In re H.L.M. ( 2014 )


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  • An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
    controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
    with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    NO. COA13-1027
    NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
    Filed: 15 April 2014
    IN THE MATTER OF:
    H.L.M., T.D.M.                          Caldwell County
    Nos. 12 JT 146-47
    Appeal by respondent mother from orders entered 26 June
    2013 by Judge Mark L. Killian in Caldwell County District Court.
    Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 March 2014.
    No brief filed for petitioner-appellee father.
    Robert W. Ewing for respondent-appellant mother.
    HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.
    Respondent mother appeals from the orders entered in this
    private     proceeding     terminating      her    parental     rights     to   two
    children.      On appeal, Respondent contends the trial court made
    insufficient findings of fact to support both the grounds for
    termination and the conclusion that termination of her rights
    was in the juveniles’ best interests.              We vacate the termination
    order and remand the matter.
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    Petitioner father and respondent are the biological parents
    of   the   juveniles,    who    were   born    in     2001    and     2005.        On   19
    December 2011, the parties reached a consent agreement regarding
    custody    of   the   juveniles.       The     consent       order    provided      that
    petitioner would have primary custody of the juveniles, that
    neither party would be required to pay child support, and that
    respondent would have visitation with the juveniles, subject to
    mutually agreeable conditions.
    On 3 October 2012, petitioner filed petitions to terminate
    respondent’s      parental      rights       alleging        she     had      willfully
    abandoned and failed to support the juveniles.                       The matter came
    on for hearing on 1 May 2013 in Caldwell County District Court’s
    juvenile division.           On 26 June 2013, the trial court entered
    orders     terminating       respondent’s       parental        rights        to    both
    juveniles.       After   making    findings      of    fact,       the   trial     court
    concluded that grounds existed to support termination and that
    it   was   in   the   best   interests    of    the    juveniles         to   terminate
    respondent’s parental rights.            Respondent gave timely notice of
    appeal in writing on 25 July 2013.
    Respondent’s first two arguments on appeal are that the
    trial court’s findings of fact do not support its conclusions
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    that    grounds         existed       to   terminate     her    parental         rights.        We
    agree.
    At    the       adjudicatory        stage    of   a   termination          of    parental
    rights hearing, the burden is on the petitioner to prove by
    clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that at least one ground
    for termination exists.                    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1109(f) (2013);
    In re Blackburn, 
    142 N.C. App. 607
    , 610, 
    543 S.E.2d 906
    , 908
    (2001).         Review           in   the     appellate        courts       is    limited       to
    determining            whether    clear      and    convincing       evidence       exists      to
    support the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact
    support the conclusions of law.                      In re Huff, 
    140 N.C. App. 288
    ,
    291, 
    536 S.E.2d 838
    , 840 (2000), appeal dismissed, disc. review
    denied, 
    353 N.C. 374
    , 
    547 S.E.2d 9
     (2001).
    “For this Court to exercise its appellate function, the
    trial       court       must      enter     sufficient       findings        of        fact   and
    conclusions of law to reveal the reasoning which led to the
    court’s ultimate decision.”                    In re D.R.B., 
    182 N.C. App. 733
    ,
    736, 
    643 S.E.2d 77
    , 79 (2007).                      “When a trial court is required
    to make findings of fact, it must make the findings of fact
    specially.”            In re Harton, 
    156 N.C. App. 655
    , 660, 
    577 S.E.2d 334
    ,    337    (2003)          (citing      N.C.    Gen.     Stat.      §   1A-1,       52(a)(1)
    (2001)).           A    termination         order    that    omits      findings        of    fact
    -4-
    necessary    to   support   the   grounds   for   termination   must   be
    reversed.     See In re C.N.C.B., 
    197 N.C. App. 553
    , 558, 
    678 S.E.2d 240
    , 243 (2009).
    In this case, the trial court’s findings of fact do not
    adequately support the grounds for termination.         The grounds for
    termination are identified in one vague finding of fact in each
    order:
    5.   The Respondent, the mother of the minor
    child, is not a fit and proper person to
    have custody of the minor child involved
    herein and that the mother’s parental rights
    in and to the said minor child should be
    terminated on the grounds that:
    The mother has willfully abandoned the child
    for   at   least   six   consecutive   months
    immediately [sic] filing of the petition.
    [Respondent], the child’s mother, has not
    seen the child or provided support for the
    minor child for the last six (6) months.
    The trial court’s orders sufficiently recite the statutory
    grounds for terminating parental rights enumerated in N.C. Gen.
    Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7) (2013).       See In re L.M.T., ___ N.C. ___,
    ___, 
    752 S.E.2d 453
    , 455 (2013)          (“The trial court’s written
    findings must address the statute’s concerns, but need not quote
    its exact language.”).      However, we hold that the trial court’s
    findings of fact do not shed light on the reasoning supporting
    either ground.     In fact, the trial court’s orders are devoid of
    -5-
    any   findings      describing          respondent’s      specific     actions        or
    omissions that support its conclusion that respondent willfully
    abandoned the juveniles or failed to provide adequate support
    for the children.          Instead, the trial court made only a few
    findings describing the history of the case, and then set forth
    its ultimate findings related to the grounds for termination.
    These findings are insufficient to permit appellate review of
    the termination orders.           Accordingly, we vacate the termination
    orders and remand the matter so that the trial court may, if
    supported    by    sufficient      evidence,      enter   new    adjudication        and
    disposition orders containing sufficient findings of fact.
    Because      we    vacate     the     adjudication        of    both     grounds
    supporting       termination      and    remand    the    matter,     we     need    not
    address     respondent’s        argument         pertaining      to    disposition.
    However,    we    note   that     the    trial    court   is    required      to    make
    findings addressing the relevant factors set out in N.C. Gen.
    Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2013).
    VACATED and REMANDED.
    Judges ERVIN and DAVIS concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).