Barnes v. Hendrick Auto. ( 2014 )

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of
A p p e l l a t e P r o c e d u r e .
NO. COA13-537
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 21 January 2014
CLAUDE L. BARNES,
Employee, Plaintiff,
v. North Carolina
Industrial Commission
I.C. No. W80523
HENDRICK AUTOMOTIVE,
Employer,
and
FEDERAL INSURANCE CO.,
Carrier, Defendants.
Appeal by Plaintiff from opinion and award filed 15 January
2013 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the
Court of Appeals 9 October 2013.
Oxner Thomas & Permar, PLLC, by John R. Landry, Jr., for
Plaintiff.
Jones, Hewson & Woolard, by Lawrence J. Goldman, for
Defendants.
STEPHENS, Judge.
Factual and Procedural Background
-2-
Plaintiff Claude Barnes suffered a knee injury while
serving in the Vietnam War. Before 20 April 2010, the knee
injury had not “really ever bothered [him] very much at all.” On
that date, however, Plaintiff stepped between two fighting
employees at work. One of the employees hit Plaintiff, resulting
in further injury to his knee and an additional injury to his
shoulder. Plaintiff was employed by Defendant Hendrick
Automotive at the time. On 28 April 2010, Plaintiff saw Dr.
Christopher J. Barnes. Dr. Barnes diagnosed right knee
osteoarthritis and noted that Plaintiff’s symptoms were likely
“an exacerbation of his preexisting arthrosis.”
Plaintiff presented to Dr. Murray Seidel on 11 May 2010.
Dr. Seidel determined that Plaintiff had probably lost “full
extension of his knee for many years.” Seven days later, Dr.
Seidel recommended knee arthroplasty. Between his visits to Dr.
Seidel, Plaintiff also met with Dr. Bradley Broussard. Dr.
Broussard diagnosed “tricompartmental degenerative joint
disease” and opined that Plaintiff’s Vietnam War injury was
“probably aggravated” by his workplace injury. Dr. Broussard
advised that Plaintiff was “unable to work in any capacity until
-3-
further notice.”1 Defendants authorized and paid for the
treatment provided in these examinations.
On 18 May 2010, Dr. Seidel allowed Plaintiff to return to
work with the restrictions that he (1) not stand continuously
for eight to ten hours and (2) sit for at least twenty minutes
each hour. There was a dispute regarding Plaintiff’s ability to
work for Defendant-employer under these restrictions, and
Plaintiff thereupon filed a Form 33, requesting a hearing before
the North Carolina Industrial Commission (“the Commission”).
By order of the Commission, the parties held a mediated
settlement conference on 22 July 2011. Plaintiff was represented
by counsel during the conference and executed the mediated
settlement agreement (“MSA”) as a result. Pursuant to the MSA,
Plaintiff waived his right to further workers’ compensation
benefits, including any right to reimbursement for expenses paid
by Plaintiff, in return for $15,000. Among other things, the
parties agreed to “execute all necessary [f]orms and/or a
standard [c]ompromise [s]ettlement [a]greement (“CSA”)2 which
complie[d] with [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 97-17.” The CSA was to be
prepared by Defendants. Defendants submitted the CSA to
Plaintiff’s counsel on 1 August 2011. Sixteen days later,
1
The record does not indicate that Plaintiff met with Dr.
Broussard again.
2
A CSA is also known as a “clincher agreement.”
-4-
Plaintiff’s counsel advised Defendants’ counsel that Plaintiff
refused to sign the CSA. As a result, Defendants filed a Form 33
requesting a hearing.
The hearing was held on 7 November 2011. Afterward, the
deputy commissioner concluded that the MSA was unenforceable due
to failure to comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-17(b)(2) and
Industrial Commission Rule 502. Accordingly, the deputy
commissioner declined to approve the MSA as a final settlement
agreement. Defendants appealed to the full Commission. On 15
January 2013, the Commission concluded that the MSA was a valid
and enforceable contract under section 97-17 and Rule 502. In
addition, the Commission concluded that the MSA was fair and
just and that Plaintiff had failed to establish fraud,
misrepresentation, undue influence, or mutual mistake of fact.
Therefore, Plaintiff was compelled to execute the CSA and
Defendants were ordered to make payments in accordance with that
agreement. Plaintiff appeals the Commission’s 15 January 2013
opinion and award.
Standard of Review
Review of an opinion and award of the Commission “is
limited to consideration of whether competent evidence supports
[its] findings of fact and whether the findings support the
Commission’s conclusions of law.” Richardson v. Maxim
-5-
Healthcare/Allegis Grp., 362 N.C. 657, 660, 669 S.E.2d 582, 584
(2008) (citation omitted). Where there is competent evidence to
support the Commission’s findings, they are binding on appeal
even in light of evidence to support contrary findings. McRae v.
Toastmaster, Inc., 358 N.C. 488, 496, 597 S.E.2d 695, 700
(2004). The Commission’s conclusions of law are reviewed de
novo. Ramsey v. S. Indus. Constructors, Inc., 178 N.C. App. 25,
30, 630 S.E.2d 681, 685 (2006). Unchallenged findings of fact
are binding on appeal. Johnson v. Herbie’s Place, 157 N.C. App.
168, 180, 579 S.E.2d 110, 118 (2003).
Discussion
On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the Commission erred in
determining that the MSA was valid and enforceable against him
because (1) the MSA did not comply with Rule 502 or N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 97-17, (2) there was no meeting of the minds between the
parties, and (3) the terms of the MSA were not fair and just.
Accordingly, Plaintiff asserts that he is not bound by the terms
of the MSA because he refused to sign it.3 We affirm the
3
Plaintiff also states in numerous places throughout his brief
that “Defendants did not file a Form 60, 61, or 63 with the
Industrial Commission in response to Plaintiff’s Form 18.”
Plaintiff does not explain, however, how this asserted fact
affects the validity of the Commission’s opinion and award or
how it applies to the arguments he has raised on appeal. This
does not constitute a reviewable argument, and we do not address
it further. See generally N.C.R. App. P. 28(a) (“The function of
all briefs required or permitted by these rules is to define
-6-
Commission’s opinion and award, which enforced the MSA against
Plaintiff and compelled him to execute the CSA.
I. Rule 502 and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-17As Plaintiff notes in his brief, the MSA did not include a
list of Plaintiff’s known medical expenses, but the CSA did. On
appeal, Plaintiff argues that Defendants violated Industrial
Commission Rule 502 and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-17 by failing to
include a list of medical expenses as part of the MSA.
Therefore, Plaintiff contends, he is not bound by that document.
We disagree.
Industrial Commission Rule 502, entitled “Compromise
Settlement Agreements,” states in pertinent part that:
(c) No compromise agreement will be
considered unless the following additional
requirements are met:
. . .
(3) The settlement agreement must
contain a list of all of the known
medical expenses of the employee
related to the injury to the date
of the settlement agreement,
including medical expenses that
the employer or insurance carrier
disputes, when the employer or
carrier has not agreed to pay all
medical expenses of the employee
clearly the issues presented to the reviewing court and to
present the arguments and authorities upon which the parties
rely in support of their respective positions thereon. The scope
of review on appeal is limited to issues so presented in the
several briefs.”).
-7-
related to the injury up to the
date of the settlement agreement.
4 N.C. Admin. Code 10A.0502 (2012).4
The heading for Rule 502 specifies that the language
contained therein, requiring a “list of all known medical
expenses” to be included in the settlement agreement, limits
that requirement to compromise settlement agreements. Because
Defendants included a list of medical expenses as a part of the
compromise settlement agreement in this case — i.e., the CSA —
they did not violate Rule 502. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument
is overruled as it pertains to Rule 502.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-17, entitled “Settlements allowed in
accordance with Article,” reads in pertinent part as follows:
(a) This article does not prevent
settlements made by and between the employee
and employer so long as the amount of
compensation and the time and manner of
payment are in accordance with the
provisions of this Article. A copy of a
settlement agreement shall be filed by the
employer with and approved by the
Commission. No party to any agreement for
compensation approved by the Commission
shall deny the truth of the matters
contained in the settlement agreement,
4
Plaintiff refers to this rule as “502(3)(c),” and the
Commission’s website lists it as the same. Workers’ Compensation
Rules, The North Carolina Industrial Commission
http://www.ic.nc.gov/ncic/pages/comprule.htm (revisions
effective 1 January 2011 and 1 January 2013). Title 4 of the
2012 edition of the North Carolina Administrative Code (“the
Code”), however, lists this rule as 502(c)(3). Treating the Code
as the authoritative text, we use the latter designation.
-8-
unless the party is able to show to the
satisfaction of the Commission that there
has been error due to fraud,
misrepresentation, undue influence or mutual
mistake, in which event the Commission may
set aside the agreement. . . .
(b) The Commission shall not approve a
settlement agreement under this section,
unless all of the following conditions are
satisfied:
(1) The settlement agreement is
deemed by the Commission to be
fair and just, and that the
interests of all of the parties
and of any person, including a
health benefit plan that paid
medical expenses of the
employee[,] have been considered.
(2) The settlement agreement
contains a list of all the known
medical expenses of the employee
related to the injury to the date
of the settlement agreement,
including medical expenses that
the employer or carrier disputes,
and a list of medical expenses, if
any, that will be paid by the
employer under the settlement
agreement.
(3) The settlement agreement
contains a finding that the
positions of all of the parties to
the agreement are reasonable as to
the payment of medical
expenses. . . .
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-17(a)–(b) (2013) (emphasis added).
While section 97-17 does not expressly use the term
“compromise settlement agreement,” as Rule 502 does, we conclude
-9-
that the “settlement agreement” to which section 97-17 pertains
is the final compromise settlement agreement required to be
approved by the Commission. See id. The mediated settlement
agreement is simply the document used to memorialize the
substantive terms reached between the parties during the
mediated settlement conference. It is not the settlement
agreement that the Commission approves. While the terms
memorialized in a mediated settlement agreement may be used to
enforce the parties’ settlement, the practice of memorializing
the settlement in a mediated settlement agreement document is
not — and was never meant to be — the same as the creation of
the final settlement agreement strictly regulated under section
97-17. That is the role of the compromise settlement agreement.
See, e.g., Lemly v. Colvard Oil Co., 157 N.C. App. 99, 104, 577
S.E.2d 712, 716 (2003) (holding that the mediated settlement
agreement was enforceable against the plaintiff even though the
agreement lacked “all the required terms and language” because
it was signed by the parties and conformed with the compromise
settlement agreement). Therefore, we hold that the MSA is not
unenforceable under Rule 502 or section 97-17 for lacking a list
of medical expenses when such a list was included in the CSA.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s first argument is overruled.
II. Meeting of the Minds
-10-
In his second argument on appeal, Plaintiff contends that
the MSA is unenforceable because there was no “meeting of the
minds” during the mediated settlement conference. For support,
Plaintiff cites an alleged contradiction between (a) the MSA and
his own testimony as compared to (b) a statement made by counsel
for Defendants during the 7 November 2011 hearing before the
deputy commissioner. The MSA states that “Defendants have
reasonably denied Plaintiff’s claims for compensation.” At the
hearing, Plaintiff testified that he understood Defendants had
“denied the whole [20 April 2010] claim.” At the same hearing,
however, counsel for Defendants stated that “Plaintiff sustained
an admittedly compensable right knee injury on [20 April 2010].”
Therefore, Plaintiff asserts that the MSA is not enforceable
because “[t]he foregoing facts offer competent evidence that
there was not a meeting of the minds as to the accepted versus
denied status of Plaintiff’s claim for purposes of settlement of
his claim via the [MSA].” We disagree.
Plaintiff’s argument misapprehends our role in reviewing an
opinion and award of the Commission. As noted above, we review
the Commission’s conclusions of law to ensure they are supported
by its findings of fact and review its findings of fact to
ensure that they are supported by competent evidence.
Richardson, 362 N.C. at 660, 669 S.E.2d at 584. We lack the
-11-
authority to weigh the evidence and make findings based on that
evidence. Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 681, 509 S.E.2d 411,
414 (1998) (“The findings of fact by the Industrial Commission
are conclusive on appeal if supported by any competent evidence.
Thus, on appeal, [the appellate court] does not have the right
to weigh the evidence and decide the issue on the basis of its
weight. The court’s duty goes no further than to determine
whether the record contains any evidence tending to support the
finding.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted;
emphasis added).
In this case, the Commission found the following pertinent
facts:
5. Although[] the July 22, 2011 [MSA]
indicates in regards to “Compensability”
that “Defendants have reasonably denied
Plaintiff’s claims for compensation,”
Defendants’ post-hearing contentions
submitted to the Deputy Commissioner stated
that “Plaintiff sustained an admittedly
compensable right knee injury on April 20,
2010.”
. . .
17. In considering whether the settlement
amount is fair and just and in the best
interest of all parties, the . . .
Commission has considered that there were
contested issues in this claim, which
included the differing medical opinions as
to the extent of Plaintiff’s work
restrictions, whether Defendant-[e]mployer
could accommodate those work restrictions,
and the need for future medical treatment
-12-
and whether the potential future surgery
referenced by Dr. Seidel would be related to
the work injury or entirely the result of
the pre-existing knee injury from
Plaintiff’s military service in Vietnam, as
well as Plaintiff’s alleged failure to
recall his reading or signing the [MSA] due
to low blood sugar. Based upon a
preponderance of the evidence of record, the
. . . Commission finds that the $15,000.00
settlement amount was fair and just and in
the best interests of all parties.
18. . . . Plaintiff knowingly and willingly,
and with counsel, entered into a binding
contractual agreement at mediation to
execute a [CSA] that would compromise and
finally settle the workers’ compensation
claim related to his April 20, 2010 injury.
Acknowledging counsel for Defendants’ post-hearing contention to
the deputy commissioner, the Commission nonetheless determined
that the MSA constituted a binding contractual agreement.
Plaintiff does not dispute this finding as not based on
competent evidence or not supporting the Commission’s
conclusions of law. Therefore, it is binding on appeal, “even
though there is evidence that would support findings to the
contrary,” McRae, 358 N.C. at 496, 597 S.E.2d at 700,5 and
Plaintiff’s second argument is overruled.
5
We note that the post-hearing statement made by counsel for
Defendants was not necessarily contradictory. It is reasonable
to admit the occurrence of an on-the-job incident, but deny for
other reasons the existence of a right to compensation, as was
clearly the case here.
-13-
Even assuming that Plaintiff properly challenged the
Commission’s findings as not based on competent evidence or not
supporting its conclusions of law, we note that there is
evidence in the record to support the existence of a meeting of
the minds between the parties during the mediated settlement
conference. As a rule, “compromise settlement agreements,
including mediated settlement agreements, are governed by
general principles of contract law.” Kee v. Caromont Health,
Inc., 209 N.C. App. 193, 195, 706 S.E.2d 781, 783 (2011)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Such principles
dictate that
[t]he court is to interpret a contract
according to the intent of the parties to
the contract, unless such intent is contrary
to law. If the plain language of a contract
is clear, the intention of the parties is
inferred from the words of the contract.
When the language of the contract is clear
and unambiguous, construction of the
agreement is a matter of law for the court,
and the court cannot look beyond the terms
of the contract to determine the intentions
of the parties.
Williams v. Habul, __ N.C. App. __, __, 724 S.E.2d 104, 111
(2012) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “It is
a well-settled principle of contract law that a valid contract
exists only where there has been a meeting of the minds as to
all essential terms of the agreement.” Northington v.
Michelotti, 121 N.C. App. 180, 184, 464 S.E.2d 711, 714 (1995)
-14-
(citation omitted). “When a party affixes his signature to a
contract, he is manifesting his assent to the contract.” Mosley
v. WAM, Inc., 167 N.C. App. 594, 599, 606 S.E.2d 140, 143 (2004)
(citation omitted).
In this case, the MSA clearly stated that Defendants
reasonably denied Plaintiff’s claim for compensation. That
document was signed by both Plaintiff and Defendants. Therefore,
the parties’ signatures, alone, constituted competent evidence
to support the Commission’s conclusion that they entered into a
binding, contractual agreement. See generally Mosley, 167 N.C.
App. at 599, 606 S.E.2d at 143. The post-hearing statement made
by counsel for Defendants could not change this fact.
III. Fair and Just
Plaintiff also contends that the Commission erred in
determining that the terms of the MSA were fair and just and,
thus, in enforcing the MSA against him. For support, Plaintiff
asserts that the Commission erroneously (1) failed to establish
whether Plaintiff’s claim was contested or uncontested, (2)
shifted to Plaintiff “the burden of proof as to the causal
relationship between the recommended knee arthroplasty and
Plaintiff’s compensable knee injury,” and (3) based its
determination on information not available at the time of the
settlement negotiations. We are unpersuaded.
-15-
Section 97-17(b) provides that the Commission shall not
approve a settlement agreement unless the agreement is, inter
alia, deemed “fair and just” by the Commission. N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 97-17(b). Rule 502(a) also provides that “[o]nly those
[compromise settlement] agreements deemed fair and just and in
the best interest of all parties will be approved.” 4 N.C.
Admin. Code 10A.0502 (2012).
“Every compensation and compromise agreement between an
employer and an injured employee must be determined by the
Commission to be fair and just prior to its approval.” Lewis v.
Craven Reg’l Med. Ctr., 134 N.C. App. 438, 441, 518 S.E.2d 1, 3
(1999), affirmed, 352 N.C. 668, 535 S.E.2d 33 (2000). In making
that determination, the Commission must undertake a
full investigation . . . in order to assure
that the settlement is in accord with the
intent and purpose of the [Workers’
Compensation] Act that an injured employee
receive the disability benefits to which he
is entitled, and, particularly, that an
employee qualifying for disability
compensation under both sections 97-29
and -31 have the benefit of the more
favorable remedy.
Vernon v. Steven L. Mabe Builders, 336 N.C. 425, 432–33, 444
S.E.2d 191, 195 (1994). Generally speaking,
the fair and just determination is somewhat
subjective in nature. Neither the statutory
Workers’ Compensation Act nor the Workers’
Compensation Rules provide a specific
procedure or guideline for deciding what is
-16-
fair and just. While Rule 502 sets forth
what must be contained in a compromise
agreement, it does not specify how the
Commission should go about its fair and just
determination. The Commission must
necessarily take into account the validity
of the plaintiff’s claim, despite the fact
that the issue of compensability is not
before it. In many instances, the amount of
the settlement reached reflects how the
parties perceive the viability of the
plaintiff’s claim. The Commission is not
blind to this reality, but it must determine
for itself whether the settlement is fair
and just based on the evidence before it.
Malloy v. Davis Mechanical Inc., __ N.C. App. __, __, 720 S.E.2d
739, 744 (2011). In determining whether the settlement agreement
is fair and just, the Commission should consider the information
available to the parties at the time of the settlement
negotiations and take into account whether the plaintiff was
represented by counsel. See id. at __, 720 S.E.2d at 743; Kyle
v. Holston Grp., 188 N.C. App. 686, 696, 656 S.E.2d 667, 674
(2008) (holding that the settlement agreement was unenforceable
as not fair and just, in part because the plaintiff was
“unrepresented and unaware at the time of settling his case
that, under the law, he was entitled to the most favorable
remedy available to him, including total disability benefits if
he was totally disabled”).
-17-
In addition to finding of fact 17, quoted above, the
Commission made the following pertinent findings of fact
regarding whether the settlement agreement was fair and just:
16. At the hearing before the Deputy
Commissioner, Plaintiff, who was represented
by counsel at the mediation on July 22,
2011, testified he did not remember reading
or signing the [MSA] as a result of low
blood sugar resulting from his diabetic
condition. Plaintiff also testified that he
did not notify his attorney that he was not
feeling well at the time of the mediation
and at no time requested to take a
break. . . .
. . .
18. Based upon a preponderance of the
evidence of record, the . . . Commission
finds that Plaintiff knowingly and
willingly, and with counsel, entered into a
binding contractual agreement at mediation
to execute a [c]ompromise [s]ettlement
[a]greement that would compromise and
finally settle the workers’ compensation
claim related to his April 20, 2010 injury.
19. When viewed in light of the facts of the
case at the time of the settlement, and
based upon a preponderance of the evidence
of record, the . . . Commission finds that
the [CSA] that was drafted by Defendants and
which Plaintiff refused to sign was fair and
just and in the interests of all of the
parties.
A. The Commission’s Duty to Consider the Contested or
Uncontested Nature of Plaintiff’s Claim
-18-
Citing Malloy, Plaintiff first contends that the settlement
agreement is not fair and just because the Commission made no
determination regarding whether Plaintiff’s claim was contested
or uncontested on the issue of compensability. Plaintiff
contends that this determination is “vital” to the Commission’s
decision because it impacts whether the Commission considers the
fair and just issue in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. We
are unpersuaded.
In Malloy, we stated in obiter dictum that we believed the
Commission erred in reviewing the plaintiff’s claim “in the most
favorable manner” to the plaintiff because that claim was
contested on the issue of compensability. Malloy, __ N.C. App.
at __, 720 S.E.2d at 744. We reasoned that,
[w]hen a claim is contested, . . . the
plaintiff is not able to select the more
favorable remedy. In that situation, the
plaintiff is faced with the possibility of
receiving no compensation if he or she
proceeds to a hearing on compensability and
does not prevail. The plaintiff must
scrutinize the validity of his or her claim
and determine if a settlement would be in
his or her best interest.
Id. We also noted that the Commission should make its fair and
just determination by considering the facts in a manner most
favorable to the plaintiff only when the plaintiff’s claim is
uncontested. Id. In that circumstance, “the Commission is, in a
sense, considering the plaintiff’s claim in the most favorable
-19-
manner in order to ensure that the plaintiff is receiving the
maximum remedy possible in an uncontested claim.” Id. (emphasis
added). This is because (1) the defendant has already admitted
compensability and (2) the Commission must ensure that the
plaintiff is treated fairly for essentially agreeing to waive
the judicial process and accept compensation without those
safeguards.
In this case, Plaintiff’s claim was contested on multiple
issues. Though the Commission did not label Plaintiff’s claim as
“contested” on the particular issue of compensability, it
enforced the MSA, which stipulated that “Defendants have
reasonably denied Plaintiff’s claims for compensation,” and
described a number of “contested issues” in finding of fact 17
supporting Defendant’s denial of those claims. For these
reasons, Plaintiff’s claim was not subject to the special
consideration described in Malloy. Accordingly, we hold that the
Commission’s opinion and award sufficiently described
Plaintiff’s claim for the purposes of engaging in its fair and
just decision-making process. Therefore, Plaintiff’s first
argument is overruled.
B. Burden of Proof
In his second argument regarding the Commission’s fair and
just determination, Plaintiff contends that the Commission
-20-
misapplied the law. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the
Commission “incorrectly shift[ed] the burden of proof” as to the
causal relationship between the knee surgery recommended by Dr.
Seidel and Plaintiff’s knee injury in its findings of fact 8 and
17, requiring Plaintiff to prove that future treatment is
related to the workplace injury. Plaintiff contends that, in
fact, “there is a presumption that Plaintiff’s recommended
additional medical treatment, including surgery, is related to
his compensation [sic] knee injury, unless there is evidence
offered to rebut such presumption and no such evidence was
offered to rebut the presumption in this matter.” We are
unpersuaded.
Finding of fact 8 reads as follows:
On May 18, 2010, Plaintiff again presented
to Dr. Seidel who placed work restrictions
on Plaintiff of no standing continuously for
eight to ten hours with sitting twenty
minutes every hour. Dr. Seidel noted the
work restrictions would remain in effect for
three weeks. Dr. Seidel noted that Plaintiff
would have to seriously consider a knee
arthroplasty; however, the . . . Commission
finds that there is insufficient evidence to
determine whether Dr. Seidel considered such
surgery related to the Vietnam injury
exclusively or due to an aggravation of the
pre-existing condition as a result of the
work injury.
-21-
Finding of fact 17, quoted above, lists as a “contested issue[]”
whether the “potential future surgery” would be related to the
work injury or the Vietnam injury.
Plaintiff’s argument evidences a misunderstanding of the
process the Commission must undertake when determining whether a
settlement agreement is fair and just. This Court has stated
that “[t]he Commission is required to . . . determine that a
settlement agreement is fair and just in order to assure that
the settlement is in accord with the intent and purpose of the
[Workers’ Compensation] Act that an injured employee receive the
disability benefits to which he is entitled.” Kyle, 188 N.C.
App. at 695, 656 S.E.2d at 673 (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). While this process sometimes requires the
Commission to take the validity of the plaintiff’s claim into
consideration, it does not impose the burden of engaging in a
detailed analysis of the law as it applies to the facts of a
particular claim.
Here, as Defendants point out, the Commission “was not
determining whether future medical treatment was related to the
original work injury. [It] recognized that the future medical
treatment was a contested issue,” which would have been in
contention in a hearing. As a matter of procedure, such
questions must be addressed in a separate hearing before the
-22-
deputy commissioner — not in an argument on appeal as to the
enforceability of the parties’ settlement agreement. Therefore,
to the extent Plaintiff’s argument has any substantive legal
merit,6 it does not support his larger contention that the
settlement agreement is not fair and just. Accordingly, that
argument is overruled.
C. Information Available to the Parties at the Time of
the Settlement Negotiation
Plaintiff also contends that the Commission erred in its
fair and just determination because the information available to
the parties at the time of the negotiation was contradictory.
Specifically, Plaintiff points out that, while the MSA listed
his claim as “denied,” the Commission found that Plaintiff
sustained “compensable injuries” and counsel for Defendants
stated in a post-hearing contention that “Plaintiff sustained an
admittedly compensable right knee injury on April 20, 2010.”
Plaintiff concludes that “the information available to the
parties at the time of settlement is not consistent with the
information used by the . . . Commission in its analysis as to
whether or not the terms of the [MSA] are fair and just.” We
disagree.
Plaintiff’s argument misapplies the facts and misapprehends
the requirement that the fair and just determination take into
6
We offer no opinion on whether it does.
-23-
account only the information known by the parties at the time of
the settlement negotiations. See Malloy, __ N.C. App. at __, 720
S.E.2d at 743 (“[T]he Commission is required to evaluate the
settlement or mediation agreement based strictly on the evidence
available at the time the agreement was reached. To hold
otherwise would potentially permit either party to avoid their
contractual obligation should new circumstances arise prior to
approval by the Commission.”). First, Plaintiff’s assertion that
the Commission found he sustained compensable injuries to his
right knee and right shoulder is incorrect. The Commission only
found that “Plaintiff sustained a right knee and right shoulder
injury at work . . . .” It properly declined to make any
findings regarding the consequences of Plaintiff’s injury as
they relate to compensability. Second, even assuming that
Defendants’ post-hearing statements to the deputy commissioner
regarding the compensability of Plaintiff’s injury are relevant
to the cited rule7 or are contradictory, such comments were made
after the settlement negotiations occurred and, thus, have no
bearing on the Commission’s fair and just determination as it
pertains to the information available to the parties at the time
of the settlement negotiations. Moreover, we reiterate that
7
As the rule only requires the Commission to take into account
the information available to the parties at the time of the
settlement negotiations, we do not believe those statements are
relevant.
-24-
while Defendants did not contest the occurrence of an on-the-job
accident involving Plaintiff’s right knee, they raised multiple
issues as to the compensable consequences, if any, of that
accident. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s third argument is overruled.
IV. The CSA
Lastly, Plaintiff contends that the Commission is prevented
from enforcing the CSA against him pursuant to Rule 502(c)(2)
because it was not signed by the parties. This argument is
without merit.
As discussed above, the CSA comprises the fully executed
settlement agreement between the parties. Because the MSA was
signed by the parties and is valid and enforceable, the
signature requirement of Rule 502(c)(2) is satisfied.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s final argument is overruled, and the
Commission’s opinion and award is
AFFIRMED.
Judges CALABRIA and ELMORE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).