In re J.A. ( 2014 )

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA13-832
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 6 May 2014
IN THE MATTER OF:
J.A., J.J. and J.J. Mecklenburg County
Nos. 12 JA 382–84
Appeal by respondent mother from orders entered 19 April
2013 by Judge Elizabeth T. Trosch in Mecklenburg County District
Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 April 2014.
Twyla Hollingsworth-Richardson, for petitioner-appellee
Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services.
J. Thomas Diepenbrock, for respondent-appellant mother.
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, by Stephen Martin,
for guardian ad litem.
HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.
Respondent mother (“Teresa”) appeals from orders
adjudicating her minor child J.A. (“Julie”)1 to be a neglected
juvenile. Because the trial court’s unchallenged findings of
1
Julie is a pseudonym used to protect the identity of the
juvenile pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 3.1(b). Other pseudonyms
are used for the respondent mother, Julie’s putative father, and
Julie’s siblings to further conceal Julie’s identity.
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fact support its conclusion that Julie is a neglected juvenile,
we affirm.
Teresa gave birth to Julie in March 2012, and Julie was
born with a congenital heart defect that required surgery to
reconstruct her aortic arch. Julie’s condition also impeded the
development of the reflexes and muscles necessary to eat
normally, and she had to receive nutrition through a gastronomy
tube. Teresa and Julie’s putative father (“Earl”) received
education and training from members of the hospital staff
regarding the intensive care needed to ensure Julie’s health.
Their training included information about the nature of Julie’s
heart defect, how to administer her medication, how to conduct
all of her necessary daily medical assessments, and how to
identify symptoms of cardiac decompensation. The hospital
discharged Julie to the home of Teresa’s mother on 22 May 2012,
with a discharge plan that included semiweekly appointments with
a home health nurse.
On 15 June 2012, the Mecklenburg County Department of
Social Services (“DSS”) filed a petition alleging Julie and her
older siblings, J.A. (“Pat”) and J.J. (“Taylor”), were neglected
juveniles. DSS alleged that Teresa had not kept Julie’s
necessary medical appointments and had not provided appropriate
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care or stable living arrangements for Julie. The neglect
allegations regarding Pat and Taylor were based on their co-
residence in the home where Julie was neglected, and on prior
allegations of domestic violence and improper supervision. DSS
took non-secure custody of Julie, Pat, and Taylor the same day.
After adjudication hearings held on 15 and 19 February 2013
and a disposition hearing held on 25 February 2013, the trial
court entered adjudication and disposition orders on 19 April
2013 adjudicating Julie to be a neglected juvenile, but
dismissing the petition concerning Pat and Taylor. The court
concluded Julie had not received her necessary medical care and
that immediate return to Teresa’s home was not in her best
interests. The trial court continued custody of Julie with DSS,
ordered DSS to continue making reasonable efforts to reunify
Julie with Teresa, and directed Teresa to comply with all of her
Family Service Agreement requirements. Teresa filed a timely
notice of appeal.
Teresa argues the trial court erred when it allowed the
admission of hearsay evidence at the adjudication hearing.
Teresa also argues the trial court’s conclusion that Julie is a
neglected juvenile is not supported by the evidence. We
disagree.
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“The role of this Court in reviewing a trial court’s
adjudication of neglect is to determine (1) whether the findings
of fact are supported by clear and convincing evidence, and (2)
whether the legal conclusions are supported by the findings of
fact.” In re T.H.T., 185 N.C. App. 337, 343, 648 S.E.2d 519,
523 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted), aff’d as
modified, 362 N.C. 446, 665 S.E.2d 54 (2008). “If such evidence
exists, the findings of the trial court are binding on appeal,
even if the evidence would support a finding to the contrary.”
Id. The determination that a child is a neglected juvenile
under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15) (2013) is a conclusion of law
subject to de novo review. See In re Helms, 127 N.C. App. 505,
510, 491 S.E.2d 672, 675–76 (1997).
While Teresa properly states the applicable standard of
review in this appeal, she does not properly apply it to the
issues presented to this Court. In her first argument, Teresa
asserts that the trial court erred by admitting, over objection,
the hearsay statements of Earl. However, Teresa only links the
alleged hearsay evidence to one of the trial court’s findings of
fact, that Teresa “had not kept the child’s necessary medical
appointments[,]” and even this argument is unavailing as the
finding is supported by other testimony apart from the alleged
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hearsay evidence. Because Teresa does not challenge any of the
forty-nine other findings of fact made by the trial court in its
adjudication order, or any of the findings of fact made in the
court’s disposition order, they are all binding upon this Court
on appeal. Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729,
731 (1991). Further, Teresa’s argument that the trial court
erred by allowing hearsay into evidence fails to link the
alleged hearsay to the court’s findings and thus cannot provide
Teresa a basis for relief on appeal.
Similarly, in her challenge to the trial court’s conclusion
that Julie is a neglected juvenile, Teresa fails to argue that
this conclusion is not supported by the court’s findings of
fact. Instead, Teresa argues that when the focus is properly
put on Julie’s status, the evidence does not support the court’s
conclusion that she is a neglected juvenile. Teresa essentially
asks this Court to review the evidence that was before the trial
court, ignore the trial court’s findings of fact, and substitute
our judgment on the evidence for that of the trial court. We
decline this invitation. See In re Hughes, 74 N.C. App. 751,
759, 330 S.E.2d 213, 218 (1985) (“The trial judge determines the
weight to be given the testimony and the reasonable inferences
to be drawn therefrom. If a different inference may be drawn
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from the evidence, he alone determines which inferences to draw
and which to reject.”)
Here, the trial court found that Teresa failed to provide
the medical care Julie needed. Specifically, the trial court
found Teresa attended only one home healthcare appointment and
never contacted her home health nurses to seek education,
support, or training regarding Julie’s health needs. The trial
court also found Teresa left Julie in the care of Earl without
providing him with all of the equipment necessary to monitor her
medical condition or her prescribed medication. The trial court
further found that on 12 June 2012, Teresa called the Sanger
Clinic to reschedule Julie’s cardiology appointment. At that
time, Teresa was instructed to bring Julie to the clinic for
evaluation because Julie was experiencing diarrhea, a symptom of
cardiac decompensation.
Teresa did not take Julie to the clinic, however, and two
days later she unexpectedly left Julie in the care of Earl’s
grandmother. When Earl arrived at his grandmother’s home, he
found Julie had a pus-filled sore around her gastronomy tube,
that the gastronomy tube was crusty and clogged with food, and
that Julie looked unwell and was suffering from diarrhea. Earl
took Julie to the emergency room, where she was found to be
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dehydrated and suffering from low blood sugar and acidosis. The
court found that Julie’s condition when she arrived at the
hospital was potentially fatal. These findings are unchallenged
by Teresa and thus binding on appeal.
We hold the trial court’s conclusion that Julie is a
neglected juvenile is fully supported by its unchallenged
findings of fact. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15) (2013)
(defining a neglected juvenile, in part, as one “who is not
provided necessary medical care”). Accordingly, the trial
court’s adjudication and disposition orders are
AFFIRMED.
Judges ERVIN and DAVIS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).