grandmother.           Shortly    thereafter,    Respondent-father’s          younger
    brother, J.C., also moved into the paternal grandmother’s home.2
    In October 2009, D.H., the younger half-brother of Respondent-
    father, had been adjudicated a dependent juvenile based in part
    on    J.C.’s    sexual    molestation      of   D.H.      The   sexual     abuse   had
    occurred       while     D.H.     and    J.C.   resided      with    the     paternal
    grandmother (the mother of both boys).3                   D.H. has also alleged
    sexual abuse by Respondent-father.
    2
    Some of the evidence in the record suggests that J.C. lived in
    a tent or trailer on the grounds of the paternal grandmother’s
    home.
    3
    D.H. was born in March 1996. It appears that J.C. was born in
    1992.   Thus, both D.H. and J.C. were minors during the period
    when the abuse occurred.
    -3-
    On      3      January    2013,      DSS       filed     petitions4     seeking
    adjudications that Kim and Henry were neglected and dependent
    because (1) the juveniles lacked stable and appropriate housing,
    (2) Respondent-father had untreated anger management issues, and
    (3) Respondent-parents both had untreated mental health issues,
    a history of domestic violence, and no appropriate alternative
    child care arrangement.         The court placed the juveniles in the
    nonsecure    custody    of    DSS   on      that   date.      Respondent-parents
    remained in the paternal grandmother’s home until early June
    2013 when they moved into another residence.
    On 4 September 2013, the district court held an evidentiary
    hearing and, on 7 October 2013, entered a combined adjudication
    and disposition order, concluding that (1) Kim and Henry were
    dependent and neglected juveniles, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
    101(9),     (15)    (2013),   and     (2)      removal     from   the   custody    of
    Respondent-parents was in the juveniles’ best interest.                           The
    court placed Kim and Henry in the custody of DSS and allowed
    Respondent-parents supervised visitation for a minimum of one
    4
    On 17 March 2010, the Randolph County Department of Social
    Services (“DSS”) had filed a petition alleging that Kim was
    neglected and dependent. Another petition in the case was filed
    on 9 June 2010, alleging Kim was neglected and dependent. After
    a hearing on the March 2010 petition, the court concluded that
    Kim was not neglected or dependent, and dismissed that petition.
    DSS then voluntarily dismissed the June 2010 petition.
    -4-
    hour per week.     The court also ordered, inter alia, Respondent-
    parents to submit to random drug screens and follow through with
    recommended treatment in the event of a positive result.                  In
    addition, the court ordered Respondent-father to complete a sex
    offender     assessment    and     follow   through   with   any   resulting
    recommendations.    Respondent-parents appeal.
    Rule 9(b)(5) Supplement to the Record on Appeal
    On 24 February 2014, DSS and the Guardian ad Litem filed a
    joint supplement to the printed record on appeal, consisting of
    four consolidated orders of adjudication and disposition entered
    between January 2010 and October 2013 (“the supplement orders”).
    Respondent-parents filed objections to the supplement and moved
    to strike it.       Those motions were referred to this panel in
    March 2014.
    The supplement orders concern four minor children of J.C.,5
    all of whom have been removed from his custody and adjudicated
    dependent,     abused,    and/or     neglected.       At   the   adjudication
    5
    In his testimony, Respondent-father referred to J.C. as “my
    brother,”   although  the  “Joint  Response  by   Appellees   to
    Respondent-Appellant   Father’s   Objection   to   the    Record
    Supplement” refers to J.C. as “Respondent-Appellant’s Father’s
    brother[.]”    However, every other reference in the record
    indicates that J.C. is Respondent-father’s brother, rather than
    his uncle.
    -5-
    hearing in this matter, the attorney for DSS asked the court to
    take judicial notice of the supplement orders.                      Contrary to the
    assertions    of    Respondent-parents,         there    was    no    objection    by
    either of their attorneys when the court agreed to take judicial
    notice of the supplement orders.6             A social worker from DSS then
    testified about the reasons for the removals and adjudications
    of   J.C.’s     children.        Although       nothing        in    the   combined
    adjudication and disposition order regarding Kim and Henry that
    is the subject of this appeal references the supplement orders
    and they are thus irrelevant to our resolution of this appeal,
    they were part of the evidence before the district court at the
    hearing.      Accordingly, we deny Respondent-parents’ motions to
    strike.
    Discussion
    Respondent-parents         argue    that    (1)     all    or     portions    of
    subparagraphs a, d, e, g, h, i, and j of the district court’s
    finding of fact 5 are not supported by clear and convincing
    evidence, (2) the conclusions of law that Kim and Henry are
    dependent     and   neglected    juveniles      are     not    supported    by    the
    6
    Respondent-mother’s trial counsel did object to the court
    taking judicial notice of the entire DSS “files” on the
    children, but did not object when the court stated it would take
    judicial notice of the adjudication orders only.
    -6-
    court’s findings of fact, and (3) certain conditions imposed by
    the court constituted an abuse of its discretion.                  We affirm in
    part and reverse in part.
    I. Standard of review
    “The allegations in a petition alleging that a juvenile is
    abused, neglected, or dependent shall be proved by clear and
    convincing evidence.”            N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-805 (2013).                On
    appeal,   an      adjudication    order    is   reviewed    to   determine     “(1)
    whether     the    findings   of    fact    are    supported      by   clear   and
    convincing evidence, and (2) whether the legal conclusions are
    supported by the findings of fact.”                 In re Pittman, 
    149 N.C. App. 756
    , 763-64, 
    561 S.E.2d 560
    , 566 (citation and internal
    quotation      marks    omitted),   appeal      dismissed   and    disc.   review
    denied, 
    356 N.C. 163
    , 
    568 S.E.2d 608
    -09 (2002), cert. denied sub
    nom., Harris-Pittman v. Nash Cnty. Dep’t of Social Servs., 
    538 U.S. 982
    , 
    155 L.E.2d 673
     (2003).                Findings of fact are binding
    “where there is some evidence to support those findings, even
    though the evidence might sustain findings to the contrary.”                     In
    re Montgomery,         
    311 N.C. 101
    , 110-11, 
    316 S.E.2d 246
    , 252-53
    (1984) (citation omitted).          Findings of fact are also binding if
    an appellant does not challenge them on appeal.                        Koufman v.
    Koufman, 
    330 N.C. 93
    , 97, 
    408 S.E.2d 729
    , 731 (1991) (citation
    -7-
    omitted). We review dispositions to determine whether the court
    abused    its   discretion   in     deciding   what   action     is    in   the
    juvenile’s best interest.          In re C.W., 
    182 N.C. App. 214
    , 219,
    
    641 S.E.2d 725
    , 729 (2007) (citation omitted).
    II. Findings of fact
    Respondent-parents        challenge       all     or     portions       of
    subparagraphs a,7 d, e, f, g, h, i, and j of finding of fact 5 as
    not supported by clear and convincing evidence.               We agree as to
    finding    of   fact   5h,   but    disagree     regarding    the     remaining
    challenged findings of fact.
    Finding of fact 5 states:
    5. The [c]ourt finds the following facts for
    the purpose of adjudication:
    a.     The minor children       are    neglected    and
    dependent children.
    b.     [Respondent-parents] were evicted from
    [ABC Street], Asheboro, NC.
    c.     When [Respondent-parents] and the minor
    children     were     evicted,     they
    ([Respondent-parents]  and the minor
    7
    Finding of fact 5a is actually a conclusion of law, and we
    review it as such. See In re M.R.D.C., 
    166 N.C. App. 693
    , 697,
    
    603 S.E.2d 890
    , 893 (2004) (holding that a finding of fact which
    is actually a conclusion of law is reviewed as a conclusion of
    law on appeal), disc. review denied, 
    359 N.C. 321
    , 
    611 S.E.2d 413
     (2005); In re R.A.H., 
    182 N.C. App. 52
    , 60, 
    641 S.E.2d 404
    ,
    409 (2007) (noting that mislabeling a finding of fact as a
    conclusion of law is inconsequential if the remaining findings
    of fact support it).
    -8-
    children)   went     to    the    paternal
    grandmother[’s]     . . .      home    for
    approximately   four    to   five   months
    before the petitions in the matter were
    filed.
    d.   [Respondent-f]ather acknowledged that
    he knew that the paternal grandmother’s
    home was an inappropriate home for the
    minor children.
    e.   This [c]ourt adjudicated on or about
    October 28, 2009 that [J.C.] sexually
    molested the minor child [D.H.].
    f.   [J.C.] was living      at   the   paternal
    grandmother’s home.
    g.   [J.C.] had access to the minor children
    at the paternal grandmother’s home.
    h.   When [Respondent-parents] would leave
    the paternal grandmother’s home to go
    [to] the store, they would leave the
    minor children with [J.C.].
    i.   [Respondent-parents] had no other place
    to take the minor children after they
    were evicted from [ABC Street] in
    Asheboro, NC.   [Respondent-f]ather had
    five to seven months to find housing
    other than the paternal grandmother’s
    home.    [Respondent-f]ather had ample
    time to find appropriate and stable
    housing.
    j.   [J.C.] would actually play video games
    in the same living room while the minor
    children    were    at   the   paternal
    grandmother’s home.
    As for finding of fact 5d, when asked if he was “aware that
    [the paternal grandmother’s] home was not an appropriate place
    -9-
    for your children[,]” Respondent-father replied, “I guess so,
    yeah.”     He also testified that he knew (1) his brother, D.H.,
    had been removed from the paternal grandmother’s custody and had
    not been returned and (2) DSS had recommended that the paternal
    grandmother’s      home     was    not   an     appropriate      place   for   his
    children.    Respondent-father further testified that he knew the
    children    of    his    other    brother,     J.C.,   had    been   removed   from
    J.C.’s custody before Respondent-father moved his children to
    his mother’s residence.           This evidence fully supports finding of
    fact 5d.
    As for finding of fact 5e, the district court took judicial
    notice of juvenile adjudication orders pertaining to Respondent-
    father’s relatives, including an order adjudicating his brother
    D.H. as neglected and dependent.               That order contains a finding
    of fact that D.H. was sexually assaulted by J.C.                     This evidence
    fully supports finding of fact 5e.
    With regard to findings of fact 5f, 5g, and 5j, Respondent-
    father testified that, “right before the date that the petitions
    in this matter” were filed, his brother J.C. “moved in after a
    short    while”    and    “stayed    there      certain      nights.”     Although
    Respondent-father testified that J.C. often “slept in a tent or
    his camper outside” in the yard of the paternal grandmother’s
    -10-
    house, he also testified about watching television and playing
    video games with J.C. at night in the living room where Kim and
    Henry slept.       This evidence fully supports findings of fact 5f,
    5g, and 5j.
    As to finding of fact 5i, Respondent-father testified that
    Respondent-parents           could    not     find    housing       for     their    family
    anywhere other than at the home of                         the paternal       grandmother
    during the period between their eviction and the filing of the
    petition.       The supervising social worker testified that, before
    DSS filed the petition, Respondent-parents declined a request by
    DSS   to    move      Kim    and     Henry     to    the    home     of     the    maternal
    grandmother.       This evidence fully supports finding of fact 5i.
    Regarding       finding        of   fact      5h,    our     review    reveals       no
    evidence    that      Kim    and     Henry    were    left       alone    with      J.C.   on
    occasions when Respondent-parents went to the store.                                Because
    this finding of fact is not supported by any evidence in the
    record,    we    do    not    consider        it    when     reviewing       the    court’s
    conclusions of law.
    III. Conclusions of law
    Respondent-parents next argue that the court’s conclusions
    of law that Kim and Henry are dependent and neglected juveniles
    -11-
    are not supported by the findings of fact.                    We agree as to
    dependency, but disagree as to neglect.
    A dependent juvenile is one whose “parent, guardian, or
    custodian is unable to provide for the care or supervision [of
    the juvenile] and lacks an appropriate alternative child care
    arrangement.”         N.C.    Gen.   Stat.   §   7B-101(9)      (2013).       In
    determining whether a juvenile is dependent, “the trial court
    must address both (1) the parent’s ability to provide care or
    supervision,    and     (2)    the   availability        to   the    parent   of
    alternative child care arrangements.”            In re P.M., 
    169 N.C. App. 423
    , 427, 
    610 S.E.2d 403
    , 406 (2005).               The court’s adjudicatory
    findings   contained    in    finding   of   fact    5   do   not   address   the
    ability of the parents to provide care or supervision or the
    availability of alternative child care arrangements.                    We thus
    hold the findings of facts do not support a conclusion that Kim
    and Henry are dependent juveniles.8          Accordingly, we reverse this
    adjudication.
    A juvenile is neglected if, inter alia, he or she does not
    receive proper care, supervision, or discipline from a parent or
    8
    We further note that, although some of the findings of fact
    which the court included in its dispositional determination
    could be construed as relating to the Respondent-parents’
    “ability to provide care and supervision” for the juveniles,
    none address the “availability . . . of alternative child care
    arrangements.” See 
    id.
    -12-
    guardian; is not being provided necessary medical or remedial
    care; or is residing in an environment injurious to his or her
    welfare.        N.C.   Gen.   Stat.     §     7B-101(15).      In    making     this
    determination, the district court must assess whether there is
    “some physical, mental, or emotional impairment of the juvenile
    or a substantial risk of such impairment as a consequence of the
    failure to provide proper care, supervision, or discipline.”                       In
    re   Safriet,    
    112 N.C. App. 747
    ,    752,   
    436 S.E.2d 898
    ,     901-02
    (1993) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).                      A court
    “need   not     wait   for    actual    harm     to   occur    if    there    is   a
    substantial risk of harm to the child in the home.”                   In re T.S.,
    
    178 N.C. App. 110
    , 113, 
    631 S.E.2d 19
    , 22 (2006), affirmed per
    curiam, 
    361 N.C. 231
    , 
    641 S.E.2d 302
     (2007).
    “In determining whether a juvenile is a neglected juvenile,
    it is relevant whether that juvenile . . . lives in a home where
    another juvenile has been subjected to abuse or neglect by an
    adult who regularly lives in the home.”                 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
    101(15).
    In    considering   the   identically-worded
    predecessor statute, this Court held, . . .
    that while this language regarding neglect
    of other children does not mandate         a
    conclusion of neglect, the trial judge has
    discretion in determining the weight to be
    given such evidence.    Since the statutory
    definition of a neglected child includes
    -13-
    living with a person who neglected other
    children and since this Court has held that
    the weight to be given that factor is a
    question for the trial court, the court, in
    this case, was permitted, although not
    required,   to   conclude  that   P.M.  was
    neglected. . . . In cases of this sort, the
    decision   of  the   trial  court  must  of
    necessity be predictive in nature, as the
    trial court must assess whether there is a
    substantial risk of future abuse or neglect
    of a child based on the historical facts of
    the case.
    In re P.M., 169 N.C. App. at 427, 
    610 S.E.2d at 406
     (citations
    and internal quotation marks omitted).              In that case, before
    P.M. was born,
    P.M.’s father sexually abused one of [the]
    respondent’s     daughters     after    [the]
    respondent allowed him to be in the presence
    of that daughter, in violation of a safety
    plan with . . . [DSS] that prohibited the
    father   from   having   contact   with  that
    daughter.     A psychologist who evaluated
    [the] respondent after that event concluded
    that [the] respondent had failed to take
    responsibility for the consequences of her
    failing to care for her four children.
    . . . [A] month after the birth of P.M., DSS
    filed a petition alleging that P.M. was
    neglected and dependent based on the prior
    adjudications as to [the] respondent’s other
    children and her current lack of insight
    into the harm suffered by those children.
    
    Id. at 425
    , 
    610 S.E.2d at 405
    .               We held that “the historical
    facts   of    the   case    [which]    included    the   fact   that   [the]
    respondent    had   twice   violated    court-ordered    protection    plans
    -14-
    with DSS . . . and was failing to take responsibility” were
    sufficient to support a conclusion of neglect.                         
    Id. at 427
    , 
    610 S.E.2d at 406
    .            We see no meaningful distinction between the
    facts   in   that     case       and   those     presented         here,    to    wit,    that
    Respondent-parents moved their minor children into a home with
    J.C.,   a    man    with     a    history      of     sexually      abusing       his    minor
    relatives.9
    Respondent-father             concedes          that    the     “court       here        was
    permitted”     to     conclude         that    Kim     and    Henry        were    neglected
    juveniles based upon their exposure to J.C., and he further
    acknowledges       that     the    court      had     discretion      in     weighing         the
    evidence     before    it    in    reaching         that    conclusion.           See    In    re
    Nicholson, 
    114 N.C. App. 91
    , 94, 
    440 S.E.2d 852
    , 854 (1994)
    (holding that the district court has discretion in determining
    the weight to be afforded to evidence of the abuse or neglect of
    other   children).           We    agree       and     conclude      that     the       court’s
    findings of fact support its conclusion of law that Kim and
    Henry are neglected juveniles.                 This argument is overruled.
    9
    We also observe that there is copious evidence in the record
    and in the findings of fact which the district court labeled as
    dispositional rather than adjudicatory regarding the paternal
    grandmother’s refusal to believe that J.C. had abused D.H. and
    her denial of any responsibility in the events that led to the
    removal of D.H. from her custody and his eventual adjudication
    as a dependent juvenile.
    -15-
    IV. Conditions placed on Respondent-parents
    Respondent-mother       argues        that        the     court   abused          its
    discretion by       ordering her to submit to random drug screens
    because     nothing    in    the     record       and     no   allegations        in     the
    petitions suggest that she has a substance abuse problem.                                 We
    disagree.
    In a juvenile proceeding under Chapter 7B, “the child’s
    interest     in     being    protected        from       abuse     and   neglect         is
    paramount.”        In re Pittman, 149 N.C. App. at 761, 
    561 S.E.2d at 564
    .    A juvenile court has the authority, if it determines that
    it is in the juvenile’s best interest, to require a parent of a
    juvenile     who     has    been     adjudicated          abused,    neglected,           or
    dependent     to    “undergo       psychiatric,          psychological,      or        other
    treatment or counseling directed toward remediating or remedying
    behaviors    or     conditions      that    led     to    or   contributed        to     the
    juvenile’s adjudication or to the court’s decision to remove
    custody of the juvenile from the parent . . . .”                           N.C. Gen.
    Stat. § 7B-904(c) (2013).                  Under this grant of authority, a
    court may, in its discretion, order a parent to submit to a
    substance abuse assessment.            See In re A.S., 
    181 N.C. App. 706
    ,
    712-13, 
    640 S.E.2d 817
    , 821, affirmed per curiam, 
    361 N.C. 686
    ,
    
    651 S.E.2d 883
     (2007).             “A ruling committed to a trial court’s
    -16-
    discretion is to be accorded great deference and will be upset
    only upon a showing that it was so arbitrary that it could not
    have been the result of a reasoned decision.”                     White v. White,
    
    312 N.C. 770
    , 777, 
    324 S.E.2d 829
    , 833 (1985).
    We considered and rejected Respondent-mother’s argument in
    a recent case.          In In re A.R., the parents contended that the
    court erred by requiring them, inter alia, to submit to mental
    health     assessments,         substance    abuse      evaluations,        and     drug
    screens when the children had been removed for domestic violence
    and not for substance abuse or mental health reasons.                        __     N.C.
    App. __, __, 
    742 S.E.2d 629
    , 632 (2013).                  We disagreed, holding
    that   imposition       of   these   mandates     “is    reasonably        related    to
    aiding [the parents] in remedying the conditions which led to
    the children’s removal; all of these requirements assist [the
    parents]     in    both      understanding      and   resolving      the      possible
    underlying cause of [the parents]’ domestic violence issues.”
    
    Id.
     at __, 742 S.E.2d at 632-33.
    We believe the same reasoning applies here.                         Respondent-
    parents acknowledge a history of domestic violence.                        Respondent-
    father   has      “an   extensive       history   with    drugs      and    alcohol.”
    Respondent-mother         has    been     diagnosed      with   recurrent          major
    depression     with     psychotic       features.        All    of   these        issues
    -17-
    contributed to the removal of the juveniles from Respondent-
    parents’ custody.        Drug screens and substance abuse treatment if
    indicated,      along    with    mental    health     treatment,      may     assist
    Respondent-mother in understanding and resolving these issues.
    Accordingly, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion.
    Respondent-father          argues     that     the     court     abused    its
    discretion by ordering him to complete a sex offender assessment
    and comply with its recommendations.                Specifically, Respondent-
    father     contends     that    the   district      court     was    collaterally
    estopped10 from imposing this condition because prior courts had
    ruled    that    all     previous     allegations      of    sexual     abuse    by
    Respondent-father were unfounded.             We disagree.
    The     March      2010    petition      regarding     Kim     alleged     that
    Respondent-father “exhibited sexually deviant behaviors[.]”                      In
    the order dismissing the March 2010 petition, the district court
    made no findings regarding the allegation that Respondent-father
    “engage[d] in sexually deviant behaviors[,]” finding only that
    he had “not been involved with [Kim] since birth.”                       The June
    10
    Collateral estoppel applies only to parties, and not to
    courts.   See King v. Grindstaff, 
    284 N.C. 348
    , 356, 
    200 S.E.2d 799
    , 805 (1973) (observing that under the doctrine of
    “collateral estoppel by judgment, parties and parties in privity
    with them — even in unrelated causes of action — are precluded
    from retrying fully litigated issues that were decided in any
    prior   determination   and   were   necessary   to  the   prior
    determination”) (citations omitted; emphasis added).
    -18-
    2010    petition    alleged       several       acts   of        sexual     abuse     by
    Respondent-father against Kim and stated that Respondent-mother
    believed   Respondent-father        had    “molested        his   half-sibling[,]”
    presumably a reference to the allegations made by D.H.                            In the
    order dated 21 July 2010 which returned Kim to the custody of
    Respondent-parents, the court found that no reasonable factual
    basis   existed    to   support    the     allegations       that     Kim   had     been
    sexually abused by Respondent-father or that Kim was at risk of
    sexual abuse while in his care.             DSS then voluntarily dismissed
    the June 2010 petition.            At the adjudication hearing in the
    current matter, a DSS social worker testified that D.H. had
    accused Respondent-father of sexually abusing him.11
    However, nothing in the adjudication and disposition order
    before this Court suggests that these previous concerns about
    Respondent-father’s       possible        sexual     abuse       of   Kim    or     D.H.
    prompted   the     condition      that    he      undergo    a    sexual     offender
    assessment and any treatment recommended as a result thereof.
    Rather, it appears that Kim’s sexual acting out, which appears
    to have occurred after June 2010, led to the condition that
    Respondent-father       undergo    a     sexual    offender       assessment.         In
    11
    Nothing in the record suggests there has been any legal
    determination that Respondent-father did or did not sexually
    abuse D.H.
    -19-
    unchallenged findings of fact 52-55 the district court found
    that:   (1) at a March 2013 home visit, Kim’s foster parents
    expressed concerns about Kim’s sexual acting out in the form of
    public masturbating and possible attempted sexual interactions
    with Henry;12 (2) Respondent-parents acknowledged this behavior
    began before Kim was removed from their custody; (3) Respondent-
    father felt these behaviors were normal; and (4) Kim has been
    referred for appropriate counseling.        None of these facts had
    been introduced into evidence in any previous matter nor has any
    court   previously   considered     them.     In   light   of   these
    unchallenged findings of fact, we hold the court did not abuse
    its discretion by ordering Respondent-father to complete a sex
    offender assessment and follow any recommended treatment.
    In sum, we affirm the adjudication of Kim and Henry as
    neglected juveniles and the court’s resulting disposition.        We
    reverse the adjudication of dependency.
    AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part.
    Judges BRYANT and DILLON concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).
    12
    At the time of these reports, Kim was just over three years
    old, and Henry was about 18 months old.