State v. Inyama ( 2014 )

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA13-666
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 6 May 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Wake County
No. 11 CRS 219377
VICTOR NNAMDI INYAMA
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 15 October 2012
by Judge Paul C. Ridgeway in Wake County Superior Court. Heard
in the Court of Appeals 6 January 2014.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Joseph E. Elder, for the State.
Appellate Defender Staples S. Hughes, by Assistant
Appellate Defender Hannah E. Hall, for defendant.
McCULLOUGH, Judge.
Victor Nnamdi Inyama (“defendant”) appeals the denial of
his motion to suppress following the entry of judgment based
upon his guilty pleas to possession with intent to sell or
deliver marijuana, possession of a firearm by a felon, and
attaining the status of an habitual felon. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
I. Background
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On 17 August 2011, defendant was arrested on an outstanding
warrant for failure to appear on charges of speeding and driving
while license revoked at an apartment where marijuana and
firearms were found. As a result of the marijuana and firearms,
additional arrest warrants were served for possession with
intent to sell or deliver marijuana and possession of a firearm
by a felon.
On 28 November 2011, a Wake County Grand Jury returned
separate bills of indictment indicting defendant on charges of
possession with intent to sell or deliver marijuana and
possession of a firearm by a felon. The following day, a Wake
County Grand Jury also indicted defendant for attaining the
status of an habitual felon.
Prior to trial, on 4 October 2012, defendant filed a motion
“to suppress any evidence obtained from [his] person, the
[apartment] where [he] was arrested, and any statements made by
[him] as a result of searches and seizures of his person and/or
residence[.]” In the motion, defendant challenged the validity
of three warrants issued on 17 August 2011, arguing the warrants
were not based on sufficient or legally obtained evidence within
the affidavits supporting their issuance. The motion came on to
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be heard in Wake County Superior Court before the Honorable Paul
C. Ridgeway on 15 October 2012.
Evidence presented during the suppression hearing tended to
show that members of the Raleigh Police Department’s Gang
Suppression Unit became interested in defendant on 16 August
2011 when Dominique McLaughlin, with whom the police had dealt
in the past, identified defendant by name as the owner of drugs
and firearms found during the search of McLaughlin’s residence.
The following day, Officer Eddie Camacho ran defendant’s name
through the warrant database and discovered an outstanding
warrant for defendant’s arrest for failure to appear on charges
of speeding and driving while license revoked. Camacho also
realized that he had previously encountered defendant during a
traffic stop on 25 May 2011. At the time, defendant was driving
a 1998 Cadillac DeVille, license plate number ACC-7005.
DMV records for the vehicle indicated it was registered to
Natasha Montgomery of 2721 Milburnie Road. Although the vehicle
was registered to Montgomery, Camacho recalled that during his
prior encounter with defendant at the traffic stop, defendant
acknowledged the car was registered in his girlfriend’s name but
stressed that it was his vehicle because he paid for it.
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In search of defendant, Camacho and another officer went to
the address to which the vehicle was registered on Milburnie
Road. Montgomery’s stepfather, Phillip Becoat, answered the
door and spoke with the officers. The officers informed Becoat
that they were not searching for Montgomery, but for
Montgomery’s boyfriend, naming defendant. Becoat responded that
defendant and Montgomery “used to live there at 2721 Milburnie
Road[,]” but “were [now] living together in an apartment complex
off New Bern.”
With the information from Becoat, Camacho searched the City
of Raleigh’s utility records to find the apartment. His search
revealed that Montgomery lived at 217 Merrell Drive, Apartment
101.
When the officers arrived at the apartment, they noticed
the 1998 Cadillac DeVille and another vehicle registered to
Montgomery in the parking lot near the apartment. Upon
approaching the front door of the apartment, Camacho could hear
male voices inside. Camacho, however, could not understand what
the voices were saying or determine how many people were inside.
Camacho then knocked on the door. He could hear people
frantically moving around inside the apartment, but no one
answered the door. Camacho continued to knock and announce
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himself for five to ten minutes before calling his supervisor
for assistance.
Camacho’s supervisor arrived shortly thereafter and knocked
on the door. Again, no one responded. Camacho’s supervisor
then found Montgomery’s phone number in a police database and
called Montgomery. Montgomery told the officers that she was at
work, no one should be inside the apartment, she did not know
who was in the apartment, and defendant was last in the
apartment a few days earlier. The officers had received a key
to the apartment from apartment management, but Montgomery would
not consent for the officers to enter the apartment to search
for defendant.
At that time, Camacho applied for and obtained a warrant to
search the apartment for defendant (“warrant one”).
When Camacho returned with warrant one, a Selective
Enforcement Unit (“SEU”) already on the scene executed the
warrant as Camacho and other officers maintained a perimeter.
The SEU was made aware that multiple people were inside and
defendant had prior firearms violations. The SEU used the key
obtained from management to enter the apartment. Upon entry,
three men, including defendant, exited a back room of the
apartment at the orders of the SEU and were detained outside.
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The SEU then performed a protective sweep of the apartment,
during which Officer C.R. Matthews noticed what he believed to
be a partially smoked marijuana cigarette lying on the floor in
one of the bedrooms in plain view. Officer Matthews informed
Camacho of the marijuana cigarette and Camacho entered the
apartment and, based on its appearance and smell, confirmed that
the item on the bedroom floor was in fact a partially smoked
marijuana cigarette.
Based on the marijuana cigarette, Camacho applied and
obtained a warrant to search the apartment for “controlled
substances, paraphernalia, documents indicating dominion or
ownership of residence, packaging material, currency, firearms,
ammunition, cellular telephones, and any and all evidence
relating to the criminal [p]ossession of controlled
substances[]” (“warrant two”). During the execution of warrant
two, officers found drugs, drug paraphernalia, materials for
packaging drugs, firearms, and ammunition in the apartment.
A third warrant (“warrant three”) was later issued to
search three vehicles in the parking lot, including the 1998
Cadillac DeVille associated with defendant. Additional
firearms, marijuana stems, a receipt with defendant’s name on
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it, and a picture of defendant with a group of people were
recovered from the 1998 Cadillac DeVille.
Upon consideration of the testimony, warrant applications,
and arguments, the trial court denied defendant’s motion in open
court stating the following:
I've reviewed the evidence submitted in this
case, the four corners of the search
warrants as well as the case law handed up.
And with respect to each of the three
warrants, I find that, based on the four
corners of the application of the search
warrant, the magistrate had substantial
basis for concluding that there was probable
cause to believe that the defendant -- in
the case of the first search warrant, the
defendant would be found at the location
described therein; and with respect to
warrants two and three, that evidence of a
crime would be found at those locations
described therein.
After the trial court announced its decision, defendant
preserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to
suppress and pled guilty to possession with intent to sell or
deliver marijuana, possession of a firearm by a felon, and
attaining the status of an habitual felon. Judgment was entered
based on defendant’s plea sentencing defendant as an habitual
felon to a term of 77 to 102 months imprisonment. Defendant
appealed the denial of his motion to suppress.
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A written order denying defendant’s motion to suppress was
later filed by the trial court on 27 November 2012.
II. Discussion
On appeal, defendant raises various issues with regard to
the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
Our review of a trial court’s denial of a motion to
suppress is “strictly limited to determining whether the trial
judge’s underlying findings of fact are supported by competent
evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on
appeal, and whether those factual findings in turn support the
judge’s ultimate conclusions of law.” State v. Cooke, 306 N.C.
132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982). “The trial court’s
conclusions of law . . . are fully reviewable on appeal.” State
v. Hughes, 353 N.C. 200, 208, 539 S.E.2d 625, 631 (2000).
Findings of Fact
In the first issue raised on appeal, defendant argues the
trial court erred in issuing finding of fact number six because
it is not supported by competent evidence. Finding of fact
number six provides, “Officer Camacho and Officer Carpenter
proceeded to 2721 Milburnie Road. At that address, they spoke
with Natasha Montgomery’s stepfather, Phillip Becoat, who
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informed the officers that Victor Inyama was Natasha
Montgomery’s boyfriend.”
Specifically, defendant contends there is no evidence that
Becoat informed officers that defendant was Montgomery’s
boyfriend. In response, the State does not address defendant’s
precise argument, but instead asserts there was sufficient
evidence that defendant was Montgomery’s boyfriend and, in the
alternative, the finding is not critical to the trial court’s
denial of defendant’s motion to suppress.
Although testimony at the suppression hearing indicated
defendant was Montgomery’s boyfriend, the testimony does not
support the finding that Becoat informed the officers that
defendant was Montgomery’s boyfriend. During the suppression
hearing, Camacho testified as follows:
I spoke to Ms. Montgomery's stepfather,
Philip
Becoat. . . . He was very cooperative, very
polite. He introduced himself as Philip
Becoat. He allowed us to go inside and
search for Ms. Montgomery. We informed him
that we wasn't [sic] looking for her. We
were looking for her boyfriend, Victor
Inyama.
I spoke to -- actually, Officer Carpenter
and I spoke to him. He stated that they
used to live there at 2721 Milburnie Road
but that he couldn't take their nonsense. I
didn't ask him too much what he meant by
nonsense. He stated they were living
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together in an apartment complex off New
Bern.
While this testimony implies defendant was Montgomery’s
boyfriend, it is not evidence that Becoat explicitly informed
officers that defendant was Montgomery’s boyfriend.
However, we agree with the State that the finding was not
necessary for a determination of the merits of defendant’s
motion to suppress. In defendant’s motion to suppress,
defendant did not seek to suppress evidence by challenging the
truthfulness of the affidavits accompanying the warrant
applications pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-978. Instead,
defendant sought to suppress evidence on the ground that there
was insufficient evidence in the affidavits to establish
probable cause to search. “Simply stated, the sole question
raised by the defendant's motion to suppress is whether the
officer's affidavit was sufficient to support a finding of
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant.” State v.
Rutledge, 62 N.C. App. 124, 125, 302 S.E.2d 12, 13 (1983).
In this case, Camacho’s sworn statement in the application
for warrant one provided, “Becoat advised that [defendant] is
[Montgomery’s] boyfriend.” Because defendant did not challenge
the truthfulness of the sworn statement below, we accept the
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evidence in the affidavit as true for the sake of analyzing the
remaining issues on appeal.
Moreover, we note that the statement in Camacho’s
affidavit, that “Becoat advised [defendant] is Montgomery’s
boyfriend[,]” is not irreconcilable with Camacho’s testimony at
the suppression hearing. If defendant had challenged the
truthfulness of Camacho’s affidavit in the motion to suppress,
it is likely the State could have produced evidence to support
the affidavit.
Conclusions of Law
In defendant’s second, third, and fourth issues on appeal,
defendant challenges the trial court’s conclusions that the
warrants were supported by probable cause. These are the issues
raised in defendant’s motion to suppress below.
As this Court has explained,
A valid search warrant application must
contain allegations of fact supporting the
statement. The statements must be supported
by one or more affidavits particularly
setting forth the facts and circumstances
establishing probable cause to believe that
the items are in the places or in the
possession of the individuals to be
searched. Although the affidavit is not
required to contain all evidentiary details,
it should contain those facts material and
essential to the case to support the finding
of probable cause. . . . The clear purpose
of these requirements for affidavits
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supporting search warrants is to allow a
magistrate or other judicial official to
make an independent determination as to
whether probable cause exists for the
issuance of the warrant under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 15A–245(b) (2001). N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 15A-245(a) requires that a judicial
official may consider only information
contained in the affidavit, unless such
information appears in the record or upon
the face of the warrant.
State v. McHone, 158 N.C. App. 117, 120, 580 S.E.2d 80, 83
(2003) (quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted).
When addressing whether a search warrant is
supported by probable cause, a reviewing
court must consider the totality of the
circumstances. In applying the totality of
the circumstances test, our Supreme Court
has stated that an affidavit is sufficient
if it establishes reasonable cause to
believe that the proposed search . . .
probably will reveal the presence upon the
described premises of the items sought and
that those items will aid in the
apprehension or conviction of the offender.
Probable cause does not mean actual and
positive cause nor import absolute
certainty. Thus, under the totality of the
circumstances test, a reviewing court must
determine whether the evidence as a whole
provides a substantial basis for concluding
that probable cause exists. In adhering to
this standard of review, we are cognizant
that great deference should be paid to a
magistrate's determination of probable cause
and that after-the-fact scrutiny should not
take the form of a de novo review.
It is well settled that whether probable
cause has been established is based on
factual and practical considerations of
everyday life on which reasonable and
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prudent persons, not legal technicians, act.
Probable cause is a flexible, common-sense
standard. It does not demand any showing
that such a belief be correct or more likely
true than false. A practical, nontechnical
probability is all that is required.
State v. Pickard, 178 N.C. App. 330, 334-35, 631 S.E.2d 203,
206-07 (quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted),
appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 361 N.C. 177, 640 S.E.2d
59 (2006).
Defendant first challenges the trial court’s conclusion of
law number one regarding the issuance of warrant one.
Conclusion of law number one provides:
With respect to [warrant one], the court
concludes that, based upon the four corners
of the application for the search warrant,
the magistrate had a substantial basis for
concluding that there was probable cause to
believe that the person named in the warrant
would be found at the location described
therein.
Defendant argues the trial court erred in issuing this
conclusion because the affidavit accompanying the application
for warrant one was insufficient to establish probable cause
that defendant would be found in the apartment.
Camacho’s affidavit in the application for warrant one
provided the following statement of facts to establish probable
cause:
On 8/17/2011, I have [sic] been diligently
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searching for a wanted subject by the name
of Victor NNamdi [sic] Inyama wanted for a
speeding [f]ailure to appear warrant
(09CR36003). Through our law enforcement
data base [sic], I developed information
that Mr. Inyama was cited on 5/25/2011 while
operating a 1998 Cadillac Deville
(ACC7075/NC). Officer Carpenter and I
responded to the address assigned to the
vehicle which was 2721 Milburnie Rd. The
registered owner is Natasha Montgomery.
Upon our arrival, [w]e spoke with Mr.
Phillip Becoat who is M[s]. Montgomery's
step-father [sic]. Mr. Phillip Becoat
advised that Mr. Victor Inyama is [M]s.
Natasha Montgomery's boyfriend. Through
researching [C]ity of Raleigh utilities it
was found that Ms. Natasha Montgomery
resides at 217-101 Merrell Dr. Prior to
conducting a knock and talk I heard items
being moved by the front door and muffled
speech. Officer Carpenter advised that the
shades were open to the patio deck. I began
to knock on the door and announcing [sic]
myself when I heard subjects frantically
moving about the residence. Officer
Carpenter then advised that the shades on
the patio deck were closed. Through
multiple attempts of heavy knocking and
announcing myself no one has came [sic] to
the door thus far. Ms. Montgomery has two
vehicles registered in her name. Both
vehicles are on scene including the vehicle
that Mr. Inyama was scene [sic] operating.
At approximately 3:55 PM Sgt. Palczak spoke
with Ms. Montgomery via telephone. She
advised no one should be inside her
residence located at 217 Merrell Dr. Apt.
101. When I asked who is inside she advised
she does not know. She advised suspect
Inyama should not be inside the residence
and he was last there “a few days ago[.]”[]
Ms. Montgomery would not give verbal consent
for the police to enter with a key they had
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obtained from the apartment management.
Defendant contends this statement of the evidence does not
contain a single statement supporting a reasonable belief that
defendant was inside the apartment. In support of his argument,
defendant distinguishes his case from State v. Oats, in which
this Court determined grounds for probable cause existed to
search the residence of a third party where an informant
provided information to police that a suspect would be staying
at the residence and police were able to identify a person
sitting on the porch of the residence as the suspect, _ N.C.
App. _, 736 S.E.2d 228 (2012), appeal dismissed and disc. rev.
denied, _ N.C. _, 740 S.E.2d 473 (2013), and compares his case
to federal cases in which it was determined there was an
insufficient basis for a finding of probable cause. See United
States v. Hill, 649 F.3d 258, 264 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[N]oise
coming from inside of a house is not enough to give the police a
reason to believe that a defendant is present.”); United States
v. Hardin, 539 F.3d 404, 420-24 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding there
was insufficient evidence to form a reasonable belief that a
subject would be found in an apartment matching a description
given by a confidential informant who claimed to have purchased
drugs from the subject in the past where the informant could not
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identify the apartment by number, stated the subject would be
staying in the apartment if he was staying in the area, and
described a vehicle found near the apartment that defendant
would likely be driving).
In response to defendant’s argument, the State argues that
considering the totality of the circumstances, the affidavit
included sufficient evidence to establish probable cause that
defendant would be found in the apartment. In addition to
evidence contained in Camacho’s affidavit, the State relies on
portions of Camacho’s testimony during the suppression hearing
that were not included in the affidavit relied on by the
magistrate. This evidence included testimony that Camacho was
familiar with the 1998 Cadillac DeVille that defendant had
previously driven and testimony that Becoat informed officers
that defendant lived with Montgomery.
Although we recognize that the State errs in relying on
evidence that was not before the magistrate, upon review of
Camacho’s affidavit, we agree with the State that there was
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause.
Despite no direct evidence that defendant was in the
apartment, the affidavit considered by the magistrate indicated
that the 1998 Cadillac DeVille which defendant was driving on a
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prior occasion when he was stopped by police was parked outside
of his girlfriend’s apartment. A second vehicle registered to
defendant’s girlfriend was also in the parking lot. Although
defendant’s girlfriend informed police that no one should be
inside the apartment and defendant was last in the apartment a
few days earlier, the police could hear several male voices
inside the apartment. Defendant’s girlfriend indicated she did
not know who was inside.
Considering only the evidence within the “four corners” of
the affidavit, we hold there was sufficient evidence from which
the magistrate could find probable cause to believe defendant
was inside the apartment. Therefore, the trial court did not
err in concluding there was a substantial basis to support the
magistrate’s issuance of warrant one.
On appeal, defendant also raises challenges to the trial
court’s conclusion of law number two regarding the issuance of
warrant two. Conclusion of Law number two provides:
With respect to [warrant two and warrant
three], the Court concludes that, based upon
the four corners of the applications for the
search warrants, the magistrate had a
substantial basis for concluding that there
was probable cause to believe that evidence
of a crime, as described in the warrants,
would be found at the locations described
therein.
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As our courts have long recognized, “affidavits must
establish a nexus between the objects sought and the place to be
searched. Usually this connection is made by showing that
criminal activity actually occurred at the location to be
searched or that the fruits of a crime that occurred elsewhere
are observed at a certain place.” State v. McCoy, 100 N.C. App.
574, 576, 397 S.E.2d 355, 357 (1990) (citation omitted).
In this case, the affidavit accompanying the application
for warrant two described in detail the place to be searched.
The following statement of facts was then listed as the basis to
establish probable cause: “While executing a search warrant for
a wanted person marijuana was in [sic] observed in plain view.
Based on this discovery it is my reasonable belief that more
narcotics will be located upon a further search.”
Defendant argues the trial court erred in concluding there
was probable cause to believe evidence of a crime would be found
at the apartment because the affidavit accompanying the
application for warrant two failed to implicate the premises
searched. Specifically, defendant contends the affidavit does
not connect the marijuana to the apartment to be searched and
does not specify the location where the officers observed
marijuana in plain view. Therefore, defendant claims the
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affidavit is fatally defective. See State v. Campbell, 282 N.C.
125, 131, 191 S.E.2d 752, 756-57 (1972) (holding an affidavit
that detailed no underlying facts and circumstances from which
the issuing officer could find that probable cause existed to
search the premises described was fatally defective).
Although the affidavit does not state that the search
warrant for defendant was executed at the address identified to
be searched, we hold that it is clear from a common sense
reading of the affidavit that the place to be searched was the
same place searched during the execution of the prior search
warrant. Therefore, we hold the affidavit was not fatally
defective.
In defendant’s final argument on appeal, defendant argues
the trial court erred in concluding there was probable cause to
believe firearms and ammunition would be found at the apartment
based on the discovery of the partially smoked marijuana
cigarette.
In support of his argument, defendant cites cases that
stand for the proposition that firearms are associated with drug
dealers and drug trafficking. Defendant then contends that the
partially smoked marijuana cigarette was insufficient, based on
the amount of marijuana, to support a finding of probable cause
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to believe firearms and ammunition would be found. We disagree.
Where criminal activity has been discovered at the apartment, we
find the trial court did not err in concluding there was a
reasonable basis for the magistrate to believe firearms would be
found.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, we hold there was a
substantial basis for the magistrate to determine there was
probable cause to issue the warrants. Therefore, we affirm the
denial of defendant’s motion to suppress.
Affirmed.
Chief Judge MARTIN and JUDGE ERVIN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).