State v. Harper ( 2022 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
    2022-NCCOA-630
    No. COA21-752
    Filed 20 September 2022
    Pitt County, No. 19 CRS 056608
    STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
    v.
    RONALD PRESTON HARPER
    Appeal      by   defendant     from    judgments   entered   24   June   2021   by
    Judge Thomas D. Haigwood in Pitt County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of
    Appeals 9 August 2022.
    Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Juliane L.
    Bradshaw, for the State.
    Hynson Law, PLLC, by Warren D. Hynson, for defendant-appellant.
    TYSON, Judge.
    ¶1         Ronald Preston Harper (“Defendant”) appeals from judgment entered upon a
    jury’s verdict finding him guilty of willingly resisting, delaying, or obstructing a
    public officer. We find no error.
    I.     Background
    ¶2         Winterville Police Officers Jordan Cruse (“Officer Cruse”) and Jordan Fuquay
    (“Officer Fuquay”) were dispatched to a Sam’s Club gas station in Winterville on 14
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    Opinion of the Court
    September 2019 at approximately 2:40 p.m. The dispatch was in response to a caller
    reporting an individual “cursing and using profanity towards” the caller.
    ¶3         Prior to the officers’ arrival, Defendant was talking to the caller at the gas
    station about a “blue line” bumper sticker located on the caller’s car and race
    relations. The Defendant and the caller disagreed over policing practices within the
    United States. No physical confrontation or altercation occurred between Defendant
    and the caller.
    ¶4         Upon arrival, Officer Cruse and Officer Fuquay observed the caller seated
    inside a vehicle parked at a gas pump. Defendant’s vehicle was parked behind the
    caller’s vehicle at another gas pump. The officers located the caller, who stated
    Defendant was bothering him. At that time, Defendant was arguing with the gas
    station attendant over the gas pump, which was spilling fuel due to the hose being
    over extended.
    ¶5         Officer Cruse and Officer Fuquay requested to speak with Defendant about the
    reason for the dispatch call. Defendant refused to speak with the officers, stating he
    was “attending to his pumping duties.” Officer Cruse continued to request Defendant
    to speak with him, whereby Defendant asked if he was under arrest. Officer Cruse
    responded, “[n]o, you’re not free to leave right now.” Defendant added, “So I’m under
    arrest. What statute in North Carolina are you coming to talk to me about?” Officer
    Cruse responded to Defendant that he was being detained for “causing a
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    Opinion of the Court
    disturbance.” Officer Cruse reiterated, “[t]he reason that I am talking to you is
    because we had a gentleman call, complaining that you were harassing him . . . That’s
    all I’m here to talk to you about.” Defendant replied, “[w]ell, I’m not talking to you
    about it.”
    ¶6          The exchange continued until Officer Cruse requested Defendant provide
    identification.   Defendant reached into his shirt pocket and produced a card
    purportedly containing Defendant’s name with initials, title, a telephone number,
    and a quote from City of Houston v. Hill. 
    482 U.S. 451
    , 462-63, 
    96 L.Ed.2d 398
    , 412-
    13 (1987) (“The freedom of individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police action
    without thereby risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we
    distinguish a free nation from a police state.”). Defendant asserted he had previously
    worked as an “investigative journalist” for twenty years.
    ¶7          Officer Cruse continued to request Defendant’s identification several times to
    complete the investigation and dispatch report. Defendant continued to refuse to
    produce any identification other than the card. Defendant again tried to hand Officer
    Cruse the same card, requesting Officer Cruse to read the card because the encounter
    was “a constitutional issue.”
    ¶8          Soon thereafter, Defendant responded to yet another request for identification,
    stating it was located inside his vehicle. Officer Cruse escorted Defendant over to his
    vehicle where Defendant grabbed his card holder attached to his cell phone.
    STATE V. HARPER
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    Opinion of the Court
    Defendant again tried to give Officer Cruse the card, stating “I’m not giving you
    nothing until you take this. Take that!” When Officer Cruse refused, Defendant
    offered the card to Officer Fuquay.
    ¶9            Officer Cruse handcuffed Defendant and requested Officer Fuquay retrieve
    Defendant’s card, out-of-state driver’s license, and cell phone. Defendant’s license
    identified him as “Ronald Preston Harper Jr. from Pennsylvania.” Defendant was
    placed under arrest for obstructing Officer Cruse’s investigation by refusing to
    provide identification and charged with resisting, delaying, or obstructing a public
    officer.
    ¶ 10          Officer Cruse was conducting unrelated third-party traffic stops or
    investigations post-arrest when Defendant appeared at three locations on 22 October
    2019 and twice on 17 December 2019. Defendant moved within 10 feet of the stop
    and recorded Officer Cruse. Defendant next appeared at a stop Officer Cruse was
    conducting on 17 December 2019.         He came near the officer and stated, “I am
    watching you Jordan, you A--hole.” During the second stop on 17 December 2019,
    Defendant drove by and gestured with a hand motion resembling a gun pointed at
    Officer Cruse. Officer Cruse charged Defendant with communicating threats. The
    two charges were joined and tried together. Defendant was convicted by a jury of
    resisting, delaying, or obstructing a police officer but was acquitted of communicating
    threats. Defendant appeals.
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    II.      Jurisdiction
    ¶ 11          Jurisdiction lies in this Court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7A-27(b)(1), 15A-
    1444(a) (2021).
    III.   Issues
    ¶ 12          Defendant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court properly
    denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of resisting, delaying, or obstructing
    a public officer; (2) whether the trial court erred by allowing Defendant to waive
    counsel and represent himself in superior court after Defendant had signed a waiver
    of counsel in district court; and, (3) whether the trial court erred by failing to instruct
    the jury on justification or excuse for the charge of resisting, delaying, or obstructing
    a public officer.
    IV.         Motion to Dismiss
    ¶ 13          At the close of the State’s evidence, Defendant moved to dismiss the
    obstructing a public officer charge. Following the defense’s evidence, the trial court
    renewed sua sponte Defendant’s motion to dismiss and the motion. The issue is
    preserved for review by this Court. N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(3).
    A. Standard of Review
    ¶ 14          Where a defendant properly preserves a motion to dismiss, this Court reviews
    the denial of a motion to dismiss de novo. State v. Parker, 
    274 N.C. App. 464
    , 469, 
    852 S.E.2d 638
    , 644 (2020) (citation omitted). Under de novo review, this Court “considers
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    Opinion of the Court
    the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment” for that of the trial court.
    In re Appeal of The Greens of Pine Glen Ltd. P'ship, 
    356 N.C. 642
    , 647, 
    576 S.E.2d 316
    , 319 (2003) (citation omitted).
    B. Analysis
    ¶ 15         In ruling on a motion to dismiss criminal charges, the question is “whether
    there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged . . .
    and (2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator of such offense.” State v. Barnes, 
    334 N.C. 67
    , 75, 
    430 S.E.2d 914
    , 918 (1993) (citation omitted).
    ¶ 16         Whether the State presented substantial evidence of each essential element of
    the offense is a question of law this Court reviews de novo. State v. Golder, 
    374 N.C. 238
    , 250, 
    839 S.E.2d 782
    , 790 (2020) (citation omitted). In ruling on a motion to
    dismiss, this Court views all evidence in the light most favorable to the State and
    draws all reasonable inferences in the State’s favor. 
    Id.
    ¶ 17         The elements of the offense of resisting, delaying, or obstructing a public officer
    are: (1) “the victim was a public officer”; (2) “the defendant knew or had reasonable
    grounds to believe the [officer] was a public officer”; (3) “the [officer] was [lawfully]
    discharging or attempting to discharge a duty of his office”; (4) “the defendant
    resisted, delayed, or obstructed the [officer] in discharging or attempting to discharge
    a duty of his office”; and, (5) “the defendant acted willfully and unlawfully, that is
    intentionally and without justification or excuse.” State v. Peters, 
    255 N.C. App. 382
    ,
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    Opinion of the Court
    387, 
    804 S.E.2d 811
    , 815 (2017) (explaining the essential elements of 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-223
     (2021)).
    ¶ 18         Defendant does not challenge the first two elements on appeal. Officer Cruse
    was a public officer in uniform responding to a dispatched call in a marked vehicle,
    identified himself, announced the reason for his presence on the scene, and requested
    Defendant to identify himself. 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-223
     (2021).
    1. Lawful Discharge of Duties
    ¶ 19         Defendant first asserts the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss
    the charge of resisting, delaying, or obstructing a public officer because the initial
    contact with Defendant was not a lawful discharge of the officer’s duties. To succeed
    in a motion to dismiss, substantial evidence must tend to show Officer Cruse was
    either not discharging or attempting to discharge his duties or was doing so
    unlawfully. This element “presupposes lawful conduct of the officer in discharging or
    attempting to discharge a duty of his office.” State v. Sinclair, 
    191 N.C. App. 485
    , 489,
    
    663 S.E.2d 866
    , 870 (2008).
    ¶ 20         “The Fourth Amendment protects individuals ‘against unreasonable searches
    and seizures,’ [under] U.S. Const. amend. IV, and the North Carolina Constitution
    provides similar protection, [under] N.C. Const. art. I, § 20.” State v. Styles, 
    362 N.C. 412
    , 414, 
    665 S.E.2d 438
    , 439 (2008). Our Supreme Court has stated that “the police
    can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a
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    Opinion of the Court
    reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be
    afoot,’ even if the officer lacks probable cause.” Id. at 423-24, 
    665 S.E.2d at 445
    .
    ¶ 21         Reasonable suspicion requires “[t]he stop must be based on specific and
    articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as viewed
    through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his experience and
    training.” State v. Watkins, 
    337 N.C. 437
    , 441-42, 
    446 S.E.2d 67
    , 70 (1994) (citations
    omitted). “Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause
    and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” Styles,
    at 414, 
    665 S.E.2d at 439
     (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
    ¶ 22         The State’s evidence tends to show Officer Cruse established reasonable
    suspicion through articulable facts prior to approaching and detaining Defendant.
    Officers knew the description of the parties from the call reporting a disturbance.
    Upon the officers’ arrival at the scene, the caller immediately identified Defendant as
    the person who had caused the disturbance. Officer Cruse also testified he observed
    Defendant “yelling and fussing” at the gas station attendant upon his arrival. The
    basis for the call and subsequent investigation was substantiated prior to Defendant
    being approached and detained. Watkins, 
    337 N.C. at 442
    , 
    446 S.E.2d at 70
    .
    ¶ 23         When reviewing the reasonableness of a warrantless detention, this Court
    considers the totality of circumstances to determine whether reasonable suspicion
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    Opinion of the Court
    exists to make an investigatory detention. See State v. Sanchez, 
    147 N.C. App. 619
    ,
    623, 
    556 S.E.2d 602
    , 606 (2001) (citations omitted).
    ¶ 24         This Court determined officers had “‘a reasonable basis to stop [the] defendant
    and require him to identify himself’ to ascertain whether he was the named subject
    in their arrest warrants.” State v. Washington, 
    193 N.C. App. 670
    , 680, 
    668 S.E.2d 622
    , 628 (2008) (citations omitted).       By doing so, “the officers were lawfully
    discharging a duty of their office.” 
    Id.
     An officer may briefly detain a suspect when
    responding to and observing activity reasonably calculated to be criminal activity.
    See State v. Harrell, 
    67 N.C. App. 57
    , 63, 
    312 S.E.2d 230
    , 235 (1984) (holding an officer
    briefly seizing a driver to ask for his driver’s license to determine his identity and
    employment status was proper).
    ¶ 25         The State need only show Officer Cruse reasonably believed some criminal
    activity may be occurring based on articulable facts to survive Defendant’s motion to
    dismiss. Viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the State, Officer Cruse
    could have reasonably believed Defendant was the subject of the disturbance
    dispatch, verified that information with the caller, and observed and articulated facts
    sufficient to approach Defendant to request identification.
    ¶ 26         Upon arrival, Officer Cruse initially spoke with the caller who had reported
    Defendant was harassing him. The caller specifically identified Defendant as that
    person. Defendant was observed engaging in aggressive behaviors toward the gas
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    Opinion of the Court
    station attendant. When Officer Cruse approached Defendant in the investigation of
    the disturbance call, reasonable suspicion existed.      Officer Cruse was lawfully
    discharging his law enforcement duties and within his rights to confront and request
    Defendant’s identity.
    ¶ 27         Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, substantial
    evidence was presented tending to show and for the jury to find the third element,
    that the officer was lawfully discharging or attempting to discharge a duty of his
    office, sufficient to overcome Defendant’s motion to dismiss. See Peters, 255 N.C. App.
    at 387, 804 S.E.2d at 815 (citing 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-223
    ).
    2. Resisting, Delaying, or Obstructing
    ¶ 28         Defendant next asserts the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss
    the charge of resisting, delaying, or obstructing a public officer because the actions
    by Defendant did not rise beyond mere criticism.
    ¶ 29         Defendant wrongfully relies upon case law attempting to attribute Defendant’s
    breach of the peace and harassing and threatening conduct with that of mere
    questioning or criticism. See State v. Leigh, 
    278 N.C. 243
    , 251, 
    179 S.E.2d 708
    , 713
    (1971); State v. Humphreys, 
    275 N.C. App. 788
    , 789, 
    853 S.E.2d 789
    , 791 (2020).
    Defendant argues his actions merely apprised the officers of his constitutional rights.
    See Leigh, 
    278 N.C. at 251
    , 
    179 S.E.2d at 713
     (explaining that “criticizing or
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    Opinion of the Court
    questioning an officer while he is performing his duty, when done in an orderly
    manner, does not amount to obstructing or delaying an officer”). We disagree.
    ¶ 30          Defendant has no right to breach the peace on private or public property or to
    harass others to constitutionally “express himself.”           Also, Defendant’s harassing
    customers, arguing with employees, and spilling flammable fuel on private property
    are independent grounds for other potential charges and crimes to warrant the
    officers’ request for identification.
    ¶ 31          A defendant commits the offense of resisting, delaying, or obstructing a public
    officer by “willfully and unlawfully resist[ing], delay[ing] or obstruct[ing] a public
    officer in discharging or attempting to discharge a duty of his office[.]” 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14
    –223. This Court has previously held the failure by an individual to provide
    personal identifying information during a lawful stop constitutes resistance, delay,
    or obstruction within the meaning of 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-223
    . See State v. Friend,
    
    237 N.C. App. 490
    , 493, 
    768 S.E.2d 146
    , 148 (2014).
    ¶ 32          Actions or even language which cause delays or obstruction in an officer’s
    investigation can constitute this offense. See Leigh, 
    278 N.C. at 249
    , 
    179 S.E.2d at 711
    . Defendant was not a mere bystander present in a public place, but rather an
    identified subject of the complaint that initiated the dispatch call and the reason for
    the investigation.
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    Opinion of the Court
    ¶ 33         Defendant’s actions prevented and obstructed Officer Cruse from conducting a
    proper and prompt investigation into the alleged disturbance. Defendant refused to
    provide verifiable identification and delayed the officers’ ability to promptly
    investigate and resolve the call. While Defendant did in fact attempt to give Officers
    Cruse and Fuquay a card with purported information, that was not immediately
    verifiable as accurate. The officers were unable to ensure accurate information was
    presented to investigate the disturbance dispatch, close out the call, and complete
    their report.
    ¶ 34         Together with the totality of all the evidence, Defendant’s refusal to provide
    verifiable identification to law enforcement is for a jury to decide whether his conduct
    amounted to resisting, delaying, or obstructing the officers. 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-223
    ;
    see State v. Powell, 
    299 N.C. 95
    , 99, 
    261 S.E.2d 114
    , 117 (1980) (stating
    “contradictions and discrepancies of fact are for the jury to resolve and do not warrant
    dismissal”). Defendant’s conduct and refusals tend to show the investigation was
    obstructed or delayed the release of other witnesses as Officer Cruse was unable to
    conduct a lawful investigation and complete the call. 
    Id.
    ¶ 35         As noted, Officer Cruse arrived in uniform, identified himself, and was
    properly investigating and lawfully conducting a complaint of Defendant’s actions
    breaching the peace on private property, by threatening and harassing others. By
    refusing to identify himself and cooperate with Officer Cruse’s investigation,
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    Opinion of the Court
    sufficient evidence of this element was presented tending to show and for the jury to
    find Defendant resisted, delayed, or obstructed the officer in discharging or
    attempting to discharge a duty of his office to survive Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
    See Peters, 255 N.C. App. at 387, 804 S.E.2d at 815 (citing 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-223
    ).
    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, substantial evidence
    supports the fourth element that Defendant resisted, delayed, or obstructed the
    officer in discharging or attempting to discharge a duty of his office to overcome a
    motion to dismiss. 
    Id.
     Defendant’s argument is without merit.
    3. Willful and Unlawful Conduct
    ¶ 36         Defendant asserts the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the
    charge of resisting, delaying, or obstructing a public officer because his actions were
    justified and not willful. “Willful” is defined as “the wrongful doing of an act without
    justification or excuse, or the commission of an act purposely and deliberately in
    violation of law.” State v. Brackett, 
    306 N.C. 138
    , 142, 
    291 S.E.2d 660
    , 662 (1982)
    (internal citation omitted).
    ¶ 37         As noted, Officer Cruse was properly dispatched to and was investigating a
    disturbance call, wherein Defendant was identified as the suspect, and he lawfully
    conducted a brief detention to identify Defendant. “Those [communications] intended
    to hinder or prevent an officer from carrying out his duty admittedly are discouraged
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    Opinion of the Court
    by [
    N.C. Gen. Stat. §14-223
    ].” State v. Singletary, 
    73 N.C. App. 612
    , 615, 
    327 S.E.2d 11
    , 13 (1985) (citation omitted).
    ¶ 38         Again, Defendant wrongfully rests his arguments on the detention being
    unlawful, as well as offering the card to justify his belligerency, conduct, and failure
    to provide verifiable identification.    Defendant correctly points out the Court in
    Friend does not require a government-issued identification, although officers may
    require defendants to present verifiable identification. Friend, 237 N.C. App. at 493,
    768 S.E.2d at 148.
    ¶ 39         As the State correctly argues, Defendant’s card did not provide a legal name,
    photo, date of birth, address, or any other identifying information, other than initials
    and a last name.     Defendant’s vehicle also displayed out-of-state license plates
    preventing officers from immediately verifying identity and ownership, until his out-
    of-state driver’s license was retrieved from inside the vehicle.
    ¶ 40         The State’s evidence also tends to show Defendant was the identified subject
    of the investigation, was observed harassing others, spewing profanities and verbal
    bile, spilling gasoline on private property, and being uncooperative by refusing to
    offer information to delay and prolong the officers’ investigation. Singletary, 73 N.C.
    App. at 615, 
    327 S.E.2d at 13
    . Defendant was the subject of the investigation and not
    a mere bystander in a public place. Defendant argues nothing to grant a pre-emptive
    dismissal based on any justification or lack of willfulness.
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    Opinion of the Court
    ¶ 41         Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, substantial
    evidence tends to show the fifth element that Defendant acted willfully and
    unlawfully and was intentional and without justification or excuse to overcome
    Defendant’s motion to dismiss. See Peters, 255 N.C. App. at 387, 804 S.E.2d at 815
    (citing 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-223
    ).
    ¶ 42         Officer Cruse reasonably believed Defendant was the subject of the complaint,
    properly conducted an investigatory detention, and lawfully requested Defendant’s
    verifiable identification to conduct and complete an investigation.      Substantial
    evidence was presented of each essential element of the offense charged, and of
    Defendant being the perpetrator of such offense. 
    Id.
     The trial court did not err by
    denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss.            His argument is without merit and
    overruled.
    V.      Waiver of Counsel
    ¶ 43         Defendant argues the trial court erred when it allowed Defendant to waive
    counsel and represent himself in superior court after Defendant signed a waiver of
    counsel in district court.
    A. Standard of Review
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    Opinion of the Court
    ¶ 44         This court reviews the sufficiency of a trial court’s statutory inquiry concerning
    a defendant’s waiver of his rights to counsel de novo. State v. Watlington, 
    216 N.C. App. 388
    , 393-94, 
    716 S.E.2d 671
    , 675 (2011) (citations omitted).
    B. Analysis
    ¶ 45         Both the Constitution of the United States and the North Carolina
    Constitution recognize criminal defendants have a right to assistance of counsel. U.S.
    Const. Amend. VI; N.C. Const. Art. I, §§ 19, 23; see also State v. Montgomery, 
    138 N.C. App. 521
    , 524, 
    530 S.E.2d 66
    , 68 (2000). Defendants also have the right to waive
    counsel, represent themselves, and handle their case without assistance of counsel.
    State v. Mems, 
    281 N.C. 658
    , 670-71, 
    190 S.E.2d 164
    , 172 (1972).
    ¶ 46         Before a defendant is allowed to waive the right to counsel, a trial court must
    conduct a statutorily-required colloquy to determine that “constitutional and
    statutory standards are satisfied.” State v. Moore, 
    362 N.C. 319
    , 322, 
    661 S.E.2d 722
    ,
    724 (2008). Courts “must determine whether the defendant knowingly, intelligently
    and voluntarily waives the right to in-court representation by counsel.” 
    Id.
    ¶ 47         The procedure to waive counsel is codified in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1242 (2021).
    Courts may only enter an order to allow defendants to waive their right to counsel
    after being satisfied the movant: (1) has been clearly advised of his rights to the
    assistance of counsel, including his right to the assignment of appointed counsel when
    he is so entitled; (2) understands and appreciates the consequences of this decision;
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    Opinion of the Court
    and, (3) comprehends the nature of the charges and proceedings and the range of
    permissible punishments. Id.
    ¶ 48           The record indicates Defendant executed a written disclosure and waiver of
    counsel on 3 October 2020 in open court during district court proceedings. Written
    waivers of counsel, certified by the trial court, create a rebuttable presumption that
    the waiver was executed knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily pursuant to N.C.
    Gen. Stat. § 15A-1242; State v. Kinlock, 
    152 N.C. App. 84
    , 89, 
    566 S.E.2d 738
    , 741
    (2002), aff’d per curiam, 
    357 N.C. 48
    , 
    577 S.E.2d 620
     (2003). Once a written waiver
    of counsel is executed and certified by the trial court, subsequent waivers or inquiries
    are not necessary before further proceedings. State v. Watson, 
    21 N.C. App. 374
    , 378,
    
    204 S.E.2d 537
    , 540 (1974).
    ¶ 49           Once the initial waiver of counsel was executed, it was not necessary for
    successive written waivers to be executed, nor for additional inquiries to be made by
    the district or superior court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1242. The record on
    appeal contains no transcript of the proceedings challenging or surrounding the
    October 2020 waiver. The only evidence in the record before this Court regarding the
    waiver is the signed waiver and certification made by the district court judge that a
    proper inquiry and disclosure was made in compliance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
    1242.
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    Opinion of the Court
    ¶ 50         An executed waiver creates a “rebuttable presumption” of sufficiency and the
    record provides no grounds for rebuttal. The record indicates Defendant executed
    multiple waivers attesting he understood his rights, “voluntarily, knowingly and
    intelligently” elected to waive counsel and no evidence contra exists the initial waiver
    was statutorily or constitutionally insufficient. The trial court did not err when it
    allowed Defendant to waive counsel and represent himself in subsequent
    proceedings. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1242.
    ¶ 51         Any asserted inadequacy in a court’s further inquiry into Defendant’s waiver
    is immaterial, provided the original waiver was compliant with the statute and was
    certified by the trial court. Any successive inquiry beyond the original waiver would
    serve only to determine whether Defendant desired to withdraw his waiver. The
    record is devoid of any objection, request to withdraw the waiver, or a request for
    counsel. Defendant failed to show the initial disclosure and waiver he executed and,
    which was certified in district court, failed to satisfy the statute. N.C. Gen. Stat.
    § 15A-1242 (2021). We find no prejudicial or reversible error. Defendant’s argument
    is overruled.
    VI.   Jury Instruction on Justification or Excuse
    ¶ 52         Defendant argues the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on
    justification or excuse for the charge of resisting, delaying, or obstructing a public
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    Opinion of the Court
    officer. 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-223
     (2021).
    A. Standard of Review
    ¶ 53         Trial courts have a duty to instruct the jury on all substantial features of the
    case arising from the evidence and “must properly instruct the jury as to all essential
    elements of the offense charged.” State v. Hairr, 
    244 N.C. 506
    , 509, 
    94 S.E. 2d 472
    ,
    474 (1956). Errors in jury instructions are “preserved for appellate review, even
    without objection, ‘when the trial court deviates from an agreed-upon pattern
    instruction.’” State v. Clagon, 
    279 N.C. App. 425
    , 432, 
    865 S.E.2d 343
    , 348 (2021)
    (internal citation omitted).
    B. Analysis
    ¶ 54         Defendant failed to object to jury instruction at trial both during the charge
    conference and when asked by the trial court following the delivery of instruction to
    the jury.   No evidence in the record indicates Defendant objected to the jury
    instructions agreed upon at the charge conference. After delivering the instructions
    to the jury, the trial court held the following colloquy with the parties:
    THE COURT: Before sending the verdict sheets to the jury
    and allowing them to begin their deliberations, I will hear
    at this time any objections or corrections to the Court’s
    charge to the jury. First from the State?
    STATE: No, sir.
    THE COURT: From the Defendant?
    DEFENDANT: No, sir.
    STATE V. HARPER
    2022-NCCOA-630
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶ 55         Defendant’s failure to request, to object prior to or after the instructions were
    given to the jury, along with his express agreement after the instructions were given
    to the jury, constitutes invited error. Defendant’s invited error waived any “right to
    all appellate review concerning the invited error, including plain error review.” State
    v. Barber, 
    147 N.C. App. 69
    , 74, 
    554 S.E.2d 413
    , 416 (2001) (citation omitted).
    ¶ 56         We find instructive and precedential our Supreme Court’s determination in
    State v. White, 
    349 N.C. 535
    , 
    508 S.E.2d 253
     (1998). The Court examined defense
    counsel’s involvement in jury instructions in a capital murder-death penalty case. 
    Id.
    The Court held: “Counsel . . . did not object when given the opportunity either at the
    charge conference or after the charge had been given.        In fact, defense counsel
    affirmatively approved the instructions during the charge conference.        Where a
    defendant tells the trial court that he has no objection to an instruction, he will not
    be heard to complain on appeal.” 
    Id. at 570
    , 508 S.E.2d at 275 (citation omitted).
    ¶ 57         The record shows the jury instructions: (1) were agreed upon at the charge
    conference; (2) were not objected to at the charge conference; (3) were not objected to
    when provided to the jury; or, (4) when Defendant was given a further opportunity to
    object by the trial court before the jury retired. No deviations from the agreed-upon
    jury instructions were made by the trial court. By failing to object at trial and
    expressly agreeing to the jury instructions as given, Defendant waived any right to
    STATE V. HARPER
    2022-NCCOA-630
    Opinion of the Court
    appeal this issue. Defendant’s argument is barred as invited error. Id. Defendant’s
    argument is dismissed.
    VII.     Conclusion
    ¶ 58         Upon de novo review, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion
    to dismiss. Substantial evidence of each essential element of the charged offense of
    resisting, delaying, or obstructing a police officer, and of Defendant being the
    perpetrator of such offense, was presented to submit the charge to the jury. Officer
    Cruse was lawfully discharging his duties in responding to a breach of the peace and
    disturbance call and was within his rights to require Defendant, the identified
    subject, to provide verifiable identification.
    ¶ 59         With the totality of the circumstances and evidence introduced and admitted,
    Defendant’s failure to provide the requested identification was sufficient to submit
    the charge and evidence to the jury for their consideration and resolution.
    ¶ 60         Defendant was apprised of his rights to counsel and expressly waived his right
    to assistance of counsel during district court proceedings. Defendant’s waiver was
    certified by the trial court and sufficient to waive his right to counsel in further
    proceedings. Nothing in the record indicates the court failed to statutorily comply
    with apprising Defendant of his rights prior to Defendant waiving counsel in district
    STATE V. HARPER
    2022-NCCOA-630
    Opinion of the Court
    court. The superior court was not required to further apprise Defendant of his right
    to counsel and to undertake another statutory colloquy without request or objection.
    ¶ 61         Defendant invited any purported error by failing to object to the agreed-upon
    jury instructions at the charge conference or during and after delivery to the jury. No
    evidence suggests any deviation from the agreed-upon instructions.
    ¶ 62         Defendant received a fair trial, free from prejudicial errors he preserved or
    argued. We find no error in the jury’s verdict or in the judgment entered thereon. It
    is so ordered.
    NO ERROR
    Judge GORE concurs
    Judge INMAN concurs in the result.