State v. Hines ( 2014 )


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  • An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
    controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
    with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    NO. COA13-793
    NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
    Filed: 21 January 2014
    STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
    v.                                      Wilson County
    No. 12 CRS 52283
    TYQUAN LEE HINES
    Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 23 January 2013
    by Judge Milton F. Fitch, Jr. in Wilson County Superior Court.
    Heard in the Court of Appeals 30 December 2013.
    Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
    Kathryn H. Shields, for the State.
    James W. Carter for defendant-appellant.
    HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.
    Defendant Tyquan Lee Hines appeals from a judgment entered
    pursuant to his guilty plea to selling or delivering marijuana.
    The trial court found defendant had a prior record level of VI,
    based on 19 prior record points, and sentenced defendant to a
    term of 20 to 24 months imprisonment.                Defendant filed written
    notice of appeal on 1 February 2013.
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    We first note that defendant’s notice of appeal does not
    include a certificate of service and thus does not conform to
    Rule 4 of our Rules of Appellate Procedure.                N.C. R. App. P.
    4(a)(2) (providing that written notice of appeal must be served
    upon   all   adverse    parties).     Failure     to   comply   with   Rule   4
    constitutes    a     jurisdictional    default,    which    “precludes    the
    appellate court from acting in any manner other than to dismiss
    the appeal.”       Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co. v. White Oak Transp. Co.,
    
    362 N.C. 191
    , 197, 
    657 S.E.2d 361
    , 365 (2008).              Accordingly, we
    dismiss defendant’s appeal, but, in our discretion, we allow
    defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari to review the merits
    of his arguments.
    Defendant argues the trial court erred in concluding he had
    a prior record level of VI, based on 19 points, because the
    worksheet used to calculate his prior record level lists one
    conviction twice.      We agree.
    “The prior record level of a felony offender is determined
    by calculating the sum of the points assigned to each of the
    offender’s prior convictions . . . .” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
    1340.14(a) (2013).        The State bears the burden of proving a
    defendant’s prior convictions by a preponderance of the evidence
    and may meet its burden through:
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    (1) Stipulation of the parties.
    (2) An original or copy of the court record
    of the prior conviction.
    (3) A copy of records maintained by                   the
    Division   of   Criminal   Information,               the
    Division of Motor Vehicles, or of                     the
    Administrative Office of the Courts.
    (4) Any other method found by the court to
    be reliable.
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.14(f) (2013).                Although a defendant’s
    stipulation to his prior convictions will relieve the State of
    its burden of proving the existence of the convictions, such a
    stipulation “does not preclude our de novo appellate review of
    the    trial    court’s      calculation       of   defendant’s    prior   record
    level[.]”       State v. Massey, 
    195 N.C. App. 423
    , 429, 
    672 S.E.2d 696
    , 699 (2009);          see also State v. Fair, 
    205 N.C. App. 315
    ,
    318,   
    695 S.E.2d 514
    ,    516   (2010)    (“[W]hether   [a]    defendant’s
    convictions      can    be     counted    towards     sentencing    points   for
    determination of his structured sentencing level is a conclusion
    of law, fully reviewable by this Court on appeal.”).
    Here, at the opening of the plea proceedings, the following
    exchange occurred:
    [Prosecutor]: The defendant has entered a
    plea of guilty to selling marijuana and
    being record Level Six. Is that correct . .
    . ?
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    [Defense Counsel]: That’s correct, Judge. Is
    he five or six[?]
    [Prosecutor]: It has a six on the record
    sheet, I am sorry. Let me make sure-- Yes,
    I did put six.
    The     trial   court     subsequently      signed      a     prior   record   level
    worksheet prepared by the prosecutor concluding defendant had a
    prior record level of VI.                The Court found defendant had 19
    prior     record    level       points    derived     from     8   prior    Class   I
    convictions (16 points total), 2 prior Class 1 misdemeanors (2
    points     total),       and    1   additional        point    because     defendant
    committed the instant offense while on probation, parole, or
    post-release       supervision.          However,     defendant’s     prior    record
    level worksheet contains an error on its face in that one of
    defendant’s prior convictions for possession of a Schedule II
    controlled substance is listed twice (file number 10 CRS 50930
    from Wilson County on 4 April 2011).                        Excluding one of the
    double-counted convictions gives defendant 17 prior record level
    points and a prior record level of V.                   N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
    1340.14(c) (2013).
    The State contends that defense counsel’s silence after the
    prosecutor’s statement that he “put six” as defendant’s prior
    record level constitutes a stipulation that defendant’s prior
    record    level    was    VI.       However,    the    prosecution’s       answer   to
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    counsel’s question was merely that he “put six” on the prior
    record level worksheet.                 Given defense counsel’s uncertainty as
    to whether defendant’s prior record level was V or VI, we do not
    believe counsel’s subsequent silence amounted to a stipulation
    that defendant’s prior record level was VI.                         State v. Alexander,
    
    359 N.C. 824
    ,   828,       
    616 S.E.2d 914
    ,     917       (2005)     (“While    a
    stipulation need not follow any particular form, its terms must
    be definite and certain in order to afford a basis for judicial
    decision, and it is essential that they be assented to by the
    parties or those representing them.” (citations and quotation
    marks     omitted)).              Moreover,         “[t]he     determination          of     an
    offender’s prior record level is a conclusion of law that is
    subject to de novo review on appeal[,]” State v. Bohler, 
    198 N.C. App. 631
    ,      633,        
    681 S.E.2d 801
    ,       804     (2009),    and
    “[s]tipulations        as     to    questions        of     law     are       generally    held
    invalid and ineffective, and not binding upon the courts, either
    trial or appellate.”               State v. Hanton, 
    175 N.C. App. 250
    , 253,
    
    623 S.E.2d 600
    ,      603     (2006)     (citation          and     quotation       marks
    omitted).
    Accordingly, we hold the trial court erred in sentencing
    defendant as having a prior record level of VI, and remand this
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    matter for resentencing.     As we are remanding for resentencing
    we need not address the remaining issues briefed by defendant.
    Remanded for resentencing.
    Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge DILLON concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).