State v. Bullard ( 2014 )

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA13-794
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 4 February 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Robeson County
Nos. 06 CRS 013731, 013733
JOHN DARREN BULLARD
Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 5 June 2012 by
Judge Robert F. Floyd, Jr. in Robeson County Superior Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 November 2013.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Mary Carla Hollis, for the State.
Kevin P. Bradley, for defendant-appellant.
HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.
John Darren Bullard (“Defendant”) appeals from judgments
after a jury trial finding him guilty of second-degree murder
and of discharging a weapon into occupied property. Defendant
contends that the trial court committed reversible error in
denying his request for a jury instruction on self-defense and
in making other evidentiary decisions at trial. For the
following reasons, we disagree and find no error.
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I. Factual & Procedural History
On 5 June 2012, Defendant was convicted of second-degree
murder and of discharging a firearm into occupied property. The
evidence presented at Defendant’s trial tended to show the
following.
On 17 September 2006, Officer Greg Chavis (“Officer
Chavis”) of the Pembroke Police Department was dispatched to
investigate a reported shooting at the Spirit gas station in
Pembroke. Upon arrival, Officer Chavis received information
that a person had been shot and that the person was at a nearby
McDonald’s. When Officer Chavis arrived at the McDonald’s, he
observed Defendant pacing back and forth outside of a Hummer,
acting belligerent, and using profanity with someone on a cell
phone. Defendant was shirtless and had pellet wounds on his
upper torso. Defendant told the person on the other end of the
line that “he didn’t care how much money that it took, . . . he
was going to kill somebody.” Officer Chavis testified that
Defendant was “very mad” and “pissed off,” and that Defendant
kept saying that he was going to kill somebody.
Raymond Hunt (“Hunt”), who was with Defendant during the
shooting, testified that he and Defendant had pulled into the
Spirit gas station that night and encountered Christopher
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Locklear1 (“Locklear”) and his entourage. Hunt testified that
Locklear and Defendant got into an argument that resulted in
Locklear’s group pulling guns out and “closing in” on Defendant.
Fearing for his and Defendant’s life, Hunt testified that he
grabbed an AK-47 from the back of the Hummer and sprayed a
couple of rounds into the air and told Locklear’s group to back
off. Defendant and Hunt then got into the Hummer, which Hunt
testified was subsequently shot up by Locklear and his
entourage. Defendant and Hunt both sustained injuries from
birdshot during the incident. Thereafter, Defendant and Hunt
drove to the McDonald’s and called an ambulance. Locklear’s
testimony regarding the incident generally confirmed that there
was an argument with Defendant, but Locklear denied shooting at
Defendant and claimed that Defendant and Hunt were the
aggressors.
Locklear indicated that problems with Defendant started on
the night before the Spirit gas station incident. Specifically,
Locklear testified that he was riding in a car with Defendant’s
ex-girlfriend when Defendant stopped the car and attempted,
1
Persons identified in this opinion with the surname “Locklear”
have no familial relationship with one another. To avoid
confusion, other Locklears will be introduced using their full
name and abbreviated subsequently using their first name or
initials.
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unsuccessfully, to take his ex-girlfriend with him. Testimony
indicated that one of Defendant’s friends, Cashley Scott
(“Scott”) fired shots into the air as Locklear’s car was driving
away. Locklear testified that the incident with Defendant’s ex-
girlfriend precipitated the argument at the Spirit gas station.
Notwithstanding these incidents, the animus between
Defendant and Locklear was allegedly settled. Sometime after
the shooting at the Spirit gas station, Locklear testified that
he ran into Defendant at McDonald’s where the two discussed what
had happened and attempted to resolve their conflict.
Nearly a month after the shooting incident at the Spirit
gas station, in the early morning hours of 15 October 2006,
Locklear was cruising in Pembroke with a group of friends
including his girlfriend, Kayla Deese (“Deese”), his friends
Billy Hammonds (“Hammonds”) and Tommy Kurt Lloyd (“Lloyd”), and
Lloyd’s girlfriend, Crystal Locklear (“Crystal”). Hammonds
drove Locklear’s 1999 GMC Envoy. Locklear was riding in the
front passenger seat while Lloyd, Crystal, and Deese rode in the
backseat. Everyone in the group had been drinking.
On the same night, Defendant was also driving through
Pembroke with some friends in a Cadillac Escalade. Defendant,
Hunt, Scott, and Joshua Locklear (“J.L.”) had been to the
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Player’s Club in nearby Lumberton with a group of women and were
on their way back home. Defendant was driving, J.L. was in the
front passenger seat, and Hunt and Scott rode in the backseat.
The women rode behind the Escalade in a Cadillac CTS sedan. On
their way home, the women lost sight of Defendant and the
Escalade, so they pulled off to make a telephone call and to use
the bathroom.2
Meanwhile, as Defendant drove the Escalade into Pembroke,
he passed Locklear’s Envoy on Union Chapel Road. Deese
testified that when Locklear and the group riding in the Envoy
saw Defendant’s Escalade, Hammonds said “[t]here’s that truck,
you all. There’s them boys.” Deese testified that upon hearing
Hammonds’ words, Locklear said, “No, it’s straight. We got it
straight with them.” Locklear testified that he thought
everything was “cool” with Defendant because they had come to an
agreement with each other during their previous discussion.
Upon seeing Locklear, however, testimony indicated that
Defendant and Hunt became angry and “a little rowdy.” Defendant
turned the Escalade around, and using back roads, doubled back
2
Testimony at trial revealed that the women were not present for
the ensuing events and that they rejoined Defendant’s group at a
later point in time.
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through town in the direction that Locklear’s Envoy was
traveling.
Locklear’s Envoy eventually reached the edge of town, so
Hammonds turned around at a convenience mart to head back into
Pembroke. When Locklear’s group turned around, they noticed
Defendant’s Escalade sitting at a stop sign right off the main
road. Locklear testified that he was “shocked” to see
Defendant’s Escalade sitting at the stop sign and thought there
might be trouble. Locklear testified that because of the police
presence in Pembroke, it would be better to head back into town.
Deese testified she told Crystal “let’s get down.” Hammonds
testified that he was scared because he didn’t know what
Defendant’s group was capable of.
Locklear testified that after they passed by Defendant,
Defendant’s Escalade pulled out and got behind their vehicle.
As Defendant’s Escalade got closer, Locklear began to hear
bottles hitting the road near the Envoy. Locklear testified
that they turned off the main road and began to hear gunshots.
Thereafter, the Envoy’s back window shattered and Lloyd and
Crystal were shot. Locklear testified that he grabbed a .25
caliber pistol, stuck the gun out of the window, and fired
several rounds to let Defendant know that he was armed and to
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prevent Defendant from ambushing the Envoy. After Locklear
returned fire, he testified that Defendant’s Escalade fled the
scene.
Deese testified similarly. She recalled hearing the
bottles shatter outside the Envoy, turning off the main road,
coming to a stop, and hearing gunshots. Deese testified that
after the Envoy sustained gunshots the group checked to see if
anyone was harmed, at which point Crystal said “[i]’ve been
shot,” and fell over into Deese’s lap. Deese testified that she
didn’t see anyone in the Envoy return fire on Defendant’s
Escalade.
Likewise, Hammonds also testified that the Envoy sustained
gunshot fire as he turned onto the side road. Hammonds
indicated that when the shots began, he ducked down to avoid
injury. Hammonds did not see Locklear return fire on the
Escalade.
Lloyd testified that Defendant’s Escalade got right behind
the Envoy and that Defendant’s group was hanging out of the
Escalade attempting to throw beer bottles at them. When the
gunshots began, Lloyd looked back and the back windshield
shattered in his face. Lloyd was shot in the arm and reported
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being in shock. As a result, he was unable to recall whether
Locklear returned fire.
Hunt, Scott, and J.L., who were riding with Defendant in
the Escalade, also testified about the shooting.3 Hunt testified
that after seeing Locklear’s Envoy, Defendant stated something
to the effect of “I ought to shoot these boys” or “I want to
shoot them” or “you think I’ll shoot them[?]” Hunt testified
that he then heard gunfire from two different guns. When the
gunshots began, Hunt testified that he laid down in the Escalade
to avoid injury. Hunt did not report seeing any gunfire, but
indicated that the shots he heard were “[v]ery, very close.”
Scott testified that after the Escalade got behind the
Envoy, he heard gunshots coming from inside his vehicle and saw
Defendant’s arm hanging out of the window with a gun in his
hand. On cross-examination it was revealed that Scott
previously told law enforcement that he could not tell who shot
first because he heard the gunshots “all together.”
J.L. testified, “[Defendant] grabbed a gun out of the
middle of the console and I heard gunshots. There was gun fired
out [sic] my truck. My truck got hit. And I just—when I seen a
gun, I just laid down in the passenger side.” When asked when
3
Hunt, Scott, and J.L. were the State’s witnesses. Defendant
did not testify and produced no witnesses on his behalf.
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the Escalade was hit with gunfire, J.L. said “[d]uring when all
this was going on. It was like, you know, pretty much when all
this was going on—the shooting and everything was going on.”
Evidence collected at the scene indicated that both vehicles
sustained gunshot damage.
After the shootout, Locklear’s group attempted to get
Crystal medical attention, but she stopped breathing on the way
to the hospital. The medical examiner testified that Crystal
died of a single gunshot to the right side of her back that had
lodged in her chest.
Officer Tony Locklear (“Officer T.L.”) was in the area
during the shootout and heard the shots being fired. Upon
hearing the shots, Officer T.L. pulled out of the parking lot he
was in, radioed dispatch, and headed toward the area where he
heard the shots. While en route, Officer T.L. passed
Defendant’s Escalade heading in the opposite direction. Officer
T.L. recognized the Escalade as the vehicle that Defendant
normally drove. Over Defendant’s objection, Officer T.L.
testified that he notified Officer Chavis that Defendant “just
passed me” and that Defendant had “probably been involved in
some type of shooting.”
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Based on the foregoing evidence, defense counsel requested
a jury instruction concerning self-defense and voluntary
manslaughter. The trial court denied defense counsel’s request.
Following his convictions, Defendant gave notice of appeal in
open court.
II. Jurisdiction
Defendant’s appeal from the superior court’s final
judgments lies of right to this Court pursuant to N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 7A-27(b), 15A-1444(a) (2013).
III. Analysis
Defendant’s appeal raises three questions for this Court’s
review: (1) whether the trial court erred in refusing to
instruct the jury on theories of perfect and imperfect self-
defense; (2) whether the trial court committed reversible error
in allowing testimony by Officer T.L. that Defendant had
“probably been involved in some type of shooting;” and (3)
whether the trial court committed reversible error by not
allowing Defendant to impeach Officer T.L.’s testimony by
inquiring into his termination from the police department. We
address each in turn.
A. Failure to Provide Jury Instructions on Self-Defense
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Defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing
to instruct the jury on theories of perfect and imperfect self-
defense and in refusing to submit voluntary manslaughter as a
lesser-included offense.4 “[Arguments] challenging the trial
court’s decisions regarding jury instructions are reviewed de novo
by this Court.” State v. Osorio, 196 N.C. App. 458, 466, 675
S.E.2d 144, 149 (2009). “‘Under a de novo review, the court
considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment’
for that of the lower tribunal.” State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628,
632–33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (quoting In re Greens of Pine
Glen, Ltd. P’ship, 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003)).
“The [trial court] is required to charge [the jury] on all
substantial and essential features of a case which arise upon the
evidence even absent a special request for the instruction.” State
v. Deck, 285 N.C. 209, 214–15, 203 S.E.2d 830, 834 (1974); see also
4
Defendant’s requested submission of voluntary manslaughter as a
lesser-included offense is predicated on his imperfect self-
defense theory. See State v. Ross, 338 N.C. 280, 283, 449
S.E.2d 556, 559 (1994) (“There are two types of self-defense:
perfect and imperfect. Perfect self-defense excuses a killing
altogether, while imperfect self-defense may reduce a charge of
murder to voluntary manslaughter.” (internal citation omitted)).
Thus, whether the trial court erred in refusing to submit
voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense depends on
whether the evidence supports Defendant’s imperfect self-defense
theory. Cf. State v. Millsaps, 356 N.C. 556, 561, 572 S.E.2d 767,
771 (2002) (“An instruction on a lesser-included offense must be
given only if the evidence would permit the jury rationally to find
defendant guilty of the lesser offense and to acquit him of the
greater.”).
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State v. Bogle, 324 N.C. 190, 195, 376 S.E.2d 745, 748 (1989)
(“Failure to instruct upon all substantive or material features of
the crime charged is error.”). “When supported by competent
evidence, self-defense unquestionably becomes a substantial and
essential feature of a criminal case.” Deck, 285 N.C. at 215, 203
S.E.2d at 834. Furthermore, “[w]hen determining whether the
evidence is sufficient to entitle a defendant to jury instructions
on a defense or mitigating factor, courts must consider the
evidence in the light most favorable to defendant.” State v.
Oliver, 334 N.C. 513, 520, 434 S.E.2d 202, 205 (1993) (quotation
marks and citation omitted).
Thus, the question presented to this Court is whether, viewing
the facts in a light most favorable to Defendant, the evidence at
trial was sufficient to invoke the doctrine of self-defense and
support a jury instruction on that doctrine. For the following
reasons, we hold that Defendant was not entitled to an instruction
on either perfect or imperfect self-defense and find no error with
the trial court’s decision.
A defendant is entitled to an instruction on perfect self-
defense as an excuse for a killing when it is shown that, at the
time of the killing, the following four elements existed:
(1) it appeared to defendant and he
believed it to be necessary to kill the
deceased in order to save himself from
death or great bodily harm; and
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(2) defendant’s belief was reasonable in
that the circumstances as they appeared
to him at the time were sufficient to
create such a belief in the mind of a
person of ordinary firmness; and
(3) defendant was not the aggressor in
bringing on the affray, i.e., he did
not aggressively and willingly enter
into the fight without legal excuse or
provocation; and
(4) defendant did not use excessive force,
i.e., did not use more force than was
necessary or reasonably appeared to him
to be necessary under the circumstances
to protect himself from death or great
bodily harm.
State v. Williams, 342 N.C. 869, 873, 467 S.E.2d 392, 394 (1996)
(quotation marks and citations omitted).
On the other hand, if defendant believed it
was necessary to kill the deceased in order
to save [himself] from death or great bodily
harm, and if defendant’s belief was
reasonable in that the circumstances as they
appeared to [him] at the time were
sufficient to create such a belief in the
mind of a person of ordinary firmness, but
defendant, although without murderous
intent, was the aggressor in bringing on the
difficulty, or defendant used excessive
force, the defendant under those
circumstances has only the imperfect right
of self-defense, having lost the benefit of
perfect self-defense, and is guilty at least
of voluntary manslaughter.
State v. Wilson, 304 N.C. 689, 695, 285 S.E.2d 804, 808 (1982)
(quotation marks and citations omitted).
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An imperfect right of self-defense is thus
available to a defendant who reasonably
believes it necessary to kill the deceased
to save himself from death or great bodily
harm even if defendant (1) might have
brought on the difficulty, provided he did
so without murderous intent, and (2) might
have used excessive force. Imperfect self-
defense therefore incorporates the first two
requirements of perfect self-defense, but
not the last two.
State v. Mize, 316 N.C. 48, 52, 340 S.E.2d 439, 441–42 (1986).
However, if the defendant brings on the difficulty with
murderous intent—that is, “ with the intent to take life or
inflict serious bodily harm[—]he is not entitled even to the
doctrine of imperfect self-defense; and if he kills during the
affray he is guilty of murder.” Id. at 52, 340 S.E.2d at 442
(quotation marks and citations omitted).
Here, Defendant is not entitled to an instruction on
perfect or imperfect self-defense. The only permissible
inference from the evidence presented at trial is that Defendant
instigated the 15 October 2006 shootout with murderous intent.
After the incident at the Spirit gas station, Officer Chavis
heard Defendant tell someone over the phone that “he didn’t care
how much money that it took, . . . he was going to kill
somebody.” Moreover, the collective testimony by the occupants
of Locklear’s Envoy and Defendant’s Escalade establish that upon
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seeing Locklear’s Envoy, Defendant got “a little rowdy,” turned
the Escalade around, and used back roads to pursue Locklear.
Uncontroverted testimony also indicated that Defendant pulled
the Escalade up behind Locklear’s Envoy and that bottles were
thrown in the Envoy’s direction.
Furthermore, Defendant did not testify or produce witnesses
on his behalf and none of the State’s evidence suggests that
Locklear fired at Defendant first. Testimony by Locklear,
Deese, Hammonds, and Lloyd indicated that Defendant fired first,
injuring Lloyd and fatally injuring Crystal in the process.
Nevertheless, Defendant directs our attention to testimony by
Hunt, Scott, and J.L., who indicated that they heard two guns
being fired and that the shots seemed to occur “all together.”
However, even in isolation, this testimony does not permit the
inference that Locklear instigated the shootout. At best, the
evidence fails to establish who fired first. Furthermore, other
testimony by Hunt, Scott, and J.L. suggests that Defendant shot
first. Hunt testified that upon seeing Locklear’s Envoy,
Defendant stated something to the effect of “I ought to shoot
these boys” or “I want to shoot them” or “you think I’ll shoot
them[?]” and then Hunt immediately heard gunfire. Scott
indicated that after the Escalade got behind the Envoy, he heard
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gunshots coming from inside his vehicle and saw Defendant’s arm
hanging out of the window with a gun in his hand. When asked if
there had been any altercation that night between the occupants
of Locklear’s Envoy and Defendant’s Escalade prior to Defendant
shooting, J.L. said “[n]ot that night, no.”
In summary, the evidence presented at trial showed that
Defendant instigated the 15 October 2006 shootout with murderous
intent. Furthermore, Defendant presented no evidence on his
behalf to rebut such evidence. Accordingly, the trial court did
not err in refusing to instruct the jury on theories of perfect
and imperfect self-defense nor in refusing to submit voluntary
manslaughter as a lesser-included offense.
B. Evidentiary Objection to Officer T.L.’s Testimony
The second question presented to this Court by Defendant’s
appeal is whether the trial court committed reversible error
when it allowed testimony from Officer T.L., over Defendant’s
objection, that Defendant had “probably been involved in some
type of shooting.” Defendant contends that there was no
foundation for Officer’s T.L.’s statement and that he was
speculating regarding an event to which he had no personal
knowledge. We disagree.
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“[W]hether a lay witness may testify as to an opinion is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. A trial court abuses its
discretion if its determination is manifestly unsupported by
reason and is so arbitrary that it could not have been the
result of a reasoned decision.” State v. Sharpless, ___ N.C.
App. ___, ___, 725 S.E.2d 894, 898 (2012) (quotation marks and
citations omitted) (alteration in original). Furthermore, “we
consider not whether we might disagree with the trial court, but
whether the trial court’s actions are fairly supported by the
record.” Id. at ___, 725 S.E.2d at 899. A defendant is
prejudiced by evidentiary errors when he can demonstrate that
there “is a reasonable possibility that, had the error in
question not been committed, a different result would have been
reached at the trial out of which the appeal arises.” N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 15A-1443(a) (2013).
Under our rules of evidence, a witness “may not testify to
a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a
finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter.” N.C. R.
Evid. 602. “The purpose of Rule 602 is to prevent a witness
from testifying to a fact of which he has no direct personal
knowledge. [P]ersonal knowledge is not an absolute but may
consist of what the witness thinks he knows from personal
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perception.” State v. Cole, 147 N.C. App. 637, 645, 556 S.E.2d
666, 671 (2001) (quotation marks and citations omitted)
(alteration in original). See also N.C. R. Evid. 701 (requiring
lay opinion testimony to be “rationally based on the perception
of the witness”).
Here, Officer T.L., who was in the area at the time of
the shooting, testified as follows:
[Officer T.L.:] I know when I heard the
shots with my windows
being down and the
buildings behind to the
left and to the right of
me, I knew it was on my
side in my general area.
I wasn’t sure if it come
[sic] from the left side
or the right side.
[Questioner:] And so what did you do?
[Officer T.L.:] I immediately got on the
radio and notified
dispatch and any other
officers that were
listening, whether it be
campus police or
Sheriff’s Department and
[Officer] Chavis that it
had been shots fired and
I’d be attempting to
locate over on Union
Chapel Road.
[Questioner]: So what did you do?
[Officer T.L.:] I pulled out and made a
left, went to the end of
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Union Chapel Road to the
stop sign, made a U-
turn, didn’t see any
traffic, made a U-turn,
come back up Union
Chapel Road. At that
time I had passed a
black Cadillac Escalade
and a Cadillac car which
was following the
Escalade. I notified
[Officer] Chavis that
the vehicle that
[Defendant] normally
drove, which was the
Cadillac, had just
passed me, he’d probably
been involved in some
type of shooting, and I
was riding down Union
Chapel Road--
[Defense Counsel:] Objection. Move to
strike. There’s no
foundation for that from
this witness.
Upon review of this record, we find no error with the trial
court’s decision to allow this testimony. First, as is clear
from the form of the question, Officer T.L. was recounting what
he did in response to hearing gunshots in his general vicinity.
As such, Officer T.L. was not offering a lay opinion as to
Defendant’s guilt. Second, assuming arguendo that Officer
T.L.’s testimony was admitted in error, Defendant cannot
establish that such error was prejudicial. At most, Officer
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T.L.’s testimony indicates an uncontroverted fact—that Defendant
was involved in the shooting.
Accordingly, Defendant’s evidentiary objection is without
merit and we find no error with the trial court’s decision to
allow Officer T.L.’s testimony into evidence.
C. Attempt to Impeach Officer T.L.’s Testimony
The third and final question presented to this Court by
Defendant’s appeal is whether the trial court committed
reversible error by not allowing Defendant to impeach Officer
T.L.’s testimony by inquiring on cross-examination into his
termination from the police department.5 During a voir dire
offer of proof, it was revealed that Officer T.L. was terminated
from the Pembroke Police Department in 2009 for allegedly
mishandling evidence.6 Defendant contends that mishandling
evidence is relevant to Officer T.L.’s character for
truthfulness. We disagree.
Pursuant to N.C. R. Evid. 608(b):
[s]pecific instances of the conduct of a
witness, for the purpose of attacking or
supporting his credibility, . . . may not be
proved by extrinsic evidence. They may,
5
The State’s objection to this line of questioning was sustained
by the trial court.
6
Specifically, Officer T.L. indicated that he was disciplined
due to “missing evidence.”
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however, in the discretion of the trial
court, if probative of truthfulness or
untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-
examination of the witness (1) concerning
his character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness . . . .
“As the rule provides, it is within the trial court’s discretion
to allow or disallow cross-examination of a witness about his
specific acts if the acts are relevant to his character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness.” State v. Hunt, 339 N.C. 622,
658, 457 S.E.2d 276, 297 (1994). “Evidence that a witness has
attempted to deceive others is among the types of conduct most
widely accepted as being indicative of one’s character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness.” State v. Baldwin, 125 N.C.
App. 530, 535, 482 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1997) (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
Here, we hold that a police officer’s termination for
mishandling evidence, without additional evidence of deceit, is
not probative for truthfulness. Officer T.L. was terminated
from his position with the Pembroke Police Department “due to
missing evidence” in an unrelated case. The trial transcript
reveals that defense counsel had no further information
regarding Officer T.L.’s termination and no factual basis to
continue questioning him about it. Moreover, even assuming
error, Defendant has not established that there is a reasonable
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possibility that a different result would have occurred at
trial. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(a). Accordingly, we find
no error in the decision of the trial court denying Defendant
the opportunity to question Officer T.L. about his termination
from the Pembroke Police Department.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we find no error with the
judgments of the trial court.
No Error.
Judges ROBERT C. HUNTER and CALABRIA concur.
Report per rule 30(e).