Blanchard v. Britthaven, Inc. ( 2014 )


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  • An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
    controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
    with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    NO. COA12-1366
    NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
    Filed: 18 February 2014
    ANNE BLANCHARD, EXECUTRIX OF THE
    ESTATE OF MARY LOU BARTHAZON,
    Plaintiff,
    v.                                      Orange County
    No. 09 CVS 1109
    BRITTHAVEN, INC. and HILLCO,
    LTD.,
    Defendants.
    Appeal    by   plaintiff     from    judgment     and   order    entered    12
    October 2011 and 13 January 2012 by Judge Shannon R. Joseph in
    Orange County Superior Court.             Heard in the Court of Appeals 23
    May 2013.
    Henson & Fuerst, P.A., by Anne Duvoisin; Connor & Connor,
    LLC, by Kenneth L. Connor; and Brian G. Brooks, Attorney at
    Law, PLLC, by Brian G. Brooks, for plaintiff-appellant.
    Hurley Law Office, by Michael C. Hurley and Katherine L.
    Jones, for defendants-appellees.
    GEER, Judge.
    Plaintiff Anne Blanchard, executrix of the Estate of Mary
    Lou Barthazon, appeals from the trial court's entry of a final
    judgment     following     a     jury   verdict    in   favor     of   defendants
    -2-
    Britthaven, Inc. and Hillco, Ltd.                     Plaintiff had asserted claims
    for       ordinary   and      medical    negligence         arising     out    Britthaven's
    allegedly       improper       care     of    Ms.     Barthazon        while   she    was   a
    resident      at     Britthaven's       Chapel      Hill,     North     Carolina      nursing
    home, which, plaintiff contended, resulted in Ms. Barthazon's
    death.
    On appeal, plaintiff primarily argues that the trial court
    erred in excluding evidence of (1) documents produced by the
    North       Carolina    Department       of    Health       and    Human    Services    ("NC
    DHHS") following inspections of Britthaven's Chapel Hill, North
    Carolina       nursing        home      and     (2)        decisions     resulting      from
    administrative          appeals        related        to     Ms.    Barthazon's       death.
    Plaintiff's arguments on appeal regarding the admissibility of
    the       exhibits     all     hinge    on     plaintiff's         assertion     that    the
    documents were relevant to prove causation.                           However, plaintiff
    did not, at trial, seek admission of the exhibits on that basis.
    Plaintiff's appellate arguments were not, therefore,                                 properly
    preserved at trial for appeal.
    Facts
    On 21 June 2004, Ms. Barthazon was admitted as a resident
    to    a    nursing     home    in    Chapel     Hill       operated    by   Britthaven,     a
    wholly owned subsidiary of Hillco.                     At that time, Ms. Barthazon
    was 95 years old, was non-ambulatory, and had severe Alzheimer's
    -3-
    dementia and osteoporosis, making her at risk for broken bones
    from falls.          Pursuant to her resident care plan, Ms. Barthazon
    was only to be transferred from a chair to her bed by use of a
    certain mechanical lift.                 On 30 September 2007,                    Mack Weldon
    Jones,    Jr.,      who     was   working      for    Britthaven             as   a    certified
    nursing      assistant,      manually      transferred            Ms.    Barthazon        from    a
    chair    to   her     bed    without     the    use     of    a    mechanical          lift,     in
    violation of Ms. Barthazon's care plan.
    Due    to    swelling      and    bruising       in   Ms.        Barthazon's       knees,
    Britthaven staff ordered an x-ray of Ms. Barthazon's knees on 13
    October 2007.             The 13 October 2007 x-rays revealed that Ms.
    Barthazon had two broken femurs.                  Because of her condition, Ms.
    Barthazon      was    admitted      to    the     University            of    North    Carolina
    Hospital's         Emergency      Department       on    14       October         2007.        Ms.
    Barthazon died on 18 October 2007.
    On 13 July 2009, plaintiff, Ms. Barthazon's daughter, filed
    suit    against      defendants,        asserting       claims          for    (1)     "ORDINARY
    CORPORATE NEGLIGENCE" causing Ms. Barthazon's broken femurs but
    not causing her death; (2) medical negligence causing various
    lifetime injuries and Ms. Barthazon's death; and (3) "ORDINARY
    NEGLIGENCE         (NON-ADMINISTRATIVE          BASIC        CARE)"          causing      various
    lifetime injuries and Ms. Barthazon's death.                            The complaint also
    sought to pierce the corporate veil and obtain relief against
    -4-
    Britthaven's parent company, Hillco, on the basis that Hillco
    also owed duties of care to Ms. Barthazon and its breach of
    those duties caused Ms. Barthazon's injury.
    On 17    June 2011, defendants filed a motion for partial
    summary judgment on plaintiff's claims for corporate negligence,
    ordinary negligence, piercing the corporate veil, and punitive
    damages.      On or about 2 August 2011, defendants filed a "MOTION
    FOR FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT" as to all of plaintiff's claims.
    The   trial   court    granted       in    part   and    denied     in     part
    defendants'     motion     for     summary      judgment      as   to    corporate
    negligence and granted defendants' motion for summary judgment
    as to all of plaintiff's ordinary negligence claims other than
    the corporate negligence claim.1               On or about 1 September 2011,
    the   trial     court    entered    an     order    deferring      a    ruling     on
    defendants'      motion     for    partial       summary      judgment     as      to
    1
    On 29 August 2011, the court entered an order on
    defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on the ordinary
    negligence claims which provided that "Defendants' Motion for
    Partial Summary Judgment is granted as to all of Plaintiff's
    claims for ordinary negligence that were not adjudicated as part
    of this Court's Order of August 5, 2011."      The 5 August 2011
    partial summary judgment order does not appear to be included in
    the record on appeal. However, a 14 August 2011 email from the
    trial court to counsel regarding defendants' summary judgment
    motions indicates that, on 5 August 2011, the court entered an
    order granting in part and denying in part defendants' partial
    summary judgment motion as to the corporate negligence claim.
    That email also indicated that the court took defendants'
    summary judgment motion as to plaintiff's claim for punitive
    damages under advisement at that time. The trial court restated
    the content of the email during a pretrial hearing.
    -5-
    plaintiff's        claim   based     on     piercing    the      corporate      veil    and
    denying defendant's motion for final summary judgment.
    Although the record is not entirely clear, it appears that
    the case proceeded to trial on plaintiff's claims for medical
    negligence, corporate negligence, and liability against Hillco
    based   on    piercing       the     corporate      veil.        During     the      charge
    conference,        following    the       presentation      of    all     the    parties'
    evidence, the trial court, on its own initiative, suggested that
    the verdict sheet set out an initial question of whether "any
    conduct"      of    defendants       proximately        caused      Ms.    Barthazon's
    injuries before asking the jury to decide whether defendants
    breached any duty of care towards Ms. Barthazon.
    In       accordance      with     the     court's      suggestion,         the    first
    question     on     the    verdict    sheet       asked:    "Was    any     conduct     of
    defendant Britthaven, Inc. a proximate cause of any injury to,
    or the death of, Mary Lou Barthazon?"                      Following deliberation,
    the jury answered that first question in the negative.                                  The
    trial   court,      therefore,       entered      final     judgment      in    favor   of
    defendants on 12 October 2011.
    On 19 October 2011, plaintiff filed a motion for a new
    trial pursuant to Rule 59(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
    The trial court denied plaintiff's motion for a new trial in an
    -6-
    order entered 13 January 2012.                   Plaintiff timely appealed to
    this Court.
    I
    Plaintiff          first   argues     that       the   trial   court    erred    by
    excluding       (1)     evidence     of    inspections         (called     "surveys")
    conducted at Britthaven's Chapel Hill nursing home pursuant to
    state and federal regulations and (2) evidence arising out of
    Britthaven's          administrative       appeals         from    those     surveys.
    Plaintiff contends that this evidence was relevant to the issue
    of causation and admissible under Rule 803(8)(c) of the Rules of
    Evidence.
    Britthaven is a long-term care facility that participates
    in the federal Medicare program.                 Pursuant to state and federal
    regulations,      NC    DHHS     inspects,      or    "surveys,"    long-term       care
    facilities to ensure compliance with Medicare regulations.                           See
    N.C. Admin. Code, tit. 10A, r. 13D.2109(a) (October 2013); 
    42 C.F.R. § 488.330
    (a)(1)(i) (2013); 
    42 C.F.R. § 488.330
    (b)(1).
    If     NC   DHHS     finds    noncompliance        with    federal     regulations
    after a survey, NC DHHS produces a statement of deficiencies
    ("SOD") that outlines the specific instances of noncompliance
    and the evidence on which the findings are made.                         NC DHHS also
    certifies its findings to the federal Centers for Medicare &
    Medicaid    Services      ("CMS").        
    42 C.F.R. § 488.330
    (a)(1)(i)(C).
    -7-
    The findings of NC DHHS surveyors are recommendations to CMS,
    which then makes its own determination regarding the long-term
    care facility's compliance with federal regulations.                                 
    42 C.F.R. § 488.12
     (2013).
    In this case, NC DHHS conducted surveys at Britthaven's
    Chapel Hill nursing home on 19 October 2007 and 29 November
    2007.      NC       DHHS   reported        its       results     from    the    October      and
    November 2007 surveys on "FORM CMS-2567" documents.                               Both forms
    contained       a    summary       SOD    with       supporting        findings,      and    the
    November 2007 form further contained a plan of correction for
    the deficiencies found.                  In each form's SOD, NC DHHS reported
    noncompliance with federal Medicare regulations.
    CMS adopted NC DHHS' recommendations based on the November
    2007 survey and resulting SOD, which CMS determined superseded
    the SOD for the October 2007 survey.                       Findings of noncompliance
    in both surveys were based upon Mr. Jones' manual transfer of
    Ms.   Barthazon       from     a   chair       to    her   bed    in     violation      of   Ms.
    Barthazon's care plan.
    Following        completion         of     a    survey     and     SOD,    a    facility
    subject to CMS-imposed sanctions for noncompliance may appeal,
    under certain conditions, to a federal administrative law judge
    ("ALJ").    See 
    42 C.F.R. § 498.5
     (2013).                         A dissatisfied party
    may   further       appeal     the       ALJ's      decision     to     the    United   States
    -8-
    Department of Health and Human Service's Departmental Appeals
    Board (the "Board").         See 
    42 C.F.R. § 498.80
     (2013).
    Utilizing this process, Britthaven appealed CMS' decision
    to an ALJ, and the ALJ issued a decision affirming CMS' findings
    of noncompliance with two Medicare regulations, which resulted
    in   immediate     jeopardy    to   resident    health   and    safety    at   the
    facility    (the    "ALJ   decision").         Britthaven   then    appealed    a
    single legal issue to the Board, and the Board issued a decision
    affirming the ALJ decision (the "Board decision").
    In arguing that the trial court erred in excluding evidence
    of the surveys and the ALJ and Board decisions, plaintiff argues
    that the evidence was admissible to prove causation under Rule
    803(8)(c).       We   need    not   address    whether   such    evidence,     if
    relevant,    would    be     admissible   under    the   Rules     of    Evidence
    because review of the record shows that plaintiff never argued
    to the trial court that the exhibits were admissible to show
    causation, the sole argument made on appeal.2
    2
    We note that our review of the record has revealed no
    ruling by the trial court on the admissibility of the ALJ and
    Board decisions. Although plaintiff contends that, when ruling
    upon the admissibility of the "surveys" during the 15 and 16
    August 2011 pretrial hearings, the trial court was, in fact,
    ruling upon the admissibility of not only the surveys, but also
    the ALJ and Board decisions, the specific arguments of the
    parties at trial and the trial court's rulings indicate that
    references to "surveys" were limited to the surveys alone.   By
    failing to obtain a ruling from the trial court on the
    admissibility of the ALJ and Board decisions, plaintiff failed
    -9-
    On   9   August    2011,    defendants    filed   a   motion   in    limine
    seeking to exclude evidence of the findings and conclusions from
    the surveys, while on 10 August 2011, plaintiff filed a motion
    requesting that the trial court judicially notice and "admit[]
    into evidence" the "surveys and ALJ opinions relating to Ms.
    Barthazon's transfer by Mack Jones."               Plaintiff asserted that
    the   records    were    "important    public    documents,"      but    made   no
    argument that they were relevant to causation in the written
    motion for judicial notice.
    The trial court heard arguments on defendants' motion in
    limine at a 15 August 2011 pretrial hearing.                  At the hearing,
    the   parties    only    argued    regarding    whether     the   surveys    were
    admissible to show the applicable standard of care.                     Plaintiff
    did not argue at the hearing that the surveys were admissible to
    show causation.         The trial court announced at the hearing that
    it was "inclined to exclude" the surveys.
    At a continuation of the hearing on the following day, 16
    August 2011, the court again addressed the admissibility of the
    to preserve that issue for appeal.      N.C.R. App. P. 10(a)(1)
    (requiring, in order to preserve issue for appeal, that
    "complaining party . . . obtain a ruling upon the party's
    request, objection, or motion").     Nonetheless, even assuming
    that the trial court ruled that the ALJ and Board decisions were
    inadmissible, we hold that, as with the surveys, plaintiff
    failed to preserve the specific argument made on appeal since
    she failed to argue at trial that the ALJ and Board decisions
    were admissible to show causation.
    -10-
    surveys.     Consistent with the fact that the parties had debated
    only the relevance of the surveys to the standard of care, the
    court explained that Rule 702, which addresses expert testimony
    regarding the standard of care, "gave me some pause."                At the 16
    August 2011 hearing, plaintiff again failed to argue that the
    surveys and the ALJ and Board decisions were admissible to show
    causation.     The trial court deferred any ruling on plaintiff's
    motion for judicial notice.3
    Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the rulings
    on defendants' motion in limine on or about 19 August 2011.                 The
    motion   addressed   admissibility       of    the   "survey   documents"   and
    asserted no arguments pertaining to causation.                  Plaintiff has
    pointed to -- and we have found -- no ruling on the motion to
    reconsider.
    Thus, although plaintiff argued, both in support of her
    motion   for   judicial   notice   and    in    opposition     to   defendants'
    motion in limine, that the surveys were admissible as evidence,
    plaintiff argued only that the surveys were admissible to show
    the applicable standard of care and any breach of that standard
    by defendants.     In addition, we have found no indication in the
    3
    The record on appeal does not contain written orders
    addressing either defendant's motion in limine or plaintiff's
    motion for judicial notice.
    -11-
    record that plaintiff argued at trial that the surveys should be
    admitted to prove causation.4
    Rule 10(a)(1) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure provides
    that "[i]n order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a
    party must have presented to the trial court a timely request,
    objection,   or    motion,   stating   the   specific   grounds    for   the
    ruling the party desired the court to make . . . ."               (Emphasis
    added.)   The purpose of the rule "'is to require a party to call
    the [trial] court's attention to a matter upon which he or she
    wants a ruling before he or she can assign error to the matter
    on appeal.'"      Lathon v. Cumberland Cnty., 
    184 N.C. App. 62
    , 68,
    
    646 S.E.2d 565
    , 568 (2007) (quoting Reep v. Beck, 
    360 N.C. 34
    ,
    37, 
    619 S.E.2d 497
    , 499 (2005)).             Because plaintiff did not
    specifically argue to the trial court that the surveys should be
    4
    Plaintiff filed a motion, which was denied by the trial
    court, requesting that the trial court apply the doctrine of
    collateral estoppel to findings made in the ALJ decision as
    affirmed by the Board decision, including findings related to
    causation.     This   motion did not, however, address the
    admissibility of the surveys, the ALJ decision, or the Board
    decision at trial.   See Rymer v. Estate of Sorrells, 
    127 N.C. App. 266
    , 268, 
    488 S.E.2d 838
    , 840 (1997) ("'Collateral estoppel
    precludes relitigation of an issue decided previously in
    judicial or administrative proceedings provided the party
    against whom the prior decision was asserted enjoyed a full and
    fair opportunity to litigate that issue in an earlier
    proceeding.'" (quoting In re McNallen, 
    62 F.3d 619
    , 624 (4th
    Cir. 1995))). Consequently, the collateral estoppel motion was
    not sufficient to preserve the issue raised on appeal.
    -12-
    admitted as relevant to causation, plaintiff did not preserve
    this issue for appeal.
    We note, however, that plaintiff's motion for a new trial
    sought   a   new      trial   based     upon   the    court's   exclusion       of   the
    surveys and ALJ and Board decisions since findings in those
    documents    supported        plaintiff's      "core      allegations"     at   trial.
    Among    other     findings,     the    motion   specifically      referenced        the
    ALJ's findings of fact regarding causation.                   Even if we assume -
    - although it is not entirely clear from the record -- that
    plaintiff was making the same argument in the motion for a new
    trial as made on appeal, the motion for a new trial, standing
    alone, is not sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal.
    Rule 10(a)(1) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure provides
    that in order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party
    must present a "timely request, objection, or motion," and an
    issue raised for the first time in a post-trial motion is not
    considered        a     timely     request       sufficient        for     appellate
    preservation.         (Emphasis added.)          See Hanna v. Brady, 
    73 N.C. App. 521
    , 528, 
    327 S.E.2d 22
    , 26 (1985) ("We do not feel that a
    motion for a new trial made under Rule 59 [of the Rules of Civil
    Procedure]       is    intended    to    serve       as   a   substitute    for      the
    obligation of counsel to timely object to the jury instructions.
    The obvious purpose behind the requirement of a timely objection
    -13-
    is to avoid the need to completely retry a case when a judge
    could merely correct the instructions.").
    However,    even    if    plaintiff     had     preserved       her   causation
    argument for appeal, plaintiff does not challenge in her brief
    the trial court's ruling, pursuant to Rule 403 of the Rules of
    Evidence,     that   any       probative      value     of      the    surveys     was
    substantially     outweighed      by   the    danger       of   confusion     of   the
    issues at trial.         See 
    id.
     ("Although relevant, evidence may be
    excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
    the danger of . . . confusion of the issues . . . .").                       Because
    plaintiff has made no showing that the trial court abused its
    discretion in excluding the evidence under Rule 403, see State
    v. Whaley, 
    362 N.C. 156
    , 160, 
    655 S.E.2d 388
    , 390 (2008) ("We
    review a trial court's decision to exclude evidence under Rule
    403 for abuse of discretion."), she cannot show prejudice from
    the error she asserts on appeal.
    In sum, plaintiff failed to argue at trial that the surveys
    and   the   ALJ   and     Board    decisions        were     admissible     to     show
    causation and, consequently, failed to preserve that issue for
    review.     Moreover, plaintiff has not shown prejudice because she
    has failed, on appeal, to challenge the trial court's ruling
    excluding the evidence under Rule 403.
    -14-
    II
    Plaintiff next argues that even if the surveys and the ALJ
    and Board decisions were not otherwise admissible as evidence,
    the trial court erred by not allowing plaintiff to cross-examine
    defendants' expert witness on causation, Dr. Alexander Doman,
    with those documents.           Plaintiff contends that because Dr. Doman
    stated    on    voir    dire    that    he    had    taken     the   documents      into
    consideration when reaching his opinions, plaintiff was entitled
    to cross-examine Dr. Doman with the surveys and the ALJ and
    Board decisions.
    Rule 705 of the Rules of Evidence provides that an expert
    "may    testify    in   terms    of    opinion      or   inference    and    give    his
    reasons    therefor      without      prior       disclosure    of   the    underlying
    facts or data, unless an adverse party requests otherwise, in
    which    event    the    expert       will    be    required    to   disclose       such
    underlying facts or data on direct examination or voir                              dire
    before stating the opinion."                  Rule 705       states further:        "The
    expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying
    facts or data on cross-examination."
    In this case, plaintiff questioned Dr. Doman on voir dire
    regarding whether Dr. Doman had reviewed the surveys:
    Q.   Have you taken into account in this
    case, in arriving at your opinions, the
    conclusions of the interdisciplinary survey
    team that cited the nursing home in this
    -15-
    case for multiple violations of the federal
    regulations as it related to the care of
    Mary Lou Barthazon?
    A.     Yes.
    Q.   What were the opinions that the State
    arrived at in that regard?
    A.     That there were some deficiencies.
    Q.   And on what basis do you conclude that
    that was in error?
    A.   I'm not expressing an opinion regarding
    federal investigations.      I'm expressing
    opinions today regarding the cause of the
    fractures.
    Q.   What qualifies you to express opinions
    about the basis for confusion about these
    issues as opposed to merely offering your
    opinions about the cause of the injuries?
    A.   There is no difference.     . . . I'm
    expressing an opinion as to the cause of the
    injury; and someone else is expressing the
    opinion that's different from my opinion,
    apparently.   People -- the jury can reach
    their conclusion as to which opinion . . .
    they choose to accept.
    Plaintiff then asked the court to permit cross-examination
    of   Dr.   Doman   before   the   jury   regarding   the   content   of   the
    surveys:
    [PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL]: In view of the
    fact that the witness has indicated that he
    has taken into account the survey issued by
    the   State  and   the   conclusions  reached
    therein   with   respect   to   his  opinion,
    respectfully I ask that I be permitted to
    query him in the presence of the jury on the
    contents of the survey.
    -16-
    THE COURT: Denied at this point.
    (Emphasis added.)
    On appeal, plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in
    excluding      evidence           of   the     surveys       and     the     ALJ    and   Board
    decisions      because       "Dr.      Doman    admitted        on    voir    dire    that    he
    considered         and    reviewed       the    surveys      and     the     ALJ    record    in
    forming his opinions."                 However, plaintiff questioned Dr. Doman
    only as to whether he had taken into account "the conclusions of
    the interdisciplinary survey team" and "the State."                                 He did not
    testify    whether         he     considered      the    ALJ       and     Board    decisions.
    Plaintiff then moved the court only for permission to cross-
    examine Dr. Doman with "the survey issued by the State and the
    conclusions reached therein."                   Since plaintiff did not ask the
    court for leave to cross-examine Dr. Doman with the ALJ and
    Board decisions, plaintiff has failed to preserve for appeal any
    argument      regarding         cross-examination         of       Dr.   Doman     with   those
    records.      N.C.R. App. P. 10(a)(1).
    With respect to the surveys, we initially observe that "'an
    expert may be . . . cross-examined with respect to material
    reviewed      by    the     expert       but   upon     which      the     expert    does    not
    rely.'"       Dep't of Transp. v. Blevins, 
    194 N.C. App. 637
    , 644,
    
    670 S.E.2d 621
    , 626 (quoting Williams v. CSX Transp., Inc., 
    176 N.C. App. 330
    ,        336,    
    626 S.E.2d 716
    ,    723    (2006)),       aff'd    per
    -17-
    curiam    as    modified    on    other    grounds     sub   nom.   N.C.    Dep't    of
    Transp. v. Blevins, 
    363 N.C. 649
    , 
    686 S.E.2d 134
     (2009).                            Dr.
    Doman's voir dire testimony indicating he had taken into account
    the surveys was, therefore, sufficient to lay a foundation for
    plaintiff to cross-examine him regarding the contents of the
    surveys.
    However,    despite       laying    a   sufficient      foundation     at    the
    trial level for use of the evidence, plaintiff then failed to
    make any offer of proof as to what Dr. Doman's testimony would
    have   been     before     the    jury    if     cross-examined     regarding       the
    surveys.       "'In order to preserve an argument on appeal which
    relates    to     the    exclusion        of   evidence,       including     evidence
    solicited on cross-examination, the defendant must make an offer
    of proof so that the substance and significance of the excluded
    evidence is in the record.'"              State v. Ryals, 
    179 N.C. App. 733
    ,
    740-41, 
    635 S.E.2d 470
    , 475 (2006) (quoting State v. Ginyard,
    
    122 N.C. App. 25
    , 33, 
    468 S.E.2d 525
    , 531 (1996)).
    Without    an     offer    of     proof    --   which     could     have    been
    accomplished by plaintiff's counsel asking during voir dire the
    questions that he wanted to ask before the jury -- we cannot
    determine whether plaintiff was prejudiced by the trial court's
    ruling.        As our Supreme Court has explained, "'the essential
    content or substance of the witness' testimony must be shown
    -18-
    before we can ascertain whether prejudicial error occurred.'"
    State v. Jacobs, 
    363 N.C. 815
    , 818, 
    689 S.E.2d 859
    , 861 (2010)
    (quoting State v. Raines, 
    362 N.C. 1
    , 20, 
    653 S.E.2d 126
    , 138
    (2007)).       See also State v. Williams, 
    355 N.C. 501
    , 534-35, 
    565 S.E.2d 609
    , 629 (2002) (holding defendant failed to preserve for
    appeal argument that trial court erroneously sustained State's
    objection to question during cross-examination of witness when,
    on voir dire, defendant failed to make offer of proof as to what
    witness       would    have    testified        to   on    cross-examination       had
    objection been overruled).
    III
    Plaintiff also argues that several other "developments in
    the conduct of the trial" made evidence of the surveys and the
    ALJ   and     Board    decisions      admissible.         Specifically,    plaintiff
    argues      that    five    statements    by     defense    counsel      during   jury
    selection -- four asserting that no one had decided whether
    there was any truth in plaintiff's allegations and one asserting
    that no one had made any decision about this case -- were untrue
    in    light    of     the   surveys    and   the     ALJ   and   Board    decisions.
    Plaintiff also argues that defense counsel's opening statement
    incorrectly framed plaintiff's allegations as, in plaintiff's
    words, "those of hysterical, over-reacting family members" when
    -19-
    the evidence of the surveys and the ALJ and Board decisions
    showed her allegations to be sound.
    Plaintiff did not, however, argue at trial that the jury
    selection questions or defendants' opening statement opened the
    door    for    admission      of   the    surveys    and     the    ALJ    and   Board
    decisions.      Although plaintiff did argue in her motion for a new
    trial that defendants' jury selection statements opened the door
    for admissibility of the evidence, her argument made for the
    first   time    in    that    motion     did   not   give    the   trial    court    an
    opportunity      to    revisit,     during       trial,     its    pretrial      ruling
    excluding the surveys or to make, during trial, a ruling on
    whether to exclude the ALJ and Board decisions.                    The argument in
    her motion for a new trial did not, therefore, preserve the
    issue for appeal.          See Hanna, 73 N.C. App. at 528, 
    327 S.E.2d at 26
    .
    Plaintiff additionally contends that prejudice to her from
    exclusion of the surveys and the ALJ and Board decisions was
    compounded by defense counsel's closing argument assertion that
    Mr. Jones was fired as a scapegoat for not transferring Ms.
    Barthazon      with    a     mechanical    lift.          Plaintiff    objected      to
    defendants' closing argument in front of the jury, asserting
    that the challenged statement "misstates the evidence," and the
    trial court sustained the objection.
    -20-
    Because plaintiff's argument on appeal regarding whether
    the   evidence   was   erroneously    excluded      was   not   preserved   for
    appeal, the question whether the exclusion prejudiced plaintiff
    is    immaterial.      Moreover,     the    trial    court      sustained   the
    objection, and plaintiff did not request a limiting instruction
    from the court or seek a mistrial.            See Smith v. Hamrick, 
    159 N.C. App. 696
    , 699, 
    583 S.E.2d 676
    , 679 (2003) ("[T]his Court
    has held that when an objection is made to an improper argument
    of counsel and the court sustains the objection, that court does
    not err by failing to give a curative instruction if one is not
    requested.").
    Given plaintiff's failure to request a limiting instruction
    and failure to move for a mistrial on this issue, we are not
    persuaded by plaintiff's argument that she was unduly prejudiced
    even though the trial court sustained her objection.                 See State
    v. Barber, 
    93 N.C. App. 42
    , 49, 
    376 S.E.2d 497
    , 501 (1989)
    (rejecting argument defendant was entitled to new trial based on
    prosecutor's improper closing argument since defendant failed to
    request limiting instruction when court sustained objection to
    argument and since evidence against defendant was overwhelming).
    IV
    Plaintiff's final argument is that "[t]he undue prejudice
    to Plaintiff's case by the exclusion of [the surveys and the ALJ
    -21-
    and Board decisions] [were] compounded and made exponentially
    greater when combined with the trial court's decision to place
    causation   in   a   verdict   sheet     all   by   itself   and   outside   the
    context of negligence by asking whether any 'conduct' caused
    injury to Mrs. Barthazon."        While, as with the above remarks by
    defense counsel, the question of prejudice is not material given
    our determination that plaintiff failed to preserve at trial her
    arguments   regarding      admissibility,      plaintiff's     brief   arguably
    challenges the propriety of the trial court's verdict sheet.
    It is well established that "[t]he form and the number of
    issues   submitted    to    the   jury    is   within    the   trial   court's
    discretion."     Godfrey v. Res-Care, Inc., 
    165 N.C. App. 68
    , 80,
    
    598 S.E.2d 396
    , 404 (2004).            In this case, the verdict sheet
    included eight interrogatories.            The first two interrogatories
    appeared as follows:
    ISSUE ONE
    Was any conduct of defendant Britthaven,
    Inc. a proximate cause of any injury to, or
    the death of, Mary Lou Barthazon?
    ANSWER: ____________
    (If you answer Issue One "Yes," you are to
    proceed to Issue Two.  If you answer Issue
    One "No," stop here. You have reached your
    verdict.)
    ISSUE TWO
    -22-
    Was any injury to, or the death of, Mary Lou
    Barthazon proximately caused by any medical
    negligence of defendant Britthaven, Inc.?
    Answer: ______________
    (Proceed to Issue Three.)
    The remaining six interrogatories asked: (1) whether any
    injury or death to Ms. Barthazon was caused by any "corporate
    negligence" of Britthaven; (2) whether Ms. Barthazon's death was
    proximately caused by any medical negligence of Britthaven; (3)
    what amount, if any, was Ms. Barthazon's estate entitled to
    recover     by        reason    of     her     death;          (4)     other      than      injuries
    resulting        in     her    death,        was     any       injury       to    Ms.      Barthazon
    proximately caused by any medical or corporate negligence of
    Britthaven; (5) what amount, if any, was Ms. Barthazon's estate
    entitled    to        recover    for     injury          to    Ms.    Barthazon         other   than
    injuries resulting in her death; and (6) did Hillco control
    Britthaven with regard to the acts or omissions that injured Ms.
    Barthazon.
    The jury answered the first interrogatory in the negative
    and, accordingly, proceeded no further.                              Plaintiff contends that
    by making the causation issue the first interrogatory, the trial
    court     placed         "substantial              and        unwarranted          emphasis"      on
    causation.             She     further       asserts          that    the        verdict     sheet's
    organization harmed             her since it allowed the jury to decide
    causation first, without first addressing duty and breach, and
    -23-
    therefore         "truncated"        the     "collective       sharing      process      that
    allows for correction of errors in memory or factual errors and
    that may lead to changes of opinion or strengthening of initial
    opinions."
    We    initially       note     that    plaintiff       cites    no   authority      in
    support of her arguments.                  However, Rule 28(b)(6) of the Rules
    of Appellate Procedure provides that "[t]he body of the argument
    . . . shall contain citations of the authorities upon which the
    appellant relies."             Because of the omission of any authority,
    this    Court       would     be    entitled       under    the   Rules     of   Appellate
    Procedure to decline to address this issue.                          See Works v. Works,
    ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 
    719 S.E.2d 218
    , 222 (2011) ("Moreover,
    we decline to consider the remaining assertions raised in wife's
    brief       for    which      wife    failed       to      present     supporting     legal
    authority.         See N.C.R.App. P. 28(b)(6).").
    In    any     event,        this    Court     has    previously      rejected      the
    argument that a defendant was prejudiced by the "order of the
    charges on the verdict form" when the form "began with the most
    serious      charge    and     listed      alternative        verdicts      in   descending
    order   of        severity,    contrary       to     defendant's      request     that   the
    possible verdicts be listed in the opposite order."                               State v.
    Bates, 
    70 N.C. App. 477
    , 480, 
    319 S.E.2d 683
    , 685 (1984), aff'd
    on other grounds, 
    313 N.C. 580
    , 
    330 S.E.2d 200
     (1985).                                    The
    -24-
    Court in Bates reasoned that the defendant "cite[d] no authority
    in support of this contention and we know of none."             
    Id.
    Here, we similarly find plaintiff's unsupported argument
    regarding the order of interrogatories on the verdict sheet to
    be unpersuasive.      See also State v. Watson, 
    169 N.C. App. 331
    ,
    339, 
    610 S.E.2d 472
    , 478 (2005) ("There is no rule in North
    Carolina indicating the order choices must be listed on verdict
    sheets.").
    Plaintiff additionally argues that the first interrogatory
    --   asking     whether   any   "conduct"   of    Britthaven     caused      Ms.
    Barthazon's injury or death -- was improper since "conduct" is
    not part of the three-part negligence inquiry of duty, breach,
    and causation.      As with the prior argument regarding the order
    of the interrogatories, plaintiff cites no authority for this
    contention.     Nevertheless, we fail to see how the wording of the
    first   interrogatory     prejudiced   plaintiff.        We   find    that   the
    language -- asking broadly whether any "conduct" of Britthaven
    caused Ms. Barthazon injury -- was actually helpful to plaintiff
    since it did not limit the question to one or more acts of
    negligence but rather allowed the jury to consider any conduct
    at   all   of   Britthaven.     Plaintiff   has   not,    therefore,      shown
    prejudicial error.
    -25-
    No error.
    Judges ELMORE and DILLON concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).