State v. Burnette ( 2014 )


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  • An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
    controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
    with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    NO. COA13-976
    NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
    Filed: 1 April 2014
    STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
    v.                                       Forsyth County
    No. 12 CRS 58053, 58353-56
    JERRY ELDRED BURNETTE, JR.
    Appeal by Defendant from judgments entered 8 February 2013
    by Judge R. Stuart Albright in Forsyth County Superior Court.
    Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 January 2014.
    Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney
    General Angenette Stephenson, for the State.
    W. Michael Spivey, for Defendant-appellant.
    DILLON, Judge.
    Jerry    Eldred     Burnette,     Jr.,    (“Defendant”)      appeals     from
    judgments entered 8 February 2013, convicting him of one count
    of   first-degree       sexual    offense    and    ten   counts     of   indecent
    liberties with a child, arguing that the trial court erred in
    denying his motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence
    and that his constitutional right to a unanimous verdict was
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    abridged.          We believe there was no prejudicial error in this
    case.
    I.      Background
    The evidence of record tends to show the following:                                       In
    2011, nine-year old Caroline1, her two brothers, and her mother
    moved    in       to    live   with     Defendant       in     his    two-bedroom         house.
    Caroline’s mother, who worked at night, slept in one bedroom,
    and Defendant slept in the other bedroom.                               Caroline and her
    brothers slept in various places in the house; however, Caroline
    often slept with Defendant in his bed, while Caroline’s mother
    was working.
    During          the   course    of    the      next    year,    Defendant         touched
    Caroline      all       over   her     body     with     his       fingers   and        penis    on
    multiple          occasions     in    his     bedroom.         Testimony       showed          that
    Defendant’s            improper       conduct      occurred         “over    five        times.”
    Defendant admitted in a written statement that he engaged in
    improper          conduct      with     Caroline         “5        times”    and        that     he
    “[e]jaculated each time.”
    On     8    October      2012,       Defendant        was    indicted       on    various
    charges arising from Defendant’s conduct with Caroline.                                         His
    case came on for trial on 4 February 2013, the Honorable Judge
    1
    A pseudonym.
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    R. Stuart Albright presiding.             The jury found Defendant guilty
    of one count of first-degree sexual offense and ten counts of
    indecent liberties and found the existence of an aggravating
    factor for each charge, that Defendant had taken advantage of a
    position of trust.      The trial court entered judgments consistent
    with the jury’s verdicts, sentencing Defendant to 300 to 369
    months     incarceration   on       the     first-degree     sexual     offense
    conviction and 20 to 24 months incarceration on each of the ten
    indecent    liberties   with    a   child     convictions,    to   be   served
    consecutively.    From these judgments, Defendant appeals.
    II. Analysis
    Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his
    motion to dismiss at least some of the indecent liberty charges
    and that his right to a unanimous jury verdict was abridged.
    Though Defendant couches these arguments as a single argument,
    we address each one separately.
    A. Motion to Dismiss
    Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his
    motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence to support
    his ten indecent liberties convictions.            Specifically, Defendant
    contends the State produced insufficient evidence to show ten
    “distinct[,] separate incidents.”           We disagree.
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    “This Court reviews the trial court’s denial of a motion to
    dismiss de novo.”                  State v. Smith, 
    186 N.C. App. 57
    , 62, 
    650 S.E.2d 29
    , 33 (2007).                    “‘Upon defendant’s motion for dismissal,
    the    question         for       the    Court   is     whether   there     is   substantial
    evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged,
    or of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of defendant’s
    being the perpetrator of such offense. If so, the motion is
    properly denied.’”                  State v. Fritsch, 
    351 N.C. 373
    , 378, 
    526 S.E.2d 451
    , 455 (quoting State v. Barnes, 
    334 N.C. 67
    , 75, 
    430 S.E.2d 914
    , 918 (1993)), cert. denied, 
    531 U.S. 890
    , 
    148 L. Ed. 2d 150
     (2000).                “In making its determination, the trial court
    must    consider            all     evidence      admitted,       whether    competent    or
    incompetent, in the light most favorable to the State, giving
    the    State          the     benefit      of     every    reasonable       inference    and
    resolving any contradictions in its favor.”                             State v. Rose, 
    339 N.C. 172
    , 192, 
    451 S.E.2d 211
    , 223 (1994), cert. denied, 
    515 U.S. 1135
    , 
    132 L. Ed. 2d 818
     (1995).
    In       the    present          case,    Defendant’s      ten    indecent    liberty
    convictions were based on the following acts, as reflected on
    the jury verdict sheets:
        4 acts of rubbing Caroline’s vagina with his penis,
    simulating sexual intercourse;
        3 acts of touching her breasts with his fingers;
        2 acts of touching her vagina with his fingers;
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        1 act of touching her anus with his fingers.
    The evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the State,
    showed that Defendant put his penis in Caroline’s vagina over
    five times, that he touched her breasts with his hands over five
    times, that he touched her vagina with his fingers over five
    times, and that he touched her anus with his fingers over five
    times.       We believe that from this evidence it could be inferred
    that the indecent liberties by Defendant took place during the
    course of at least six episodes, in that “over five times” means
    at least six times.
    We have held that “multiple sexual acts, even in a single
    encounter,      may   form   the   basis    for   multiple   indictments    for
    indecent liberties.”         State v. James, 
    182 N.C. App. 698
    , 705,
    
    643 S.E.2d 34
    , 38 (2007).           However, we have also held that the
    touching of multiple areas of a victim’s body during a single
    encounter only constitutes a single act of touching and not
    multiple sexual acts.         State v. Laney, 
    178 N.C. App. 337
    , 341,
    
    631 S.E.2d 522
    ,   524-25     (2006).        However,   we   reached   our
    conclusion in Laney, in part, because, in that case, the only
    sexual acts alleged involved touching the victim’s body with his
    hands and was not accompanied by some other type of sexual act.
    
    Id.
       (noting that “[t]he sole act involved was touching – not
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    two    distinct       sexual   acts”).          Our   Court    has    explained     the
    distinction between Laney and James as follows:
    In   Laney,   defendant    touched  both  the
    victim’s breasts and put his hands under her
    waist-band.   This Court held that there was
    one single act of touching and not multiple
    sexual acts.      However, in [James], this
    Court, in distinguishing [Laney], stated
    that as opposed to mere touching, “multiple
    sexual acts, even in a single encounter, may
    form the basis for multiple indictments for
    indecent liberties.” Thus, this Court found
    a   different   analytical   path  should  be
    applied when dealing with “sexual acts” as
    opposed to touching in the context of
    charges of indecent liberties.
    State v. Williams, 
    201 N.C. App. 161
    , 185, 
    689 S.E.2d 412
    , 425
    (2009)      (citations     omitted).       Thus,      while    multiple       touchings
    occurring during the same encounter will generally only sustain
    a     single     conviction       for      indecent         liberties,        touchings
    accompanied      by    a   separate     sexual    act   –    such    as   a   defendant
    rubbing the victim’s vagina with his penis – during the same
    encounter, may sustain two convictions for indecent liberties.
    In     this     case,     Defendant’s          ten     indecent        liberties
    convictions were based on six acts of touching and four acts of
    another     sexual     act,    namely    simulating         sexual   intercourse    by
    rubbing his penis on Caroline’s vagina.                     To sustain Defendant’s
    six acts of touching, there must be evidence from which it could
    be inferred that Defendant touched Caroline during six different
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    encounters.         Based     on    the     evidence     that    Defendant      touched
    Caroline’s       breasts,     vagina      and     anus   “over    five   times,”       we
    believe there was evidence from which it could be inferred that
    Defendant    committed        acts   of     indecent      liberties      by    touching
    during at least six different encounters; and, therefore, we do
    not believe the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion
    to dismiss those charges.                  Further, we believe that rubbing
    one’s    penis     against     a     victim’s       vagina,      simulating      sexual
    intercourse, constitutes a “sexual act” distinct from touching;
    and,    therefore,     a    separate      conviction      for    indecent     liberties
    based on such genital rubbing can be sustained even where a
    defendant    is    also     convicted       for   indecent      liberties     based    on
    touching during the same encounter.                      We believe the evidence
    that Defendant rubbed his penis against Caroline’s vagina “over
    five    times”    is   sufficient      to    overcome      Defendant’s        motion   to
    dismiss the four counts of taking indecent liberties based on
    genital rubbing, notwithstanding that these four acts might have
    occurred    during     some    of    the    same    encounters      relied     upon     to
    sustain some of his six convictions based on touching.
    B. Unanimous Jury Verdict
    Defendant argues that his right to a unanimous jury verdict
    under our Constitution and General Statutes was violated.                              See
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    N.C. Const. art. 1, § 24; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1237(b) (2011).
    Specifically, Defendant argues on appeal that his right to a
    unanimous jury verdict “was violated because ten separate counts
    of indecent liberties were submitted to the jury in a manner
    that created a risk some jurors found Defendant guilty of ten
    counts based on acts of touching that occurred during just four
    separate and distinct encounters with the child.”
    Initially, we note that at trial, Defendant lodged a motion
    to dismiss at the close of the State’s evidence and at the close
    of all evidence, but without reference to the alleged abridgment
    of   his   right   to    a    unanimous   jury    verdict.       We    also   note,
    however, that the failure to object to alleged errors by the
    trial court that violate a defendant’s right to a unanimous
    verdict    does    not   waive    his   right     to    raise   the   question   on
    appeal.     State v. Ashe, 
    314 N.C. 28
    , 39, 
    331 S.E.2d 652
    , 659
    (1985).
    In State v. Lawrence, 
    360 N.C. 368
    , 375, 
    627 S.E.2d 609
    ,
    613 (2006), our Supreme Court held that “a defendant may be
    unanimously convicted of indecent liberties even if: (1) the
    jurors considered a higher number of incidents of immoral or
    indecent behavior than the number of counts charged, and (2) the
    indictments    lacked        specific   details    to   identify      the   specific
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    incidents.”            This is because “the indecent liberties statute
    simply          forbids           ‘any      immoral,          improper,          or      indecent
    liberties[,]’”             and,    “while       one    juror       might    have      found    some
    incidents        of    misconduct         and    another          juror    might      have    found
    different incidents of misconduct, the jury as a whole found
    that improper sexual conduct occurred.”                            Id. at 374, 
    627 S.E.2d at
      612-13       (citing         
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.1
    (a)(1)         (2005))
    (emphasis added).
    In    the       present       case,    there      was       evidence      that    Defendant
    committed indecent liberties in four different ways: by touching
    Caroline’s breasts, by touching her vagina, by touching her anus
    and by rubbing his penis against her vagina.                                The evidence also
    shows    that         he    did    each     of    these       acts      “over    five     times.”
    However,        Defendant         was    only    convicted         of     committing     each    of
    these    acts     four       or    fewer     times.       In       other     words,     the    jury
    considered a higher number of incidents for each type of conduct
    than the number it ultimately convicted him for.                                       Therefore,
    based      on    the       Supreme       Court’s       holding       in     Lawrence,        
    supra,
    Defendant’s        right      to     a    unanimous      jury       verdict      has    not    been
    abridged.
    III. Conclusion
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    Based on the foregoing, we conclude Defendant had a fair
    trial, free from prejudicial error.
    NO ERROR.
    Judge STROUD and Judge HUNTER, JR. concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).