Hall v. N.C. Servs. Corp. ( 2014 )

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA13-781
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 4 February 2014
THOMAS ADAIR HALL,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. Iredell County
No. 11-CVS-2506
NORTH CAROLINA SERVICES
CORPORATION, AND MANHEIM
REMARKETING, INC., AND MANHEIM
CORPORATE SERVICES, INC., All also
known as or doing business as
MANHEIM STATESVILLE, MANHEIM
CONSULTING, TOTAL RESOURCE
AUCTIONS, and/or STATESVILLE AUTO
AUCTION,
Defendants,
PMA INSURANCE GROUP,
Carrier,
and
SHELOR CHEVROLET CORPORATION,
Employer,
Appellants.
Appeal by Appellants from order entered 11 February 2013 by
Judge Nathaniel J. Poovey in Superior Court, Iredell County.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 January 2014.
No brief for Plaintiff-Appellee.
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Hedrick Gardner Kincheloe & Garofalo, LLP, by M. Duane
Jones, Elizabeth A. Sprenger, and Lindsey L. Smith, for
Employer/Carrier-Appellants.
McGEE, Judge.
Thomas Adair Hall (“Plaintiff”) was injured in the course
and scope of his employment with Shelor Chevrolet (“Employer”)
on 26 August 2008, when he was hit by a vehicle operated by
Byrum Holmes (“Mr. Holmes”). The record suggests Mr. Holmes was
an employee of either North Carolina Services Corporation,
Manheim Remarketing, Inc., Manheim Corporate Services, Inc.,
Manheim Statesville, Manheim Consulting, Total Resource
Auctions, or Statesville Auto Auction (together, “Defendants”).
Employer’s workers’ compensation carrier, PMA Insurance
Group (“Carrier”), accepted Plaintiff’s claim for workers’
compensation benefits as compensable and paid $87,170.76 in
medical expenses to Plaintiff. Plaintiff initiated suit on 19
August 2011 against Defendants for negligence. Plaintiff
entered a “compromised settlement of his third party personal
injury claim against Manheim Statesville in the amount of
$200,000.00.”
Plaintiff filed a motion pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-
10.2(j), asking the trial court “to determine the subrogation
amount, if any, of the workers compensation carrier, PMA
Insurance Group[.]” That statute provides as follows:
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Notwithstanding any other subsection in this
section, in the event that a judgment is
obtained by the employee in an action
against a third party, or in the event that
a settlement has been agreed upon by the
employee and the third party, either party
may apply to the resident superior court
judge of the county in which the cause of
action arose or where the injured employee
resides, or to a presiding judge of either
district, to determine the subrogation
amount.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-10.2(j) (2013). “[T]he judge shall
determine, in his discretion, the amount, if any, of the
employer’s lien[.]” Id. The trial court in this case
considered the factors set forth in N.C.G.S. § 97-10.2(j) and
reduced the “workers compensation lien or subrogation right” of
Employer and Carrier to $40,000.00. Employer and Carrier
(together, “Appellants”) appeal.
Appellants argue the trial court “erred in applying North
Carolina law to the determination of the amount of the
Employer/Carrier’s workers’ compensation lien.” Appellants
contend the trial court should have applied Virginia workers’
compensation law because the “parties negotiated to provide
workers’ compensation benefits in accordance with the terms and
provisions” of Virginia law. However, binding precedent from
this Court controls the outcome of this case.
The facts in Cook v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc., 209 N.C.
App. 364, 704 S.E.2d 567 (2011) are similar to the facts of the
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present case. In Cook, the plaintiff suffered an injury by
accident in North Carolina and “entered into a lump-sum worker’s
compensation settlement” with his employer “with the approval of
the Chancery Court of Tennessee[.]” Id. at 365, 704 S.E.2d at
569. The plaintiff then filed a complaint against the
defendants, alleging the defendants’ negligence caused his
injuries, and reached a settlement with the defendants for
$220,000.00. Id. The plaintiff moved to reduce the workers’
compensation lien on his negligence settlement, and the trial
court reduced the lien to $30,000.00. Id. at 365-66, 704 S.E.2d
at 569.
On appeal, the employer and carrier in Cook argued that
Tennessee law, which did not permit reduction of the lien,
should have been applied. Id. at 366, 704 S.E.2d at 569. This
Court rejected that argument, holding that N.C.G.S. § 97-10.2(j)
was remedial in nature. Cook, 209 N.C. App. at 368, 704 S.E.2d
at 570-71. As to “the law merely going to the remedy, or
procedural in its nature, the lexi fori——or law of the forum in
which the remedy is sought——will control.” Id. at 366, 704
S.E.2d at 570. “In this case the forum is North Carolina.” Id.
at 368, 704 S.E.2d at 571.
This Court recently applied the rule in Cook in Anglin v.
Dunbar Armored, Inc., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 742 S.E.2d 205,
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206 (2013), a case in which the plaintiff filed a motion to
“reduce [the] Defendants’ subrogation interest[.]” The trial
court concluded that “North Carolina law should apply because
the [p]laintiff is seeking relief pursuant to North Carolina
law[.]” Id. at ___, 742 S.E.2d at 207. The trial court further
concluded that the defendants were “entitled to the remaining
$21,206.31 of the lien from the $30,000.00 of UIM funds.” Id.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that, “because the funds at
issue were paid to [the] plaintiff from a South Carolina
contract——his UIM insurance policy——South Carolina law
controls.” Id. at ___, 742 S.E.2d at 207. However, this Court
rejected the plaintiff’s argument because “the terms of the
insurance contract [were] not at issue in [that] case.” Id.
This Court ultimately concluded that the trial court did not err
in applying N.C.G.S. § 97-10.2(j). Id. at ___, 742 S.E.2d at
209.
Appellants contend Cook misinterpreted the law and urge
this Court “to reconsider its holding in Cook that the lex fori
governs the determination of the employer’s lien[.]” This we
are without authority to do. Pritchett & Burch, PLLC v. Boyd,
169 N.C. App. 118, 123, 609 S.E.2d 439, 442-43 (2005) (“We are
bound by prior decisions of this Court.”); see also In the
Matter of Appeal from Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30
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(1989). In accordance with Cook and Anglin, the decision of the
trial court to apply N.C.G.S. § 97-10.2(j) is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges ELMORE and STROUD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).