Lawson v. Lawson ( 2014 )

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. 13-1119
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 1 April 2014
JOHN WALTER LAWSON,
MARGARET (MEG) ELIZABETH
LAWSON DARLING,
Plaintiffs,
v. Forsyth County
No. 12 CVS 8369
HEIDI CAVANAGH LAWSON,
JACQUELINE CAVANAGH HUGHES,
MARK CAPRISE, DEPUTY SHERIFF
P.J. MULLEN, DEPUTY SHERIFF
MICHAEL BRANNON, CORPORAL
CLAYBOURN HARPER, SHERIFF
WILLIAM SCHATZMAN, HARTFORD
INSURANCE, LIEUTENANT MAX
CREASON, CHIEF KENNETH GAMBLE,
Defendants.
Appeal by plaintiffs from order entered 24 April 2013 by
Judge William Z. Wood, Jr., in Forsyth County Superior Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 February 2014.
Margaret (Meg) Elizabeth Lawson Darling, and John Walter
Lawson, pro se.
Lonnie G. Albright, Asst. Forsyth County Attorney, for
defendant-appellees.
STEELMAN, Judge.
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Where plaintiffs fail to acknowledge that their appeal is
interlocutory, and do not allege the existence of a substantial
right that would be jeopardized by failing to address their
claims now, their appeal is dismissed.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On 11 June 2010 warrants were issued by the Cary Police
Department in Wake County, charging plaintiff John Lawson with
assault on a female and violation of a N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B
protective order. Both offenses were allegedly committed against
John Lawson’s ex-wife, Heidi Lawson. On 12 June 2010 these
warrants were transmitted electronically to the Forsyth County
Sheriff’s Department. After the warrants were verified, Deputies
Mullen and Brannon arrested John Lawson at the Forsyth County
home of his sister, plaintiff Margaret Darling.
On 21 December 2012, plaintiffs filed an unverified pro se
complaint against defendants Heidi Lawson; Jacqueline Hughes,
Heidi Lawson’s sister; Mark Caprise, Heidi Lawson’s boyfriend;
Forsyth County Sheriff William Schatzman; Forsyth County Deputy
Sheriffs P.J. Mullen and Michael Brannon, and Corporal Claybourn
Harper in their official and individual capacities; Kernersville
Police Chief Kenneth Gamble; Lieutenant Max Creason, in his
official and individual capacity; and Hartford Insurance, which
plaintiffs alleged had “provided a surety bond pursuant to N.C.
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General Statute § 162-8” “covering [the] actions of Sheriff
Schatzman[.]” The complaint generally alleged that (1) there was
an ongoing domestic dispute between John Lawson and Heidi
Lawson; (2) on 10 June 2010 Hughes falsely reported to law
enforcement authorities that John Lawson had raped Heidi Lawson;
(3) on 12 June 2010, Kernersville Police Lieutenant Max Creason,
Heidi Lawson’s brother-in-law, called the Forsyth County
Sheriff’s Department and falsely reported that the Kernersville
Police Department was issuing warrants for John Lawson’s arrest
and that John Lawson could be located at the home of his sister,
Meg Darling; (4) on 12 June 2010 Forsyth County Deputies Mullen
and Brannon “forced their way into the Darling residence” and
arrested John Lawson; (5) the deputies did not verify the
existence of arrest warrants before arresting John Lawson; that
(6) no warrants “ever existed” that were issued by the
Kernersville Police Department for John Lawson’s arrest, and;
(7) that Heidi Lawson had sought “to deprive John Lawson of his
constitutional right to be a father,” that the other defendants
“through their actions or lack there[of]” had “exhibited an
agreement with Heidi Lawson” and that “collectively the
defendants [should] be held accountable for all of the actions
referenced [in the complaint] pursuant to the existence of a
civil conspiracy[.]”
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Plaintiffs’ complaint is somewhat confusing, but appears to
assert the following claims:
1. Claims against Schatzman, Mullen,
Brannon, Harper, Gamble, Creason, Heidi
Lawson, Hughes, and Caprise under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for violation of plaintiffs’ rights
under the 4th and 14th Amendments to the
United States Constitution.
2. Claims under the N.C. Constitution, §§
19, 20, 21, 35, and 36, against Creason,
Harper, Brannon, Mullen, Schatzman, and
Gamble “in their official capacities.”
3. Claims for malicious prosecution against
Heidi Lawson, Hughes, Creason, Harper,
Mullen, and Brannon.
4. Claims for abuse of process against Heidi
Lawson, Hughes, Creason, Harper, Mullen,
Brannon, and Caprise.
5. Claims for defamation, libel, and slander
against Heidi Lawson and Caprise.
6. Claims for intentional infliction of
emotional distress against Heidi Lawson,
Hughes, and Caprise.
7. Claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress against Heidi Lawson.
8. Claim for civil obstruction of justice
against Heidi Lawson.
9. Claim by Darling for intrusion upon
seclusion against Heidi Lawson, Hughes,
Creason, Mullen, and Brannon.
10. Claim for negligent retention and
supervision against Schatzman and Gamble.
11. Claim “on the bond” against Schatzman
and Hartford Insurance.
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The present appeal concerns only defendants Schatzman,
Mullen, Brannon, and Harper (“the Forsyth County defendants”).
On 23 January 2013 the Forsyth County defendants filed an answer
denying the material allegations of plaintiffs’ complaint and
raising various defenses, including failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted, governmental immunity, and
an allegation that Hartford Insurance had not provided a surety
bond under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 162-8 or N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-
435.1 On 24 January 2013 the Forsyth County defendants filed a
request for admissions from plaintiffs. On 22 February 2013,
plaintiffs admitted that they had been provided with copies of
the warrants for John Lawson’s arrest that were issued by the
Cary Police Department on 10 June 2010. Although plaintiffs
“concede[d] to the existence of the arrest warrants” they did
not seek to amend their complaint to reflect the existence of
warrants for John Lawson’s arrest.
On 7 March 2013, the Forsyth County defendants filed a
motion for summary judgment, based on governmental immunity, and
supported by plaintiffs’ responses to the request for
1
Plaintiffs later admitted that Hartford Insurance Company had
not provided a surety bond for the Forsyth County Sheriff’s
Department. Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their complaint
to allege a different surety but did not obtain a ruling on the
motion, and did not appeal from the dismissal of their claim
against Hartford, which is not a party to this appeal.
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admissions, copies of the arrest warrants issued for John
Lawson, and affidavits of Forsyth County employees averring that
Hartford Insurance had not provided a surety bond for the
Forsyth County Sheriff’s Department and setting out the timeline
of the events surrounding John Lawson’s arrest. In response,
plaintiffs submitted a written brief and a transcript
purportedly made from a video that Darling recorded during John
Lawson’s arrest.2
A hearing was conducted on the Forsyth County defendants’
summary judgment motion on 15 and 18 April 2013. Plaintiffs did
not submit affidavits, depositions, or any other sworn testimony
in opposition to the motion. On 24 April 2013 the trial court
entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of the
Forsyth County defendants, and dismissing plaintiffs’ claim
against Hartford Insurance.
Plaintiffs appealed from entry of summary judgment in favor
of the Forsyth County defendants.
II. Interlocutory Nature of Appeal
“A judgment is either interlocutory or the final
determination of the rights of the parties.” N.C. Gen. Stat.
§1A-1, Rule 54(a). “A final judgment is one which disposes of
2
Because the transcript begins at a point when John Lawson is
talking with the deputies, it does not shed any light on the
circumstances under which the deputies entered Darling’s house
and made contact with John Lawson.
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the cause as to all the parties, leaving nothing to be
judicially determined between them in the trial court. An
interlocutory order is one made during the pendency of an
action, which does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for
further action by the trial court in order to settle and
determine the entire controversy.” Veazey v. City of Durham, 231
N.C. 357, 361-62, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950) (citations omitted).
Plaintiffs admit on appeal that the “order entered 24 April
2013 [was] interlocutory” at the time it was entered, but
contend that after the order was entered “[a]ll of the remaining
claims as to all of the parties of 12 CVS 8369” were “judicially
disposed of with subsequent orders.” In support of this
assertion, plaintiffs allege that on 6 March 2013 Judge Stuart
Albright dismissed plaintiffs’ claims against defendants
Creason, Gamble, and Caprise pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, and dismissed plaintiffs’ § 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim
against Hughes, and that on 3 September 2013 Judge Anderson
Cromer granted summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs’
remaining claims against Hughes. Plaintiffs include the summary
judgment order in favor of Hughes in an appendix to their brief,
but have not included in the record the orders entered by Judge
Albright, citing instead to unsworn statements of defense
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counsel at the summary judgment hearing. We note that “appellate
review is conducted on the basis of the information contained in
the record developed before the trial court,” Cunningham v. City
of Greensboro, 212 N.C. App. 86, 98, 711 S.E.2d 477, 485-86
(2011), and that “appellate courts in this State are bound by
the record as certified and can judicially know only what
appears of record.” Vassey v. Burch, 301 N.C. 68, 74, 269 S.E.2d
137, 141 (1980). Furthermore, if we assume that plaintiffs
omitted the dismissal orders through an oversight, we
nonetheless conclude that this appeal is interlocutory because
the record is devoid of any information concerning the
disposition of plaintiffs’ claims against Heidi Lawson.
Plaintiffs contend that “Heidi Lawson has never answered
the complaint and plaintiff-appellants filed for an entry of
default against her on 7 September 2013.” However, plaintiffs
did not include their motion for entry of default in the record,
and do not provide any information concerning whether default
was entered, or whether judgment was entered, whether Heidi
Lawson moved to set aside an entry or judgment of default, or
whether any other procedural or substantive matters pertaining
to the current status of plaintiffs’ claims against Heidi Lawson
remain unresolved. Because the record contains no basis upon
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which to conclude that these claims have been resolved, we hold
that plaintiffs’ appeal is interlocutory.
“Generally, there is no right of immediate appeal from
interlocutory orders and judgments.” Goldston v. American Motors
Corp., 326 N.C. 723, 725, 392 S.E.2d 735, 736 (1990). “[W]hen an
appeal is interlocutory, the appellant must include in its
statement of grounds for appellate review ‘sufficient facts and
argument to support appellate review on the ground that the
challenged order affects a substantial right.’” Johnson v.
Lucas, 168 N.C. App. 515, 518, 608 S.E.2d 336, 338 (quoting
N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(4)), aff’d per curiam, 360 N.C. 53, 619
S.E.2d 502 (2005). In this case, plaintiffs have failed to
acknowledge that their appeal remains interlocutory due to the
outstanding claims against Heidi Lawson, and offer no argument
concerning why they are entitled to immediate appeal on the
basis of a substantial right. “It is not the duty of this Court
to construct arguments for or find support for appellant’s right
to appeal from an interlocutory order; instead, the appellant
has the burden of showing this Court that the order deprives the
appellant of a substantial right which would be jeopardized
absent a review prior to a final determination on the merits.”
Jeffreys v. Raleigh Oaks Joint Venture, 115 N.C. App. 377, 380,
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444 S.E.2d 252, 254 (1994) (citing GLYK and Assoc. v. Railway
Co., 55 N.C. App. 165, 170-71, 285 S.E.2d 277, 280 (1981)).
We hold that plaintiffs have attempted to appeal from an
interlocutory order and that their appeal must be dismissed.
DISMISSED.
Judges McGEE and ERVIN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).